HomeMy WebLinkAboutAgenda Packet - EVWD Board of Directors - 01/14/2026BOARD OF DIRECTORS
JANUARY 14, 2026
East Valley Water District was formed in 1954 and provides water and wastewater services to
108,000 residents within the cities of San Bernardino and Highland, and portions of San
Bernardino County.
EVWD operates under the direction of a 5member elected Board.
GOVERNING BOARD EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT
Ronald L. Coats
Chairman of the Board
Brian W. Tompkins
Chief Financial Officer
Chris Carrillo
ViceChairman
Jeff Noelte
Director of Engineering & Operations
David E. Smith
Governing Board Member
Kerrie Bryan
Director of Administrative Services
Phillip R. Goodrich
Governing Board Member
Patrick Milroy
Operations Manager
James Morales, Jr.
Governing Board Member
Manuel Moreno
Water Reclamation Manager
William Ringland
Public Affairs/Conservation Manager
Michael Moore
General Manager/CEO
Ryan Ritualo
Information Technology Manager
Justine Hendricksen
District Clerk
Board of Directors Regular Meeting
January 14, 2026 5:00 PM
31111 Greenspot Road, Highland, CA 92346
www.eastvalleywater.gov
PLEASE NOTE:
Materials related to an item on this agenda submitted to the Board after distribution of the
agenda packet are available for public inspection in the District’s office located at 31111
Greenspot Rd., Highland, during normal business hours. Also, such documents are available
on the District’s website at eastvalley.org and are subject to staff’s ability to post the
documents before the meeting.
Pursuant to Government Code Section 54954.2(a), any request for a disabilityrelated
modification or accommodation, including auxiliary aids or services, that is sought in order
to participate in the above agendized public meeting should be directed to the District Clerk
at (909) 8854900 at least 72 hours prior to said meeting.
In order to comply with legal requirements for posting of agenda, only those items filed
with the District Clerk by 12:00 p.m. on Wednesday prior to the following Wednesday
meeting not requiring departmental investigation, will be considered by the Board of
Directors.
CALL TO ORDER
PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE
ROLL CALL OF BOARD MEMBERS
PRESENTATIONS AND CEREMONIAL ITEMS
American Society of Civil Engineers Award
PUBLIC COMMENTS
Any person wishing to speak to the Board of Directors is asked to complete a Speaker
Card and submit it to the District Clerk prior to the start of the meeting. Each speaker is
limited to three (3) minutes, unless waived by the Chairman of the Board. Under the State
of California Brown Act, the Board of Directors is prohibited from discussing or taking
action on any item not listed on the posted agenda. The matter will automatically be
referred to staff for an appropriate response or action and may appear on the agenda at a
future meeting.
1.AGENDA
This agenda contains a brief general description of each item to be considered.
Except as otherwise provided by law, no action shall be taken on any item not
appearing on the following agenda unless the Board of Directors makes a
determination that an emergency exists or that a need to take immediate action on
the item came to the attention of the District subsequent to the posting of the
agenda.
a.Approval of Agenda
2.APPROVAL OF CONSENT CALENDAR
All matters listed under the Consent Calendar are considered by the Board of
Directors to be routine and will be enacted in one motion. There will be no
discussion of these items prior to the time the board considers the motion unless
members of the board, the administrative staff, or the public request specific items
to be discussed and/or removed from the Consent Calendar.
a.Approve the December 10, 2025 Regular Board Meeting Minutes
b.Approve Directors' Fees and Expenses for December 2025
c.Accept and File Investment Transaction Report for Month Ended November 30,
2025
3.DISCUSSION AND POSSIBLE ACTION ITEMS
a.Receive and File Information Regarding Emergency Plan Updates to the Risk
and Resilience Assessment and Emergency Response Plan and Consider
Approval of the 2026 Local Hazard Mitigation Plan
b.Consider Approval of Ordering Imported Water from the San Bernardino
Valley Municipal Water District for Calendar Year 2026
c.Consider Approval of Amendment No. 2 to the Professional Services
Agreement with Trussell Technologies for Regulatory Reporting Support for
the Sterling Natural Resource Center
4.REPORTS
a.Board of Directors’ Reports
b.General Manager/CEO Report
c.Legal Counsel Report
d.Board of Directors’ Comments
ADJOURN
BOARD OF DIRECTORSJANUARY 14, 2026East Valley Water District was formed in 1954 and provides water and wastewater services to108,000 residents within the cities of San Bernardino and Highland, and portions of SanBernardino County.EVWD operates under the direction of a 5member elected Board.GOVERNING BOARD EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENTRonald L. CoatsChairman of the Board Brian W. TompkinsChief Financial OfficerChris CarrilloViceChairman Jeff NoelteDirector of Engineering & OperationsDavid E. SmithGoverning Board Member Kerrie BryanDirector of Administrative ServicesPhillip R. GoodrichGoverning Board Member Patrick Milroy Operations ManagerJames Morales, Jr.Governing Board Member Manuel MorenoWater Reclamation ManagerWilliam RinglandPublic Affairs/Conservation ManagerMichael Moore
General Manager/CEO
Ryan Ritualo
Information Technology Manager
Justine Hendricksen
District Clerk
Board of Directors Regular Meeting
January 14, 2026 5:00 PM
31111 Greenspot Road, Highland, CA 92346
www.eastvalleywater.gov
PLEASE NOTE:
Materials related to an item on this agenda submitted to the Board after distribution of the
agenda packet are available for public inspection in the District’s office located at 31111
Greenspot Rd., Highland, during normal business hours. Also, such documents are available
on the District’s website at eastvalley.org and are subject to staff’s ability to post the
documents before the meeting.
Pursuant to Government Code Section 54954.2(a), any request for a disabilityrelated
modification or accommodation, including auxiliary aids or services, that is sought in order
to participate in the above agendized public meeting should be directed to the District Clerk
at (909) 8854900 at least 72 hours prior to said meeting.
In order to comply with legal requirements for posting of agenda, only those items filed
with the District Clerk by 12:00 p.m. on Wednesday prior to the following Wednesday
meeting not requiring departmental investigation, will be considered by the Board of
Directors.
CALL TO ORDER
PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE
ROLL CALL OF BOARD MEMBERS
PRESENTATIONS AND CEREMONIAL ITEMS
American Society of Civil Engineers Award
PUBLIC COMMENTS
Any person wishing to speak to the Board of Directors is asked to complete a Speaker
Card and submit it to the District Clerk prior to the start of the meeting. Each speaker is
limited to three (3) minutes, unless waived by the Chairman of the Board. Under the State
of California Brown Act, the Board of Directors is prohibited from discussing or taking
action on any item not listed on the posted agenda. The matter will automatically be
referred to staff for an appropriate response or action and may appear on the agenda at a
future meeting.
1.AGENDA
This agenda contains a brief general description of each item to be considered.
Except as otherwise provided by law, no action shall be taken on any item not
appearing on the following agenda unless the Board of Directors makes a
determination that an emergency exists or that a need to take immediate action on
the item came to the attention of the District subsequent to the posting of the
agenda.
a.Approval of Agenda
2.APPROVAL OF CONSENT CALENDAR
All matters listed under the Consent Calendar are considered by the Board of
Directors to be routine and will be enacted in one motion. There will be no
discussion of these items prior to the time the board considers the motion unless
members of the board, the administrative staff, or the public request specific items
to be discussed and/or removed from the Consent Calendar.
a.Approve the December 10, 2025 Regular Board Meeting Minutes
b.Approve Directors' Fees and Expenses for December 2025
c.Accept and File Investment Transaction Report for Month Ended November 30,
2025
3.DISCUSSION AND POSSIBLE ACTION ITEMS
a.Receive and File Information Regarding Emergency Plan Updates to the Risk
and Resilience Assessment and Emergency Response Plan and Consider
Approval of the 2026 Local Hazard Mitigation Plan
b.Consider Approval of Ordering Imported Water from the San Bernardino
Valley Municipal Water District for Calendar Year 2026
c.Consider Approval of Amendment No. 2 to the Professional Services
Agreement with Trussell Technologies for Regulatory Reporting Support for
the Sterling Natural Resource Center
4.REPORTS
a.Board of Directors’ Reports
b.General Manager/CEO Report
c.Legal Counsel Report
d.Board of Directors’ Comments
ADJOURN
BOARD OF DIRECTORSJANUARY 14, 2026East Valley Water District was formed in 1954 and provides water and wastewater services to108,000 residents within the cities of San Bernardino and Highland, and portions of SanBernardino County.EVWD operates under the direction of a 5member elected Board.GOVERNING BOARD EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENTRonald L. CoatsChairman of the Board Brian W. TompkinsChief Financial OfficerChris CarrilloViceChairman Jeff NoelteDirector of Engineering & OperationsDavid E. SmithGoverning Board Member Kerrie BryanDirector of Administrative ServicesPhillip R. GoodrichGoverning Board Member Patrick Milroy Operations ManagerJames Morales, Jr.Governing Board Member Manuel MorenoWater Reclamation ManagerWilliam RinglandPublic Affairs/Conservation ManagerMichael MooreGeneral Manager/CEO Ryan RitualoInformation Technology ManagerJustine HendricksenDistrict ClerkBoard of Directors Regular MeetingJanuary 14, 2026 5:00 PM31111 Greenspot Road, Highland, CA 92346www.eastvalleywater.govPLEASE NOTE:Materials related to an item on this agenda submitted to the Board after distribution of theagenda packet are available for public inspection in the District’s office located at 31111Greenspot Rd., Highland, during normal business hours. Also, such documents are availableon the District’s website at eastvalley.org and are subject to staff’s ability to post thedocuments before the meeting.Pursuant to Government Code Section 54954.2(a), any request for a disabilityrelatedmodification or accommodation, including auxiliary aids or services, that is sought in orderto participate in the above agendized public meeting should be directed to the District Clerkat (909) 8854900 at least 72 hours prior to said meeting.
In order to comply with legal requirements for posting of agenda, only those items filed
with the District Clerk by 12:00 p.m. on Wednesday prior to the following Wednesday
meeting not requiring departmental investigation, will be considered by the Board of
Directors.
CALL TO ORDER
PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE
ROLL CALL OF BOARD MEMBERS
PRESENTATIONS AND CEREMONIAL ITEMS
American Society of Civil Engineers Award
PUBLIC COMMENTS
Any person wishing to speak to the Board of Directors is asked to complete a Speaker
Card and submit it to the District Clerk prior to the start of the meeting. Each speaker is
limited to three (3) minutes, unless waived by the Chairman of the Board. Under the State
of California Brown Act, the Board of Directors is prohibited from discussing or taking
action on any item not listed on the posted agenda. The matter will automatically be
referred to staff for an appropriate response or action and may appear on the agenda at a
future meeting.
1.AGENDA
This agenda contains a brief general description of each item to be considered.
Except as otherwise provided by law, no action shall be taken on any item not
appearing on the following agenda unless the Board of Directors makes a
determination that an emergency exists or that a need to take immediate action on
the item came to the attention of the District subsequent to the posting of the
agenda.
a.Approval of Agenda
2.APPROVAL OF CONSENT CALENDAR
All matters listed under the Consent Calendar are considered by the Board of
Directors to be routine and will be enacted in one motion. There will be no
discussion of these items prior to the time the board considers the motion unless
members of the board, the administrative staff, or the public request specific items
to be discussed and/or removed from the Consent Calendar.
a.Approve the December 10, 2025 Regular Board Meeting Minutes
b.Approve Directors' Fees and Expenses for December 2025
c.Accept and File Investment Transaction Report for Month Ended November 30,
2025
3.DISCUSSION AND POSSIBLE ACTION ITEMS
a.Receive and File Information Regarding Emergency Plan Updates to the Risk
and Resilience Assessment and Emergency Response Plan and Consider
Approval of the 2026 Local Hazard Mitigation Plan
b.Consider Approval of Ordering Imported Water from the San Bernardino
Valley Municipal Water District for Calendar Year 2026
c.Consider Approval of Amendment No. 2 to the Professional Services
Agreement with Trussell Technologies for Regulatory Reporting Support for
the Sterling Natural Resource Center
4.REPORTS
a.Board of Directors’ Reports
b.General Manager/CEO Report
c.Legal Counsel Report
d.Board of Directors’ Comments
ADJOURN
BOARD OF DIRECTORSJANUARY 14, 2026East Valley Water District was formed in 1954 and provides water and wastewater services to108,000 residents within the cities of San Bernardino and Highland, and portions of SanBernardino County.EVWD operates under the direction of a 5member elected Board.GOVERNING BOARD EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENTRonald L. CoatsChairman of the Board Brian W. TompkinsChief Financial OfficerChris CarrilloViceChairman Jeff NoelteDirector of Engineering & OperationsDavid E. SmithGoverning Board Member Kerrie BryanDirector of Administrative ServicesPhillip R. GoodrichGoverning Board Member Patrick Milroy Operations ManagerJames Morales, Jr.Governing Board Member Manuel MorenoWater Reclamation ManagerWilliam RinglandPublic Affairs/Conservation ManagerMichael MooreGeneral Manager/CEO Ryan RitualoInformation Technology ManagerJustine HendricksenDistrict ClerkBoard of Directors Regular MeetingJanuary 14, 2026 5:00 PM31111 Greenspot Road, Highland, CA 92346www.eastvalleywater.govPLEASE NOTE:Materials related to an item on this agenda submitted to the Board after distribution of theagenda packet are available for public inspection in the District’s office located at 31111Greenspot Rd., Highland, during normal business hours. Also, such documents are availableon the District’s website at eastvalley.org and are subject to staff’s ability to post thedocuments before the meeting.Pursuant to Government Code Section 54954.2(a), any request for a disabilityrelatedmodification or accommodation, including auxiliary aids or services, that is sought in orderto participate in the above agendized public meeting should be directed to the District Clerkat (909) 8854900 at least 72 hours prior to said meeting.In order to comply with legal requirements for posting of agenda, only those items filedwith the District Clerk by 12:00 p.m. on Wednesday prior to the following Wednesdaymeeting not requiring departmental investigation, will be considered by the Board ofDirectors.CALL TO ORDERPLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCEROLL CALL OF BOARD MEMBERSPRESENTATIONS AND CEREMONIAL ITEMSAmerican Society of Civil Engineers AwardPUBLIC COMMENTSAny person wishing to speak to the Board of Directors is asked to complete a SpeakerCard and submit it to the District Clerk prior to the start of the meeting. Each speaker islimited to three (3) minutes, unless waived by the Chairman of the Board. Under the Stateof California Brown Act, the Board of Directors is prohibited from discussing or takingaction on any item not listed on the posted agenda. The matter will automatically bereferred to staff for an appropriate response or action and may appear on the agenda at afuture meeting.1.AGENDAThis agenda contains a brief general description of each item to be considered.Except as otherwise provided by law, no action shall be taken on any item notappearing on the following agenda unless the Board of Directors makes adetermination that an emergency exists or that a need to take immediate action onthe item came to the attention of the District subsequent to the posting of theagenda.a.Approval of Agenda2.APPROVAL OF CONSENT CALENDARAll matters listed under the Consent Calendar are considered by the Board ofDirectors to be routine and will be enacted in one motion. There will be nodiscussion of these items prior to the time the board considers the motion unlessmembers of the board, the administrative staff, or the public request specific itemsto be discussed and/or removed from the Consent Calendar.a.Approve the December 10, 2025 Regular Board Meeting Minutesb.Approve Directors' Fees and Expenses for December 2025
c.Accept and File Investment Transaction Report for Month Ended November 30,
2025
3.DISCUSSION AND POSSIBLE ACTION ITEMS
a.Receive and File Information Regarding Emergency Plan Updates to the Risk
and Resilience Assessment and Emergency Response Plan and Consider
Approval of the 2026 Local Hazard Mitigation Plan
b.Consider Approval of Ordering Imported Water from the San Bernardino
Valley Municipal Water District for Calendar Year 2026
c.Consider Approval of Amendment No. 2 to the Professional Services
Agreement with Trussell Technologies for Regulatory Reporting Support for
the Sterling Natural Resource Center
4.REPORTS
a.Board of Directors’ Reports
b.General Manager/CEO Report
c.Legal Counsel Report
d.Board of Directors’ Comments
ADJOURN
Agenda Item
#2a
January 14, 20261
Meeting Date: January 14, 2026
Agenda Item #2a
Consent Item
Regular Board Meeting
TO: Governing Board Members
FROM: General Manager/CEO
SUBJECT: Approve the December 10, 2025 Regular Board Meeting Minutes
RECOMMENDATION
That the Board of Directors approve the December 10, 2025 regular Board meeting minutes as
submitted.
DISTRICT PILLARS AND STRATEGIES
II - Sustainability, Transparency, and Accountability
a. Uphold Transparent and Accountable Fiscal and Resource Management
REVIEW BY OTHERS
This agenda item has been reviewed by Administration.
FISCAL IMPACT
There is no fiscal impact associated with this agenda item.
Recommended by:
________________
Michael Moore
General Manager/CEO
Respectfully submitted:
________________
Justine Hendricksen
District Clerk
ATTACHMENTS
Draft December 10, 2025 minutes
Regular Board Meeting
Meeting Date: December 10, 2025
CALL TO ORDER
The Chairman of the Board called the meeting to order at 4:00 p.m.
ROLL CALL OF BOARD MEMBERS
PRESENT
Directors: Carrillo, Coats, Goodrich, Morales, Smith
ABSENT
None
STAFF
Michael Moore, General Manager/CEO; Brian Tompkins, Chief Financial Officer; Jeff
Noelte, Director of Engineering and Operations; Kerrie Bryan, Director of
Administrative Services; Patrick Milroy, Operations Manager; Manny Moreno, Water
Reclamation Manager; William Ringland, Public Affairs/Conservation Manager; Rudy
Guerrero, Finance Manager; Roxana Morales, Public Affairs Supervisor; Justine
Hendricksen, District Clerk; Shayla Antrim, Administrative Specialist
LEGAL COUNSEL
Jean Cihigoyenetche
GUESTS
Members of the public
PUBLIC COMMENTS
Chairman Morales declared the public participation section of the meeting open at
4:01 p.m.
There being no written or verbal comments, the public participation section was
closed.
Draft pending approval
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1.APPROVAL OF AGENDA
a.Approval of Agenda
A motion was made by Director Smith, seconded by Vice Chairman Coats, that the
Board approve the December 10, 2025 agenda as submitted.
The motion carried by the following:
Ayes: Carrillo, Coats, Goodrich, Morales, Smith
Noes: None
Absent: None
2.RECESS INTO CLOSED SESSION
The Board entered into Closed Session at 4:01 p.m. as provided in the Ralph M. Brown
Act Government Code Sections 54956.9(d)(2) and 54956.9(d)(1).
RECONVENE THE MEETING
The Board reconvened the meeting at 5:00 p.m.
PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE
Director Carrillo led the flag salute.
ROLL CALL OF BOARD MEMBERS
PRESENT
Directors: Carrillo, Coats, Goodrich, Morales, Smith
ABSENT
None
ANNOUNCEMENT OF CLOSED SESSION ACTIONS
With respect to Item #2. a., legal counsel reported that the Board considered a claim
for damages submitted by Ruben Ortega and Arianna Ortega pursuant to Government
Code Section 54956.9(d)(2) and the Board voted unanimously (5-0) to reject the
claim.
With respect to Item #2.b. legal counsel stated that no reportable action was taken.
PRESENTATIONS AND CEREMONIAL ITEMS
2025 Telly Award – District Videos
The Public Affairs/Conservation Manager presented the District’s four 2025 Telly
Awards. The District received two Bronze Telly Awards and two People’s Telly Awards
recognizing excellence in video production for Sterling Natural Resource Center Now
Operational and Where Your Water Comes From.
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PUBLIC COMMENTS
Chairman Morales declared the public participation section of the meeting open at
5:06 p.m.
Mr. Jimmy Saldana, newly appointed Mayor Pro-Tem for the City of Highland,
congratulated the District for its work providing water and wastewater services and
expressed support for future initiatives.
There being no further written or verbal comments, the public participation section
was closed at 5:08 p.m.
3.APPROVAL OF CONSENT CALENDAR
a.Approve the October 8, 2025 Regular Board Meeting Minutes
b.Approve the November 12, 2025 Regular Board Meeting Minutes
c.Approve Directors' Fees and Expenses for November 2025
d.Accept and File SB 165 Report for Community Facilities District 2021-1
Mediterra
e.Accept and File Financial Statements for September 2025
f.Accept and File Financial Statements for October 2025
g.Approve October 2025 Disbursements: Accounts payable disbursements
for the period include check numbers 266239 through 266436, bank
drafts, and ACH payments in the amount of $4,026,133.40 and
$546,427.24 for payroll
A motion was made by Vice Chairman Coats, seconded by Director Carrillo, that the
Board approve the Consent Calendar items as submitted.
The motion carried by the following:
Ayes: Carrillo, Coats, Goodrich, Morales, Smith
Noes: None
Absent: None
Abstain: None
4.INFORMATIONAL ITEMS
a.Review the Draft Popular Annual Financial Report for Year Ended June
30, 2025
The Chief Financial Officer presented the Popular Annual Financial Report (PAFR). He
explained that the PAFR was a summarized version of the Annual Comprehensive
Financial Report intended to improve transparency and public understanding. He
reviewed the Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA) criteria, discussed the
review process and point-based scoring system, and summarized remarks provided by
GFOA reviewers.
For information only.
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5.DISCUSSION AND POSSIBLE ACTION ITEMS
a.Consider Authorization to Transfer Unclaimed Funds into the District's
General Fund
The Finance Supervisor reviewed the annual process for transferring unclaimed funds
to the District’s general fund. He explained that the items primarily consisted of
deposit refunds and represented a small list brought to the Board each year. In
accordance with the California Government Code, notice was required to be published
in a newspaper, and funds remaining unclaimed after 45 days would be transferred to
the District’s general fund to prevent escheatment to the State. He noted that the
District made attempts to contact customers and received responses from five, and
that the process applied to amounts over $15 that had remained unclaimed for more
than three years.
A motion was made by Director Goodrich, seconded by Director Carrillo, that the
Board of Directors authorize the Chief Financial Officer to perform procedures
prescribed in the Government Code and Civil Code of Procedure for the purpose of
encumbering stale dated checks and keeping the related funds from escheating to the
State as submitted.
The motion carried by the following:
Ayes: Carrillo, Coats, Goodrich, Morales, Smith
Noes: None
Absent: None
b.Consider Approval to Surplus Trucks and Equipment
The Operations Manager presented District trucks and equipment being considered for
surplus in accordance with District Surplus Policy 7.1.1 and reviewed the approved
methods of disposal. He described each vehicle proposed for surplus and referenced
the surplus list included in the staff report. He explained that staff and the General
Manager/CEO would determine the appropriate method of disposal for each item,
which is expected to be completed within the next 12 to 18 months.
A motion was made by Director Carrillo, seconded by Director Goodrich, that the
Board authorize the General Manager/CEO to surplus vehicles and equipment as
submitted.
The motion carried by the following:
Ayes: Carrillo, Coats, Goodrich, Morales, Smith
Noes: None
Absent: None
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c.Consider Approval of Amendment No. 5 - Reimbursement Agreement
with the City of Highland for Law Enforcement Services
The General Manager/CEO provided information regarding a fifth amendment to the
reimbursement agreement with the City of Highland for law enforcement services. He
explained that the Board had approved an amendment in June 2025, and the revised
agreement reflects a 6.3% contract increase for the current year, as communicated by
the Sheriff’s Department, resulting from a recently negotiated Memorandum of
Understanding.
A motion was made by Director Carrillo, seconded by Director Goodrich, that the
Board of Directors approve Amendment No. 5 to the Reimbursement Agreement with
the City of Highland for law enforcement services as submitted.
The motion carried by the following:
Ayes: Carrillo, Coats, Goodrich, Morales, Smith
Noes: None
Absent: None
d.Consider Adoption of the 5-Year Work Plan
The General Manager/CEO provided an overview of the District’s 5-Year Work Plan. He
explained that the Work Plan had been adjusted to align with the District’s long-term
vision. He reviewed the strategic planning elements and the Work Plan's purpose. He
stated that the five-year plan focused on planning efforts and was developed from the
District’s renewed strategic pillars.
A motion was made by Director Goodrich, seconded by Director Carrillo, that the
Board of Directors adopt the 5-Year Work Plan.
The motion carried by the following:
Ayes: Carrillo, Coats, Goodrich, Morales, Smith
Noes: None
Absent: None
e.Consider Approval of Board Reorganization, appointment of Executive
Management Team and set the time, day and place for holding
meetings
A motion was made by Director Goodrich, seconded by Director Smith that the Board
approve the following:
Ronald L. Coats to serve as Board President and Chris Carrillo to serve as Vice
President;
Michael Moore be appointed as General Manager/Chief Executive Officer and
Board Secretary;
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Brian Tompkins be appointed as Chief Financial Officer; and
Regularly scheduled meetings will be held at 31111 Greenspot Rd., Highland,
CA 92346 on the 2nd and 4th Wednesday of each month at 5:00 p.m.
The motion carried by the following:
Ayes: Carrillo, Coats, Goodrich, Morales, Smith
Noes: None
Absent: None
6.REPORTS
a.Board of Directors’ Reports
Director Smith reported on the following: November 17 he attended the Association of
San Bernardino County Special Districts meeting, which included a presentation on
responding to First Amendment audits; November 18 he met with the General
Manager/CEO to discuss District business; November 20 he attended the San
Bernardino Valley Water Conservation District Workshop; and December 1 he attended
the Finance and Human Resources Committee meeting.
Director Carrillo reported on the following: December 2 he attended an Inland Action
meeting where Assemblymember Juan Carrillo discussed infrastructure priorities
including the High Desert Corridor and high-speed rail; December 3 he attended the
San Bernardino City Council meeting, which included a presentation from the San
Bernardino International Airport Authority on airport status and planned
improvements; December 4 he attended Supervisor Joe Baca Jr.’s Holiday Open House
at the San Bernardino Government Center; December 8 he met with the General
Manager/CEO to discuss District business and to review the agenda; and December 9
he attended the Inland Action weekly meeting, which included a presentation by the
San Bernardino City Unified School District Superintendent on the state of education.
Director Goodrich reported on the following: December 1 he attended the Water
Resiliency Ad-Hoc Committee meeting, where members discussed local water issues
and partnership opportunities; December 2-4 he attended the Association of California
Water Agencies (ACWA) Fall Conference, which included legislative updates and
breakout sessions; and December 9 he attended the City of Highland Council meeting,
which included the council reorganization where Penny Lilburn was appointed as
Mayor and Jimmy Saldana as Mayor Pro-Tem.
Vice Chairman Coats reported on the following: November 13 he attended the
California Special Districts’ Finance Corporation Board meeting; November 17 he
attended the Association of San Bernardino County Special Districts meeting, which
included a presentation from Best Best & Krieger on First Amendment audit best
practices; November 18 he attended the Highland Chamber of Commerce monthly
meeting, where State Senator Rosilicie Ochoa Bogh spoke on small business and State
issues; November 18 he attended the Yucaipa Valley Water District Board meeting
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where they approved their annual audit and received construction project updates;
November 19 he met with the General Manager/CEO to discuss District business;
December 1 he attended the Finance and Human Resources Committee meeting;
December 2-4 he attended the Association of California Water Agencies Fall
Conference, which focused on new laws, regulations, PFAS standards, and statewide
water issues; and December 4 he met with the General Manager/CEO to review the
agenda and to receive District updates.
b. General Manager/CEO Report
Customer Service reported that an individual had been impersonating East
Valley Water District staff in a neighborhood and demanding payment to
prevent water service shutoffs. The District posted alerts on its website and
social media channels to warn customers and coordinated with the San
Bernardino County Sheriff’s deputy assigned to the Sterling Natural Resource
Center to monitor the area and help protect customers.
The District will host its annual employee awards banquet on Saturday to
recognize staff for years of service, accomplishments over the past year, and to
announce the Employee of the Year.
The District launched its third annual elementary student art contest with the
theme “The Magic of Water.” Student artwork will be used on District water
bottles. Teachers and families within the service area are encouraged to visit
the District website for participation details and submission guidelines.
District offices and customer service lines will be closed from December 24,
2025, through January 1, 2026, in observance of the holidays. Regular office
hours will resume on January 2, 2026. Water system operations and
wastewater treatment at the Sterling Natural Resource Center will continue
uninterrupted. Customers may report water or wastewater emergencies by
calling (909) 889-9501. Bill payments will remain available online, by phone,
and at participating 7-Eleven locations.
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The Board will receive an update next month on PFAS/PFOS drinking water
regulations and the District’s testing results.
In January, staff will provide the Board with an update on current and pending
legislation affecting special districts, including changes to the Brown Act and
financial disclosure and training requirements.
The General Manager/CEO thanked James for his service as Board Chairman
over the past two years.
The Director of Engineering & Operations presented the District’s Water Supply
Dashboard.
For information only.
c. Legal Counsel Report
No report at this time.
d. Board of Directors’ Comments
Director Smith congratulated Vice Chairman Coats for being elected as Board
President. He commended the Chief Financial Officer and staff for receiving the GFOA
Award. He thanked Chairman Morales for a job well done serving as Board Chairman.
Director Goodrich emphasized the value of strong community partnerships and
collaboration. He congratulated incoming Vice Chairman Coats as incoming Board
President. He commended Chairman Morales for his service as Board President and his
achievements.
Director Carrillo congratulated Vice Chairman Coats on becoming Board President and
thanked staff for a successful year, noting the quality of the presentations and
planning documents provided to the Board.
Vice Chairman Coats congratulated the Chief Financial Officer and staff on receiving
the Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA) award for the District’s financial
report and recognized the Public Affairs team for the Telly Awards. He expressed
appreciation for the District’s planning efforts, transparency, and accomplishments
throughout the year. He reflected on his service as Vice Chairman to Chairman
Morales, presented Chairman Morales with a gavel in appreciation of his service as
Board President, and wished everyone happy holidays.
Chairman Morales thanked those in attendance and expressed optimism about the
District's future. He thanked the Board for its confidence during his term as Chairman.
He requested that the meeting be adjourned in memory of his maternal grandmother,
Kathleen Newell. The Board agreed, and the meeting was adjourned in her memory.
2
5
4
3
For information only.
ADJOURN
Agenda Item
#2b
January 14, 20261
Meeting Date: January 14, 2026
Agenda Item #2b
Consent Item
Regular Board Meeting
TO: Governing Board Members
FROM: General Manager/CEO
SUBJECT: Approve Directors' Fees and Expenses for December 2025
RECOMMENDATION
That the Board of Directors approve the Directors' Fees and Expenses for December 2025 as
submitted.
DISTRICT PILLARS AND STRATEGIES
II - Sustainability, Transparency, and Accountability
a. Uphold Transparent and Accountable Fiscal and Resource Management
REVIEW BY OTHERS
This agenda item has been reviewed by Administration.
FISCAL IMPACT
The fiscal impact associated with this agenda item is $ 9,798.56, which is included in the
current fiscal year budget.
Recommended by:
________________
Michael Moore
General Manager/CEO
Respectfully submitted:
________________
Justine Hendricksen
District Clerk
ATTACHMENTS
December 2025 Director Expense Reports
Name: Month / Year:2025
Meeting
No.Stipend Written Oral
1 12 /02 255.50
2 12 /03 255.50
3 12 /04 255.50
4 12 /08 255.50
5 12 /09 255.50
6 12 /10 255.50
7 12 /11 255.50
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Meetings
0.7/mi
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Subtotal
TOTAL PAYMENT
Date of Approval
49.00 X
7
I certify that the above is correct and accurate to the best of my knowledge.
Inland Action Meeting
City of San Bernardino Council Meeting
San Bernardino County Supervisor Baca Event
$1,822.80
$1,788.50
$34.30
20.00
29.00
Agenda Review
Inland Action Meeting
Regular Board Meeting
San Bernardino Municipal Water Department Event
$0.00
DIRECTOR EXPENSE / REIMBURSEMENT
ACTIVITY SHEET
1
Name: Month / Year:2025
1
2
3
4
5
Event Description:Inland Action Meeting
Brief Description of Meeting/Event Value to EVWD
Attended via Zoom Inland Action Meeting.
Brief Description of Meeting/Event Value to EVWD
Attended San Bernardino County Supervisor Joe Baca Jr. Holiday Community event.
Meeting Date:12 / 8 / 2025
Event Description:Agenda Review
Brief Description of Meeting/Event Value to EVWD
Agenda review with CEO Moore.
Meeting Date:12 / 9 / 2025
Meeting Date:12 / 3 / 2025
Event Description:City of San Bernardino Council Meeting
Brief Description of Meeting/Event Value to EVWD
Meeting Date:12 / 4 / 2025
Event Description:San Bernardino County Supervisor Baca Event
Attended via Zoom San Bernardino City Council meeting.
Chris Carrillo December /
As part of the District's commitment to transparency, please provide a brief description of any meeting/event(s)
that you will not be providing a report during the Board meeting at which your Director's Expense Sheet is
DIRECTOR EXPENSE / REIMBURSEMENT
ACTIVITY SHEET
AB 1234 SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT FORM
2
Name: Month / Year:2025
6
7
8
9
10
Chris Carrillo December /
As part of the District's commitment to transparency, please provide a brief description of any meeting/event(s)
that you will not be providing a report during the Board meeting at which your Director's Expense Sheet is
for recycled water center.
DIRECTOR EXPENSE / REIMBURSEMENT
ACTIVITY SHEET
AB 1234 SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT FORM
3
Name: Month / Year:2025
Meeting
No.Stipend Written Oral
1 12 /01 255.50
2 12 /02 255.50
3 12 /03 255.50
4 12 /04 255.50
5 12 /10 255.50
6 12 /11 255.50
7 12 /15 255.50
8 12 /16 255.50
9 12 /17 255.50
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Meetings
0.7/mi
No.
1 12 /04
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Subtotal
TOTAL PAYMENT
Date of Approval
$503.48
Sheraton Hotel San Diego
ACWA Event
Regular Board Meeting
City of San Bernardino Water Dept.
CSDA Finance Corp.
Yucaipa Valley Water District
$2,299.50
$29.40
503.48Lodging
I certify that the above is correct and accurate to the best of my knowledge.
Finance & Human Resources Committee Meeting
ACWA Event
ACWA Event
$2,832.38
42.00 X
9
42.00
Meeting with General Manager/CEO or Designee
DIRECTOR EXPENSE / REIMBURSEMENT
ACTIVITY SHEET
1
Name: Month / Year:2025
1
2
3
4
5
Ronald L. Coats December /
As part of the District's commitment to transparency, please provide a brief description of any meeting/event(s)
that you will not be providing a report during the Board meeting at which your Director's Expense Sheet is being
Reviewed transfer of unclaimed funds into the general fund; reviewed the Popular Annual Financial Report;
other Finance and Human Resources activities
sessions of all things water.
sessions of all things water.
sessions of all things water.
DIRECTOR EXPENSE / REIMBURSEMENT
ACTIVITY SHEET
AB 1234 SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT FORM
2
Name: Month / Year:2025
6
7
8
9
10
Meeting Date:12 / 11 / 2025
Event Description:City of San Bernardino Water Dept.
Brief Description of Meeting/Event Value to EVWD
Attended the ribbon cutting for their new recycled water system
Meeting Date:12 / 15 / 2025
Event Description:CSDA Finance Corp.
Brief Description of Meeting/Event Value to EVWD
Met to discuss and vote on rescinding a previous loan approval and vote on approving a new loan proposal
for the Diablo Valley Water District
equipment, diving contractor for inspection of several reservoirs, and 5,000 acre feet of water from Valley
District for recharge
Ronald L. Coats December /
that you will not be providing a report during the Board meeting at which your Director's Expense Sheet is being
DIRECTOR EXPENSE / REIMBURSEMENT
ACTIVITY SHEET
AB 1234 SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT FORM
3
Name: Month / Year:2025
Meeting
No.Stipend Written Oral
1 12 /01 255.50
2 12 /02 255.50
3 12 /03 255.50
4 12 /04 255.50
5 12 /09 255.50
6 12 /10 255.50
7 12 /11 255.50
8 12 /16 255.50
9 12 /17 0.00
10 12 /19 255.50
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Meetings
0.7/mi
No.
1 12 /02
2 12 /02
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Subtotal
TOTAL PAYMENT
Date of Approval
232.00 X
9
Meeting with General Manager/CEO or Designee
I certify that the above is correct and accurate to the best of my knowledge.
Regional Water Ad-Hoc
ACWA Event
ACWA Event
$3,099.38
$2,299.50
$162.40
503.48
Parking 134.00
Lodging
116.00
116.00
Highland boxing Xmas event
ACWA Event
City of Highland Council Meeting
Regular Board Meeting
San Bernardino Municipal Water Dept.
Meeting with General Manager/CEO or Designee
$637.48
Room exp. at ACWA event (2 days)
Parking exp. At ACWA event (2 days)
DIRECTOR EXPENSE / REIMBURSEMENT
ACTIVITY SHEET
1
Name: Month / Year:2025
1
2
3
4
5
Event Description:City of Highland Council Meeting
Brief Description of Meeting/Event Value to EVWD
Attend Monthly City Council meeting as Board rep.
Brief Description of Meeting/Event Value to EVWD
Attend ACWA's winter conference various breakouts sessions for continued Board member education Day2
Meeting Date:12 / 4 / 2025
Event Description:ACWA Event
Brief Description of Meeting/Event Value to EVWD
Attend ACWA's winter conference various breakouts sessions for continued Board member education Day3
Meeting Date:12 / 9 / 2025
Meeting Date:12 / 2 / 2025
Event Description:ACWA Event
Brief Description of Meeting/Event Value to EVWD
Meeting Date:12 / 3 / 2025
Event Description:ACWA Event
Attend ACWA's winter conference various breakouts sessions for continued Board member education Day1
Phillip R. Goodrich December /
As part of the District's commitment to transparency, please provide a brief description of any meeting/event(s)
that you will not be providing a report during the Board meeting at which your Director's Expense Sheet is being
DIRECTOR EXPENSE / REIMBURSEMENT
ACTIVITY SHEET
AB 1234 SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT FORM
2
Name: Month / Year:2025
6
7
8
9
10
Phillip R. Goodrich December /
As part of the District's commitment to transparency, please provide a brief description of any meeting/event(s)
that you will not be providing a report during the Board meeting at which your Director's Expense Sheet is being
DIRECTOR EXPENSE / REIMBURSEMENT
ACTIVITY SHEET
AB 1234 SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT FORM
3
Name: Month / Year:2025
Meeting
No.Stipend Written Oral
1 12 /02 255.50
2 12 /08 255.50
3 12 /10 255.50
4 12 /16 255.50
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Meetings
0.7/mi
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Subtotal
TOTAL PAYMENT
Date of Approval
$0.00
San Bernardino Valley MWD
$1,022.00
$0.00
I certify that the above is correct and accurate to the best of my knowledge.
San Bernardino Valley MWD
Meeting with General Manager/CEO or Designee
Regular Board Meeting
$1,022.00
0.00 X
4
DIRECTOR EXPENSE / REIMBURSEMENT
ACTIVITY SHEET
1
Name: Month / Year:2025
1
2
3
4
5
James Morales, Jr.December /
As part of the District's commitment to transparency, please provide a brief description of any meeting/event(s)
that you will not be providing a report during the Board meeting at which your Director's Expense Sheet is being
DIRECTOR EXPENSE / REIMBURSEMENT
ACTIVITY SHEET
AB 1234 SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT FORM
2
Agenda Item
#2c
January 14, 20261
Meeting Date: January 14, 2026
Agenda Item #2c
Consent Item
1
7
1
9
Regular Board Meeting
TO: Governing Board Members
FROM: General Manager/CEO
SUBJECT: Accept and File Investment Transaction Report for Month Ended November 30, 2025
RECOMMENDATION
That the Board of Directors accept and file the attached Investment Transaction report for the
month ended November 30, 2025.
BACKGROUND / ANALYSIS
California Government Code §53607 requires the CFO/Treasurer of a public agency to submit a
monthly investment transaction report to the Board of Directors (Board) when the Board has
delegated to the CFO/Treasurer the authority to invest, reinvest, sell, or exchange securities
held in the Agency’s investment portfolio.
During November, there were no deposits to, or withdrawals from the Local Agency Investment
Fund (LAIF) account, therefore the balance of $17,026,039 remained unchanged.
The District made one transfer into California CLASS during the November totaling
$770,000. This deposit went to the reclamation sub-account in CLASS and established the debt
service reserve for the SNRC loan. Interest earned during the month ended November 30, 2025
of $11,835 was posted to the account, increasing the account balance to $3,810,187 at month
end.
Investments held in the District’s U.S. Bank Custodial Account totaled $17,037,112 at the
beginning of November. During the month, earnings added $29,484 to the U.S. Bank account,
while fees reduced the balance by $1,000. In addition, the amortization of premiums and
accretion of discounts on several different securities added $272 to the adjusted cost basis for
the investments, resulting in an account balance at the end of November of $17,065,868.
Investment transactions within the U.S. Bank account during November included one maturity
of $300,000 and two investment purchases for $806,922. At the end of November, the account
balance was split between a mutual fund balance of $159,743, and federal securities shown on
the attached schedule with a total balance of $16,906,125.
Agenda Item
#2c
January 14, 20262
Meeting Date: January 14, 2026
Agenda Item #2c
Consent Item
1
7
1
9
DISTRICT PILLARS AND STRATEGIES
II - Sustainability, Transparency, and Accountability
a. Uphold Transparent and Accountable Fiscal and Resource Management
REVIEW BY OTHERS
This agenda item has been reviewed by the Finance Department.
FISCAL IMPACT
There is no fiscal impact associated with this agenda item.
Recommended by:
________________
Michael Moore
General Manager/CEO
Respectfully submitted:
________________
Brian Tompkins
Chief Financial Officer
ATTACHMENTS
Investment Transaction Report for Month Ended Nov 2025
LAIF November 2025
CLASS November 2025
EAST VALLEY WATER DISTRICT
Investment Activity
Month Ended November 30, 2025
Purch Units /Maturity Amort Cost Adjusted Cost Matured /Market
Date Issuer CUSIP Yield Face Value Date Total Adjustment 11/1/2025 Purchases Called Total Water Sewer Reclamation Value
10/18/21 US Treasury Note 91282CAZ4 0.375%500,000 11/30/25 499,843.92 499,843.92 499,843.92 499,843.92 500,000.00
03/31/21 US Treasury Note (UST0026A 91282CBT7 0.750%500,000 03/31/26 499,559.72 86.80 499,646.52 499,646.52 499,646.52 495,055.00
12/08/23 US Treasury Note 91282CJL6 4.875%500,000 11/30/25 500,018.42 500,018.42 500,018.42 500,018.42 500,000.00
12/26/23 US Treasury Note 91282CJS1 4.250%500,000 12/31/25 499,921.87 32.90 499,954.77 499,954.77 499,954.77 500,170.00
12/27/23 US Treasury Note (UST4326)91282CJP7 4.375%600,000 12/15/26 602,550.04 (170.00) 602,380.04 602,380.04 602,380.04 604,572.00
04/22/24 US Treasury Note 91282CJC6 4.625%200,000 10/15/26 199,566.26 30.40 199,596.66 199,596.66 199,596.66 201,628.00
04/05/24 US Treasury Note 91282CKH3 4.500%500,000 03/31/26 499,557.84 58.79 499,616.63 499,616.63 499,616.63 501,055.00
4/10 & 4/11 US Treasury Note 91282CKJ9 4.500%800,000 04/15/27 797,185.63 130.97 797,316.60 797,316.60 797,316.60 809,784.00
09/23/24 US Treasury Note 91282CLL3 3.375%500,000 09/15/27 499,077.74 35.22 499,112.96 499,112.96 499,112.96 498,690.00
02/13/25 US Treasury Note UST4228 91282CMN8 4.125%200,000 02/15/28 199,674.62 10.75 199,685.37 199,685.37 199,685.37 203,164.00
05/15/25 US Treasury Note UST3728 91282CND9 3.625%200,000 05/15/28 299,556.91 13.06 299,569.97 299,569.97 299,569.97 301,827.00
10/31/25 US Treasury Note UST3630 91282CPD7 3.625%400,000 05/15/28 399,875.00 - 399,875.00 399,875.00 399,875.00 400,344.00
10/31/25 US Treasury Note 91282CMA6 4.125%300,000 05/15/28 305,059.56 (87.38) 304,972.18 304,972.18 304,972.18 306,258.00
11/26/25 US Treasury Note 91282CMA6 4.125%400,000 11/30/29 - (15.99) - 408,578.12 408,562.13 408,562.13 408,344.00
11/26/25 US Treasury Note 91282CPN5 3.625%400,000 11/30/30 - - 398,343.75 398,343.75 398,343.75 398,156.00
07/30/20 FHLMC MTN 3134HAGV9 4.000%500,000 08/27/27 497,730.42 96.80 497,827.22 497,827.22 497,827.22 499,205.00
04/14/25 FHLMC MTN 3134HBKC4 4.150%100,000 04/17/28 500,000.00 500,000.00 500,000.00 500,000.00 500,155.00
05/07/25 FHLMC MTN 3134HBND9 4.520%300,000 11/07/28 300,000.00 300,000.00 300,000.00 - - -
09/23/21 Federal Home Loan Bank 3130APAZ8 1.030%200,000 09/30/26 200,000.00 200,000.00 200,000.00 200,000.00 195,590.00
03/25/21 Federal Home Loan Bank 3130ALUF9 1.000%300,000 03/30/26 300,000.00 300,000.00 300,000.00 300,000.00 297,246.00
09/17/21 Federal Home Loan Bank 3130AP6M2 1.020%400,000 09/30/26 400,000.00 400,000.00 400,000.00 400,000.00 391,172.00
10/25/24 Federal Home Loan Bank 3130B3G72 4.250%300,000 10/22/27 300,000.00 300,000.00 300,000.00 300,000.00 300,174.00
10/30/24 Federal Home Loan Bank 3130B3JC8 4.310%200,000 10/20/27 200,000.00 200,000.00 200,000.00 200,000.00 200,226.00
10/15/21 Federal Home Loan Bank 3130APJ55 1.250%300,000 10/26/26 299,999.24 299,999.24 299,999.24 299,999.24 293,532.00
04/10/24 Federal Home Loan Bank 3130B0UQ0 5.000%500,000 04/15/27 500,000.00 500,000.00 500,000.00 500,000.00 500,840.00
04/22/24 Federal Home Loan Bank 3130B13F2 4.910%450,000 11/27/26 450,187.64 (1.91) 450,185.73 450,185.73 450,185.73 455,269.50
11/17/21 Federal Farm Credit Bank 3133ENEM8 1.430%200,000 11/23/26 200,000.00 200,000.00 200,000.00 200,000.00 195,468.00
01/27/25 Federal Home Loan Bank 3130B4R52 4.500%500,000 10/27/28 500,000.00 500,000.00 500,000.00 500,000.00 504,040.00
01/24/25 Federal Home Loan Bank 3130B4SN2 4.500%500,000 07/28/28 500,000.00 500,000.00 500,000.00 500,000.00 502,290.00
02/18/25 Federal Home Loan Bank 3130B54T2 4.550%200,000 08/18/27 200,000.00 200,000.00 200,000.00 200,000.00 200,142.00
02/21/25 Federal Home Loan Bank 3130B4YG0 4.550%200,000 08/14/29 199,766.17 23.22 199,789.39 199,789.39 199,789.39 200,772.00
12/18/24 Federal Home Loan Bank 3130B4BW0 4.500%500,000 06/12/28 500,000.00 500,000.00 500,000.00 500,000.00 501,000.00
04/16/25 Federal Home Loan Bank 3130B5XT0 4.050%300,000 10/21/27 300,000.00 300,000.00 300,000.00 300,000.00 299,895.00
05/08/25 Federal Home Loan Bank 3130B6CN4 4.125%200,000 05/03/30 200,000.00 200,000.00 200,000.00 200,000.00 200,002.00
05/22/25 Federal Home Loan Bank 3130B6JZ0 4.250%300,000 11/22/27 300,000.00 300,000.00 300,000.00 300,000.00 300,411.00
06/26/25 Federal Home Loan Bank 3130B6VG8 4.100%300,000 06/26/28 300,000.00 300,000.00 300,000.00 300,000.00 301,203.00
07/31/25 Federal Home Loan Bank 3130B72H6 4.300%500,000 07/15/30 500,000.00 500,000.00 500,000.00 500,000.00 502,185.00
09/25/25 Federal Home Loan Bank 3130B7WY6 3.900%10/02/29 200,000.00 200,000.00 200,000.00 200,000.00 199,894.00
09/24/25 Federal Home Loan Bank 3130B7WD2 3.930%11/30/26 500,000.00 500,000.00 500,000.00 500,000.00 499,830.00
10/02/25 Federal Home Loan Bank 3130B7WX8 3.800%10/02/28 700,000.00 700,000.00 700,000.00 700,000.00 700,133.00
01/16/25 FNMA 3136GA5M7 4.550%300,000 01/13/28 299,944.95 16.04 299,960.99 299,960.99 299,960.99 299,538.00
12/20/24 FHLMC MTN 3134HAS61 4.500%400,000 12/17/27 399,960.00 3.58 399,963.58 399,963.58 399,963.58 399,952.00
03/31/25 FHLMC MTN 3134HBGK1 4.175%500,000 04/01/27 500,000.00 500,000.00 500,000.00 500,000.00 500,180.00
08/29/25 FHLMC MTN 3136GAPH6 4.065%350,000 08/27/30 349,895.00 9.18 349,904.18 349,904.18 349,904.18 350,122.50
15,300,000.00 16,398,930.95 272.43 16,399,219.37 806,921.87 300,000.00 16,906,125.25 14,656,730.20 2,249,395.05 - 16,919,514.00
86.7%13.3%
Adjusted Cost 11/30/2025
Local Agency Investment Fund
P.O. Box 942809
Sacramento, CA 94209-0001
(916) 653-3001
December 01, 2025
LAIF Home
PMIA Average Monthly Yields
EAST VALLEY WATER DISTRICT
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
31111 GREENSPOT ROAD
HIGHLAND, CA 92346
Account Number:
November 2025 Statement
Tran Type Definitions
Account Summary
Total Deposit:0.00 Beginning Balance:17,026,038.98
Total Withdrawal:0 00 Ending Balance:17,026,038.98
12/1/25, 9:50 AM LAIF Regular Monthly Statement
https://laifms.treasurer.ca.gov/RegularStatement.aspx 1/1
Agenda Item
#3a
January 14, 20261
Meeting Date: January 14, 2026
Agenda Item #3a
Discussion Item
1
7
1
8
Regular Board Meeting
TO: Governing Board Members
FROM: General Manager/CEO
SUBJECT: Receive and File Information Regarding Emergency Plan Updates to the Risk and
Resilience Assessment and Emergency Response Plan and Consider Approval of the 2026 Local
Hazard Mitigation Plan
RECOMMENDATION
That the Board of Directors receive and file information regarding emergency plan updates to
the Risk and Resilience Assessment and Emergency Response Plan and approve the 2026 Local
Hazard Mitigation Plan for implementation following receipt of approval pending adoption from
the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
BACKGROUND / ANALYSIS
East Valley Water District’s (District) existing Risk and Resilience Assessment (RRA), Emergency
Response Plan (ERP), and Local Hazard Mitigation Plan (LHMP) were certified and approved in
2020. An Emergency Management Consultant, Navigating Preparedness Associates, was
contracted by the District in December 2024, and has spent the past year updating all three
plans. The plans are required to be updated every five years and will advance the District’s
emergency preparedness efforts and to comply with the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) and the America’s Water Infrastructure Act of 2018.
The 2018 America’s Water Infrastructure Act (AWIA) was enacted to improve the resilience of
the nation’s drinking water systems against natural hazards, malevolent acts, cybersecurity
threats, and other risks. Under AWIA Section 2013, covered water systems must:
Conduct and periodically update the RRA
Develop and maintain an ERP informed by the RRA
Certify completion of these actions to the Environmental Protection Agency
1. Risk & Resilience Assessment (RRA)
Staff conducted a comprehensive review and update of the District’s RRA, evaluating
risks to critical assets and operations. These include but are not limited to:
Source water and supply reliability
Treatment facilities and distribution infrastructure
Cybersecurity and information technology systems
Physical security and access controls
Agenda Item
#3a
January 14, 20262
Meeting Date: January 14, 2026
Agenda Item #3a
Discussion Item
1
7
1
8
Natural hazards such as earthquakes, flooding, wildfires, and extreme weather
Dependence on power, communications, and external agencies
The updated RRA identifies potential vulnerabilities, evaluates the likelihood and
consequences of various threat scenarios, and prioritizes mitigation strategies to enhance
system resilience. The District submitted the updated RRA to the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and received receipt of the certified RRA on March 27, 2025.
2. Emergency Response Plan (ERP)
The District’s ERP was updated to reflect the revised RRA and current operational
practices. Updates include but are not limited to:
Revised emergency response procedures and incident command protocols
Updated notification and communication procedures with staff, customers,
regulators, and partner agencies
Coordination with local emergency management agencies and mutual aid
networks
Continuity of operations and recovery planning
Incorporation of lessons learned from recent emergencies and exercises
The District submitted the updated ERP to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
and received receipt of the certified ERP on September 26, 2025.
Both the RRA and ERP documents are maintained as confidential and are not publicly
disclosed, consistent with AWIA security requirements.
3. Local Hazard Mitigation Plan (LHMP)
The LHMP was updated to reflect modifications to District facilities and infrastructure and
incorporates financial evaluations derived from the RRA update, encompassing water and
wastewater systems and:
o Identifies and profiles natural and man-made hazards that could potentially affect
the District’s service area
o Analyzes District facilities and equipment at risk from those hazards
o Develops a mitigation strategy and actions to lessen or reduce the impact of the
hazards profiled
o Implements the strategy and actions through planning, policy changes, programs,
projects, and other activities
Updates to the LHMP include but are not limited to:
o Replacement of the security assessments in the 2020 LHMP with Geographic
Information System exhibits
o A revised risk assessment based on updates to the RRA
Agenda Item
#3a
January 14, 20263
Meeting Date: January 14, 2026
Agenda Item #3a
Discussion Item
1
7
1
8
o A revised list of hazards and subsequent hazard analysis
o A new financial risk assessment that considers the value and percentage of District
pipelines at risk to hazards
o A revised public outreach/engagement documentation pursuant to FEMA updates
to the Plan Review Tool
o An updated list of hazard mitigation actions that consolidate actions identified in
the 2020 LHMP
The LHMP has passed through an internal staff and public review process. The public
review process is detailed below under Public Outreach efforts:
Public Outreach Efforts
Due to the sensitive and security-related nature of the RRA and ERP, no public outreach was
conducted, and the documents are not released to the public.
The LHMP underwent a comprehensive public review process pursuant to FEMA’s requirements.
Under 44 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) § 201.6(c)(1), LHMPs must “document an
opportunity” for stakeholders to be involved in the planning process. Required parties include
neighboring communities, local and regional agencies involved in hazard mitigation activities,
agencies that have the authority to regulate development, businesses, academia, and other
private and non-profit interests.
Actions taken in the LHMP public outreach process include:
Developing a community public survey that was open to the public, advertised on social
media, and sent directly to members of the Community Advisory Commission
Uploading a public review draft to the District website, sending the draft to stakeholders
listed under 44 CFR, and opening it for public comments
Performing content analysis on responses to open-ended questions within the survey and
to comments received on the public review draft
Presenting to the Finance & Human Resources Committee on the LHMP development
process and its application to the District’s capital improvement goals
Documenting all materials within the LHMP as an appendix
Following Board approval of the LHMP, staff will seek approval by Cal OES/FEMA. Staff will
include updates and revisions deemed necessary by Cal OES/FEMA and incorporate identified
mitigation strategies into future capital improvement planning and operational practices. Staff
will continue to review and update the LHMP every five years as required, along with the RRA
and ERP.
DISTRICT PILLARS AND STRATEGIES
III - Organizational Resiliency
Agenda Item
#3a
January 14, 20264
Meeting Date: January 14, 2026
Agenda Item #3a
Discussion Item
1
7
1
8
a. Advance Emergency Preparedness Efforts
IV - Planning, Maintenance, and Preservation of District Resources
d. Enhance Planning Efforts that Respond to Future Demands
REVIEW BY OTHERS
This agenda item has been reviewed by the Administration Department.
FISCAL IMPACT
Approving the LHMP has no impact on the District’s budget.
Recommended by:
________________
Michael Moore
General Manager/CEO
Respectfully submitted:
________________
Kerrie Bryan
Director of Administrative Services
ATTACHMENTS
Presentation
Local Hazard Mitigation Public Review Draft
Navigating Preparedness Associates, LLC and
Kerrie Bryan, Director of Administrative Services
January 14, 2026
Emergency Plan Updates and
2026 Local Hazard Mitigation
Plan (LHMP) Approval
EMERGENCY PLAN SUMMARY
•2018 America’s Water Infrastructure Act (AWIA)
•Requires community water systems serving >3,300 people to conduct Risk and
Resilience Assessments (RRAs) and develop Emergency Response Plans (ERPs)
•Must certify completion with the EPA
•Must review/recertify RRA and ERP every five years
•Disaster Mitigation Action of 2000 (DMA 2000)
•Requires development of LHMPs for agencies to be eligible for certain
State/Federal grant funding
•Staff have completed updates to the RRA and ERP in compliance
with AWIA requirements
•Staff are nearing completion of the 2026 LHMP update and will
be requesting Board Approval
2
BACKGROUND ON RRAS AND ERPS
3
RRA CERTIFICATION
•EVWD received receipt of RRA certification on 3/27/2025
•RRA updates included:
•Water supply reliability and water sources
•Risk and valuation of treatment facilities and distribution
infrastructure
•The status of cybersecurity and information technology systems
•The status of physical security and access controls
•Natural hazard risks
•Dependence on power, communications, and external agencies
•Potential vulnerabilities, likelihood of consequences, and strategies
4
ERP CERTIFICATION
•EVWD received receipt of ERP certification on 9/26/25
•ERP updates included:
•Emergency response procedures/incident command protocols
•Notification/communication procedures (staff, customers, etc.)
•Coordination procedures with local emergency management agencies
and mutual aid networks
•Continuity of operations and recovery planning
•Incorporation of lessons learned from recent emergencies and exercise
NOTE: RRA and ERP are not for public release
5
LOCAL HAZARD MITIGATION PLAN (LHMP)
•Identifies Natural hazards
•Earthquakes, floods, and wildfires
•Identifies Man-made hazards
•Cyberattacks, HAZMAT
•LHMP assesses risk and
mitigation measures
6
WHY LHMPS MATTER
•Important source of State
and Federal grant funds
•Natural hazards are causing
increasingly greater damage
each year, especially wildfires
•More people live in
hazard-prone areas
•Increased costs of disaster
response and recovery
7
HAZARDS REVIEW
Hazards included in the LHMP:
8
•Climate
Change
•Cyberattack
•Dam Failure &
Inundation
•Drought
•Earthquakes
•Flooding
•HAZMAT
Incident
•Heat Wave
•Landslide
•Power
Loss/PSPS
•Severe
Storms
•Wildfire
MITIGATION ACTIONS
•“Mitigation actions” are any
projects, investments, or
improvements that could
reduce damage from a hazard
•Based on District and
community priorities
•Included based on cost,
duration, and impact
•Mitigation measures directed
by the District
•All must be tied to a funding
mechanism and hazard
9
LHMP COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT PROCESS
•LHMP update included a comprehensive public review
and engagement process as required by FEMA:
10
Documentation
within the
LHMP as an
Appendix
Presentation to
Finance/HR
Committee
Content
Analysis on
Responses to
Questions and
Comments
Public Review
Draft Uploaded
to District
Website and
Sent to
Stakeholders
Community
Public Survey
(Sent to the
CAC)
LHMP NEXT STEPS
11
The LHMP Has Passed
Through Internal and
Public Review
•Currently Being Reviewed
by Cal OES Prior to
Submission to FEMA Upon
Board Approval
Per FEMA Guidelines,
LHMP Will Be
Reviewed and
Updated Every 5 Years
Staff Will Incorporate
Identified Mitigation
Strategies into Future
Capital Improvement
Planning and
Operational Practices
STAFF RECOMMENDATION
Staff recommends the Board of Directors:
•Receive and file the report documenting completion of the
required updates to the RRA and ERP, pursuant to the AWIA
•Approve the 2026 LHMP with the understanding final approval
from FEMA is pending
12
QUESTIONS?
L E A D E R S H I P | P A R T N E R S H I P | S T E W A R D S H I P
mitigationplan
2026 hazard
Prepared By: Navigating Preparedness Associates
i
RECORD OF REVIEWS AND REVISIONS
The table below contains the record of reviews and revisions of this LHMP document following
the initial Public Review Draft (see “Distribution”).
Review & Revision Table
Revision
# Date Sections Reviewed or Revisions Made Entered by
1 12/16/2025 Comprehensive technical and copy edits made to the full
LHMP document following the internal review draft. Dylan Kilby, NPA
ii
DISTRIBUTION
The table below contains the record of distribution for this LHMP. All distributions of the LHMP
are to be recorded within this table. including draft copies and accepted submissions to FEMA.
Record of Distribution
Date Plan Version or
Date of Plan Method of Distribution Description or Distribution
Audience
11/5/2025 0.6 Server Post and Hard Copies Internal Review Draft #1
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
RECORD OF REVIEWS AND REVISIONS ................................................................... i
DISTRIBUTION ........................................................................................................... ii
SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 1
1.1 Hazard Mitigation Planning ................................................................................................ 1
1.2 Local Mitigation Planning Requirements ............................................................................ 2
1.3 Hazard Mitigation Plan Description .................................................................................... 2
1.4 Grant Programs with Mitigation Plan Requirements ........................................................... 4
1.4.1 Stafford Act Grant Programs ....................................................................................... 4
1.4.2 National Flood Insurance Act Grant Programs ............................................................ 4
SECTION 2: PLANNING PROCESS .................................................................................. 5
2.1 Plan History ....................................................................................................................... 6
2.2 Plan Purpose and Authority ............................................................................................... 6
2.3 Planning Process Description ............................................................................................ 7
2.4 Planning Team .................................................................................................................. 7
2.4.1 Planning Team Activities ............................................................................................. 8
2.5 Community Engagement ................................................................................................... 8
2.6 Incorporation into Other Planning Mechanisms ............................................................... 10
2.7 Review of Existing Plans, Reports, Technical Documents, and Data ............................... 12
2.8 Changes in Plan Development ........................................................................................ 16
SECTION 3: PLANNING AREA DESCRIPTION .......................................................... 18
3.1 Location ........................................................................................................................... 18
3.2 Geography ....................................................................................................................... 20
3.3 Climate ............................................................................................................................ 20
3.4 History ............................................................................................................................. 21
3.5 Government ..................................................................................................................... 21
3.6 Economy ......................................................................................................................... 21
3.7 Demographics ................................................................................................................. 22
3.8 Land Use ......................................................................................................................... 24
3.8.1 District Pressure Zones ............................................................................................. 26
iv
SECTION 4: CAPABILITIES ASSESSMENT AND HAZARD IDENTIFICATION ........... 28
4.1 Existing Authorities, Policies, Programs, and Resources ................................................. 28
4.1.1 Planning and Regulatory Capabilities ........................................................................ 29
4.1.2 Administrative and Technical Capabilities ................................................................. 31
4.1.3 Financial Capabilities ................................................................................................ 32
4.1.4 Education and Outreach Capabilities ........................................................................ 35
4.1.5 National Flood Insurance Program Participation........................................................ 37
4.2 Hazard Identification ........................................................................................................ 37
4.2.1 Hazard Screening ..................................................................................................... 38
4.2.2 Emergency Proclamation History .............................................................................. 42
4.2.3 Disaster Proclamation Process ................................................................................. 43
4.2.4 Hazard Risk Rating ................................................................................................... 44
4.3 Hazard Characterization and Profiles .............................................................................. 46
4.3.1 Climate Change ........................................................................................................ 46
4.3.2 Cyberattack ............................................................................................................... 52
4.3.3 Dam Failure & Inundation .......................................................................................... 56
4.3.4 Drought ..................................................................................................................... 62
4.3.5 Earthquakes and Seismic Events .............................................................................. 73
4.3.6 Flood ......................................................................................................................... 85
4.3.7 Hazardous Materials Incident .................................................................................... 92
4.3.8 Heat Wave ................................................................................................................ 97
4.3.9 Landslide ................................................................................................................ 105
4.3.10 Power Failure/PSPS ............................................................................................. 108
4.2.11 Severe Storms ...................................................................................................... 114
4.3.12 Wildfire .................................................................................................................. 120
SECTION 5: RISK & VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT ............................................ 131
5.1 Identification of Critical Facilities and Assets ................................................................. 131
5.1.1 Critical Assets and Devices at Risk ......................................................................... 132
5.1.2 GIS Methodology .................................................................................................... 135
5.2 Land Use Trends and Development .............................................................................. 138
5.3 Natural and Cultural Resources Inventory ..................................................................... 141
v
5.3.1 Natural Resources .................................................................................................. 141
5.3.2 Cultural Resources .................................................................................................. 142
5.4 Vulnerability Assessment and Potential Loss ................................................................. 143
5.4.1 Climate Change ...................................................................................................... 143
5.4.2 Cyberattack ............................................................................................................. 143
5.4.3 Dam Inundation ....................................................................................................... 144
5.4.4 Drought ................................................................................................................... 146
5.4.5 Earthquakes and Seismic Events ............................................................................ 147
5.4.6 Flooding .................................................................................................................. 149
5.4.7 Hazardous Materials Release ................................................................................. 153
5.4.8 Heat Wave .............................................................................................................. 155
5.4.9 Landslide ................................................................................................................ 155
5.4.10 Power Loss ........................................................................................................... 157
5.4.11 Severe Storms ...................................................................................................... 158
5.4.12 Wildfires ................................................................................................................ 158
SECTION 6: MITIGATION STRATEGY ..................................................................... 161
6.1 Hazard Mitigation Statement .......................................................................................... 162
6.2 Hazard Mitigation Goals and Objectives ........................................................................ 162
6.3 Mitigation Actions/Projects and Implementation Strategy ............................................... 162
6.3.1 Previous Mitigation Actions/Projects Assessment ................................................... 163
6.3.2 2026 LHMP Mitigation Actions ................................................................................ 169
6.3.3 Supplementary Information for Mitigation Actions .................................................... 178
SECTION 7: PLAN MAINTENANCE ......................................................................... 185
7.1 Monitoring and Evaluation ............................................................................................ 186
7.2 Plan Update ................................................................................................................... 187
7.3 Continued Public Involvement ....................................................................................... 187
SECTION 8: PLAN APPROVAL AND ADOPTION ..................................................... 189
APPENDIX A: LOCAL MITIGATION PLAN REVIEW TOOL ....................................... 190
APPENDIX B: PLANNING TEAM MEETING DOCUMENTATION.............................. 191
Meeting #1 – Internal LHMP Project Kickoff Meeting ........................................................... 192
Meeting 2 – LHMP Planning Team Meeting #2 .................................................................... 197
vi
Meeting 3 – LHMP Planning Team Meeting #3 .................................................................... 203
APPENDIX C: PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT DOCUMENTATION .................................... 204
APPENDIX D: MITIGATION ACTION PRIORITIZATION (STAPLEE) ......................... 216
APPENDIX E: ACRONYMS ..................................................................................... 217
APPENDIX F: DAM INUNDATION EXHIBIT ............................................................. 221
APPENDIX G: EARTHQUAKE & SEISMIC HAZARD EXHIBIT ................................. 222
APPENDIX H: FLOOD HAZARD EXHIBIT ................................................................ 227
APPENDIX I: LANDSLIDE SUSCEPTIBILITY EXHIBIT ............................................ 228
1
SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION
The East Valley Water District (District) has prepared the 2026 Local Hazard Mitigation Plan
(LHMP) to assess the natural and human-caused risks to the District and to reduce the potential
impact of these hazards by creating mitigation strategies. The 2026 LHMP represents the
District’s commitment to create a safer and more resilient community by taking action to reduce
risk.
This plan complies with the Federal Disaster Mitigation Act (2000), Federal Register 44 Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 201 and 206, which modified the Robert T. Stafford Disaster
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act by adding a new section, 322 - Mitigation Planning. As of
November 1, 2004, this law requires local government entities to develop and submit hazard
mitigation plans as a condition of receiving Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) funding and
other mitigation project grants. The Human Resources & Risk Management department has
coordinated the preparation of the LHMP in cooperation with the District’s departments,
community stakeholders, partner agencies, and members of the public.
This introduction to the LHMP provides a brief description of hazard mitigation planning, LHMP
requirements, and an outline of the 2026 LHMP. There is also an overview of Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) programs and grants related to hazard mitigation.
1.1 Hazard Mitigation Planning
Hazard mitigation is any sustained action taken to reduce or eliminate the long-term risk to human
life and property from hazards. The intent is to reduce losses from future disasters. 44 CFR §
201.1(b) states that the purpose of mitigation planning is for local governments to identify the
hazards that impact them, to identify actions and activities to reduce losses from those hazards,
and to establish a coordinated process to implement the plan.
Throughout this process, the District will:
• Identify and profile hazards that could potentially affect the service area
• Analyze the District facilities and equipment at risk from those hazards
• Develop a mitigation strategy and actions to lessen or reduce the impact of the hazards
profiled
• Implement the strategy and actions that may involve planning, policy changes, programs,
projects, and other activities
The District’s implementation of short-/long-term mitigation actions is the primary planning
objective. This type of planning will supplement the District’s comprehensive planning and
emergency management programs.
2
1.2 Local Mitigation Planning Requirements
Hazard mitigation planning is governed by the Stafford Act, as amended by the Disaster Mitigation
Act of 2000 (DMA 2000), and by federal regulations implementing the Stafford Act. DMA 2000
revised the Stafford Act to require state, local, and tribal governments to develop and submit to
FEMA a mitigation plan that outlines processes for identifying the natural hazards, risks, and
vulnerabilities of the jurisdiction. Plan approval by FEMA is a prerequisite to receiving federal
hazard mitigation grant funds.1
To implement the mitigation planning requirements of the Stafford Act, FEMA promulgated 44
CFR Part 201, the federal regulations governing the planning process, plan content, and the
process for obtaining approval of the plan from FEMA. The planning requirements set forth in the
CFR are identified throughout this plan mirroring the order of the FEMA Regulation Checklist in
the Local Mitigation Plan Review Tool.
Federal law and the State of California’s requirements for hazard mitigation plans require
coverage of only natural hazards. The District’s 2025 Risk and Resilience Assessment (RRA) and
the Emergency Response Plan (ERP) include technological and human-caused hazards as well
as natural hazards. Likewise, the Planning Team decided to cover both natural and
technological/human-caused hazards within this LHMP, including a description and analysis of
each hazard.
FEMA has produced a Local Mitigation Plan Review Tool, which has been tailored by Region IX
as an appendix to the Local Mitigation Planning Guide (Effective 2023), to demonstrate how the
mitigation plan meets the regulation in 44 CFR § 201.6. It also offers State and FEMA Mitigation
Planners an opportunity to provide feedback to the jurisdiction. The Plan Review Tool has a
regulation checklist that provides a summary of FEMA’s evaluation of whether the plan has
addressed all requirements. Local planners can also use the checklist prior to submitting the plan
for approval to ensure they have addressed all the requirements. The Local Mitigation Plan
Review Tool is provided in Appendix A of this document.
1.3 Hazard Mitigation Plan Description
The 2026 LHMP consists of the sections and appendices described in Table 1-1 below:
Table 1-1: Plan Sections, Appendices, and Descriptions
Section 1:
Plan Introduction
Section 1 includes an introduction to hazard mitigation planning,
lists the LHMP planning requirements, provides a description of the
plan, and discusses grants related to hazard mitigation.
1 42 U.S. Code § 5165(a) Retrieved from: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/5165
3
Table 1-1: Plan Sections, Appendices, and Descriptions
Section 2:
Planning Process
Section 2 describes the planning process for the 2026 LHMP,
including an overview of how the LHMP was prepared, identification
of the LHMP Planning Team, involvement of outside agencies and
communities, the inclusion of related plans, reports, and
information, and stakeholder and public outreach activities.
Section 3: Planning
Area Description
Section 3 includes a description of the natural and built states of
the District, including climate, geography, demographics, and
economic conditions.
Section 4: Capability
Assessment and
Hazard Identification
Section 4 identifies and evaluates the resources available for
hazard mitigation within the District. It also lists and profiles the
hazards identified in the 2026 LHMP.
Section 5: Risk
Assessment
Section 5 identifies and evaluates vulnerable assets. It describes
potential impacts and estimates losses for each hazard. The
intention of this risk assessment is to help the community
understand the greatest risks facing the District.
Section 6: Mitigation
Strategy
Section 6 identifies and evaluates the current, ongoing, and
completed mitigation projects and programs in the District. It also
lists mitigation strategies for reducing potential losses.
Section 7: Plan
Maintenance
Procedures
Section 7 describes procedures for updating the LHMP to keep it
current and for continued public engagement in the planning
process.
Section 8: Plan
Approval and Adoption
Resolution
Section 8 includes documentation of Cal OES and FEMA
processes and adoption of the LHMP by the District’s Board.
Appendix A
Appendix A contains the FEMA Local Mitigation Plan Review Tool,
which documents the District’s compliance with the local hazard
mitigation plan requirements of 44 CFR Part 201.
Appendix B
Appendix B contains documentation of the planning process for the
Planning Team, including invitations, attendee lists, meetings
minutes, presentations, emails, etc.
Appendix C
Appendix C contains documentation of the planning process,
including surveys, social media outreach and opportunity for
comment for the stakeholders and public, and other
stakeholder/public outreach efforts.
Appendix D
Appendix D contains the mitigation action prioritization using the
Social, Technical, Administrative, Political, Legal, Economic,
Environmental (STAPLE/E) method.
Appendix E
Appendix E lists acronyms and abbreviations used in the 2026
LHMP.
Appendices F, G, H, & I
Appendix F, G, H, & I contain exhibits related to the hazard
analysis.
4
1.4 Grant Programs with Mitigation Plan Requirements
Currently, four FEMA grant programs provide funding to local entities that have a FEM A-approved
local mitigation plan meeting federal hazard mitigation plan requirements. One of the grant
programs is authorized under the Stafford Act . The remaining three programs are authorized
under the National Flood Insurance Act and the Bunning-Bereuter-Blumenauer Flood Insurance
Reform Act.
1.4.1 Stafford Act Grant Programs
FEMA funding is provided to state, local, and tribal governments that have an approved Hazard
Mitigation Plan through the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP). The HMGP provides
grants to implement long-term hazard mitigation measures after a disaster declaration. The
purpose of the HMGP is to reduce the loss of life and property due to natural disasters and to
enable mitigation measures to be implemented during the immediate recovery from a disaster.
To qualify for HMGP funding, projects must provide a long-term solution to a problem, and the
project’s potential savings must exceed the cost of implementing the project.
HMGP funds may be used to protect either public or private property or to purchase property that
has been subjected to, or is in danger of, repetitive damage. The amount of funding available for
the HMGP under a particular disaster declaration is limited. Under the program, the federal
government may provide a state, county, tribe, or local government entity with up to 20 percent
of the total disaster grants awarded by FEMA and may provide up to 75 percent of the cost of
projects approved under the program.
1.4.2 National Flood Insurance Act Grant Programs
The goal of the Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) Grant Program is to reduce or eliminate flood
insurance claims under the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). This program emphasizes
mitigating Repetitive Loss (RL) properties. The primary source of funding for the FMA program is
the National Flood Insurance Fund. Grant funding is available for planning, project, and technical
assistance. Project grants are awarded to local entities to apply mitigation measures to reduce
flood losses to properties insured under the NFIP. In FY 2014, FMA funding totaled $190.6 million.
The cost-share for this grant is 75 percent federal and 25 percent nonfederal. However, a cost-
share of 90 percent federal and 10 percent nonfederal is available in certain situations to mitigate
Severe Repetitive Loss (SRL) properties.
The Repetitive Flood Claims (RFC) Program provides funding to reduce or eliminate the long-
term risk of flood damage to residential and non-residential structures insured under the NFIP.
Structures considered for mitigation must have had one or more claim payments for flood
damages. All RFC grants are eligible for up to 100 percent federal assistance.
5
SECTION 2: PLANNING PROCESS
This section summarizes the planning area’s hazard mitigation planning efforts in 2026. In
addition, the section describes public and stakeholder outreach efforts as part of the LHMP
planning process. The section also summarizes the review and incorporation of existing plans,
studies, and reports used to develop the LHMP.
Documentation of the 2026 LHMP planning process for the Hazard Mitigation Planning Team is
provided in Appendix B, and documentation of the process for the public and stakeholders is
found in Appendix C. These appendices document the planning meetings and outreach. They
include meeting agendas, presentations, sign-in sheets, minutes, social media materials and
other media used to conduct the planning process.
FEMA REGULATION CHECKLIST: PLANNING PROCESS
44 CFR § 201.6(c)(1): The plan shall include documentation of the planning process
used to develop the plan, including how it was prepared, who was involved in the
process, and how the public was involved.
Element:
A1. Does the plan document the planning process, including how it was prepared and who
was involved in the process for each jurisdiction? (Requirement 44 CFR § 201.6(c)(1))
A1-a. Does the plan document how the plan was prepared, including the schedule or time
frame and activities that made up the plan’s development, as well as who was involved?
A1-b. Does the plan list the jurisdiction(s) participating in the plan that seek approval, and
describe how they participated in the planning process?
A2. Does the plan document an opportunity for neighboring communities, local and regional
agencies involved in hazard mitigation activities, and agencies that have the authority to
regulate development as well as businesses, academia, and other private and non-profit
interests to be involved in the planning process? (Requirement 44 CFR § 201.6(b)(2))
A2-a. Does the plan identify all stakeholders involved or given an opportunity to be involved
in the planning process, and how each stakeholder was presented with this opportunity?
A3. Does the plan document how the public was involved in the planning process during the
drafting stage and prior to plan approval? (Requirement 44 CFR § 201.6(b)(1))
A3-a. Does the plan document how the public was given the opportunity to be involved in
the planning process and how their feedback was included in the plan?
A4. Does the plan describe the review and incorporation of existing plans, studies, reports,
and technical information? (Requirement 44 CFR § 201.6(b)(3))
6
A4-a. Does the plan document what existing plans, studies, reports and technical
information were reviewed for the development of the plan, as well as how they were
incorporated into the document?
Source: FEMA, Local Mitigation Planning Handbook Review Tool, June 2025
The planning process began with the District establishing the planning area (congruent with the
service area) and emailing stakeholders within the planning area to invite them to participate in
the process. The District then identified the financial and technical resources required to update
the LHMP. Finally, the District then established the Planning Team and created a schedule for
the update process.
2.1 Plan History
The 2026 LHMP is an update to the 2020 LHMP. It addresses and consolidates natural hazards
assessed in the County of San Bernardino LHMP (2023-2028) Update. Although not required, it
also assesses technological/human-caused hazards such as cyberattacks.
2.2 Plan Purpose and Authority
The purpose of the LHMP is to identify natural and technological/human-caused hazards that
impact the District, to assess the vulnerability and risk posed by those hazards to District-wide
human and structural assets, to develop strategies to mitigate those identified hazards, to present
future maintenance procedures for the plan, and to document the planning process. The Plan is
prepared in compliance with DMA 2000 requirements and represents an updated LHMP for the
District.
The requirements for adopting this LHMP by the local governing body are described below, as
set forth in the Stafford Act and as amended by DMA 2000 and its implementing regulations. The
local planning requirements are documented throughout the LHMP and in Appendix A, FEMA
Local Mitigation Plan Review Tool. This Plan Review Tool is documented in the governing body
meeting resolution documented in Section 8.
FEMA REGULATION CHECKLIST: PLAN ADOPTION
44 CFR § 201.6(c)(5): The local hazard mitigation plan shall include “Documentation that the
plan has been formally adopted by the governing body of the jurisdiction requesting approval
of the plan (e.g., City Council, County Commissioner, Tribal Council).”
Element:
F1. For single-jurisdictional plans, has the governing body of the jurisdiction formally adopted
the plan to be eligible for certain FEMA assistance?
F1-a. Does the participant include documentation of adoption? Click or tap here to enter text.
Choose an item.
7
Source: FEMA, Local Mitigation Plan Review Tool, June 2025
Funding for the development of the LHMP was provided by a FEMA grant. Navigating
Preparedness Associates (NPA) was retained by the District to provide consulting services in
guiding the planning process and Plan development.
2.3 Planning Process Description
The planning process began in December 2024. Select staff from various departments in the
District and other stakeholders were invited to join the Hazard Mitigation Planning Team
(“Planning Team”). Representatives from the County of San Bernardino, California Department of
Forestry and Fire Protection (Cal Fire), the Cities of Highland and San Bernardino, and San
Bernardino Valley Metropolitan Water District were invited to participate in Planning Team
meetings. Documentation of participant outreach and the overall planning process are located in
Appendices B and C.
2.4 Planning Team
An initial invitation to support the Planning Team was provided by email on December 18, 2024.
A copy of the email may be found in Appendix B. The Planning Team’s responsibility included
providing feedback on hazards that affect the planning area, reviewing drafts of the plan, and
participating in developing mitigation activities. The members of the Planning Team are listed in
Table 2-1 below.
Table 2-1: LHMP Planning Team
Name Agency Key Role
Patrick Milroy EVWD Operations Manager
Manny Moreno EVWD Water Reclamation Manager
Ray Roybal EVWD Water Reclamation
Supervisor
Jon Peel EVWD Water Maintenance
Supervisor
Dale Barlow EVWD Facilities Supervisor
Nathan Carlson EVWD Senior Engineer
William Ringland EVWD Public Affairs/Conservation
Manager
Roxana Morales EVWD Public Affairs Supervisor
Ryan Ritualo EVWD IT Manager
Kerrie Bryan EVWD Director of Administrative
Services
8
Table 2-1: LHMP Planning Team
Name Agency Key Role
Eileen Tafolla-
Bateman
EVWD Human Resources
Coordinator
Lee Rosenberg NPA Consultant
Dylan Kilby NPA Consultant
2.4.1 Planning Team Meetings & Activities
Three meetings were held with the Planning Team. The District’s LHMP Project Manager
reviewed all documents and sent out meeting notices. Table 2-2 summarizes the meetings and
their purpose below:
Table 2-2: Planning Meetings & Activities
Date Activity Purpose
12/22/2024 Kickoff Meeting/Planning
Meeting #1
Kickoff meeting and project management
tools for the whole project. Discussion of the
hazard mitigation process including hazard
analysis, risk assessment, adoption, and
approval.
10/8/2025 Planning Meeting #2
Review of hazards assessed/chosen.
Discussion of the risk assessment
prioritization metric. Discussion of selected
hazard mitigation actions. Introduction to the
public review process and remaining steps
before submission to FEMA/Cal OES.
TBD Planning Meeting #3 TBD – will happen following the public review
comment period
2.5 Community Engagement
The District engaged the local community through hosting public meetings, developing a public
engagement survey, and opening a public review draft for comments. All public engagement
documentation may be found in Appendix C.
NPA developed a community public survey to source responses from residents within the
District’s service area. The survey was created using the SurveyMonkey platform and was open
from 10/13/2025 to 10/31/2025. It asked questions on hazards of particular concern, the public’s
familiarity with hazard mitigation, and which agencies are trusted messengers. The survey was
distributed through social media and email blasts. Out of concern that the survey was not being
answered by the community, EVWD also sent the survey to local stakeholders who were a part
of the Community Advisory Commission (CAC). The survey received 12 responses. The
responses and outreach methods are summarized in Appendix C.
9
Given the small number of responses, the Planning Team elected not to statistically analyze the
responses. Instead, the Planning Team performed content analysis by reviewing the open-ended
responses and general trend about disasters experienced while living in San Bernardino County
with the understanding those who responded were almost certainly highly involved community
stakeholders. These comments were used to inform discussions among District staff on selecting
hazard mitigation activities and ensuring the chosen hazards reflected community concerns.
A representative from NPA attended one of EVWD’s quarterly meetings for the Finance/HR
Committee on December 1, 2025, to discuss the hazard mitigation process, role of the LHMP,
and how the mitigation actions are intended to create a more robust water and wastewater
system. The Committee discussed the implementation of the LHMP and how the mitigation
actions were prioritized.
On TBD, the District released a public review draft of the LHMP for review and comment. The
comment period lasted for TBD days. The public review draft was advertised through TBD. Copies
of the LHMP were left at TBD. XXXX comments were received on topics XXXXX. Appendix C
contains copies of the postings and the received comments.
The District also sent copies of the public review draft directly to stakeholders including local
government, educational institutions, other water and wastewater districts, and major private
businesses. These organizations were invited to review the results of the hazard analysis, identify
common strategies between LHMPs to facilitate cost-effective mitigation actions, and provide
input on data sources. XXXXX comments were received on topics XXXXX.
Table 2-3: Local Stakeholders Contacted in Planning Process
Organization Department & Role
TBD TBD
10
2.6 Incorporation into Other Planning Mechanisms
FEMA REGULATION CHECKLIST: PLAN MAINTENANCE
44 CFR § 201.6(c)(4)(ii): The plan shall include “a process by which local governments
incorporate the requirements of the mitigation plan into other planning mechanisms
such as comprehensive or capital improvement plans, when appropriate.”
Element:
D3. Does the plan describe a process by which each community will integrate the
requirements of the mitigation plan into other planning mechanisms, such as comprehensive
or capital improvement plans, when appropriate? (Requirement 44 CFR § 201.6(c)(4)(ii))
D3-a. Does the plan describe the process the community will follow to integrate the ideas,
information and strategy of the mitigation plan into other planning mechanisms?
D3-b. Does the plan identify the planning mechanisms for each plan participant into which the
ideas, information and strategy from the mitigation plan may be integrated?
D3-c. For multi-jurisdictional plans, does the plan describe each participant's individual
process for integrating information from the mitigation strategy into their identified planning
mechanisms?
Source: FEMA, Local Mitigation Planning Handbook Review Tool, June 2025
FEMA REGULATION CHECKLIST: PLAN UPDATE
44 CFR § 201.6(d)(3): A local jurisdiction must review and revise its plan to reflect
changes in development, progress in local mitigation efforts, and changes in priorities,
and resubmit it for approval within 5 years in order to continue to be eligible for mitigation
project grant funding.
Element:
E2. Was the plan revised to reflect changes in priorities and progress in local mitigation
efforts? (Requirement 44 CFR § 201.6(d)(3))
E2-c. Does the plan describe how jurisdictions integrated the mitigation plan, when
appropriate, into other planning mechanisms?
Source: FEMA, Local Mitigation Planning Handbook Review Tool, June 2025
The LHMP planning process provided the District with an opportunity to review the policies
contained in its Capital Improvement and Financial Plan (CIFP) and other plans. The CIFP and
the LHMP are complementary documents that work together to reduce risk to the residents of its
service area. Many of the ongoing recommendations identified in the LHMP are programs or
projects that are in the CIFP.
The District will incorporate hazard mitigation identification and risk assessment, and plan
recommendations and mitigation actions contained in the LHMP into the following documents:
11
• Water Shortage Contingency Plan – The Water Shortage Contingency Plan describes
the stages of water conservation during shortages under various scenarios. The LHMP
provides a similar, more detailed description of some of these hazards, such as drought.
Updates to the LHMP can inform revisions to the Water Shortage Contingency Plan.
Hazards in both plans should corroborate one another.
• Urban Water Management Plan (UWMP) – The District’s 2020 UWMP is included as a
chapter within the 2020 Upper Santa Ana River Watershed Integrated Regional Urban
Water Management Plan. The UWMP supports long-term resource planning and
management, especially in context of conservation, drought, and efficient use of urban
water resources. The UWMP will consider using mitigation actions related to drought as
part of the plan development/revision process.
• Drought Contingency Plan (DCP) – The District’s DCP contains measures used to
ameliorate the impacts of drought within the drinking water system. The DCP and LHMP
will mutually inform one another given the DCP contains what are, in effect, hazard
mitigation actions.
• Water System Master Plan (WSMP) – The District’s WSMP describes how the District’s
drinking water system is planned, implemented, and maintained. It also provides
information on potential changes to water needs depending on local demand, land use
changes, and drought conditions. The WSMP was instrumental in identifying potential
hazard mitigation actions and in developing the risk assessment.
• Sewer System Master Plan (SSMP) – The District’s SSMP provides the primary
guidelines for planning and implementation of the District’s sewer system in addition to
current and future conditions of its sewer infrastructure. The SSMP also provides
information on recommended projects and facilities, proposed phasing of facilities
construction, and other recommended actions to improve the system’s operation. As with
the WSMP, the SSMP was instrumental in identifying potential hazard mitigation actions.
• Capital Improvement and Financial Plan (CIFP) – The District’s CIFP defines
infrastructure investments necessary over a seven-year period. It is reviewed annually by
the District’s Board of Directors. Mitigation actions identified in the LHMP directly inform
the CIFP and vice versa.
• Emergency Response Plan (ERP) – ERPs outline the emergency plans and procedures,
mitigation actions, detection strategies, and resilience strategies at utilit y agencies. The
Planning Team used the ERP to identify potential mitigation actions. Future revisions to
the ERP will consider the hazards analyzed within this document for effective
preparedness.
• Risk and Resilience Assessment (RRA) – The RRA is a systematic examination of the
potential impacts to District infrastructure and the consequences thereof. The RRA
discusses various natural and manmade hazards (e.g., fires, severe storms, cyberattacks,
physical assault on facility, contamination of water). District capabilities are then assessed
by if the hazard poses a “significant risk” – including but not limited to physical barriers,
water sources, pipes/infrastructure, and storage/distribution facilities. The RRA was used
to identify potential mitigation actions and potential hazards.
12
These efforts may coincide with the Plan Maintenance activities listed in Section 7. Additional
action items may be implemented by creating new public educational programs, continued
interagency coordination, and public input and participation.
2.7 Review of Existing Plans, Reports, Technical Documents, and Data
The Planning Team consulted a large number of resource documents and references in
developing this update. Table 2-4 contains a comprehensive list of the primary guidance, policy
tools, extant plans, and authorities incorporated within this LHMP. Throughout the document,
additional footnotes are used when other data sources are available.
Table 2-4: Resource Documents and References Reviewed
And Incorporated in the Plan
Referenced Document or
Technical Source
Resource
Type Description of Reference and Its Use
California State Hazard Mitigation Plan
(2023)
https://www.caloes.ca.gov/wp-
content/uploads/Hazard-
Mitigation/Documents/2023-California-
SHMP_Volume-1_11.10.2023.pdf
Technical and
Planning
Resource
Provides the State of California’s Hazard Mitigation
Plan (SHMP) for 2023-2028. Describes hazards
that informed the hazard analysis and risk
assessment portions of this LHMP.
Referenced as “California SHMP (2023)” in
footnotes.
California’s Fourth Climate Change
Assessment (2019)
https://www.energy.ca.gov/sites/default/
files/2019-11/Statewide_Reports-SUM-
CCCA4-2018-
013_Statewide_Summary_Report_ADA
.pdf
Technical and
Planning
Resource
Outlines the key findings for the state and local
communities on how climate change is and will
impact the State of California. Used throughout the
hazard analysis within this LHMP.
Referenced as “California 4th Climate Change
Assessment (2018)” in footnotes.
National Risk Index
https://hazards.fema.gov/nri/
Technical and
Planning
Resource
Displays the relative risk of counties and census
tracts to the 18 FEMA hazards according to
expected annual loss, social vulnerability, and
community resilience.
County of San Bernardino Multi-
Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan
(2022)
https://www.sbcounty.gov/uploads/SBC
Fire/documents/EmergencyServices/Ha
zard-Mitigation-Plan-202212.pdf
Technical and
Planning
Resource
Provides the County of San Bernardino’s Multi-
Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan (MJHMP) for
2022-2027. Describes hazards that informed the
hazard analysis and risk assessment portions of this
LHMP. Used as a reference for community profiles
and land use.
Referenced as “County of San Bernardino MJHMP
(2022)” in footnotes.
13
Table 2-4: Resource Documents and References Reviewed
And Incorporated in the Plan
Referenced Document or
Technical Source
Resource
Type Description of Reference and Its Use
City of San Bernardino Local Hazard
Mitigation Plan (2024)
https://www.sanbernardino.gov/460/Loc
al-Hazard-Mitigation-Plan
Technical and
Planning
Resource
Provides the City of San Bernardino’s LHMP for
2024-2029. Describes hazards that informed the
hazard analysis and risk assessment portions of this
LHMP. Used as a reference for community profiles
and land use.
Referenced as “City of San Bernardino LHMP
(2024)” in footnotes.
EVWD – Water System Master Plan
(2019)
https://www.eastvalleywater.gov/busine
ss/engineering/plans-
standards/overview/
Technical and
Planning
Resource
Describes in detail the infrastructure used by the
District in providing water services to its customers.
Describes changes to water demand within the
service area. Used as background material in
understanding the District’s operations and in
developing/researching hazard mitigation activities.
EVWD – Sewer System Master Plan
(2019)
https://www.eastvalleywater.gov/busine
ss/engineering/plans-
standards/overview/
Technical and
Planning
Resource
Describes in detail the infrastructure used by the
District in providing wastewater and sewer services
to its customers. Describes transmission, collection,
and maintenance. Identifies potential capital
improvement projects. Used as background
material in understanding the District’s operations
and in developing/researching hazard mitigation
activities.
EVWD – Sewer System Management
Plan (2023)
https://www.eastvalleywater.gov/busine
ss/engineering/plans-
standards/overview/
Technical and
Planning
Resource
Describes the procedures for implementing various
sewer management programs including
operations/maintenance; rehabilitation; spill
emergency response plans; and the Fats, Oils, &
Grease Program. Used as background material and
in developing/researching hazard mitigation
activities.
EVWD – 2024-2025 Fiscal Year Budget
https://www.eastvalleywater.gov/media/i
qnlfq41/fy-2024-25-adopted-budget-low-
resolution-file.pdf
Technical and
Planning
Resource
Provides details on finances, customer bases, and
current expenses within the District. Used to
develop sections on business and economy and in
developing/researching hazard mitigation activities.
Referenced as “EVWD FY 24-25 Budget” in
footnotes.
14
Table 2-4: Resource Documents and References Reviewed
And Incorporated in the Plan
Referenced Document or
Technical Source
Resource
Type Description of Reference and Its Use
EVWD – 2025-2026 Fiscal Year Budget
https://www.eastvalleywater.gov/media/
3zlf0dfi/final-2025-budget-document-
website.pdf
Technical and
Planning
Resource
Provides details on finances, customer bases, and
current expenses within the District. A preliminary
version of this edition was used to identify capital
improvement projects.
CDPH – Climate Change and Health
Profile Report, San Bernardino County
(2017)
https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/OH
E/Pages/ClimateHealthProfileReports.a
spx
Technical and
Planning
Resource
Provides information on how climate change may
influence human and ecosystem health throughout
the County of San Bernardino. Topics include
temperature changes, fire hazard severity zones,
heat waves, droughts, and vector-borne illnesses.
Western Riverside Council of
Governments (WRCOG) – San
Bernardino County Vulnerability
Assessment (2022)
https://www.wrcog.us/DocumentCenter/
View/7477/San-Bernardino-County-
Vulnerability-Assessment
Technical and
Planning
Resource
Provides information on hazards and climate
vulnerabilities within the County of San Bernardino.
Details are provided on projects for the county’s
natural hazards, vulnerable sectors, and potential
adaptation strategies.
Referenced as “WRCOG SBC Vulnerability
Assessment (2022)” in footnotes.
Upper Santa Ana River Watershed
Integrated Regional Urban Water
Management Plan (2020)
https://www.sbvwcd.org/our-
projects/upper-santa-ana-integrated-
regional-water-management-plan/
Technical and
Planning
Resource
Describes water supply reliability under normal and
drought conditions. Used in drafting sections on
land use and the drought hazard analysis.
City of San Bernardino General Plan
(2005)
https://www.sanbernardino.gov/372/Pla
nning-Division
Technical and
Planning
Resource
Provides the General Plan for the City of San
Bernardino. Includes the 2021-2029 Housing
Element (updated January 2024). Used throughout
the document as a background resource, especially
concerning developmental trends for each hazard
and within discussions on land use.
Referenced as “City of San Bernardino General
Plan (2005)” in footnotes.
15
Table 2-4: Resource Documents and References Reviewed
And Incorporated in the Plan
Referenced Document or
Technical Source
Resource
Type Description of Reference and Its Use
City of Highland General Plan (2006)
https://www.cityofhighland.org/191/Gen
eral-Plan
Technical and
Planning
Resource
Provides the General Plan for the City of Highland.
Includes the 2021-2029 Housing Element. Used
throughout the document as a background
resource, especially concerning developmental
trends for each hazard and within discussions on
land use.
Referenced as “City of Highland General Plan
(2006)” in footnotes.
California Energy Commission (2018).
California’s Fourth Climate Change
Assessment
https://www.energy.ca.gov/data-
reports/reports/californias-fourth-
climate-change-assessment
Technical and
Planning
Resource
Describes monitoring, analysis, and modeling of
climate as well as efforts designed to reduce
emissions.
California Governor’s Office of
Emergency Services
http://myhazards.caloes.ca.gov/
Technical and
Planning
Resource
Provides a tool for the general public to discover
hazards in their area (earthquake, flood, fire, and
tsunami) and learn steps to reduce personal risk.
California Department of Conservation
https://www.conservation.ca.gov/cgs/ge
ohazards
Technical and
Planning
Resource
Identifies significant geologic hazards that exist, or
are likely to exist, so that informed land use and
emergency response planning decisions can be
made.
California Department of Water
Resources
https://water.ca.gov/Programs/All-
Programs/Division-of-Safety-of-
Dams/Inundation-Maps
https://fmds.water.ca.gov/webgis/?appid
=dam_prototype_v2
Technical and
Planning
Resource
Provides information on dam safety, a list of dams
within California and dam inundation maps for dams
in the planning area.
Federal Emergency Management
Agency
https://www.fema.gov/
Technical and
Planning
Resource
Resource for LHMP guidance (How-To series),
floodplain and flood-related NFIP data (mapping,
repetitive loss, NFIP statistics), and historic hazard
incidents. Used in the risk assessment and
mitigation strategy.
16
Table 2-4: Resource Documents and References Reviewed
And Incorporated in the Plan
Referenced Document or
Technical Source
Resource
Type Description of Reference and Its Use
Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security
Agency https://www.cisa.gov/
Technical and
Planning
Resource
Resource for cybersecurity and cyberattack
guidance, especially regarding critical infrastructure
and public utilities. Describes historical
cybersecurity incidents and lessons learned. Used
in the risk assessment and mitigation strategy.
HAZUS-MH
https://www.fema.gov/flood-
maps/products-tools/hazus
Technical
Resource
Base data sets within the program were used in the
vulnerability analysis.
National Centers for Environmental
Information
https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/data-access
Technical
Resource
Online resource for weather-related data and
historic hazard event data. Used in the risk
assessment.
National Integrated Drought Information
System (2024)
https://www.drought.gov/drought/
Technical
Resource
Source for drought-related projections and
conditions. Used in the risk assessment.
FEMA Dam Safety
https://www.fema.gov/emergency-
managers/risk-management/dam-safety
Technical
Resource
Database used in the dam failure hazard profiling.
Used in the risk assessment.
National Weather Service
https://www.weather.gov/
Technical
Resource
Source for hazard information, data sets, and
historical event records. Used in the risk
assessment.
United States Geological Survey
Earthquake Hazards Program.
https://www.usgs.gov/programs/earthqu
ake-hazards
Technical Data Source for geological hazard data and incident data.
Used throughout the document concerning
earthquakes and risk assessments. Specific
programs and data sources are cited within the
footnotes.
CalTopo
https://www.caltopo.com
Technical Data Source for remotely viewing topographical maps.
Used in surveying the District’s physical geography.
Western Regional Climate Center
https://wrcc.dri.edu/
Website Data Online resource for climate data used throughout
the natural hazards analyses.
2.8 Changes in Plan Development
This LHMP demonstrates a comprehensive update to the 2020 LHMP. Both LHMPs fulfill the
same requirements and follow the same general outline, from planning process and district profile
to the risk assessment and mitigation strategies. Notably, this LHMP places the capabilities
assessment immediately following Section 3 before the hazard analysis, and the risk assessment
is now after the hazard analysis. The appendices are mostly the same, though the critical facilities
list is now included within the risk assessment. Additionally, the security assessments within the
2020 LHMP are replaced by Geographic Information System (GIS) exhibits.
17
The Planning Team updated the District’s profile, capabilities assessment, and risk assessment
based on concurrent updates to the RRA and ERP. Other updates were made according to new
versions of various District plans outlined within Table 2-4, such as the 2019 WSMP. This LHMP
also includes updated hazard analyses and risk assessments following completion of the Sterling
Natural Resource Center (SNRC). Information on the SNRC is provided in Section 3. All relevant
hazard information was updated with sources when appropriate.
Public engagement broadly followed a similar timeline as the 2020 LHMP, though this LHMP
includes a new public survey (described in 2.5 Community Engagement).
The hazards addressed in the 2026 LHMP differ from the 2020 LHMP. Hazards that concerned
malevolent threats and proximity hazards were removed as described in Table 4-6. Reasons
include hazards no longer meeting the probability threshold for inclusion (Physical Adversary) and
hazards recontextualized as preparedness activities (Loss of Critical Spares).
On the other hand, the 2026 LHMP substantially increases the number of natural hazards given
updates to regulatory maps and data sources used in the 2020 LHMP (also described in Table
4-6). Dam Failure & Inundation is now included despite its low probability of occurrence given the
widespread destruction that could occur. The soil liquefaction aspect of the Earthquakes &
Seismic Events hazard was deleted given the service area is not within current CGS maps of soil
liquefaction hazard.
The risk assessment portion of the 2026 LHMP includes a comprehensive GIS analysis on the
threats to the District’s buildings and infrastructure. The methodology is summarized within
Section 5: Risk Assessment. Each mapping project analyzed the intersection of District
buildings and infrastructure with the selected hazards to provide baseline financial risk. Selected
maps without sensitive data were exported and included throughout the hazard analysis, risk
assessment, and appendices.
Finally, the 2026 LHMP repurposes the hazard mitigation actions from the 2020 LHMP and
provides them (and others) in a new template. The new hazard mitigation actions consolidate
many of the actions from the 2020 LHMP into discrete projects that are Specific, Measurable,
Attainable, Relevant, and Timebound (SMART).
18
SECTION 3: PLANNING AREA DESCRIPTION
The District is a California Special District located in the eastern section of the San Bernardino
Valley. It supplies water to the City of Highland, the Yuhaaviatam of San Manuel Nation, and parts
of the City of San Bernardino and unincorporated County of San Bernardino. As of June 30, 2025,
the District served 21,808 water connections and 20,080 wastewater connections with 300 miles
of water pipeline. On average, the District provides 17,000 acre-feet of water per year to 108,000
customers over 30.1 square miles.
The Surface Water Treatment Plant treats local surface water from the Santa Ana River and
purchased water from the State Water Project’s Devil’s Canyon Pump station. The water goes
through several treatment processes and disinfection prior to delivery. This facility provides
approximately 25 percent of the water delivered to customers.
The District operates the SNRC within the City of San Bernardino proper. The SNRC supports
water supply sustainability and independence through treating up to eight million gallons of
wastewater per day and recharging the local Bunker Hill Groundwater Basin. The recharged water
discharged into the Basin supports the 600,000 residents within the County of San Bernardino
that rely on the Bunker Hill Basin for water.2 Additionally, the SNRC uses co-digestion technology
in which food waste and remaining organic waste from wastewater treatment undergo anaerobic
digestion to provide low-cost power to the SNRC.
3.1 Location
The District is in the northeastern San Bernardino Valley approximately 65 miles due east of Los
Angeles. The District's service area includes the easterly part of the City of San Bernardino, all of
the City of Highland, and small unincorporated areas of the County of San Bernardino. The service
area shares use of the local groundwater basin with the Cities of Redlands, Loma Linda, Colton,
and Grand Terrace.
Formerly an agricultural area, the service area has significantly urbanized over the last three
decades. The City of Highland, City of San Bernardino, and parts of unincorporated County of
San Bernardino have seen high growth within the valley up to the foothills of the mountains.
Figure 3-1 on the next page provides a map of the District’s service area.
2 “Sterling Natural Resource Center”. EVWD (n.d.). Archived September 11, 2025.
web.archive.org/web/2/https://www.eastvalleywater.gov/our-water/systems/wastewater-system/sterling-natural-
resource-center/
19
Figure 3-1: District Service Area
20
3.2 Geography
The San Bernardino Valley is surrounded by the San Bernardino Mountains to the north and east.
The service area’s elevation above mean sea level ranges from approximately 500 feet on the
valley floor to 2,000 feet within the foothills. These foothills eventually rise to the 11,502-foot
summit of Mt. San Gorgonio in the north – the highest peak in Southern California.
The District has access to multiple water sources including groundwater, local surface water, and
imported water. 75-80 percent of total water supply is from groundwater and the remaining 20-25
percent is from surface water sources. The District has three primary sources of water supply:
local groundwater from the Bunker Hill Basin pumped from District-owned wells, local surface
water from the Santa Ana River, and imported surface water from the State Water Project via the
San Bernardino Valley Municipal Water District. Up to 20 percent of water provided to District
customers is from the Santa Ana River via the North Fork Water Company.
The Bunker Hill Groundwater Basin covers 92,000 acres and stores approximately five million
acre-feet of water. It is located on the southern slopes of the San Gorgonio mountains atop the
Santa Ana River watershed and receives surface water runoff from the headwaters of the Santa
Ana River and other tributaries. The basin is recharged by rain, runoff from the surrounding
mountains, and imported water. Its water is used for over 600,000 people in the Cities of Highland,
Redlands, Loma Linda, San Bernardino, Colton, Rialto, Bloomington, Fontana, Grand Terrace,
and Riverside, as well as portions of unincorporated County of San Bernardino.
There are two major earthquake faults in the San Bernardino Valley: the San Andreas Fault and
the San Jacinto fault. The San Andreas Fault runs though the District’s boundaries from northwest
to southeast. This fault cuts the District in half, with potable water reservoirs on the north side of
the fault and wells and pipeline structures on the south side of the fault. The San Jacinto Fault is
within five miles of the District’s southern and western boundaries.
3.3 Climate
The climate of the District’s service area is typical of Southern California’s Mediterranean and
semi-arid climate with hot, dry summers and mild, dry winters. The Köppen climate classification
within the service area is a mix of Csa (hot-summer mediterranean), BSk (cold semi-arid), and
BSh (hot semi-arid) depending on the elevation.3 On average, there are approximately 280 days
of sunshine per year. High temperature average 94 degrees Fahrenheit in summer (July) and 66
degrees Fahrenheit during winter (January). Lows average between 63 and 42 degrees
Fahrenheit, respectively.
According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the area’s dry season
runs from approximately April through November, during which there is a less than 10 percent
daily chance of precipitation (dropping to under one percent in June). Its rainiest month is
3 “Koppen-Geiger Climate Classification – 2007”. NOAA (2025). Archived August 21, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250821205634/https://sos.noaa.gov/catalog/datasets/koppen-geiger-climate-
classification-2007/
21
February, peaking at approximately 18 percent daily chance of precipitation. On average, there
are between 0 and 2.5 days of precipitation per month from April through November and 4.1 to
4.5 days of precipitation from December through March. Average monthly rainfall in February is
2.1 inches; in June, precipitation is negligible.4
On occasion, Southern California experiences significant weather variability due to extremely hot
weather, winter storms, and/or Santa Ana winds. Section 4 contains additional descriptions of the
service area climate regarding those hazards.
3.4 History
East Valley Water District is a California Special District formed on January 18, 1954, by local
residents voting to establish water service by a public agency. Originally called the East San
Bernardino County Water District, the name was changed to East Valley Water District in 1982. It
initially provided water to unincorporated communities within Highland and East Highlands.
Increased urbanization of the formerly agricultural communities pushed the District to expand its
services into wastewater and septic treatment beginning in 1964. The District’s wastewater
services were further developed following incorporation of the City of Highland and expansion of
the City of San Bernardino. In January 2024, the District activated the SNRC and began its
recycled water reclamation operations.
3.5 Government
The District is a California Special District under California law, providing it with limited purpose
to deliver specialized services (cf. water supply, wastewater conveyance, and wastewater
treatment).5 Special districts are formed and supported by voters. The District is governed by a
five-member Board of Directors who are elected at large from within the District’s service area. It
also retains a General Manager/Chief Executive Officer position. The District conducts its
business at regularly scheduled meetings at its administrative facilities, which are open to the
public. The District maintains a website which provides an opportunity for customer feedback
and assistance.
3.6 Economy
According to the District’s Annual Comprehensive Financial Report for the FY ending June 30,
2025 (FY 2024-2025), total operating revenue was $53.28 million. The District’s total assets and
deferred outflows were valued at $386.6 million. A plurality of the District’s revenues and expenses
are from its water services. The District received $21.28 million during FY 2024-2025 from water
sales. System charges totaled $17.51 million. In contrast, wastewater treatment charges totaled
$12.68 million in revenue.
4 “Climate and Average Weather Year Round in Highland”. Weatherspark (n.d.). A rchived August 21, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250821205752/https://weatherspark.com/y/1945/Average-Weather-in-Highland-
California-United-States-Year-Round
5 EVWD FY 24-25 Budget
22
Total operating expenses were $53.73 million for the same period. Of this, the administrative and
general category was the highest category of expenses at $16.95 million. The water department
incurred $13.01 million in operating expenses; the wastewater department, $1.45 million. The
reclamation department’s operating expenses were $10 million. The remaining expenses were
assigned to depreciation.
The primary source of revenue from water services was meter charges. For wastewater services,
the most revenue came from charges to customers, with other minor sources being inspections,
plan checking, development-related fees, and reimbursements from public agencies and utilities.
Expenses are primarily related to energy costs, pipeline maintenance costs, and dislodging of
fats, oils, and grease. Given that the collection system is entirely gravity flow, there were no
expenses for pumps or lift stations.
The previous fiscal year (FY 2023-2024) incurred major capital expenditures related to the SNRC.
The District initially planned to complete and turn on the SNRC in November 2023, but a two-
month delay in constructing the recycled water pipeline resulted in its actual online date being
January 2024. Revenues were thereby less than projections, and the District spent more funds
than expected to have wastewater treated by an outside agency. Phase redirection of wastewater
to the SNRC began shortly after the January 2024 date, with all wastewater being sent to the
SNRC by the end of March 2024.
The District’s service area is located within the metropolitan area known as the “Inland Empire” in
southeastern California. Economic information about the population served exclusively by the
District is not available. City customers are likely to be significantly wealthier than those in
unincorporated County of San Bernardino; for example, the City of Highland’s average household
income is $68,105, which is 21 percent higher than the service area average.
In FY 2024-2025, the District’s top five consumers were the San Bernardino City Unified School
District, Patton State Hospital, the Yaamava’ Resort & Casino at San Manuel, the City of Highland
government entity, and the Yuhaaviatam of San Manuel Nation government entity.6 All five
consumers are also considered major employers within the area; the Yaamava’ Resort & Casino
at San Manuel employs over 5,000 people.
3.7 Demographics
Per the Annual Comprehensive Financial Report for FY 2024-2025, the total number of customers
served was approximately 108,000. This is an approximate six percent increase since 2015. Most
of these customers are residential and commercial entities. The District does not have any major
industrial users.
The exact demographics of the District’s service area are difficult to quantify given the
heterogeneous political entities. Table 3-1 on the next page provides demographic information on
6 EVWD FY 24-25 Budget
23
the City of Highland and the City of San Bernardino as a proxy for the broader population trends
of the service area proper.
Note the District does not serve every person within the City of San Bernardino, nor do its
residents exclusively receive water and wastewater services from the District. This information is
from the US Census Bureau’s American Community Survey for years 2019-2023.7,8
Table 3-1: Cities of Highland & San Bernardino Demographics
Age City of Highland City of San Bernardino
<18 years 35.8 percent 34.1 percent
18-65 years 53.4 percent 55.7 percent
>65 years 11.8 percent 10.2 percent
Race & Ethnicity City of Highland City of San Bernardino
White alone 38.4 percent 27.6 percent
Black or African-American 6.4 percent 11.8 percent
American Indian & Alaskan
Native 1.4 percent 1.2 percent
Asian alone 8.6 percent 4.1 percent
Native Hawaiian & Pacific
Islander 0.1 percent 0.3 percent
Multiracial 13.4 percent 15.1 percent
Hispanic or Latino 59.2 percent 69.6 percent
White alone, not Hispanic or
Latino 23.7 percent 11.8 percent
Education City of Highland City of San Bernardino
High School 78.5 percent 73.8 percent
Bachelor’s Degree or Higher 22.8 percent 12.8 percent
Housing City of Highland City of San Bernardino
Households 16,401 63,133
7 “US Census Bureau QuickFacts: San Bernardino City, California”. US Census Bureau (n.d.). Archived July 11,
2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250711163735/https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/sanbernardinocitycaliforni
a/PST045224
8 “US Census Bureau QuickFacts: Highland City, California”. US Census Bureau (n.d.). Accessed September 27,
2025. https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/highlandcitycalifornia/SEX255223
24
Table 3-1: Cities of Highland & San Bernardino Demographics
Owner Occupied 65.9 percent 48.5 percent
Median Rent $1,539/month $1,433/month
Median Home Value $455,200 $384,900
Employment & Poverty City of Highland City of San Bernardino
Total Employer Firms 421 2,581
Civilian Labor Force
>15 years old 61.4 percent 60.7 percent
Median Household Income $77,979 $63,988
Poverty Rate 16.7 percent 19.5 percent
The Yuhaaviatam of San Manuel Nation (formerly known as the San Manuel Band of Mission
Indians) is a federally recognized and sovereign tribe of Native Americans. The tribe owns 1,100
acres of land north of the Cities of Highland and San Bernardino at the mountains’ foothills. Their
lands make up one of two independent government entities within the service area. Per the 2013-
2017 American Community Survey, the District provided potable water services to 138 residents9
in addition to fire services within the reservation boundaries.
The Patton State Hospital is a notable special population served by the District. It is a forensic
psychiatric hospital within the County of San Bernardino and is an independent government entity
within the service area (alongside the Yuhaaviatam of San Manuel Nation). Patton State Hospital
is located within the City of San Bernardino and has a bed capacity of 1,287 for inpatient
psychiatric care for inmates committed by the judicial system.
3.8 Land Use
Figure 3-2 on the next page displays the land use within the District’s service area. The map was
copied from the 2020 LHMP. It was created by overlaying the District’s boundary with data from
Southern California Association of Governments General Land Use for the County of San
Bernardino. Only the land uses within the District’s boundary are displayed.
9 “San Manuel Reservation and Off-Reservation Trust Land, CA, 2013-2017 American Community Survey 5-Year
Estimates”. US Census Bureau (n.d.). Archived August 21, 2025. https://www.census.gov/tribal/?st=06&aianihh=3445
25
Figure 3-2: Land Use within the District’s Service Area
26
Residential land use is primarily for both single-family and multi-family households. Most residents
live within the service area but commute outside of it for employment. Zoning density is higher
within the City of San Bernardino compared to the City of Highland, as noted by the abundance
of multi-family residential area in the southern and western portions of the service area. Purple
parcels designated “Specific Plan” are planned residential developments yet to be completed. For
non-residential land uses, open space and parks are prevalent with little medium or dense
commercial use.
Retail and commercial services are scattered throughout the service area with congregation
around major routes and thoroughfares. Light industry is prevalent within the southwest portion
of the service area with some heavy industry due to proximity to the San Bernardino Airport, which
is not served by the District.
Other notable land use factors include the lands of the Yuhaaviatam of San Manuel Nation and
the Patton State Hospital. While their land use is not indicated as residential, there are populations
which reside in these special circumstances. The Yuhaaviatam of San Manuel Nation Land Trust
is characterized as open space while the Patton State Hospital is characterized as public facility
land use.
3.8.1 District Pressure Zones
A “pressure zone” is defined as an area of a water system with a similar elevation and pressure.
Water systems are divided into pressure zones when the broader service area has significant
differences in elevation. To reduce wear and tear on pumps, pressure zones are bound by an
upper and lower elevation while receiving water from the same hydraulic grade line or discrete
pressure from a particular well or reservoir. Each pressure zone is intended to be maintained
without pressure release valves (PRVs) or pumps, though either might exist at the boundaries
between pressure zones.
Per the 2019 WSMP, the District’s water system is divided into six main pressure zones: Lower
Zone, Intermediate Zone, Upper Zone, Foothill Zone, Canal Zone, and Mountain Zone. The Canal
Zone is further divided into three “hydraulically disconnected zones” that are identified as Canal
Zone 1, Canal Zone 2, and Canal Zone 3. There are four smaller hydropneumatic zones and three
zones supplied through PRVs.
Figure 3-3 on the next page shows a map of the District’s pressure zones, hydropneumatic zones,
and PRV zones. This map comes from the 2019 WSMP.
27
Figure 3-3: District Pressure Zones
28
SECTION 4: CAPABILITIES ASSESSMENT AND HAZARD
IDENTIFICATION
The Planning Team conducted a capability assessment of the District’s authorities, policies,
programs, and resources before developing goals and mitigation actions. The results of the
assessment are listed within this section alongside the results of the hazard analysis.
4.1 Existing Authorities, Policies, Programs, and Resources
An assessment of authorities, policies, programs and resources was conducted to identify
capabilities that reduce vulnerability to hazards. The capabilities include authorities and policies,
such as legal and regulatory resources, fiscal resources, and staff (e.g., technical personnel such
as planners/engineers with knowledge of land development and land management practices).
The Planning Team also considered ways to expand and improve these existing policies and
programs to integrate hazard mitigation into the day-to-day activities and programs of the District.
Tables 4-1, 4-2, 4-3, and 4-4 below summarize the existing authorities, policies, programs, and
resources to implement mitigation actions and projects.
FEMA REGULATION CHECKLIST: CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT
44 CFR § 201.6(c)(3): The plan must include mitigation strategies that provide “the
jurisdiction's blueprint for reducing the potential losses identified in the risk assessment, based
on existing authorities, policies, programs and resources, and its ability to expand on and
improve these existing tools.”
Element:
C1. Does the plan document each participant’s existing authorities, policies, programs and
resources and its ability to expand on and improve these existing policies and programs?
(Requirement 44 CFR § 201.6(c)(3))
C1-a. Does the plan describe how the existing capabilities of each participant are
available to support the mitigation strategy? Does this include a discussion of the
existing building codes and land use and development ordinances or regulations?
C1-b. Does the plan describe each participant’s ability to expand and improve the
identified capabilities to achieve mitigation?
C2. Does the plan address each jurisdiction’s participation in the NFIP and continued
compliance with NFIP requirements, as appropriate? (Requirement 44 CFR § 201.6(c)(3)(ii))
C2-a. Does the plan contain a narrative description or a table/list of their participation
activities?
Source: FEMA, Local Mitigation Planning Handbook Review Tool, June 2025
29
4.1.1 Planning and Regulatory Capabilities
Planning and regulatory capabilities include local ordinances, policies, and laws to manage
growth and development. Examples include land use plans, capital improvement plans,
transportation plans, emergency preparedness and response plans, and building codes. These
capabilities may be used to inform and support mitigation planning or may be modified into
mitigation actions. Table 4-1 lists District planning and regulatory capabilities. Under the
Description column is an explanation of the District’s ability to use the LHMP to expound upon
and improve these existing policies and programs.
Table 4-1: Local Planning and Regulatory Capabilities
Name Description
(Effect on Hazard Mitigation)
Hazards
Addressed Date Capability
Type
Upper Santa Ana
River Watershed
Integrated Regional
Urban Water
Management Plan
The purpose of this plan is for water suppliers to
evaluate long-term resource plans and establish
management measures to ensure adequate
water supplies are available to meet existing
and future demands. The plan provides a
framework to help water suppliers maintain
efficient use of urban water supplies, continue to
promote conservation programs and policies,
ensure that sufficient water supplies are
available for future beneficial use, and provide a
mechanism for response during drought
conditions.
Expansion and Improvement: Updates to the
LHMP must address climate change as per
California SB 379. These updates can
inform the UWMP sections on climate change
including the impacts of longer and more
frequent droughts and higher temperatures.
Climate Change
Drought
2020 Planning
Regulatory
Technical
Sewer System
Management Plan
The Sewer System Management Plan provides
information on how the District operates and
regulates sewer and wastewater services. It
also outlines appropriate authorities,
regulations, and ordinances that apply to its
operations.
Expansion and Improvement: Updates to this
plan should incorporate mitigation actions and
hazards to make sure plans are consistent in
their priorities.
All Hazards 2023 Planning
30
Table 4-1: Local Planning and Regulatory Capabilities
Name Description
(Effect on Hazard Mitigation)
Hazards
Addressed Date Capability
Type
Sewer System Master
Plan
In contrast to the Management Plan, the Sewer
System Master Plan is the primary document for
technical specifications needs regarding the
sewer system.
Expansion and Improvement: Updates to this
plan should incorporate mitigation actions and
hazards to make sure plans are consistent in
their priorities. Additionally, any capital
improvement opportunities identified as hazard
mitigation actions should be specified within the
Sewer System Management Plan.
All Hazards 2019 Planning
Technical
Emergency Response
Plan (ERP) 2025
The ERP describes District hazards and
preparedness/response actions in the event of
an emergency.
Expansion and Improvement: The District ERP
contains a list of hazards. The LHMP provides a
similar, more detailed description of these
hazards. Updates to the LHMP can inform
revisions to the ERP. Hazards in both plans
should be corroborated.
All Hazards 2025 Planning
Risk and Resiliency
Assessment (RRA)
2025
The RRA describes the District’s vulnerabilities
and values at risk. It identifies hazards of
particular concern to the District and supports a
quantitative analysis of relative risk.
Expansion and Improvement: The RRA and the
LHMP should use the same source data and
similar language to describe hazards that are
contained in both. Any updates to the hazard
analysis or the risk/vulnerability sections of one
document should be included for both.
All Hazards
2025 Planning
Regulatory
California Code of
Regulations – Title 22,
Division 4.5, Chapter
11: Identification and
Listing of Hazardous
Waste
Describes characters of hazardous waste and
assigns each type of waste a specific number to
which it is subject to certain regulations.
Expansion and Improvement: N/A
All Hazards 2025 Codes and
Regulations
31
Table 4-1: Local Planning and Regulatory Capabilities
Name Description
(Effect on Hazard Mitigation)
Hazards
Addressed Date Capability
Type
California Code of
Regulations – Title 27,
Division 2,
Subdivision 1:
Consolidated
Regulations for
Treatment, Storage,
Processing or
Disposal of Solid
Waste
Describes the definitions of “solid waste” and
solid waste management. Describes the criteria
for waste management units, facilities, and
disposal sites along with required
documentation and reporting. Discusses special
treatment, storage, and disposal units.
Expansion and Improvement: Ensure that all
hazard mitigation activities conform to this
subdivision of the Code of Regulations.
All Hazards 2025 Codes and
Regulations
California Code of
Regulations – Title 24,
Part 5: California
Plumbing Code
Sets the standards and requirements for
plumbing within the State of California, including
sanitary system, sewer, and drainage
requirements.
Expansion and Improvement: Ensure that
hazard mitigation actions comply with the
California Plumbing Code and align with the
Sewer System Master Plan’s priorities.
All Hazards 2022 Codes and
Regulations
State Water
Resources Control
Board: Statewide
Waste Discharge
Requirements –
General Order for
Sanitary Sewer
Systems
Provides the General Order for sanitary sewer
systems’ safe conveyance of sewage and
maintenance of pipes, valves, pump stations,
manholes, and other infrastructure. Designates
ownership rights of laterals and the
implementation of temporary conveyance and
storage facilities. Defines sewage and
monitoring/tracking of spills.
Expansion and Improvement: The District will
reference the General Order in developing
mitigation actions that comply with wastewater
and sanitary sewer system requirements.
All Hazards 2023 Codes and
Regulations
4.1.2 Administrative and Technical Capabilities
Administrative and technical capabilities include community (including public and private) staff
and their skills and tools that can be used for mitigation planning and implementation. This
capability includes engineers, planners, emergency managers, GIS analysts, building inspectors,
grant writers, and floodplain managers. Small communities may rely on other government entities
such as counties or special districts for resources. The capabilities outlined in Table 4-2 may be
32
used when planning mitigation activities to support project feasibility studies, designs, estimates,
and construction.
Table 4-2: Administrative and Technical Capabilities
Technical
Capability Description Hazards Addressed
Professional
Engineers
Certified District staff. Provides input into facility operations and
maintenance planning. Supports analyses of facility upgrades
and other needs.
Expansion and Improvement: Provide opportunities for
continued education of engineering staff to maintain state-of-
the-art knowledge of new code and regulatory requirements.
All Hazards
Trained Water and
Wastewater System
Maintenance
Technicians
Staff trained to manage wastewater collection and treatment
systems, notice impending component faults, and take
preventive/repair actions. Staff perform emergency bypass
training and portable generator hook-up training each year.
Expansion and Improvement: Provide opportunities for
continued education of engineering staff to maintain state-of-
the-art knowledge of new code and regulatory requirements.
All Hazards
Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) and
Analysis Systems
Provides automated monitoring and control of the District’s
wastewater pumping/treatment and water distribution system.
Expansion and Improvement: Provide opportunities for
continued education of SCADA staff on the latest cybersecurity
practices and tools.
All Hazards
Emergency
Operations Center
(EOC)
The District has a fully equipped, dedicated emergency
operations center for rapid response to incidents.
Expansion and Improvement: Conduct systematic training for
EOC staff. Develop a long-range integrated training program.
All Hazards
4.1.3 Financial Capabilities
Financial capabilities include grants, general funds, bonds, development impact fees, and others.
Table 4-3 outlines financial resources that may be used to support mitigation activities.
33
Table 4-3: Financial Capabilities
Financial Resource Administrator Purpose
Hazard Mitigation Grant
Program (HMGP) FEMA
Provides support for post-disaster mitigation plans and projects.
Expansion and Improvement: Train staff on notice of intent
procedures and track opportunities on the Cal OES mitigation
website to initiate applications for grant funding.
General Fund District
Provides funding for all District activities. Funding primarily
comes from utility bills.
Expansion and Improvement: Hazard mitigation projects may be
considered during the annual budgeting process for funding
from the general fund.
Bureau of Reclamation
(BOR) – WaterSMART
and Energy Efficiency
Grants
BOR
Provides funding for organizations including water districts that
“seek to conserve and use water more efficiently” with a focus
on mitigating water conflict risk and increasing water supply
sustainability.
Expansion and Improvement: Train staff on grant application
procedures and timing.
Southern California
Association of
Governments (SCAG)
Grants
SCAG
Provides grants to local jurisdictions (including special districts)
for various activities that support local health and well-being
and/or support critical infrastructure.
Expansion and Improvement: Train staff on grant application
procedures and timing.
Riverside Urban Area
Security Initiative
(Riverside UASI) Grants
Riverside UASI
Grants that support homeland security and domestic
preparedness with a focus on cybersecurity, terrorism, and
conflict.
Expansion and Improvement: Train staff on grant application
procedures and timing.
Department of Water
Resources (DWR)
Grants
DWR
State agency funding used to support watershed projects and
mitigation programs.
Expansion and Improvement: Train staff on grant application
procedures and timing.
Bonds District
Long-term funding opportunities through selling bonds.
Expansion and Improvement: Hazard mitigation projects may be
considered during the annual budgeting process for funding
from the general fund.
34
Table 4-3: Financial Capabilities
Financial Resource Administrator Purpose
Emergency Watershed
Protection Program
(EWP)
Natural Resources
Conservation
Service (NRCS)
Short-term funding for emergencies due to natural disasters.
Support programs specific to watersheds include removing
debris from stream channels and protecting eroded banks.
Expansion and Improvement: Train staff on application
procedures and timing.
Environmental Quality
Incentives Program
(EQIP)
NRCS
Long-term program funding related to water and air quality
projects including soil erosion repair following disasters.
Expansion and Improvement: Train staff on grant application
procedures and timing.
California Forest
Improvement Grant
Program (CFIP)
Cal Fire
Short-/Moderate-term funding for reforestation and resource
management within wildland areas. Funding is meant for
management of areas with sub-merchantable or no commercial
value.
Expansion and Improvement: Train staff on grant application
procedures and timing.
California Climate
Investments (CCI) Fire
Prevention Grant
Program
Cal Fire
Grants specific to hazardous fuel reduction regarding dead,
dying, and diseased trees. Also supports fire prevention
planning and education.
Expansion and Improvement: Train staff on grant application
procedures and timing.
State Fire Assistance
Program (SFAP)
California Fire Safe
Council
Provides funding for hazard mitigation vegetation treatments
specifically for fuel on the Wildland-Urban Interface. Activities
supported include chipping, burning, and grazing.
Expansion and Improvement: Train staff on grant application
procedures and timing.
Watershed Protection
Program (WPP)
California State
Water Resources
Control Board
(SWRCB)
Provides funding for hazard mitigation programs intended to
reduce chronic flooding, control water velocity, and/or reduce
water volume using nonstructural methods. Funds may also be
used to prevent watershed soil erosion and sedimentation.
Expansion and Improvement: Train staff on grant application
procedures and timing.
35
Table 4-3: Financial Capabilities
Financial Resource Administrator Purpose
Clean Water State
Revolving Fund
(CWSRF)
SWRCB
Provides funding for programs that protect and improve water
quality and environmental protection. CWSRF can finance
publicly owned treatment facilities including wastewater
treatment plants and sewer systems.
Expansion and Improvement: Train staff on grant application
procedures and timing.
Drinking Water State
Revolving Fund
(DWSRF)
SWRCB
Provides funding for drinking water infrastructure projects that
comply with Safe Drinking Water Act requirements. DWSRF can
finance publicly owned and non-profit community water
systems. Eligible projects include treatment systems,
distribution systems, consolidations, pipeline extensions, water
storage, and water sourcing.
Expansion and Improvement: Train staff on grant application
procedures and timing.
Water Recycling Funding
Program (WRFP) SWRCB
Provides technical and financial assistance to local agencies in
support of water recycling projects.
Expansion and Improvement: Train staff on grant application
procedures and timing, especially as the WRFP relates to SNRC
operations.
Water Infrastructure
Finance and Innovation
Act (WIFIA) Loans
US EPA
Provides funding on an ongoing basis through loans for projects
in service of critical water infrastructure projects. WIFIA loans
are intended to be used in tandem with State Revolving Fund
programs.
Expansion and Improvement: Train staff on grant application
procedures and timing.
4.1.4 Education and Outreach Capabilities
These capabilities include public information/communications office, hazard awareness
campaigns, and social media accounts. Education and outreach capabilities can be used to inform
the public about current and potential mitigation activities. Table 4-4 outlines these capabilities.
36
Table 4-4: Education and Outreach Resources
Name Description Hazards
Addressed
Capability
Type
Public Information
Office
Develops and delivers outreach and engagement
programs that promote hazard awareness, safety of
drinking water, and water conservation methods.
Expansion and Improvement: Develop a section in
the newsletter that addresses mitigation planning
activities. Implement a customer outreach plan.
All Hazards Campaign
District Website
https://www.eastvalle
ywater.gov/
The District uses the website to post public
information on and to collect input for the LHMP
update process. The website is also used to provide
information on emergency declarations, response,
and recovery conditions. Links to county, State, and
federal emergency preparedness sites can be
added to provide information on individual and
family readiness.
Expansion and Improvement: Provide links to the
County website on the District’s website. Post
material on social media accounts that provide a link
to the appropriate County website page.
All Hazards Website
District Social Media
Accounts:
Instagram
https://www.instagra
m.com/eastvalleywat
er/?hl=en
Facebook
https://www.facebook
.com/eastvalleywater
X
https://x.com/i/flow/lo
gin?redirect_after_lo
gin=%2Feastvalleyw
ater
Provides easily accessed information about the
District. Used for LHMP public outreach and
engagement.
Expansion and Improvement: Devote a page on the
social media accounts to post the HMP and provide
updates on the progress of the mitigation action
plan.
All Hazards Social Media
37
Table 4-4: Education and Outreach Resources
Name Description Hazards
Addressed
Capability
Type
Sterling Natural
Resource Center
(SNRC)
The SNRC facility produces recycled water to
replenish the Bunker Hill Groundwater Basin. The
Education Program at the SNRC provides facility
tours, summer internships, classroom
demonstrations, and equipment demonstrations. It
also allows the District to engage with local
communities on water conservation.
Expansion and Improvement: The District
recognizes the importance of engaging community
members in developing mitigation techniques and
plans. Consistent with the emphasis on outreach,
the District will continue to foster collaboration with
the community using the SNRC for outreach
programs to schools and community groups.
All Hazards Education and
Outreach
4.1.5 National Flood Insurance Program Participation
The District does not participate in the NFIP. None of its facilities are located within repetitive loss
areas identified on Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs).
According to the 2023 County of San Bernardino Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan, 12
RL properties exist throughout the County. Most of the RL properties within the County are in high,
localized mountain areas due to debris flow, which could be located within the District’s service
area. The District will continue to review and design mitigation projects in accordance with NFIP
requirements.
4.2 Hazard Identification
A hazard analysis consists of identifying, screening, and profiling each hazard. The hazard
analysis encompasses natural hazards and human-caused hazards (also known as
“technological hazards”). Natural hazards result from unexpected or uncontrollable natural events
of significant size and destructive power. Human-caused hazards result from human activity; they
may be intentional (e.g., cyberattacks) or unintentional (e.g., dam failure/inundation).
This section profiles each identified hazard in their respective sections. These sections include
descriptions of the type, history, location, extent, impact of climate change, regulatory
environment, developmental trends, and probability of future events. The impact of climate
change is also discussed where appropriate. Where appropriate, hazards are accompanied by
maps and graphs to demonstrate extent and probability.
38
FEMA REGULATION CHECKLIST: HAZARD IDENTIFICATION & ANALYSIS
44 CFR § 201.6(c)(2)(i): A description of the type, location, and extent of all natural
hazards that can affect the jurisdiction. The plan must include information on previous
occurrences of hazard events and on the probability of future hazard events.
Element:
B1. Does the plan include a description of the type, location, and extent of all natural hazards
that can affect the jurisdiction? Does the plan also include information on previous occurrences
of hazard events and on the probability of future hazard events? (Requirement 44 CFR §
201.6(c)(2)(i))
B1-a. Does the plan describe all natural hazards that can affect the jurisdiction(s) in the
planning area, and does it provide the rationale if omitting any natural hazards that are
commonly recognized to affect the jurisdiction(s) in the planning area?
B1-b. Does the plan include information on the location of each identified hazard?
B1-c. Does the plan describe the extent for each identified hazard?
B1-d. Does the plan include the history of previous hazard events for each identified hazard?
B1-e. Does the plan include the probability of future events for each identified hazard, including
the type, location, and range of anticipated intensities?
B1-f. For participating jurisdictions in a multi‐jurisdictional plan, does the plan describe any
hazards that are unique to and/or vary from those affecting the overall planning area?
Source: FEMA, Local Mitigation Planning Handbook Review Tool, June 2025
4.2.1 Hazard Screening
The Planning Team reviewed the 2020 LHMP hazards and other hazards identified by FEMA’s
National Risk Index (NRI) in selecting hazards for the 2026 LHMP. The Public Engagement
Survey asked members of the public to identify hazards of community concern. Other plans that
informed the hazard screening and analysis include the District’s 2020 LHMP, the County of San
Bernardino’s 2022 MJHMP, the City of San Bernardino’s draft 2024 LHMP, and the 2021 California
State Hazard Mitigation Plan. Table 4-5 shows hazards listed in the 2020 LHMP, whereas Table
4-6 shows which hazards were considered by the Planning Team and the reasoning for inclusion
or exclusion.
Based on available information, no common or recurring hazards were omitted from this LHMP.
Some omitted hazards were deemed not applicable to the District’s service area, such as
avalanche and coastal flooding. Other hazards not included in the NRI were assessed and
included within the LHMP due to recommendations from the Planning Team, such as
cyberattacks. During a review of the 2020 hazards, the Planning Team decided to eliminate “Loss
of Critical Spares” and “Physical Adversary”. See Table 4-6 for more information
The Planning Team developed the “HAZMAT Incident” hazard as an umbrella hazard for HAZMAT
spills, pipeline failures, and transportation accidents as the hazards all have similar impacts on
District operations. The Planning Team also agreed to combine thunderstorms and high winds
39
into the “Severe Storms” hazard given the primary impact of both will be wind damage and debris.
Lightning strikes are included in discussions about thunderstorms and wildfires.
Additionally, the Planning Team agreed to carry over climate change and cyberattack as hazards
from the previous LHMP cycle. Climate change as a hazard satisfies regulatory requirements and
includes the correlation of climate change to other hazards such as drought, which can seriously
impact District operations.
Table 4-5: Hazards Listed in 2020 LHMP
1. Climate Change
2. Cyberattack
3. Drought
4. Earthquake
5. Flood/Flash Flood/Debris Flows
6. Hazardous Materials Release (as “Hazardous Material Facilities & Pipelines”)
7. Land Subsidence
8. Loss of Critical Spares
9. Physical Adversary
10. Power Failure/PSPS (as “Loss of Power”)
11. Wildland Fire
Table 4-6: Hazard Screening
Hazard FEMA NRI
Hazard?
2020
LHMP?
2026
LHMP? Notes
Avalanche Yes No No Snowfall is rare within the service area, and snowfall that
collects to the extent of avalanche danger is nonexistent. It is
extremely unlikely that avalanches will be a hazard of concern
during the hazard mitigation period, especially given the
relatively warm winter climate and distance from the slope
angles that lead to avalanches. NRI does not assign a risk
profile to the District’s census tracts.
Coastal
Flooding
Yes No No The service area lies entirely outside coastal flooding and
tsunami zones. NRI does not assign a risk profile for coastal
flooding to the County of San Bernardino.
Climate
Change
No Yes Yes Although climate change is no longer part of the updated
FEMA LHMP guidance, it is included in this LHMP given its
strong association with changes in the frequency and intensity
of other hazards discussed in the LHMP, such as droughts and
severe storms.
Cold Wave Yes No No Given FEMA’s definition of a cold wave as “extreme low
temperatures for an extended period,” this hazard is not
applicable to the service area. NRI does not assign a risk
profile for cold waves to the County of San Bernardino.
40
Table 4-6: Hazard Screening
Hazard FEMA NRI
Hazard?
2020
LHMP?
2026
LHMP? Notes
Cyberattack No Yes Yes Public utilities have historically been major targets of
cyberattacks for terrorism and financial gain, with several
high-profile incidents occurring in the State of California over
the last five years. Cyberattacks were included within the
previous LHMP cycle.
Dam Failure &
Inundation
No No Yes The southern service area and infrastructure are at risk of
inundation if the Seven Oaks Dam failed.
Drought Yes Yes Yes Droughts are a recurring problem within the County of San
Bernardino. The District’s infrastructure and operations have
historically been stressed due to drought conditions within the
last decade. Droughts are highly relevant to water districts.
Earthquakes &
Seismic Events
Yes Yes Yes The District’s infrastructure, buildings, and service area lie
near major fault lines including the San Andreas Fault System
and the San Jacinto Fault.
Emerging
Infectious
Disease (EID)
No No No Following COVID-19 and other high-profile epidemics such as
2009 H1N1 Flu and Zika Virus, the Planning Team considered
adding EIDs as a hazard that could disproportionately impact
staff instead of infrastructure. However, the Planning Team
eventually decided not to as disease mitigation activities are
the responsibility of local public health organizations.
Hail Yes No No This area of southern California very rarely experiences hail,
and not to the extent of damage to infrastructure, buildings, or
vehicles. NRI assigns a risk profile of “relatively low” to the
census tracts that encompass the service area.
Hazardous
Materials
Incident
(HAZMAT
Incident)
No Yes Yes While there are no heavy manufacturing or industrial sectors
served by the District, much of its infrastructure is involved
with HAZMAT. There exist gas stations, underground storage
tanks, and Superfund sites nearby.
Heat Wave Yes No Yes While the Planning Team decided that infrastructure is unlikely
to be stressed during a heat wave, impacts to the human
population and to water consumption rates are likely. NRI
assigns a risk profile of “relatively high” to the County of San
Bernardino.
Hurricane Yes No No Hurricanes have not frequently impacted the County of San
Bernardino. Weather hazards are subsumed within the
“Severe Storms” category. NRI does not assign a risk profile
for hurricanes to the County of San Bernardino.
Ice Storm Yes No No The County of San Bernardino’s warm and semi-arid climate
precludes the occurrence of ice storms. NRI does not assign
a risk profile for ice storms to the County of San Bernardino.
Land
Subsidence
No Yes No A review of existing geological data shows less risk for land
subsidence than assumed in the previous LHMP’s iteration.
41
Table 4-6: Hazard Screening
Hazard FEMA NRI
Hazard?
2020
LHMP?
2026
LHMP? Notes
Landslide Yes No Yes Parts of the service area and water distribution infrastructure
are located among the steep slopes of the San Bernardino
Mountains foothills in which landslides have occurred
following heavy rains. The County of San Bernardino is
assigned an NRI risk profile of “relatively high”.
Lightning Yes No No Thunderstorms are included within the “Severe Storms”
category, and the dangers of dry lightning strikes are included
within the “Wildfire” category. Lightning itself was not
considered a significant hazard to warrant its own hazard
category.
Loss of Critical
Spares
No Yes No The Planning Team considered adding this hazard again from
the previous cycle. It was deemed not appropriate for this
LHMP given that this is the purview of general maintenance
and operations as opposed to being a distinct hazard as befits
the LHMP.
Physical
Adversary
No Yes No The Planning Team decided that infrastructure attacks,
serious criminal activity, and terrorism did not meet the
threshold of probability or extent to be considered in this
LHMP cycle. The major concern is a cyberattack, not attacks
on the District’s physical infrastructure.
Power Loss No Yes Yes Partial and complete power losses have occurred that have
disrupted operations of the District’s facilities resulting in loss
of services and incurring costs. Retitled from “Loss of Power”
per the 2020 LHMP.
Riverine
Flooding
Yes Yes Yes Retitled to “Flood” given that Coastal Flooding was not a
hazard in this LHMP. NRI assigns a risk profile of “relatively
high” for riverine flooding to the census tracts comprising the
service area. Debris flows are discussed within the “Wildfire”
and “Landslide” hazards.
Severe Storms No No Yes This is a natural hazards category that was developed to
include the impacts of thunderstorms, atmospheric rivers, and
similar weather hazards.
Strong Wind Yes Yes No Although included in the 2020 LHMP, the Planning Team
decided that strong winds did not meet the criteria for
probability or extent to be included in this cycle. NRI assigns
a risk profile of “very low” for the census tracts that encompass
the service area. Santa Ana winds were considered a
subsidiary hazard to severe storms and wildfires.
Tornado Yes No No The Planning Team decided that tornadoes are not a hazard
of significant concern to the District and have neither impacted
the service area nor the surrounding Cities. Severe weather
involving high winds (e.g., windstorms) are subsumed within
the “Severe Storms” category.
Tsunami Yes No No The service area and infrastructure are outside of coastal
flooding and tsunami zones. NRI does not assign a risk profile
for tsunamis to the County of San Bernardino.
42
Table 4-6: Hazard Screening
Hazard FEMA NRI
Hazard?
2020
LHMP?
2026
LHMP? Notes
Volcanic
Activity
Yes No No There are no volcanoes within 100 miles of the District. NRI
does not assign a risk profile for volcanic activity to the County
of San Bernardino.
Wildfire Yes Yes Yes Wildfires are among the greatest threats to the District’s staff,
infrastructure, buildings, and service area population. NRI
assigns a risk profile of “very high” for the County of San
Bernardino, placing it within the 99.9th percentile among US
counties.
Winter Weather Yes No No Snowstorms and ice storms do not occur within the service
area. The impacts of major weather events that occur in the
winter months (e.g., atmospheric rivers) are subsumed within
the “Severe Storms” category. NRI assigns a risk profile of
“very low” for winter weather within the County of San
Bernardino.
4.2.2 Emergency Proclamation History
The Planning Team also considered the District’s history of disasters using 25 years of historical
data (2000-2024). Of the 38 declared disasters that impacted the County of San Bernardino, 14
were identified as impacting the organization. Note that some hazards rarely result in disaster
declarations and may be underrepresented (e.g., hazardous materials release incidents,
cyberattacks, and power failures). Table 4-7 lists these disasters.
Table 4-7: County of San Bernardino Emergency Proclamations
Year Disaster # Hazard Description Impacted
OmniTrans?
2024 FM-5537-CA Bridge Fire Fire No
2024 FM-5535-CA Line Fire Fire Yes
2023 DR-4699-CA
Severe Winter Storms, Straight-
Line Winds, Flooding, Landslides,
and Mudslides
Severe Storm
Flood
Landslide
No
2023 EM-3591-CA Severe Winter Storms, Flooding,
and Mudslides
Severe Storm
Flood No
2023 EM-3592-CA Severe Winter Storms, Flooding,
Landslides, and Mudslides
Severe Storm
Flood
Landslide
No
2021 DR-4569-CA California Wildfire Fire No
2021 FM-5381-CA Blue Ridge Fire Fire No
2020 DR-4482-CA COVID-19 Pandemic Biological Yes
2020 EM-3428-CA California COVID-19 Biological Yes
2020 FM-5350-CA El Dorado Fire Fire No
2020 FM-5325-CA Apple Fire Fire No
43
4.2.3 Disaster Proclamation Process
When there is a condition of extreme peril or potential peril to the safety of persons and property,
and the condition is beyond the capability of the local jurisdiction to control effectively, the local
governing body (board of directors, city council, board of supervisors, or a person authorized by
ordinance) may proclaim that a local emergency exists. The local government may request the
California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES) Director to concur in their
proclamation of a local emergency and provide assistance under the California Disaster
Assistance Act (CDAA).
Table 4-7: County of San Bernardino Emergency Proclamations
Year Disaster # Hazard Description Impacted
OmniTrans?
2019 FM-5301-CA Hillside Fire Fire Yes
2019 EM-3415-CA Earthquakes Earthquake No
2016 FM-5147-CA Blue Cut Fire Fire Yes
2016 FM-5144-CA Pilot Fire Fire Yes
2015 FM-5089-CA North Fire Fire No
2011 DR-1952-CA Winter Storms, Flooding, and Debris
and Mud Flows
Severe Storm
Flood Yes
2011 FM-2955-CA Hill Fire Fire No
2010 DR-1884-CA Severe Winter Storms, Flooding, and
Debris and Mud Flows
Severe Storm
Flood Yes
2009 FM-2841-CA Sheep Fire Fire No
2009 FM-2833-CA Oak Glen Fire Fire No
2008 FM-2792-CA California Freeway Complex Fire Fire No
2007-2008 DR-1731-CA California Wildfires Fire No
2007 EM-3279-CA Wildfires in California Fire No
2007 FM-2738-CA Grass Valley Fire Fire No
2007 FM-2728-CA Butler 2 Fire Fire No
2007 DR-1689-CA Severe Freeze Freezing No
2006 FM-2653-CA Sawtooth Complex Fire Fire No
2005 DR-1585-CA
Severe Storms, Flooding,
Landslides, and Mud and Debris
Flows
Severe Storm Yes
2004-2005 DR-1577-CA Severe Storms, Flooding, Debris
Flows, and Mudslides Severe Storm Yes
2003-2004 DR-1498-CA Wildfires in California Fire Yes
2003 FM-2503-CA Old Fire Fire Yes
2003 FM-2501-CA Grand Prix Fire Fire Yes
2003 FM-2497-CA Bridge Fire Fire No
2003 FM-2491-CA Locust Fire Fire No
2002 FM-2464-CA Williams Fire Fire No
2002 FSA-2433-CA Louisiana Fire Fire No
2002 FSA-2425-CA Blue Cut Fire Fire Yes
44
If sufficient conditions occur, the State may proclaim a state of emergency to fully commit State
and Mutual Aid assistance and provide resources to assist local government. Following the
proclamation of a state of emergency, the Cal OES Director may recommend that the Governor
request a Presidential declaration of a major disaster under the authority of Public Law 93-288.
The Governor’s request to the president is submitted through FEMA.
4.2.4 Hazard Risk Rating
The relative risk for each potential hazard was rated using the Calculated Priority Risk Index
(CPRI). The CPRI examines four criteria for each hazard: probability, magnitude/severity, warning
time, and duration. For each hazard, an index value is assigned for each CPRI category from 0
to 4, with “0” being the least hazardous and “4” being the most hazardous situation. This value is
assigned a weighting factor, and the result is a hazard ranking score. Table 4-8 below describes
the CPRI formula.
Table 4-8: Calculated Priority Risk Index
CPRI
Category Level ID Description Index
Value
Assigned
Weight
Probability
Unlikely Extremely rare with no documented history of occurrences
or events. Annual probability of less than 0.001 1
45%
Possible
Rare occurrences with at least one documented or
anecdotal historic event. Annual probability of between
0.01 and 0.001
2
Likely
Occasional occurrence with at least two or more
documented historical events. Annual probability of
between 0.1 and 0.01
3
Highly Likely Frequent events with a well-documented history of
occurrence. Annual probability of greater than 0.1 4
Magnitude-
Severity
Negligible
Negligible property damages (less than 5% of critical and
non-critical facilities and infrastructure). Injuries or
illnesses are treatable with first aid, and there are no
deaths. Negligible quality of life lost. Shut down of critical
facilities for less than 24 hours.
1
30%
Limited
Slight property damages (greater than 5% and less than
25% of critical and non-critical facilities and infrastructure).
Injuries and illnesses do not result in permanent disability,
and there are no deaths. Moderate quality of life lost. Shut
down of critical facilities for more than 1 day and less than
1 week.
2
45
Table 4-8: Calculated Priority Risk Index
CPRI
Category Level ID Description Index
Value
Assigned
Weight
Critical
Moderate property damages (greater than 25% and less
than 50% of critical and non-critical facilities and
infrastructures). Injuries or illnesses result in permanent
disability and at least one death. Shut down of critical
facilities for more than 1 week and less than 1 month.
3
Catastrophic
Severe property damages (greater than 50% of critical
and non-critical facilities and infrastructure). Injuries or
illnesses result in permanent disability and multiple
deaths. Shut down of critical facilities for more than 1
month.
4
Warning
Time
> than 24
hours
Population receives greater than 24 hours of warning. 1
15% 12 to 24 hours Population receives between 12-24 hours of warning. 2
6 to 12 hours Population receives between 6-12 hours of warning. 3
< than 6 hours Population receives less than 6 hours of warning. 4
Duration
< than 6 hours Disaster event will last less than 6 hours. 1
10%
6 to 24 hours Disaster event will last between 6-24 hours. 2
24 hrs. to 1
week
Disaster event will last between 24 hours and 1 week.
3
> than 1 week Disaster event will last more than 1 week. 4
The results of the CPRI are shown in Table 4-9 below.
Table 4-9: Calculated Priority Risk Index Summary
Hazard
Pr
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
We
i
g
h
t
e
d
45
%
Ma
g
n
i
t
u
d
e
&
Se
v
e
r
i
t
y
We
i
g
h
t
e
d
30
%
Wa
r
n
i
n
g
Ti
m
e
We
i
g
h
t
e
d
15
%
Du
r
a
t
i
o
n
We
i
g
h
t
e
d
10
%
CP
R
I
Ra
n
k
i
n
g
1. Climate Change 4 1.80 3 .90 1 .15 4 .40 3.25
2. Cyberattack 3 1.35 2 .60 4 .60 3 .30 2.85
3. Dam Failure & Inundation 1 .45 4 1.20 4 .60 4 .40 2.65
4. Drought 4 1.80 2 .60 1 .15 4 .40 2.95
5. Earthquakes & Seismic Events 3 1.35 4 1.20 4 .60 4 .40 3.55
46
Table 4-9: Calculated Priority Risk Index Summary
Hazard
Pr
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
We
i
g
h
t
e
d
45
%
Ma
g
n
i
t
u
d
e
&
Se
v
e
r
i
t
y
We
i
g
h
t
e
d
30
%
Wa
r
n
i
n
g
Ti
m
e
We
i
g
h
t
e
d
15
%
Du
r
a
t
i
o
n
We
i
g
h
t
e
d
10
%
CP
R
I
Ra
n
k
i
n
g
6. Flooding 2 .90 2 .60 3 .45 3 .30 2.25
7. HAZMAT Incident 2 .90 2 .60 4 .60 2 .20 2.30
8. Heat Wave 4 1.80 1 .30 1 .15 3 .30 2.55
9. Landslide 2 .90 1 .30 4 .60 1 .10 1.90
10. Power Loss 4 1.80 2 .60 3 .45 2 .20 3.05
11. Severe Storms 4 1.80 2 .60 2 .30 2 .20 2.90
12. Wildfire 4 1.80 3 .90 3 .45 4 .40 3.55
4.3 Hazard Characterization and Profiles
A hazard analysis consists of identifying, screening, and profiling each hazard . The
requirements for hazard identification are described below, as stipulated in DMA 2000 and its
implementing regulations.
4.3.1 Climate Change
Description: The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) describes climate change as
“any significant change in the measures of climate lasting for an extended period of time. In
other words, climate change includes major changes in temperature, precipitation, or w ind
patterns, among other effects, which occur over several decades or longer.”10
Climate change is often confused with global warming, the recent and ongoing rise in global
average temperatures near Earth’s surface. However, global warming represents only one
aspect of climate change. Climate change broadly refers to the many ways in which the climate
is being altered and the anticipated effects in the future.
The State of California has seen greater fluctuations in rainfall, resulting in more floods,
droughts, storm cycles, and heat waves. Glaciers and snowfields within the Sierra Nevada have
shrunk, especially within Yosemite National Park and the Palisades area. Changing plant
ecosystems due to a lack of killing frosts have allowed ragweed plants to produce pollen later
into the year, potentially prolonging allergy season.11
10 “Climate Change: Basic Information”. US EPA (January 19, 2017). Archived August 21, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250821210203/https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/climatechange/climate -
change-basic-information_.html
11 California SHMP (2023)
47
History: Climate change has occurred throughout the planet's history due to variations in the
earth’s inclination to the sun, volcanic activity, and other factors such as asteroid impacts and the
amount of solar radiation reaching the earth’s surface. The planet's temperature correlates to the
amount of solar radiation arriving at the surface and the climate with it. There is considerable
controversy over whether or not the current cycle of climate change is anthropogenic (i.e.,
human-caused); however, the answer t o that question does not change the trends measured
over the last one hundred years.12
In relatively recent history, the last glacial period, popularly known as the Ice Age, occurred from
c. 110,000 to 12,000 years ago. This most recent glacial period is part of a larger pattern of glacial
and interglacial periods known as the Quaternary glaciation (c. 2,588,000 years ago to present).
From this point of view, scientists consider this "ice age" to be merely the latest glaciation event
in a much longer ice age that dates back over two million years and is still ongoing.
During this last glacial period, there were several changes between glacier advance and retreat.
The Last Glacial Maximum, the maximum extent of glaciation within the last glacial period, was
approximately 22,000 years ago. While the general pattern of global cooling and glacial advance
was similar, local differences in advance/retreat make it difficult to compare the details from
continent to continent. Generally, temperature variation and glaciation patterns have lagged in
atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) content.
Figure 4-1 depicts global variations during the past 400,000 years as a correlation between
temperature and atmospheric CO2 content in parts per million.13
Figure 4-1: Temperature and Atmospheric CO2 Variation, Past 400,000 Years
12 California SHMP (2023)
13 Hogg, A.M. “Glacial cycles and carbon dioxide: A conceptual model”. Geophysical Research Letters, 35, L01701
(2008). doi: 10.1029/2007GL032071.
48
For 22,000 years ago, the planet has slowly warmed, and the glaciers retreated to high northern
latitudes and mountains. In addition to natural warming, anthropogenic effects have resulted in
an increase in atmospheric CO2, which is associated with a matching rise in global temperature.
The result has been a potential acceleration of climate change. Figure 4-2 provides a graphical
depiction of the recent history of temperature rise.14
Figure 4-2: Temperature Rise Since 1880
Location: Climate change by its very definition is a global phenomenon, and so it is expected to
affect the entire San Bernardino Valley. Information on location-specific impacts may be found
within the County of San Bernardino’s MJHMP (2022), City of San Bernardino’s LHMP (2024),
and the San Bernardino County Vulnerability Assessment (2022).
Extent: In addition to a broad increase in baseline temperatures, the San Bernardino County
Vulnerability Assessment and the Climate Change and Health Report describe several ways by
which the County of San Bernardino (especially the populous southwestern area, which the
District serves) may experience climate change. A full summary of every effect is outside the
scope of this LHMP, and interested parties are encouraged to read the Vulnerability Assessment
14 Dahlmen, L. & Lindsey, R. “Climate change: global temperature”. NOAA (May 29, 2025). Archived August 21,
2025. https://www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-climate/climate-change-global-temperature
49
in particular for more information. Salient examples from both documents are described below
and in the “Impact of Climate Change” subsections within other hazards.
• Increased frequency and intensity of droughts. The southwestern United States
normally experiences drought. However, droughts are expected to become longer -
lasting and of deeper intensity, impacting the region’s agricultural products and reducing
water availability for drinking, manufacturing, and waste conveyance.
• Increased frequency and intensity of wildfires. As with droughts, wildfires are a
natural part of the southwestern United States’ ecosystem. Many forests rely on fires to
clear underbrush and release seeds. However, increased dryness of deadfall as well as
hotter temperatures and winds may increase the destructive potential of wildfires,
especially those near the wilderness -urban interface. On average, more than 2 percent
of the land area in the State of California each decade over the last four decades.
Additionally, wildfires smoke can reduce air quality and increase medical costs.
• Changes to native and invasive species. Warmer and drier conditions can make
certain types of forests more susceptible to pests, as with the goldspotted oak borer in
southern California. Tree-kill due to bark beetles has increased fuel loads throughout the
State, which can likewise increase the destructive potential of wildfires. Giant reed,
pampas grass, and salt cedar are invasive within the Upper Santa Ana River Watershed
and thrive under warmer conditions.
• Increased frequency of heat waves. As discussed within the “Heat Wave” hazard,
southwestern County of San Bernardino is poised to experience a greater number of
hotter days and heat advisories. Per the Vulnerability Assessment, the service area is
projected to experience 35 -40 “additional maximum heat days” by 2050 .15 The average
hottest day of the year is expected to increase approximately 8 -11°F by 2100.
• Increased number of severe storms and flooding. One of the seemingly paradoxical
impacts of climate change is long-term reduction in overall moisture but with greater
fluctuations between extreme events. In other words, it is expected that southwestern
County of San Bernardino will be drier on average, but severe storms and flash flooding
events would be more extreme when they do occur. Extremely wet seasons are
projected to occur twice as frequently by 2050 within southern California, even as drier
seasons are projected to be drier and longer. Warmer temperatures are also expected
to cause rapid snowmelt once spring begins.
Regulatory Context: Key laws, regulations, and policies developed by the State of California and
local jurisdictions are described below.
• The California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (Assembly Bill [AB] 32 and
Senate Bill [SB] 32): AB 32 was the primary legislation driving the State’s greenhouse
gas regulation. It instructed the California Air Resource Board (CARB) to develop and
enforce regulations for the reporting and verifying of statewide greenhouse emissions with
the goal of reducing statewide emissions to 1990 levels by 2020. In September 2016, the
15 Note: “Additional maximum heat days” is defined as days with temperatures hotter than 95 percent of the daily
maximum temperatures from 1976 -2005.
50
Governor signed SB 32, which builds upon the statewide targets for 2020 by establishing
a longer-term target so that “statewide greenhouse gas emissions are reduced to 40
percent below the 1990 levels by 2030.”16 The bill further authorized CARB to adopt
regulations to achieve the maximum technologically feasible and cost-effective
greenhouse gas emissions reductions.
• California Executive Orders S-3-05 (2005) and B-30-15 (2015): Both executive orders
highlight longer-term emissions reduction targets for the State of California. Specifically,
Executive Order S-3-05 sought a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions of 80 percent
below 1990 levels by 2050, consistent with the scientific consensus that developed
regions will need to reduce emissions at least 80 percent below 1990 levels to limit global
warming to 2.0°C.17 Executive Order B-30-15 seeks to establish an interim target between
the 2020 target established through AB 32 and the long-term targets in EO S-3-05, to
achieve a reduction of GHG emissions of 40 percent below 1990 levels by 2030.18
• CEQA and Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Senate Bill 97): In 2007, the Natural
Resources Agency was directed by the legislature to prepare amendments to the
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) Guidelines, providing direction to lead
agencies on how to analyze and mitigate greenhouse gas emissions.19
• Senate Bill 379 (2015) Planning and Zoning Law: This legislation requires that the next
revision of a jurisdiction’s local hazard mitigation plan on or after January 1, 2017, or, if
the local jurisdiction has not adopted a local hazard mitigation plan, beginning on or before
January 1, 2022, include a review and update of the safety element to address climate
adaptation and resiliency strategies applicable to that city or county. The bill would require
the update to include a set of goals, policies, and objectives based on a vulnerability
assessment, identifying the risks that climate change poses to the local jurisdiction and
the geographic areas at risk from climate change impacts.20
California has also prepared programs and guidance for local governments to consider when
identifying hazards and adapting to a changing climate, including:
• California Climate Adaptation Strategy (Executive Order S-13-08): In 2008, the
Governor signed EO S-13-08, which directed the California Natural Resources Agency to
lead a statewide effort to develop a climate adaptation strategy. Published in 2009, the
statewide plan describes climate trends and the potential impacts of climate change on
16 “Climate Change”. CARB (n.d.). Archived August 21, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250821210705/https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/topics/climate-change
17 Executive Order S-3-05. Signed June 2, 2005. Archived July 2, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250702230104/https://www.library.ca.gov/wp-
content/uploads/GovernmentPublications/executive-order-proclamation/5129-5130.pdf
18 Executive Order B-30-15. Signed April 29, 2015. Archived July 24, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250724113812/https://www.library.ca.gov/wp-
content/uploads/GovernmentPublications/executive-order-proclamation/39-B-30-15.pdf
19 Senate Bill No. 97, Chapter 185. Filed August 24, 2007. Archived May 26, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250526165113/https://www.lci.ca.gov/ceqa/docs/20210721 -
SB_97_bill_20070824_chaptered.pdf
20 CA SB379 2015-2016. Passed October 8, 2015. Archived August 21, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250821211229/https://legiscan.com/CA/text/SB379/id/1265233
51
key sectors, and it outlines short- and long-term actions that state and local governments
can take to address future climate impacts.21
• California Adaptation Planning Guide (APG): Published in 2012 and updated in 2020,
this statewide resource serves as a guide to local governments to identify, evaluate, and
plan for the range of unavoidable consequences their community may face in the future
due to climate change. The APG includes a step-by-step process for conducting a
vulnerability assessment and identifying potential adaptation strategies.22
Regulatory actions taken specifically by the County of San Bernardino include:
• Regional Greenhouse Gas Reduction Plan (2021): This Plan was initially developed in
2014 and updated in 2021 for the San Bernardino Council of Governments to define
relevant greenhouse gases, discuss actions that may be taken by each participating
jurisdiction, and identify strategies in which County and State goals align. Finally, the plan
discusses local climate action plans and broader regional coordination between
jurisdictions to satisfy the plan’s goals.23
• San Bernardino County Vulnerability Assessment (2022): The Vulnerability
Assessment contains a detailed analysis of the County’s social, economic, and
environmental vulnerabilities to eight climate change-induced hazards: extreme heat,
wildfire, drought, flooding, air quality, severe weather, extreme wind, and landslides.24
Developmental Trends: The Cities of Highland and San Bernardino incorporate environmental
planning considerations within their General Plans to address both climate change and expected
secondary impacts. The City of Highland’s Land Use Element, Housing Element; Conservation &
Open Space Element; and Public Health, Safety, & Environmental Justice Element describe
actions and ordinances prioritized by the City for responsible, sustainable development.
Probability of Future Events and Magnitude: Climate change is an ongoing and accelerating
process. Essentially, it has occurred, is occurring, and will continue to occur for several decades,
centuries, or longer. Its probability is considered “highly likely” under the definitions of Table 4-8,
reflecting its documented occurrence within other State of California and County of San
Bernardino planning and preparedness documents.
21 Executive Order S-13-08. Filed November 14, 2008. Archived July 2, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250702230104/https://www.library.ca.gov/wp-
content/uploads/GovernmentPublications/executive-order-proclamation/38-S-13-08.pdf
22 “California Adaptation Planning Guide”. California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (June 2020). Archived
June 29, 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/20250629111124/https://www.caloes.ca.gov/wp -content/uploads/Hazard-
Mitigation/Documents/CA-Adaptation-Planning-Guide-FINAL-June-2020-Accessible.pdf
23 “San Bernardino County Regional Greenhouse Gas Reduction Plan”. San Bernardino County Council of
Governments (March 2021). Archived August 21, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250821211612/https://www.gosbcta.com/wp -
content/uploads/2019/09/San_Bernardino_Regional_GHG_Reduction_Plan_Main_Text_Mar_2021.pdf
24 WRCOG SBC Vulnerability Assessment (2022)
52
4.3.2 Cyberattack
Description: A cyberattack is an intentional and malicious crime that compromises the digital
infrastructure of a person or organization, often for financial or terror-related reasons. Such
attacks vary in nature and are perpetrated using software, backdoors, or social engineering to
target human operators. Attacks generally last from minutes to a few days, but large-scale events
and their impacts can last much longer. As information technology continues to grow in capability
and interconnectivity, cyberattacks become increasingly frequent and destructive. The impacts of
cyberattacks differ by motive, attack type, and perpetrator profile.
Types of cyberattacks include using viruses to erase operating systems and/or data, breaking into
systems and altering files, using someone’s personal computer to attack other computers on the
same network, or stealing confidential information. Cyberattacks may also involve security
breaches that steal information from organizations such as usernames, passwords, credit card
information, and other personal details. The spectrum of risk is limitless, with threats having a
wide range of effects on the individual, community, organization, and nation.
Perpetrators typically use some form of social engineering to carry out their attacks. The UC
Berkeley’s Information Security Office defines “social engineering” as “the art of manipulation
used to gain access to information or devices” through “exploiting your trust, respect for authority,
or sympathy”.25 Social engineering is often used to target individuals to gain access to systems
that require passwords or institutional access, such as a spoofed email address stating they forgot
their password.
Since 2013, a type of cyberattack called “cyber-ransom” has become increasingly common
against individuals and small- and medium-sized organizations. Cyber-ransom occurs when an
individual downloads ransom malware (also known as “ransomware”), often through phishing or
drive-by download. The subsequent execution of code results in encryption of all data and
personal files stored on the system. The victim then receives a message that demands a fee in
cryptocurrency, such as Bitcoin or Ethereum.
History: Cyberattacks on U.S. companies occur daily, though they are not always successful.
The quantity and quality of information being hacked, stolen, destroyed, or leaked is progressively
becoming a problem for more consumers, government entities, and businesses. In the State of
California, the Attorney General maintains a list of data security breaches from organizations that
have sent notices of a breach by way of cyberattacks.26 The range of impacted organizations –
from healthcare organizations to banks to public utilities – demonstrates how cyberattacks are a
common and important threat for any system connected to the Internet.
Recent examples of cyberattacks on utilities and government within California include:
25 “What is Social Engineering?”. UC Berkeley, Information Security Office (n.d.). Archived June 17, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250618042745/https://security.berkeley.edu/education-awareness/toolkits/social-
engineering
26 “Security Data Breaches”. California Office of the Attorney General (n.d.). Archived July 22, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250722194932/https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/databreach/list
53
• April 7, 2023: The County of San Bernardino’s Sheriff’s Office reported a security breach
that encrypted its systems and reduced operations for over two weeks. A member of the
Sheriff’s Office clicked on a phished link and downloaded ransomware, disrupting emails
and dispatch computers. The ransom cost $1.1 million in cryptocurrency.
• May 28, 2023: UC Los Angeles reported a breach within the file transfer system MOVEit.
Information from approximately 16 million users was stolen by the CLoP Ransomware
Gang, although no actual ransomware was loaded onto its systems.
• January 15, 2021: An unidentified hacker gained access to a water treatment plant within
the San Francisco Bay Area by taking a username and password from a former
employee’s TeamViewer account. The hacker deleted programs used to treat drinking
water. The problem was identified the following day, and the facility changed passwords
and reinstalled programs.
Location: Cyberattacks are not characterized by location. Attacks can originate from any
computer to affect any other computer in the world. If a system is connected to the Internet or
operating on a wireless frequency, then it is susceptible to exploitation. This includes the District’s
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems used to manage water and
wastewater infrastructure. Cyberattacks do not target a particular section of pipe or facility but the
networks used in managing them.
Targets of cyberattacks can be individual computers, networks, organizations, business sectors,
or governments. Financial institutions and retailers are often targeted to extract personal and
financial data that can be used to steal money from individuals and banks. The most commonly
targeted sectors are finance, energy and utilities, defense and aerospace, communications, retail,
and health care.
Extent: All critical facilities and infrastructure, such as water and wastewater systems operated
by electricity and/or a computer system, are vulnerable to cyberattacks. Cyberattacks are
systemic and are not reliant on particular computers so long as they are connected to the Internet
or Intranet and have control capabilities. For instance, a cyberattack may cripple the electronic
system that controls a cooling system or pressure system within critical infrastructure.
The District’s SCADA systems and financial, human resources, and administrative systems are
vulnerable to cyberattacks. This scenario may result in physical damage to the structure from
components overheating or an explosion if pressure relief systems are rendered inoperable.
Types of cyberattacks include:
• Socially Engineered Trojans: Programs designed to mimic legitimate processes (e.g.,
updating software, running fake antivirus software) with the end goal of system infection.
When the victim runs the fake process, the Trojan is installed on the system. It then
installs or runs malicious software without the victim knowing.
• Unpatched Software: Nearly all software has weak points that may be exploited by
malware. The most common software exploitations occur with Java, Adobe Reader, and
54
Adobe Flash. These vulnerabilities are often exploited as small amounts of malicious
code often downloaded via drive-by download.
• Phishing: Phishing involves malicious actors sending email messages that ask users to
click a link or download a program. Phishing attacks may appear as legitimate emails
from trusted third parties. They may also spoof the names or positions of District staff
and/or leadership. Phishing is often used to trick victims into downloading malware.
• Password Attacks: A malicious actor uses a program to crack a user’s password and
subsequently gain access to a system. Password attacks do not typically require malware
but rather stem from software applications on the attacker’s system. These applications
may use a variety of methods to gain access, including generating large numbers of
generated guesses, or dictionary attacks, in which passwords are systematically tested
against all the words in a dictionary or the list of the 1,000 most common passwords.
• Drive-by Downloads: Malware is downloaded unknowingly by the victims when they
visit an infected site or run a browser-based program. Accessing the site or interacting
with the webpage causes a download to automatically occur, or the weblink itself attaches
to a file.
• Direct Denial of Service (DDoS) Attacks: Attacks that focus on disrupting service to a
network in which attackers send high volumes of data until the network becomes
overloaded and can no longer function.
• Man-in-the-Middle: Man-in-the-Middle attacks mirror victims and endpoints for online
information exchange. In this type of attack, the attacker communicates with the victims,
who believe they are interacting with a legitimate endpoint website. The attacker is also
communicating with the actual endpoint website by impersonating the victim. As the
process goes through, the attacker obtains entered and received information from both
the victim and endpoint.
• Malvertising: Malware downloaded to a system when the victim clicks on an affected ad
that launches a program.
• Advanced Persistent Threat (APT): An attack in which the attacker gains access to a
network and remains undetected. APT attacks are designed to steal data.
The District’s 2025 RRA includes a cybersecurity survey. This document (Not For Public Release)
addresses the District’s vulnerability to cyberattacks. More information on how the assessment
is conducted is available from the Environmental Protection Agency27.
Impact of Climate Change: Cyberattacks have no direct correlation with climate change.
Indirectly, the impacts of cyberattacks that shut down major resources can exacerbate any
simultaneously occurring hazards that are associated with climate change (e.g., hacking the
District’s SCADA systems during a severe drought).
27 Accessible here (as of September 27, 2025): https://www.epa.gov/waterresilience/cybersecurity-assessments
55
Regulatory Context: Cybersecurity threats concerning drinking water systems are addressed
primarily through the 2018 America’s Water Infrastructure Act (AWIA) and Section 1433 of the
Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA). Under these laws, community water systems that serve over
3,300 people (such as the District) are required to conduct RRAs and develop Emergency
Response Plans (ERPs) then certify their completion. These organizations must also review the
RRA and ERP every five years, revise if needed, and complete the same certification step. SDWA
Section 1433 also provides the EPA with the ability to provide guidance and technical assistance
to community water systems that serve 3,300 persons and under on how to conduct RRAs and
ERPs despite not being required to do so.
Local, State, and Federal agencies have steadily increased the legal enforcement of cybersecurity
practices within critical infrastructure. In May 2025, the EPA issued an Enforcement Alert in which
EPA would increase enforcement activities to “ensure drinking water systems address
cybersecurity threats” pursuant to AWIA/SDWA Section 1433. The 2025 Enforcement Alert
acknowledged that “over 70 percent of the systems inspected by EPA since September 2023 are
in violation of [SDWA Section 1433] requirements” concerning RRAs and ERPs along with
“alarming cybersecurity vulnerabilities”. Examples included failure to change default passwords,
non-unique credentials used by staff to login to systems, and lack of access removal from former
employees.28
Developmental Trends: As stated in the “Description” and “History” sections, cybersecurity
incidents are increasing in frequency and severity. On November 13, 2024, an internal memo
issued by the EPA’s Office of the Inspector General stated that 9 percent of over 1,000 public
drinking water systems assessed by the EPA had “critical” or “high” risk vulnerabilities to
cyberattacks. 21 percent had “medium” or “low” risk vulnerabilities, though the memo stresses
that “low risk” does not imply “no risk”.29 Other agencies have likewise been concerned that state-
sponsored cyberattack groups such as Volt Typhoon have positioned themselves within critical
infrastructure and utilities with the ability to disrupt them should tensions between countries
escalate.30
Land use changes within the service area are unlikely to increase the risk of cyberattacks or other
incidents. Cyberattacks are based on vulnerabilities within technology and staff’s resistance to
social engineering tactics. Risk is not based on zoning, parcels, lots, or land ownership. Updates
to the District’s SCADA system or other industrial control methods may close the loopholes that
allow perpetrators the ability to attack.
28 “Enforcement Alert: Drinking Water Systems to Address Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities”. US EPA (May 2024).
Archived September 21, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250921185907/https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/enforcement-alert-drinking-water-
systems-address-cybersecurity-vulnerabilities
29 “’Critical’ cyber vulnerabilities found in many water utilities, warns EPA inspector general”. US EPA (November 18,
2024). Archived July 29, 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://statescoop.com/epa-critical-cybersecurity-
vulnerabilities-water-utilities-2024/
30 McGuane, R. “White House Issues Dire Warning Regarding Drinking Water Supply and Wastewater System
Cyberattacks”. California Water Views (April 1, 2024). Archived April 23, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250424012518/https://www.californiawaterviews.com/white-house-issues-dire-
warning-regarding-drinking-water-supply-and-wastewater-system-cyberattacks
56
Probability of Future Events and Magnitude: While there is little evidence to confirm the exact
likelihood of a cyberattack against the District, there is nearly 100 percent certainty that
cyberattacks will continue to impact the utilities sector. As discussed earlier, many governmental
and non-governmental organizations within the State of California have been victims of
cyberattacks that either shut down resources or cause millions of dollars in cyber-ransom payouts.
An initial attack is often followed by more severe attacks to cause harm or steal data. As
cyberattacks become more sophisticated and numerous, all of the District’s digital infrastructure
is at risk. The magnitude of any individual cyberattack depends on the aims and goals of the
attacking entity.
4.3.3 Dam Failure & Inundation
Description: The term “dam failure” encompasses a wide variety of circumstances, from high
flow/overtopping to a partial or catastrophic collapse of the entire dam. Potential causes of dam
failure are numerous and can be attributed to deficiencies in the original design of the dam, the
quality of construction, the maintenance of the dam, the operation of the appurtenances while the
dam is in operation, and acts of nature. The last category includes precipitation in excess of
design, damage from major flooding events, and damage from earthquakes.
Dam failures can occur through several mechanisms. Acts of nature that impact the foundation or
siting of a dam can cause structural failures, as with earthquakes or major landslides. Water
overtopping the dam crest is a common cause of failure in earthen and embankment dams.
Overtopping causes erosion of the dam crest and (if unchecked) eventual dam breach.31
Piping is another common form of failure. Piping is a form of internal erosion where water seeps
through the soils and slowly carries away soil particles. This creates a cavity through the
foundation, embankment, or other earthen structure, allowing more water to flow. Piping can be
exacerbated by rodent burrowing and extensive root systems from vegetation growing on and
around the dam.
Dam failures and inundation events are especially dangerous because they can occur suddenly,
providing little warning or evacuation time for the downstream communities. The flows resulting
from dam failure generally are much larger than the conveyance capacity of the downstream
channels and therefore lead to extensive flooding. Flood damage occurs due to the momentum
of the flood caused by the sediment-laden water flooding over the channel banks and debris within
the flow hitting structures.
History: The District has not experienced a dam failure or inundation event. However, dams
within California have failed or had the potential to fail within the past 100 years. Major incidents
include:
31 “Causes and Types of Dam Failures”. USACE, Hydrologic Engineering Center (n.d.). Archived October 24, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20251024202728/https://www.hec.usace.army.mil/confluence/rasdocs/ras1dtechref/6.5/p
erforming-a-dam-break-study-with-hec-ras/estimating-dam-breach-parameters/causes-and-types-of-dam-failures
57
• March 12, 1928: The St. Francis Dam catastrophically failed, and the resulting flood
caused approximately 400 fatalities. The collapse is considered one of the worst American
civil engineering disasters of the 20th century and remains the second-greatest loss of life
due to a disaster in Californian history, natural or technological.32
• December 14, 1963: The Baldwin Hills Dam inundated the neighborhood of South Los
Angeles when the dam suffered a catastrophic failure and flooded the surrounding
residential neighborhoods. It began with signs of lining failure followed by increasingly
serious leakage through the east abutment. After three hours, the dam breached, with a
total release of 250 million U.S. gallons resulting in five deaths and the destruction of 277
homes.33
• February 9, 1971: The 1971 San Fernando earthquake in metropolitan Los Angeles
County was one of the most devastating earthquakes in California history. With a
magnitude of 6.6, it claimed 65 lives and caused over $500 million in damages. It was
California’s third-worst earthquake in terms of lives lost, only exceeded by San Francisco
(1906) and Long Beach (1933) events. The 1,100-foot Lower Van Norman Dam nearly
collapsed, with the reservoir’s half-full status saving downstream residences from
inundation. The top 30 feet of the dam crumbled, leaving six feet between the water and
the remaining structure. A UC Los Angeles study estimated that the collapse of the dam
could have killed between 71,600 and 123,400 people.34
• February 7, 2017: Heavy rainfall during the 2017 California floods damaged the main
Oroville Dam spillway, resulting in DWR closing the spillway to assess damage. However,
the reservoir level continued to rise and flowed over the emergency spillway, even after
the damaged main spillway was reopened. Water flowing over the emergency spillway
caused headward erosion threatening to undermine and collapse the concrete weir, which
would have flooded communities downstream of the dam along the Feather River. No
collapse occurred, but more than 180,000 people were evacuated.35
Location: The District’s southern service area faces potential inundation from the failure of the
Seven Oaks Dam (NID CA01530), which impounds the Santa Ana River to create the Seven Oaks
Reservoir. The Seven Oaks Dam is operated and maintained by the Orange County Flood Control
District, San Bernardino County Flood Control District, and Riverside Flood Control and Water
Conservation District. It is an ungated dam used for flood control along the Santa Ana River and
was developed following a series of high-impact floods within Los Angeles, Orange, and San
32 “Case Study – St. Francis Dam (California, 1928)”. Association of State Dam Safety Officials, Lessons Learned
(n.d.). Archived July 7, 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/20250707150845/https://damfailures.org/case -study/st-
francis-dam-california-1928
33 “Case Study – Baldwin Hills Dam (California, 1963)”. Association of State Dam Safety Officials, Lessons Learned
(n.d.). Archived July 7, 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://damfailures.org/case-study/baldwin-hills-dam-
california-1963
34 Reich, K. “’71 Valley Quake a Brush with Catastrophe”. Los Angeles Times (February 4, 1996). Archived April 21,
2025. https://web.archive.org/web/20250421123335/https://www.latimes.com/archives/la -xpm-1996-02-04-mn-32287-
story.html
35 “Case Study – Oroville Dam (California, 2017)”. Association of State Dam Safety Officials, Lessons Learned (n.d.).
Archived July 7, 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://damfailures.org/case-study/oroville-dam-california-2017
58
Bernardino Counties. It operates in conjunction with the Prado Dam, which also has a flood control
purpose.
The Seven Oaks Dam is an earthen embankment dam located east of the City of Highland’s
downtown in the foothills of the San Bernardino Mountains. Construction began in 1993 and the
dam opened in 2000. It is currently owned by the County of San Bernardino Department of Public
Works. The dam is approximately 3 miles east of the District Headquarters. It is 2,980 feet long
and 550 feet high with a dam capacity of 145,600 acre-feet. Downstream areas include the Cities
of Highland, San Bernardino, and Riverside, as well as unincorporated communities along the
river. Figure 4-3 provides the location of the dam.
Figure 4-3: Location of the Seven Oaks Dam
Figure 4-4 on the next page shows the complete inundation area according to the dam inundation
maps published by the State of California’s Division of Safety of Dams (DSoD). According to a
“fair weather” failure scenario that assumes no additional flooding due to severe storms, the
floodwaters would reach District infrastructure between 12- and 30-minutes following dam failure.
Appendix F shows the inundation map overlaid with District boundaries.
59
Figure 4-4: Complete Inundation Map of the Seven Oaks Dam
Extent: The Dam Safety Action Classification (DSAC) is a classification system used to categorize
the safety level of dams. Table 4-10 provides a copy of Dam Safety Action Classes.
Table 4-10: DSAC Ratings
Dam Safety Action Class (DSAC) Characteristics
I
Urgent and
Compelling
(Unsafe)
Critically near failure or extreme high risk
II
Urgent
(Unsafe or Potentially
Unsafe)
Failure initiation foreseen or very high
risk.
III High Priority
(Conditionally Unsafe)
Significantly inadequate or moderate to
high risk.
IV Priority
(Marginally Safe) Inadequate with low risk.
V Normal
(Adequately Safe) Residual risk considered tolerable.
60
Each of the DSAC ratings are defined below. This text comes from the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission’s March 2016 report on Risk-Informed Decision Making Guidelines:36
• DSAC Class I (Urgent and Compelling): Dams where progression toward failure is
confirmed to be taking place under normal operations, and the dam is almost certain
to fail under normal operations within a time frame from immediately to within a few
years without intervention; or the combination of life or economic consequences with
probability of failure is extremely high.
• DSAC Class II (Urgent): Dams where failure could begin during normal operations or
be initiated as the consequence of an event. The likelihood of failure from one of these
occurrences, prior to remediation, is too high to assure public safety, or the
combination of life or economic consequences with probability of failure is very high.
• DSAC Class III (High Priority): Dams that have issues where the dam is significantly
inadequate, or the combination of life, economic or environmental consequences with
probability of failure is moderate to high.
• DSAC Class IV (Priority): Dams that are inadequate with low risk such that the
combination of life, economic or environmental consequences with a probability of
failure is low, and the dam may not meet all essential USACE engineering guidelines.
• DSAC Class V (Normal): Dams considered adequately safe, meeting all essential
agency guidelines, and the residual risk is considered tolerable.
Per a 2014 review by the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the Seven Oaks Dam is in
“Satisfactory” condition and conforms to Class V (Normal).37
In 2004, FEMA developed the Hazard Potential Classification for Dams.38 According to this
framework, dams are classified “according to the potential impact a dam failure (breach) or
misoperation (unscheduled release) would have on upstream and/or downstream areas or at
locations remote from the dam”. The three classifications are:
• Low Hazard Potential: Dams assigned the low hazard potential are those where
failure or misoperation results in no probable loss of human life and low economic
and/or environmental losses. Losses are principally limited to the owner’s property.
• Significant Hazard Potential: Dams assigned the significant hazard potential
classification are those dams where failure or misoperation results in no probable loss
of human life but can cause economic loss, environmental damage, disruption of
lifeline facilities, or can impact other concerns. Significant hazard potential
classification dams are often located in predominantly rural or agricultural areas but
could be located in areas with population and significant infrastructure.
36 “Risk-Informed Decision Making Guidelines: Chapter 4 – Risk Management”. Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (March 2016). Archived April 20, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250420065910/https://www.ferc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/chapter-4.pdf
37 “Seven Oaks Dam: Updated Water Control Manual”. US Army Corps of Engineers, Los Angeles District (May
2014). Archived on June 16, 2024.
https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://www.spl.usace.army.mil/Portals/17/docs/publicnotices/Draft%20Public%20Revie
w%20WQS%20SEA%20w%20IS_MAY%202014.pdf#:~:text=elevation%20was%202%2C322%20feet%2C%20and%
20found%20no,storage%20at%20the%20start%20of%20every%20storm
38 “Federal Guidelines for Dam Safety: Hazard Potential Classification System for Dams”. FEMA (April 2004).
Archived on July 1, 2025. web.archive.org/web/2/https://www.ferc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/fema-333.pdf
61
• High Hazard Potential: Dams assigned the high hazard potential classification are
those where failure or misoperation will probably cause loss of human life.
The Seven Oaks Dam is listed as a “high hazard” dam according to FEMA’s downstream hazard
potential. DSoD appends FEMA’s classification with the “extremely high hazard” category – which
is defined as dams whose downstream impacts are “expected to cause considerable loss of
human life or would result in an inundation area with a population of 1,000 or more”.
Regulatory Context: Dams and reservoirs are defined within the California Water Code Sections
6000 through 6008. There are currently more than 1,400 dams of “jurisdictional size” in the State
of California – including those managed by the federal government. Approximately 1,250 non-
federal dams are regulated by DWR under the Division of Safety of Dams (DSoD). Applicable
statutes are contained in Parts 1 and 2 of Division 3, Dams and Reservoirs, California Water
Code.
Federal dams are regulated by the agency that owns and operates them. Federal Guidelines for
Dam Safety, Emergency Action Planning for Dams, FEMA 64 provides guidelines for developing
EAPs for all dams except those producing hydroelectric power. Dams owned by the federal
government are not subject to State jurisdiction except as otherwise provided by federal law. As
of July 2025, there are 149 dams owned by federal government agencies including the US Forest
Service, Bureau of Reclamation, USACE, and branches of the US military.
On June 27, 2017, California Senate Bill 92 required EAPs for all dams that do not have a low
downstream hazard potential. Senate Bill 854 amended California Water Code section 6161 on
June 27, 2018, to clarify requirements for dams with an EAP as of March 1, 2017.
Developmental Trends: There are currently no plans to retrofit, build upon, or change any of the
Seven Oak Dam’s infrastructure or operations. No faults in the dam’s infrastructure or operations
have been noted in any past or recent assessments. There are no plans to build other dams along
the Santa Ana River or any of its tributaries within or near the service area.
In 2011, the outlet works of the Seven Oaks Dam were subjected to hydraulic testing by USACE.
The program tested that the outlet works were capable of discharging flows up to 6,200 cubic feet
per second. No modifications were made to the dam during or after the test.
Impact of Climate Change: Many US dams were built decades ago and are unsuited to a warmer
world with stronger storms.39 The Oroville Dam incident in 2017 was a result of mountain runoff
into the reservoir after heavy snowmelt. A post-incident study found that an increase in early-
season Sierra Nevada runoff contributed to the dam’s high-water levels. This early season runoff
can be attributed to human-caused warming. In addition to short-duration extreme precipitation,
39 Fountain, H. “’Expect More’: Climate Change Raises Risk of Dam Failures.” New York Times (May 21, 2020). Archived June 19,
2025. https://web.archive.org/web/20250619175814/https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/21/climate/dam-failure-michigan-climate-
change.html/
62
rainfall of longer duration but less intensity may increase this risk.40 However, existing control and
monitoring measures continue to place this scenario as an unlikely hazard, and climate change
is not expected to change the less-than-one-percent annual probability of occurrence.
Fair-weather dam failures are strongly associated with seismic shaking due to earthquakes.
This hazard is not associated with climate change.
Probability of Future Events and Magnitude: Dam failure can result from numerous natural or
human activities. Earthquakes, internal erosion, improper siting, structural and design flaws, and
rising floodwaters can all lead to dam failure and inundation events. A dam failure may also be a
result of the age of the structure or inadequate spillway capacity. The probability of a future dam
failure affecting the District is unknown but considered highly unlikely given the significant rarity
of earthen embankment dam failures. Additionally, no deficiencies in the dam’s appurtenances or
operations have been identified by USACE. This LHMP therefore places a probability of failure
under 0.1 percent chance annually.
The magnitude of potential dam failure depends on the amount of water stored and the condition
of the dam upon failure. For high hazard dams that create reservoirs primarily for flood control,
any failure would be catastrophic due to these reservoirs usually being partially or completely full.
While still possible, it is unlikely that a dam failure event at the Seven Oaks Dam will occur within
the next ten years. According to Orange County Public Works, the dam was designed to resist an
earthquake up to moment magnitude 8.0. However, serious seismic shaking could still weaken its
foundations and siting, increasing the potential for future failures in the absence of retrofit.
4.3.4 Drought
Description: Droughts are defined as long-term shortages in water – including precipitation and
groundwater recharge – that exist for at least one season. Drought cycles are a normal part of
virtually every climate on the planet, including areas of high and low rainfall.
Contrary to popular belief, drought is different from the baseline aridity of a location, which is a
permanent characteristic of low rainfall within certain climates such as the Mojave Desert and the
Great Basin. Instead, drought is a decline in the expected precipitation over an extended period
of time, typically one or more seasons in length. The severity of drought can be aggravated by
other climatic factors that reduce water retention and groundwater recharge, such as prolonged
high winds, low relative humidity, and an increase in impermeable surfaces that cause runoff (e.g.,
sidewalks and roads).
Drought is a complex natural hazard. The University of Nebraska’s National Drought Mitigation
Center defines drought through four different subcategories:41
40 Ibid.
41 “Types of Drought”. University of Nebraska, National Drought Mitigation Center (n.d.). Archived July 29, 2025.
https://drought.unl.edu/Education/DroughtIn-depth/TypesofDrought.aspx
63
• Meteorological drought: Defined solely on the degree of dryness, which is expressed
as the deficit of precipitation relative to a location’s baseline level. This difference is
compared to monthly, seasonal, and annual time scales.
• Hydrological drought: Defined by how precipitation deficits impact the local water
supply and its ability to recharge. Hydrological drought measures impacts to stream flows,
reservoirs, lake levels, water tables, and groundwater recharge. A hydrological drought
may lag behind a prolonged meteorological drought if precipitation nominally returns to
normal but the groundwater has not yet recharged.
• Agricultural drought: Defined by how precipitation deficits, soil water content, reduced
groundwater, and other deficiencies impact crops. Like hydrological droughts, agricultural
droughts can lag behind a meteorological drought if the type of crop is not immediately
impacted.
• Socioeconomic drought: Defined by how the other three types of droughts impact the
supply and demand of goods and services. For example, a socioeconomic drought might
be defined in how fruits, vegetables, grains, and meat availability changes following
prolonged drought in the San Joaquin Valley.
A drought’s severity depends on numerous factors, including duration, intensity, geographic
extent, and regional water supply demands by humans and vegetation. Due to its multi-
dimensional nature, drought is difficult to define in exact terms. Droughts also pose challenges in
terms of comprehensive risk assessments. Given their systemic nature, there exist many
secondary impacts such as soil hardening, which can increase floods due to reduced soil
permeability. Wildfire risk may also increase as vegetation and deadfall become drier.
Drought differs from other natural hazards in three ways. First, the onset and end of a drought are
difficult to determine due to the slow accumulation and lingering effects of an event after its
apparent end. Second, the lack of an exact and universally accepted definition adds to the
confusion of its existence and severity. Third, in contrast with other natural hazards, the impact of
drought is less obvious and may be spread over a larger geographic area. These characteristics
have hindered the preparation of drought contingency or mitigation plans by many governments.
Droughts may cause water shortages for human and industrial consumption, hydroelectric power,
recreation, and navigation. Water quality may also decline, and the number and severity of
wildfires may increase. Severe droughts may result in the loss of agricultural crops and forest
products, undernourished wildlife and livestock, lower land values, and higher unemployment.
Droughts can impact groundwater supplies and water collected within reservoirs.
History: Droughts frequently occur in California. Notable droughts in recent history include:
• 1976–1977: At the time of occurrence, 1977 was the driest year in State history and was
only surpassed by the 2020-2022 drought. According to an October 19, 1977, report
issued by the Comptroller General of the United States, the drought “did the most damage
to California’s agriculture, especially the livestock industry” and recognized the
inadequacy of current local, federal, and State government response mechanisms to
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ameliorate the drought. The severity spurred the US Department of the Interior to develop
statistical modeling tools to predict future droughts.42
• 1986–1992: California experienced a 7-year drought from late 1986 through late 1992.
The 1988 year was typified by severe drought throughout the United States. The
prolonged drought ended following an El Niño weather event that brought heavy rains in
the 1992 winter season.43
• 2007–2009: This three-year drought period demonstrates how the severity of drought is
determined by a combination of ecological and social/economic factors. Though
hydrologically less severe than the droughts of the 1920s, 1976-1977, and 1986-1992,
the 2007-2009 drought saw great demands for freshwater and changes in water rights,
especially regarding restrictions on the State Water Project.44
• 2011–2017: The 2011 through 2017 drought season was the driest in California’s
recorded climatic history, though no single year exceeded the intensity of the 1977
drought. Governor Jerry Brown instituted a mandatory 25 percent water restriction on
June 2015. The Sacramento and San Joaquin Valley Water Year Indices labeled most of
these years “dry” or “critical” within their watersheds, representing substantial ecological
and agricultural stress.45 Groundwater depletion-related subsidence and runoff resulted
in widespread flooding and erosion in northern California throughout 2016 when heavy
rains in January and February could not be quickly absorbed by the drought-hardened
lands, leading to substantial runoff. Hydrological drought persisted in southern California
until 2017.46,47
• 2020–2022: These three years are the driest on record in California according to NOAA's
National Centers for Environmental Information. The first year of drought coincided with
the most destructive wildfire season on record in California, with lightning complex fires
such as the CZU Fire and SCU Fire surpassing previous fires in both size and intensity.
Lake Oroville receded to 38% of its capacity. The Loch Lomond Reservoir receded to 86
percent of its capacity in July 2022. As with the 2011-2017 drought years, the Sacramento
42 Report of the Comptroller General of the United States. “California Drought of 1976 and 1977 – Extent, Damage, and
Governmental Response”. Prepared October 19, 1977. Archived on June 29, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250629101437/https://www.gao.gov/assets/ced-77-137.pdf
43 Dixon, L., Moore, N., & Pint, E. “Drought Management Policies and Economic Effects in Urban Areas of California,
1987-1992”. RAND Corporation (1996). Archived October 13, 2024.
https://web.archive.org/web/20241013163756/https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR813.html
44 “California’s Drought of 2007-2009: An Overview”. Department of Water Resources (September 2010). Archived on May
26, 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/20250526051332/https://water.ca.gov/-/media/DWR-Website/Web-
Pages/Water-Basics/Drought/Files/Resources/California-Drought-of-200709.pdf
45 “Hydroclimate Report Water Year 2015”. California Office of the State Climatologist (Fall 2016). Archived on
November 29, 2023. https://web.archive.org/web/20231130045207/https://cwc.ca.gov/-/media/DWR-Website/Web-
Pages/Programs/Flood-Management/Flood-Data/Climate-summaries/Hydroclimate_Report_2015-ADA-Final.pdf
46 “California Is No Stranger to Dry Conditions, but the Drought from 2011-2017 Was Exceptional”. NOAA, NIDIS
(n.d.). Archived on July 8, 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/20250708110047/https://www.drought.gov/california -no-
stranger-dry-conditions-drought-2011-2017-was-exceptional
47 “Water Year 2017: What a Difference a Year Makes”. California Department of Water Resources (September
2017). Archived on June 21, 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://water.ca.gov/-/media/DWR-Website/Web-
Pages/Programs/Groundwater-Management/Data-and-Tools/Files/Statewide-Reports/Water-Year-2017---What-a-
Difference-a-Year-Makes_ay_19.pdf
65
and San Joaquin Valley Water Year Indices were “critical” through 2021 and 2022.48 The
drought ended during the 2023 winter season, which resulted in one of the largest-
recorded Sierra Nevada snowpacks.
Figure 4-5 depicts periods of drought in California from 2000 to 2025, taken from an article by
the Los Angeles Times using data from the US Drought Monitor.49 The colors used correspond
to the NIDIS Drought Classification scheme depicted in Table 4-12 within the “Extent”
subsection.
Figure 4-5: Periods of Drought in California from 2000 to 2025
48 “Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Watershed Drought & Curtailments 2021-2023”. State Water Resources Control
Board (n.d.). Archived on July 11, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250711154725/https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/drought/delta/
49 Smith, H. “Nearly all of California exits the worst drought categories in U.S. Drought Monitor”. Los Angeles Times
(January 12, 2023). Archived on February 10, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250210000201/https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2023-01-12/most-of-california-
exits-worst-drought-categories
66
Figure 4-6 shows the Palmer Drought Severity Indices for the South Coast Drainage division,
which includes the entirety of the service area. Data is from January 1, 2005, through January 4,
2025. This chart is sourced from NOAA’s National Centers for Environmental Information.50
Figure 4-6: Palmer Drought Severity Indices for the South Coastal Drainage
Division
Figures 4-7 through 4-9 (starting on the next page) show the state of drought in California in
mid-May through the years 2025, 2020, and 2015.
50 “Climate at a Glance – Divisional Time Series”. NOAA, National Centers for Environmental Information (n.d.).
Archived February 28, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250228071550/https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/access/monitoring/climate -at-a-
glance/divisional/time-series/0406/pcp/12/12/1950-2021
67
Figure 4-7: Drought in California on May 20, 2025
Figure 4-8: Drought in California on May 19, 2020
68
Figure 4-9: Drought in California on May 19, 2015
Location: By definition, droughts are regional events. Given the District’s size, droughts are highly
unlikely to disproportionately impact one part of the service area over another.
Extent: The National Integrated Drought Information System (NIDIS) Act of 2006 (Public Law
109-430) prescribes an interagency approach for drought monitoring, forecasting, and early
warning.51 The NIDIS maintains the U.S. Drought Portal,52 a centralized, web-based access point
to several drought-related resources, including the US Drought Monitor and the US Seasonal
Drought Outlook.
The primary indicators for maps used by either agency are the Palmer Hydrologic Drought Index
and the 60-month Palmer Z-index. Both indices are combined within the Palmer Drought Severity
Index (PDSI), a commonly used statistic that measures the severity of drought from the
perspective of agricultural and water resource management. It is calculated on a scale from
negative 10.0 to positive 10.0 according to observed temperature and precipitation values. The
PDSI then estimates soil moisture and standardizes the final statistic according to water demand
curves. The PDSI is primarily used by NOAA and is calculated on a weekly basis. Table 4-11
describes the PDSI and includes NOAA’s color-coding.
51 “The National Integrated Drought Information System Implementation Plan – December 2016 Update”. NOAA,
NIDIS (December 2016). Archived on April 11, 2025. https://www.drought.gov/sites/default/files/2020 -
06/Implementation-Plan-December-2016-Update.pdf
52 Acccessible here (as of August 22, 2025): https://www.drought.gov/drought/
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Table 4-11: PDSI Statistic Description
PDSI Value Description
4.0 and above Extremely moist
3.0 to 3.99 Very moist
2.0 to 2.99 Moderately moist
1.0 to 1.99 Slightly moist
0.99 to -0.99 Mid-range and “incipient wet/dry spell”
-1.0 to -1.99 Slight drought
-2.0 to -2.99 Moderate drought
-3.0 to -3.99 Severe drought
-4.0 and below Extreme drought
NIDIS uses a five-point scale to define drought that ranges from D0 through D4 and is color-coded
from yellow to maroon. Federal and State-level agencies use the NIDIS scale when defining
drought risk and severity. The NIDIS scale is considered more generalizable and easier to
interpret than the PDSI. The scale is described in Table 4-12 below alongside its approximate
correspondence to the PDSI and US Geological Survey (USGS) Weekly Streamflow percentiles.
Table 4-12: NIDIS Drought Classifications
Category Description Impacts PDSI
USGS Weekly
Streamflow
(Percentile)
D0 Abnormally Dry
If going into drought: short-term dryness
slowing planning and growth of crops or
pastures.
If coming out of drought: some lingering
water deficits; pastures or crops not fully
recovered.
-1.0 to -1.9 21 to 30
D1 Moderate
Drought
Some damage to crops and pastures.
Streams, reservoirs, or wells are low. Some
water shortages developing or imminent;
voluntary water-use restrictions requested.
-2.0 to -2.9 11 to 20
D2 Severe
Drought
Crop or pasture losses are likely. Water
shortages are common, and water
restrictions are imposed.
-3.0 to -3.9 6 to 10
D3 Extreme
Drought
Major crop and pasture losses. Widespread
water shortages and/or restrictions. -4.0 to -4.9 3 to 5
D4 Exceptional
Drought
Exceptional and widespread crop and
pasture losses. Shortages of waters in
reservoir, streams, and wells that lead to
water emergencies.
-5.0 and
under 0 to 2
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Beginning in December 2024, NIDIS proclaimed all of the County of San Bernardino in D0 or
higher drought following “extreme record or near-record dryness” since the start of the 2024-2025
water year.53 Drought is anticipated to persist throughout all of the County of San Bernardino and
extend northward through the San Joaquin Valley and Sierra Nevada. As of July 10, 2025,
approximately 49 percent of the County is in D1, 47 percent in D2, and 4 percent in D3. The
service area is in D2 as of August 2025.54
Potable water operations are highly vulnerable to shortages during prolonged droughts. Indirect
impacts of drought include greater wear and tear on infrastructure and treatment facilities, as well
as diminished water quality due to greater silt concentration. Groundwater reservoirs are less
impacted by drought than runoff and above-ground reservoirs; nonetheless, the District’s reliance
on the Bunker Hill Basin for over 75 percent of its water supply means prolonged hydrological
drought could substantially impact service.
Each water supply agency in the State of California with over 3,000 connections is required to
prepare and submit an Urban Water Management Plan, which includes (among other topics) how
the agency will respond to drought. The District has access to water from the State Water Project,
which allows the District to import water from northern California in extreme need. Northern
California’s climate is generally wetter and contains greater snowfall than the naturally more arid
Southern California. Additionally, the District has an intertie with the neighboring San Bernardino
Valley Municipal Water District.
Drought does not have an explicitly quantifiable impact on solid waste services, other than higher
costs for water used in the treatment process. However, wastewater treatment infrastructure may
be negatively impacted by drought. Lower water supplies may increase concentration of dissolved
solids, thereby reducing effluence and increasing strain.
Regulatory Context: The California Water Code (CWC) Sections 10610-10656 and 10608
require “urban water suppliers” to develop an Urban Water Management Plan (UWMP) every five
years. UWMPs are necessary to support “long-term resource planning to ensure that adequate
water supplies are available to meet existing and future water needs”. UWMPs are required for
any supplier that either provides over 3,000 acre-feet of water annually to its customers or serves
over 3,000 urban connections. They must include: 1) an assessment of the reliability of water
sources over a 20-year timeframe; 2) a description of demand management measures; 3) a water
shortage contingency plan; and 4) a discussion of the use/planned use of recycled water.55
53 “Drought Status Update for California-Nevada”. NOAA, NIDIS (January 16, 2025). Archived on July 24, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://www.drought.gov/drought-status-updates/drought-status-update-california-
nevada-2025-01-16
54 “Drought Conditions for San Bernardino County”. NOAA, NIDIS (n.d.). Archived on August 22, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250822182615/https://www.drought.gov/states/california/county/san%20bernardino
55 “Urban Water Management Plans”. California Department of Water Resources (n.d.). Archived on July 22, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://water.ca.gov/Programs/Water-Use-And-Efficiency/Urban-Water-Use-
Efficiency/Urban-Water-Management-Plans
71
Furthermore, CWC Section 10635(b) requires a Drought Risk Assessment (DRA) to be developed
within each UWMP. Each DRA can be updated outside of the UWMP’s five-year update cycle.
The DRA evaluates water supply reliability and compares available supplies/projected demands
to a five-year drought scenario.
The District has an Integrated Regional UWMP with other agencies that source water from the
Upper Santa Ana River Watershed. The UWMP was initially developed in 2020 with San
Bernardino Valley Water District as the major partner. 20 agencies are represented by this UWMP.
The plan was formally adopted in July 2021.
The 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act (also known as the Clean Water Act) provides the
legal basis for the protection of inland surface waters, estuaries, and coastal waters. Under the
States of California’s Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act of 1970, the State’s Regional
Water Quality Control Board is the acting agency for implementing Clean Water Act requirements
throughout the total Santa Ana Watershed.
Developmental Trends: As described in Section 3 of this LHMP, the Cities of Highland and San
Bernardino are increasing in population at a much greater rate than the County of San Bernardino
and State of California at-large. Increased populations and land use will necessitate greater
demand on the water supply, thereby putting additional strain on the Bunker Hill Basin (and the
District’s resources) if and when drought occurs.
Three of the last five years (2020-2025) incurred a D2-D4 drought within the District’s service
area. At these levels, the District’s ability to meet its water supply mission criteria is significantly
reduced. Future developments of all land use may be impacted if projected population growth
continues to outpace the water supply.
The SNRC will abate some water supply issues. Its treatment capacity of eight million gallons per
day will support the District’s ability to mitigate the impacts of acute and chronic drought. Given
that the SNRC was only recently placed online, there is currently no data to show its impact on
water shortages, but the Planning Team believes it will be an important source of groundwater
recharge and water independence during this LHMP cycle.
Impact of Climate Change: Higher temperatures and changing weather patterns throughout the
state will result in an increasing number of and length of droughts and are likely to affect the
District. Annual precipitation has decreased in California during the last century, and it may
continue to decrease.
Like many such utilities in California, the District’s water supply relies on watersheds that are
mostly fed by melting winter snowpacks. The major mountain ranges of southern and eastern
California (e.g., San Gorgonio Mountains and Sierra Nevada) are likely to have reduced
snowpacks as average temperatures rise and the density of the snowpacks decreases. This
decrease will remain a problem even if total precipitation remains the same, as many water and
wastewater management systems are calibrated to the winter/spring snowpack melt.
72
The higher temperatures associated with climate change are also likely to intensify existing
drought conditions, especially during the summer and autumn months. Soils are likely to be drier,
and periods without rain are likely to become longer, making hydrological drought more severe.
Increasing temperatures in the lower atmosphere may also shift extratropical cyclones closer to
the poles, which will reduce the probability of atmospheric river events.
However, the relationship between human-caused climate change and droughts remains
complex. There are multifaceted and disproportionate influences that climate change has on
various weather patterns. According to the Fourth National Climate Assessment, total annual
precipitation may increase in other areas of the United States due to increases in evaporation and
air moisture content. However, the southwestern United States is less likely to receive this
change.56 Additional impacts on soil quality and aquifer recharge are more straightforward, per
the USGS’s page on climate change’s impact on droughts:
Droughts don’t just affect water stored in wetlands, lakes, and rivers, but also
water below ground stored in aquifers and in the soil. When this groundwater
gets used up, the dry ground can act like a sponge, sucking surface water
straight in. The surface water-groundwater relationship gets even more
complicated with snowpack. If snow melts too early in the year, water can move
through the environment too quickly, causing the ground to dry up and become
“thirsty” too soon. So even if there is “enough” water, the timing of the water
may dictate whether an area is in a drought.57
Probability of Future Events and Magnitude: There is no commonly accepted return period or
non-exceedance probability for defining the risk from drought (such as the 100-year or 1 percent
annual chance of flood). The magnitude of drought is usually measured in time and the severity
of the hydrologic deficit. Drought conditions can be monitored at the NIDIS website.58
Per NIDIS, the County of San Bernardino has been in drought conditions for more time than it has
been in wet periods over the last 25 years, which is why drought is in the most critical probability
category within the CPRI. Given expected influences due to climate change on the State’s
hydrological systems and development factors, it is expected that droughts will continue to be a
salient hazard throughout this LHMP cycle.
The probability of the District experiencing drought is considered virtually guaranteed over the
next ten years – especially given that the service area is under a declared drought as of this
LHMP’s publication date. Per the “probability” definition of the CPRI used in Table 4-8, drought is
considered “highly likely” with a well-documented history of occurrence.
56 Means, T. “Why is it raining so hard? Global warming is delivering heavier downpours”. University of Yale, Climate
Connections (April 30, 2021). Archived on July 8, 2025.
web.archive.org/web/2/https://yaleclimateconnections.org/2021/04/global-warming-is-delivering-heavier-downpours/
57 “Droughts and Climate Change”. USGS (n.d.). Archived on July 11, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250711180205/https://www.usgs.gov/science/science -explorer/climate/droughts-and-
climate-change
58 Accessible here (as of August 22, 2025): https://www.drought.gov/drought/states/
73
Damages due to droughts will entirely involve the District’s infrastructure and water conveyance
systems; droughts are extremely unlikely to result in staff illness or death. The severity of droughts
will depend on its ability to maintain adequate influence/effluent for wastewater treatment. Service
infrastructure may experience greater wear and tear.
4.3.5 Earthquakes and Seismic Events
Description: An earthquake is a sudden motion or trembling caused by a release of energy
accumulated within or along the edge of Earth’s tectonic plates and faults. When a fault ruptures,
seismic waves radiate and cause the ground to vibrate. The severity of the vibration increases as
the amount of energy released increases and decreases with distance from the epicenter (i.e.,
the earthquake’s origin). The initial release of energy can range from unfelt by all but the most
sensitive instruments to wildly destructive events depending on soil/slope conditions, proximity
and type of fault, and earthquake magnitude/depth.
Earthquakes usually occur without warning and can cause massive damage and extensive
casualties within minutes. Ground shaking, surface fault ruptures, aftershocks, and soil
liquefaction are common primary effects of earthquakes. Secondary effects include landslides,
power outages, fires, and dam failures. Together, earthquakes and associated seismic events are
likely the greatest threat to the District given its presence within the geologically active southern
California region.
Terms used when describing earthquakes and seismic hazards include:
• Active Fault: Faults are cracks in the Earth’s crust where two tectonic plates join or one
is splitting apart. Faults may be active or inactive, and they are often visible as rifts,
mountains, and distortions within the Earth’s crust. Per the California Geological Survey
(CGS), an active fault is one that has experienced surface movement in the past 11,700
years. Inactive faults are not considered hazards within this LHMP.
• Fault Rupture: The term “fault rupture” is often used synonymously with “earthquake”,
though not all earthquakes become fault ruptures. A fault rupture occurs when the Earth’s
surface shifts, slips, and/or cracks along a fault. Greater movement along the fault
generally causes more intense ruptures. As tectonic plates pull away from, move toward,
or slip past each other, the tension created by extremely high friction forces is released
with sudden movement along faults. The energy is released in waves that spread through
the crust, causing the ground shaking felt during earthquakes.
• Ground Shaking: Ground shaking is the motion felt on the Earth’s surface as seismic
waves ripple through it from the epicenter. It is the primary cause of earthquake damage
both due to the motion of the ground and the energy that passes through objects. The
strength of ground shaking depends on the magnitude of the earthquake, the type of fault,
and the distance from the epicenter.
• Amplification: Certain types of rocks can increase the power of (“amplify”) the energy
imparted into objects from ground shaking. The particles within soils and sedimentary
rocks can shift greatly during earthquakes, thereby increasing damage. Buildings built on
74
poorly consolidated soils, thick soils, and sediment-filled basins face greater risk than
buildings the same distance away from the earthquake built on firmer bedrock.
• Slip: Slip is defined simply as the distance that a fault moves. A large slip releases a
similarly large amount of energy , thereby causing powerful earthquakes. Slip is often
measured in centimeters or millimeters.
• Moment Magnitude: Moment magnitude (often simply called “magnitude”) is described
as the intensity of seismic shaking. It is a function of the amplitude of waves traveling
through the Earth’s crust, the rigidity of the fault, and the slip. Since energy travels through
the ground in three dimensions as opposed to only on the surface, an earthquake closer
to the surface will be more destructive and cover a wider area than one deep underground.
Moment magnitude is measured on the Moment Magnitude Scale, defined in the “Extent”
section of this hazard.
• Soil Liquefaction: Soil liquefaction occurs when ground shaking causes groundwater to
mix with soil and sand, completely filling the space between particles and water. As they
shake, these saturated soils cause soil and sand to flow past one another like a liquid. The
soil then loses its strength, causing spontaneous and destructive settling of any structures
on top. Buried structures may be pushed up or float atop the liquefied soil before becoming
re-buried once the event stops and the water settles. Soil liquefaction is more common in
areas with fine- to medium-grained soils (cf., sand or silt) and the water table is within 50
feet of the ground surface.
• Earthquake-Induced Landslides: Landslides are one of the most common secondary
effects of earthquakes. These landslides are often quite violent and can destroy roads,
buildings, utilities, and critical facilities built near steep slopes.
History: Since the District’s establishment, there have been no major earthquakes in which
magnitudes of 7.0 or greater have been felt within the service area. There have also been no
instances of fault rupture or soil liquefaction. Minor seismic shaking has been detected from
earthquakes elsewhere within the western and southwestern United States, as with the 1992
Landers earthquake (M7.3) and 1992 Big Bear earthquake (M6.3).
A comprehensive list of every earthquake impacting southern California would be outside the
scope of this LHMP. Table 4-13 below lists earthquakes greater than M5.0 that have occurred
within Southern California since data was available. Note that data before 1900 is sparse due to
the comparative lack of modern monitoring capabilities and loss of Native American knowledge.
Earthquakes with notable impacts near the service area are in bold.59
59 “Earthquake Information – Chronological Earthquake Index”. California Institute of Technology, SCEDC (n.d.).
Archived April 6, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250406135610/https://scedc.caltech.edu/earthquake/chronological.html
75
Table 4-13: Magnitude 5.0 or Greater Earthquakes in the Southern California
Region
Date/Location (Magnitude)
1769 Los Angeles Basin (6.0) 1946 Walker Pass (6.0)
1800 San Diego Region (6.5) 1948 Desert Hot Springs (6.0)
1812 Wrightwood (7.0) 1952 Kern County (7.5)
1812 Santa Barbara Channel (7.0) 1954 Arroyo Salada (6.4)
1827 Los Angeles Region (5.5) 1966 Parkfield (6.0)
1855 Los Angeles Region (6.0) 1968 Borrego Mountain (6.5)
1857 Great Fort Tejon (8.3) 1970 Lytle Creek (5.2)
1858 San Bernardino Region (6.0) 1971 San Fernando (6.6)
1862 San Diego Region (6.0) 1973 Point Mugu (5.2)
1881 Parkfield (6.0) 1975 Galway Lake (5.0)
1883 Santa Barbara Channel (5.8) 1979 Malibu (5.2)
1890 Northeast San Diego (6.8) 1979 Imperial Valley (6.5)
1892 Laguna Salada (7.3) 1980 White Wash (5.5)
1892 San Jacinto or Elsinore Fault (6.5) 1986 North Palm Springs (5.6)
1893 Pico Canyon (5.8) 1986 Oceanside (5.4)
1894 Lytle Creek Region (6.0) 1987 Elmore Ranch/Superstition Hills (6.2/6.6)
1894 East of San Diego (5.8) 1987 Whittier Narrows (5.9)
1899 Cajon Pass (5.7) 1988 Tejon Ranch (5.4)
1899 Lytle Creek Region (5.8) 1990 Upland (5.4)
1899 San Jacinto and Hemet (6.4) 1991 Sierra Madre (5.8)
1901 Parkfield (6.4) 1992 Landers (7.3)
1906 Imperial Valley (6.5) 1992 Big Bear (6.3)
1907 San Bernardino Region (5.3) 1992 Joshua Tree (6.1)
1908 Death Valley (6.0) 1993 Wheeler Ridge (5.2)
1910 Glen Ivy Hot Springs (5.5) 1994 Northridge (6.7)
1910 Elsinore (~6.0) 1995 Ridgecrest (5.8)
1915 Imperial Valley (6.3) 1999 Hector Mine (7.1)
1916 Tejon Pass Region (5.3) 2003 Big Bear (5.4)
1916 Baker (6.1) 2004 Coronado (5.3)
1918 San Jacinto (6.8) 2005 Anza (5.2)
1923 San Bernardino Region (6.0) 2005 Wheeler Ridge (5.2)
1923 North San Jacinto (6.3) 2008 Chino Hills (5.4)
1925 Santa Barbara (6.3) 2009 Northern Baja California (5.8)
1927 Lompoc (7.1) 2010 Sierra El Mayor (7.2)
1933 Long Beach (6.4) 2010 El Centro/Baja, Ca (5.7)
1937 San Jacinto Fault (6.0) 2014 La Habra (5.1)
1940 Imperial Valley (6.9) 2019 Ridgecrest (6.4)
1941 Carpentaria (5.9) 2019 Ridgecrest (7.1)
1941 Santa Barbara (5.5) 2020 Lone Pine (5.8)
1942 Fish Creek Mountains (6.6) 2025 Julian (5.2)
Further information on the above earthquakes may be found at the Southern California
Earthquake Data Center (SCEDC), managed by the Southern California Seismic Network.
76
Additional information is available through USGS and the California Integrated Seismic Network
(CISN).
The most recent significant earthquake event that impacted southern California was the 1994
Northridge Earthquake. At 4:31 a.m. on Monday, January 17, 1994, a moderate-intensity (M6.7)
but highly damaging earthquake struck the San Fernando Valley. MMI values of IX were felt within
Los Angeles County and IV as far away as San Diego. Figure 4-10 shows the CISN ShakeMap.60
Figure 4-10: CISN ShakeMap of the 1994 Northridge Earthquake
In the following days and weeks, thousands of aftershocks occurred, causing additional damage
to affected structures. 57 people were killed and more than 9,000 people were seriously injured.
Thousands of homes and businesses were without power for days, tens of thousands had no gas,
and nearly 50,000 had little or no water due to damaged lines. Outbreaks of valley fever in Ventura
County were attributed to large dust clouds triggered by landslides from seismic shaking.
The extremely strong ground motion felt in sizable portions of Los Angeles County resulted in
record economic losses, though the earthquake’s occurrence in the early morning on a holiday
likely reduced deaths and financial cost. Many collapsed buildings were unoccupied, and most
60 “1994 M6.7 Northridge, CA Shakemap”. USGS, Earthquake Hazards Program (n.d.). Archived on April 5, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250405125120/https://www.usgs.gov/media/images/1994-m67-northridge-ca-
shakemap
77
businesses were not yet open. According to USGS, damages ranged between $13-20 billion, with
other estimates being as high as $40 billion in 1994 dollars.61
Location: The State of California is highly geologically active as the relatively fast-moving Pacific
tectonic plate slips northwest of the North American tectonic plate. While most tectonic plates
move at a relative annual speed of 1 centimeter or less, the Pacific plate is moving between 7
and 11 centimeters per year.62 This causes significantly greater friction forces, resulting in
California’s massive earthquakes. Much of Southern California is near one of the over 300 faults
that crisscross the region. The area at risk to fault rupture is limited to the immediate vicinity of
the fault, though ground shaking can extend hundreds of miles from the epicenter.
Figure 4-11 shows a satellite map of faults within the service area (yellow lines) along with District
facilities. This image was sourced from the previous LHMP iteration (2020).
Figure 4-11: Fault Zones in the District Service Area
61 “Significant Earthquake Information”. NOAA, National Centers for Environmental Information (n.d.). Archived
August 22, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250822192421/https://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/hazel/view/hazards/earthquake/event -
more-info/5372
62 “Plate Tectonics”. Pacific Northwest Seismic Network (n.d.). Archived June 29, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250629034838/https://www.pnsn.org/outreach/about-earthquakes/plate-tectonics
78
Figure 4-12 depicts a map of major fault zones within southern California and northern Mexico.63
Faults and fault zones within 100 miles of the service area are described within the following
paragraphs. Unless otherwise stated, all data is taken from the SCEDC’s Fault Name Index and
Historical Earthquakes & Significant Faults Map.64
Figure 4-12: Major Fault Zones within Southern California
The San Andreas Fault Zone (SAFZ) is the dominant active fault in the southwestern United
States. The SAFZ is the main fault boundary between the Pacific and North American plates. It is
approximately 650 miles long and extends from Cape Mendocino in northern California to east of
the County of San Bernardino. The SAFZ passes through the northeastern end of the service
area by way of the San Bernardino Fault.
63 Rockwell, T. “The Rose Canyon Fault in San Diego”. Fifth International Conference on Recent Advances in
Geotechnical Earthquake Engineering and Soil Dynamics (May 24-29, 2010). Paper No. 7.06c.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/266912188_The_Rose_Canyon_Fault_in_San_Diego
64 “Historical Earthquakes & Significant Faults in Southern CA”. California Institute of Technology, SCEDC (n.d.).
Archived on April 6, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250406182347/https://scedc.caltech.edu/earthquake/significant.html
79
The SAFZ is characterized by “slip-strike” earthquakes where plates move horizontally past one
another as opposed to vertically. The constant friction between these two plates has splintered
the southern zone into many smaller fault zones near the Los Angeles Basin.
At least eight major earthquakes of M7.0+ have occurred within the southern SAFZ over the past
1,200 years. This averages to an interval of approximately 150 years per earthquake of M6.8-8.0.
The most recent event was the 1857 Fort Tejon event (M7.9). The nearly 170 years since this
earthquake encourages the idea that southern California is “overdue” for a major seismic event.
However, SCEDC stresses that this interval “varies greatly” along the SAFZ’s hundreds of miles.
The Elsinore Fault Zones (EFZ) is located along the borders of San Bernardino, Los Angeles,
Orange, and Riverside Counties. The EFZ traces a series of faults east of the Santa Ana
Mountains into Mexico for approximately 112 miles. The SCEDC reports the interval between
major ruptures is estimated at 250 years with a probable magnitude of M6.5-7.5, making it
simultaneously one of the largest and least-active fault zones in the region. To the north, the EFZ
splits into two segments: the 25-mile-long Whittier Fault (M6.0-7.2) and the 13-mile Chino Fault
(M6.0-7.0). Both faults have an unknown recurrence interval.
The fault zones with the most consistent seismicity along its constituent faults is the San Jacinto
Fault Zone (SJFZ), which is located within the Counties of San Bernardino, Riverside, Imperial,
and San Diego. Like the SAFZ, it splinters into smaller sub-faults along its 130-mile length. The
SJFZ’s recurrence interval is approximately 100 to 300 years for an M6.5-7.6 earthquake,
depending on which of its seven segments ruptures. The segment most relevant to this LHMP is
the 26-mile San Jacinto segment located to the service area’s immediate southwest within the
San Jacinto Valley. The last major earthquake was the 1918 San Jacinto event at M6.9.
The El Modeno/Peralta Hills Fault was only recently recognized as a distinct fault splintering off
the SAFZ. Both faults are categorized as “blind faults” in which geomorphological distortion (e.g.,
mountains and cracks in the crust) are not visible. These faults run approximately 12.5 miles
within eastern Orange County near Anaheim Falls. No studies have yet been undertaken to
determine the fault’s seismicity and activity, though in 2017 USGS simulated an M6.6 scenario 65
in which the service area would experience an MMI of VI+.
Smaller faults and fault zones that threaten the District are scattered throughout the San
Bernardino Valley and nearby mountain ranges. Most of these faults do not have established
recurrence intervals, were only recently discovered, and/or have high recurrence intervals with
relatively low probable magnitudes. These include the Cucamonga Fault Zone (interval: 600-700
years, M6.0-7.0), Sierra Madre Fault Zone (interval: “several thousand years”, M6.0-7.0), and the
Crafton Hills Fault Zone (interval: unknown).
65 “M 6.6 Scenario Earthquake – Peralta Hills”. USGS, Earthquake Hazards Program (May 16, 2017). Archived on
August 22,2 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250822193225/https://earthquake.usgs.gov/scenarios/eventpage/bssc2014peraltahills
ellbgeol_m6p55_se/shakemap/intensity
80
Considering the location and seismicity of these fault zones (especially the SAFZ and SJFZ), all
of the service area is at risk of moderate to extreme ground shaking. Ground shaking can cause
structural failures, pipe breakage, building collapses, and power disruption. The District is located
within Seismic Design Category E, in which buildings in California Building Code Occupancy
Groups I-III are located in areas near major active faults.
Soil liquefaction hazard exists in areas susceptible to ground shaking with sandy, high-silt soils
atop shallow groundwater. None of the service area is within any CGS soil liquefaction zones.66
Extent: The intensity of seismic shaking is measured using the Moment Magnitude Scale
(MMS), which is reported as Mw or simply M. The MMS replaced the well-known Richter Scale.
MMS measures the relative amount of energy released during seismic events. The M value is
expressed as a decimal number such as “4.4” or “7.8”. The scale is logarithmic, and each increase
of 1.0 represents 10 times the amplitude and 32 times the energy. The magnitude decreases with
distance from the epicenter, so an M6.7 earthquake in an unpopulated area might be felt at a
relative M4.3 in the nearest population center. All earthquakes are reported by the moment
magnitude at the epicenter.
In contrast, damage caused by an earthquake is assessed by the Modified Mercalli Intensity
Scale (MMI). MMI values do not consider ground shaking. Therefore, an earthquake with
relatively low moment magnitude can have a higher MMI if it impacts more structures and/or
structures not built to earthquake code. MMI values are represented by Roman numerals from I
(“Not Felt”) to X+ (“Extreme”). Table 4-14 describes the scale with language provided by USGS.67
Table 4-14: Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale
Intensity Shaking Description
I Not Felt Not felt except by a very few under especially favorable
conditions.
II Weak Felt only by a few persons at rest, especially on the upper floors
of buildings.
III Weak
Felt quite noticeably by persons indoors, especially on the
upper floors of buildings. Many people do not recognize it as an
earthquake. Standing motor cars may rock slightly. Vibrations
similar to the passing of a truck. Duration estimated.
IV Light
Felt indoors by many, outdoors by few during the day. At night,
some awakened. Dishes, windows, doors disturbed; walls
make cracking sound. Sensation like heavy truck striking
building. Standing motor cars rocked noticeably.
V Moderate
Felt by nearly everyone, many awakened. Some dishes,
windows broken. Unstable objects overturned. Pendulum
clocks may stop.
66 Shapefiles accessible through the CGS Seismic Hazard Program, accessible here (as of August 22, 2025):
https://data.ca.gov/dataset/cgs-seismic-hazards-program-liquefaction-zones
67 “The Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale”. USGS, Earthquake Hazards Program (n.d.). Archived July 11, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250711231421/https://www.usgs.gov/programs/earthquake -hazards/modified-mercalli-
intensity-scale
81
Table 4-14: Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale
Intensity Shaking Description
VI Strong Felt by all, many frightened. Some heavy furniture moved; a
few instances of fallen plaster. Damage slight.
VII Very Strong
Damage negligible in buildings of good design and
construction; slight to moderate in well-built ordinary structures;
considerable in poorly built or badly designed structures; some
chimneys broken.
VIII Severe
Damage slight in specially designed structures; considerable
damage in ordinary substantial buildings with partial collapse.
Damage great in poorly built structures. Fall of chimneys,
factory stacks, columns, monuments, walls. Heavy furniture
overturned.
IX Violent
Damage considerable in specially designed structures; well-
designed frame structures thrown out of plumb. Damage great
in substantial buildings, with partial collapse. Buildings shifted
off foundations.
X Extreme
Some well-built wooden structures destroyed; most masonry
and frame structures destroyed with foundations. Rails bent.
Greater damage is progressively assigned values of XI and XII,
with XII representing total destruction.
A major earthquake (M7.0+; MMI VIII+) could be catastrophic in impact, exceeding the response
capability of County and State partners. Extensive search and rescue operations may be required
to assist trapped or injured persons. Emergency medical care, food/water, and temporary shelter
would be required for injured or displaced persons. Mass evacuation may be essential to save
lives in areas threatened by secondary effects.
Emergency operations could be seriously hampered by the loss of communications; damage to
transportation routes within, to, and out of the disaster area; and by the disruption of public utilities
and services. Significant public health concerns (e.g., exposure to contaminated water) may arise
due to a lack of adequate water infrastructure. Extensive mutual aid may be required to bring
water and wastewater services back online.
While historical earthquakes had limited damage because they occurred in areas that were
sparsely populated, the rapid development of Southern California and significant urban
infrastructure has greatly increased potential damages and risk to life. Damage from the 1933
Long Beach Earthquake was estimated at more than $40 million ($970 million in 2024 dollars),
and 115 lives were lost. The seismic risk is much more severe today than in the past because the
population at risk is in the millions rather than a few hundred or a few thousand persons.
Regulatory Context: Two laws inform the State of California’s approach toward earthquake
hazard mitigation: the Alquist-Priolo Earthquake Fault Zoning Act (1972) and the Seismic
Hazards Mapping Act (1990). Additional regulatory and advisory information relevant to the
State’s earthquake hazard mitigation and building codes may be obtained through the California
Seismic Safety Commission.
82
The Alquist-Priolo Earthquake Fault Zoning Act (“Alquist-Priolo Act”) regulates
development and infrastructure near active faults to mitigate earthquake hazards. It was signed
into law following the 1971 San Fernando earthquake (M6.6).68 Pursuant to the Alquist-Priolo
Act, counties and municipalities within California must conduct a geological investigation of
proposed human-occupied buildings to ensure they are not built upon known, approximate,
concealed, or inferred faults. Its provisions69 may be broadly summarized as:
1) CGS is charged with maintaining detailed maps of Alquist-Priolo Earthquake Fault Zones
(APEFZs), which include faults, surface traces of those faults, and buffer zones around
known and inferred faults.
2) Property owners and real estate agents must formally disclose whether their property
lies within APEFZs prior to selling that property. This augments the Natural Hazards
Disclosure Act (Section 1103, California Civil Code), which requires a Natural Hazard
Disclosure Statement (or equivalent document within the Real Estate Transfer
Disclosure Statement) to accompany the sale of any property within the State.
3) Construction of new human-occupied dwellings within APEFZs is prohibited unless a
comprehensive geological investigation demonstrates that the fault will not pose a
danger to the structure.
The Seismic Hazards Mapping Act (SHMA) requires CGS to identify and develop maps for
“seismic hazard zones”. More broadly, these zones led to the development of CGS’s Earthquake
Zones of Required Investigation (EZRI), which includes areas where ground failure is likely to
occur due to primary and secondary impacts of seismic events including seismic shaking, fault
rupture and landslides. The accompanying EZRI maps are Seismic Hazard Reports and Fault
Evaluation Reports, which describe the methods and information sources used in making EZRI
maps. The SHMA was established following the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake (6.9).
Figure 4-13 shows the EZRIs within the District’s service area. Yellow areas designate faults
and fault buffers according to the APEFZs.70
68 “The 1971 San Fernando Earthquake”. California Department of Conservation, CGS (n.d.). Archived June 26,
2025. https://web.archive.org/web/20250626225158/https://www.conservation.ca.gov/cgs/earthquakes/san -fernando
69 California Public Resources Code, Division 2. Geology, Mines and Mining [2001-2815], Chapter 7.5. Earthquake
Fault Zoning [2621-2630]. Retrieved from:
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displayText.xhtml?division=2.&chapter=7.5.&lawCode=PRC
70 EZRI shapefiles and data are available through CGS, accessible here (as of August 22, 2025):
https://maps.conservation.ca.gov/cgs/informationwarehouse/regulatorymaps/
83
Figure 4-13: EZRIs Near the District
The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) is a professional organization that lists
standards, codes, and design loads for new construction, retrofitting, and rehabilitation. ASCE
standards are referenced by the federal register and are legally binding. Those most relevant to
the District are ASCE 7 Standard Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and ASCE 41-06 Seismic
Rehabilitation of Existing Buildings. Both set standards for new construction and mitigation of
seismic hazards. Any new construction or rehabilitation must conform to these standards by
law.71
The California Building Code is the “minimum requirement intended to protect life safety and
prevent collapse”. The Code does not intend to completely prevent damage due to an
earthquake, and buildings “may not be habitable or functional after a moderate or large
earthquake”.72 The Code incorporates standards from ASCE with additional requirements based
on the Alquist-Priolo Act and local standards. It is updated every thee years.
71 Further information may be found at the ASCE website (accessible as of September 9, 2025):
https://www.asce.org/publications-and-news/asce-7
72 “Expected Earthquake Performance of Buildings Designed to the California Building Code”. Seismic Safety
Commission (n.d.). Archived May 26, 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://ssc.ca.gov/wp-
content/uploads/sites/9/2020/08/ssc19-01.pdf
84
A second set of standards particularly relevant for water systems is the American Lifelines
Alliance’s (ALA) Seismic Guidelines for Water Pipelines (2005). ALA was established as a
“public-private partnership” between FEMA and the National Institute of Building Sciences “to
reduce risk to utility and transportation systems from natural hazards and manmade threats”.73
Unlike the ASCE standards, ALA’s guidelines are not legally binding but are considered the gold
standard for reducing damage to water systems and pipeline infrastructure from earthquakes.
Developmental Trends: Many earthquakes in southern California’s history had limited damage
because they occurred in areas that were sparsely populated at the time. However, rapid
development has greatly increased potential damages and risk to life. Damage from the 1933
Long Beach Earthquake was estimated at over $40 million ($970 million in 2024 dollars), and
115 lives were lost. The risk is much greater today than in the past as the population has
increased from tens of thousands to over ten million.
The “Planning, Maintenance, and Preservation of District Resources” section of the District’s
2025-2026 Fiscal Year Budget lists project goals for District infrastructure. Project descriptions
include replacing pipelines (North Fork Creek Crossings), retrofitting and upgrading water
facilities (Plant 101 Rehabilitation), and repairing and replacing aging water mains (Water Main
Replacement Program). All of these projects will increase resiliency.
Impact of Climate Change: There is no known relationship between climate change and
earthquake recurrence.
Probability of Future Events and Magnitude: To explore future earthquake risk, USGS
partnered with CGS and the Southern California Earthquake Center in developing 2013’s Third
Uniform California Earthquake Rupture Forecast (UCERF3). UCERF3 synthesizes historic and
paleoseismic information to produce probabilistic forecasts of seismic hazards throughout the
State of California. The model is the best available resource for estimates of the magnitude,
location, and likelihood of potentially damaging earthquakes in the area.74
Table 4-15 summarizes the 30-year likelihood of major earthquakes occurring along the three
major fault zones within southern California. UCERF3 identified an overall 30-year likelihood of
an M6.0 or higher earthquake at 98 percent.
Table 4-15: 30-Year Probability of Major Seismic Event in Southern California
Fault Zone Moment Magnitude
(M) 30-Year Probability
San Andreas Fault Zone ≥ 6.7 19.0 percent
73 Eidinger, J. et al. “Seismic Guidelines for Water Pipelines”. American Lifelines Alliance (March 2005). Archived on
October 4, 2024.
https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://www.geengineeringsystems.com/ewExternalFiles/Seismic_Guidelines.pdf
74 “Third Uniform California Earthquake Rupture Forecast (UCERF3)”. Southern California Earthquake Center (July
2017). Archived July 29, 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://southern.scec.org/ucerf
85
Table 4-15: 30-Year Probability of Major Seismic Event in Southern California
Fault Zone Moment Magnitude
(M) 30-Year Probability
≥ 7.5 17.3 percent
≥ 8.0 6.8 percent
Elsinore Fault
≥ 6.7 3.8 percent
≥ 7.5 1.0 percent
≥ 8.0 < 0.1 percent
San Jacinto Fault Zone
≥ 6.7 5.0 percent
≥ 7.5 4.9 percent
≥ 8.0 2.7 percent
Appendix G contains exhibits that plot potential earthquake scenarios in southern California
over the District’s service area. Each map includes the scenario’s moment magnitude and
estimates MMI intensity/damage using contour intervals. All scenarios are sourced from CISN
data. The results of each scenario are described in Table 4-16 below:
Table 4-16: Earthquake Damage Scenarios
Fault Zone Moment Magnitude (M) Estimated MMI
Peralta Hills Fault Zone M6.6 IV-V
San Jacinto Fault Zone M7.0 VI-VII
Elsinore Fault Zone M7.1 V-VI
San Andreas Fault Zone – Mojave Section M7.9 VIII-IX
4.3.6 Flood
Description: Floods are a common hazard anywhere near a river or coastline. A flood occurs
when excess runoff from rainfall or snowmelt accumulates faster than can be drained by channels,
rivers, canyons, or drains, resulting in overflow into nearby lands. Floods can be deep enough
and the waters fast enough to drown persons who enter the floodwaters. Additionally, large floods
can move substantial enough water to damage or displace buildings. Finally, standing floodwaters
that have not yet drained can hamper the ability for critical infrastructure staff and search and
rescue personnel to access the isolated areas.
Floods in the Santa Ana River’s watershed are often caused by heavy rainfall, though floods can
also occur after a long period of moderate rainfall or if unusually warm weather causes mountain
snow to melt faster than expected. Severe floods can inundate local District facilities and
infrastructure, causing damage due to the heavy volume, speed, and force of the floodwaters.
The District’s three major flooding concerns are riverine flooding (also known as overbank
flooding), localized flooding, and flash floods. Coastal flooding is not applicable to the District as
the service area and infrastructure are not within coastal flooding zones.
• Riverine flooding occurs when streams, rivers, and channels receive more rain,
snowmelt, and/or runoff in the watershed than normal. This causes swelling and local
flooding if the water overtops riverbanks or urban channels. The excess water then flows
86
into the surrounding floodplain. High excess water can also create flash floods within more
mountainous areas. Larger rivers typically have longer and more predictable flooding
sequences with broad floodplains, whereas smaller channels and steeper rivers may be
faster and strike with less warning time.
• Localized flooding occurs when urban and suburban areas are inundated due to heavy
precipitation that does not adequately drain. Non-permeable surfaces such as streets,
sidewalks, driveways, and foundations impede the ability for water to drain into the
groundwater. Localized flooding often drains more slowly than riverine flooding. This type
of flooding may often reoccur within urban areas until effective drainage and conveyance
systems are implemented.
• Flash floods are defined by NOAA as floods “caused by heavy or excessive rainfall in a
short period of time, generally less than 6 hours”.75 Flash floods may occur during severe
storms or inundation events and often provide little warning to those impacted. Within the
District’s service area, flash floods are most likely to occur within seasonal riverbeds and
steep, mountainous gullies.
Despite their potentially catastrophic nature, floods are a natural part of watersheds. Areas that
recurringly experience floods are part of a river’s “floodplain”. Floods are often described in terms
of yearly occurrence, such as a “100-year flood” in which a flood of similar magnitude occurs on
average once every 100 years. Likewise, the “500-year flood” occurs once every 500 years.
Both of these terms are used by FEMA and hazard mitigation planners to assess the flood risk
within an area. The 100-year floodplain is necessarily smaller than the 500-year floodplain, as
500-year floods are much larger and more destructive. Therefore, an area might be in a 500-year
floodplain but not within the 100-year floodplain, whereas by definition the 500-year floodplain
subsumes the 100-year floodplain. Floodplains may change over time due to natural or human
processes such as erosion, changes to the watershed itself (e.g., conversion to swampland), or
construction of bridges and channels.
History: According to National Weather Service (NWS) data, over 785 flash floods and 145 flood
events occurred in the County of San Bernardino between 1996 and 2024, totalling $306.9 million
in damages with 21 deaths. Most of these events occurred in July (233) and August (266). Very
few floods impacted buildings and infrastructure or harmed people, as many occurred in
unpopulated desert and mountainous areas.76
NOAA’s Storm Events Database lists nine major floods or flash floods between 2000 and 2025
caused by storms within the Cities of San Benardino and/or Highland, described in Table 4-17.77
75 “Definitions of Flood and Flash Flood”. NWS (n.d.). Archived July 25, 2025.
https://www.weather.gov/mrx/flood_and_flash#:~:text=Flash%20flood:%20A%20flood%20caused,canyons%20sweep
ing%20everything%20before%20them.
76 Real-time information available through the Flash Flood Warning system, accessible here (as of August 22, 2025):
https://www.flashfloodwarn.com/california/san-bernardino
77 Information of all events taken from the Storm Events Database maintained by the National Centers for
Environmental Information under NOAA. Accessible here (as of August 22, 2025):
https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/stormevents/
87
Table 4-17: Selected Flood Events Caused By Storms
Date Location Event Description78
February 20-
22, 2004
City of San
Bernardino
Flash Flood Thunderstorms with heavy rain caused flooding and mudslides
along the foothills of the San Bernardino Mountains in areas
recently burned by the Old Fire and Grand Prix Fire in 2003.
12-25 inches of snow fell throughout the San Bernardino
Mountains and 1.6-3.2 inches of rain fell throughout lower
elevations. Throughout the 3-day event, over $60,000 of damages
were reported.
October 20,
2004
City of San
Bernardino
Flash Flood A series of October storms brought heavy rain and thunderstorms
throughout southern California. Nine inches of rain fell within the
San Bernardino Mountains, causing flash flooding and debris
flows. “Hundreds of car accidents” were reported alongside
closure of “several mountain roads” and “sporadic power outages”.
A large mudslide killed a 49-year old man outside of Lytle Creek.
December 29,
2004
City of San
Bernardino
Flash Flood A mud and rockslide occurred in Upper Waterman Canyon to the
north of the City of San Bernardino on the outskirts of the District’s
service area.
January 9-11,
2005
Unincorporated
County of San
Bernardino
City of
Highland
Flood Flooding along the Santa Ana River destroyed several buildings,
swept away vehicles, and damaged a sewer line. 2-3 million
gallons of untreated sewage spilled into the watershed. One injury
was sustained by a man who fell into the river. Property damage
totaled $3 million.
A 35-year old pregnant woman drowned after being swept by a
flash flood along City Creek in the City of Highland. The flash flood
brought the creek from a “trickle” to a “6 ft deep torrent” (sic).
October 13,
2006
City of San
Bernardino
Flash Flood A strong pressure system over the City of San Benardino dropped
almost two inches of rain within 30 minutes. 18 structures and two
vehicles were damaged during the resulting flash flood.
December
20-22, 2010
City of San
Bernardino
Flood A series of floods occurred throughout the southern Great Basin
and Mojave Desert following a series of late-December storms and
heavy snowfall. President Obama declared a disaster under DR-
1884-CA for ten impacted counties.
The District lost road access to Plant 134 during the floods. The
District received FEMA funding to construct a bridge over an often-
flooded channel formerly crossed by the road.
78 Note: The “Description” column conforms to the “Episode Narrative” and/or “Episode Description” columns within
the Storm Events Database.
88
Table 4-17: Selected Flood Events Caused By Storms
Date Location Event Description78
August 3,
2014
City of San
Bernardino
Flash Flood Thunderstorms throughout the San Bernardino Mountains caused
2-4 inches of rain in less than 3 hours. Debris flows led to road
damage and closures as well as flash floods in low-lying areas
near the deserts.
The County of San Bernardino was “the hardest hit with flash
flooding”, with 25 homes inundated and $11 million of damages
reported.
September
15, 2015
City of
Highland
Flood Remnants of Tropical Cyclone Linda merged with a lower-pressure
system off the coast of southern California. 1-2 inches of rain fell
throughout the area, causing traffic impacts, debris flows within
Silverado Canyon, and “widespread urban flooding” throughout
San Diego, Orange, Riverside, and San Bernardino Counties.
Two houses on Yuhaaviatam of San Manuel Nation lands
sustained damage from floodwaters.
February 6,
2024
City of San
Bernardino
Flood An atmospheric river event over southern Califronia resulted in
over a foot of rain falling throughout southwestern County of San
Bernardino, including several feet of snow within the mountains.
The off-ramp from I-215 South near Base Line Street was closed
due to flooding.
The Santa Ana River has a history of cyclical floods. The most destructive event in California
history occurred in during March 1-5, 1938. This “Great Flood” occurred after a series of storms
precipitated over 30 inches of rain within the upper Santa Ana River watershed, causing the river’s
levees to fail. Portions of the City of San Bernardino and what would become the City of Highland
were submerged by the flood, isolating both areas from the surrounding lands. 22 people died as
a direct result of the flooding and over $14 million of damages occurred ($323.4 million in 2025
dollars). One year later, the San Bernardino Flood Control District was formed as a special district
charged with monitoring and maintaining the upper Santa Ana River watershed to reduce the risk
of another catastrophic flood.
Location: The Santa Ana River places parts of the District’s inhabited areas within the 100-year
and 500-year floodplain. Appendix H contains an exhibit of FEMA’s Flood Insurance Rate Maps
(FIRMs) encompassing the service area. This information was downloaded from the National
Flood Hazard Layer Viewer available on FEMA’s website.79
79 Information available via the shapefiles hosted on FEMA’s Flood Hazard Layer, accessible here (as of August 22,
2025): https://hazards-
fema.maps.arcgis.com/apps/webappviewer/index.html?id=8b0adb51996444d4879338b5529aa9cd
89
According to the FIRMs, the District’s service area and infrastructure primarily lie outside of most
100-year floodplains. The southern service area adjacent to the Santa Ana River proper and
Plunge Creek are substantially within the 100-year floodplain.
The 500-year floodplain primarily subsists of areas between Plunge Creek and the Santa Ana
River, both of which are under-developed. Other 500-year floodplains are present along Twin
Creek and Sand Creek.
Levees throughout the upper Santa Ana River watershed have substantially reduced the risk of
riverine flooding throughout the service area. Areas between City Creek and Bledsoe Creek are
within FEMA Zone X, demonstrating “areas with reduced flood risk due to levee”. Zone X areas
are also found at the confluence of Plunge Creek and City Creek near the San Bernardino
International Airport.
The service area is not within any coastal flooding and tsunami inundation zones.
Extent: The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) defines floods as the “general and
temporary condition of partial or complete inundation of two or more acres of normally dry land
area or of two or more properties”.80 The inundation must be caused by overflow of inland or tidal
waters, unusual and rapid runoff, and/or mudflow. This definition includes land collapsing or
subsiding along shorelines.
FEMA designates areas within the 100-year floodplain as “Special Flood Hazard Areas” (SFHAs).
SFHAs may be inundated at a 1 percent annual chance or higher. Moderate Flood Hazard Areas
are those within the 500-year floodplain at approximately 0.2 percent annual chance. Finally,
Minimum Flood Hazard Areas are locations that are completely outside of the 500-year floodplain.
Table 4-18 below provides a full description of FEMA’s flood zone designations.
Table 4-18: FEMA Flood Zone Designations
Hazard Level Flood Zone Description
Minimum Flood
Hazard Area
Zones C or X
(unshaded)
Areas outside of the 500-year floodplain and are of
minimal flood hazard. Zone C areas might have ponding
or local drainage problems but are not part of the 500-year
floodplain.
Moderate Flood
Hazard Area
Zones B or X
(shaded)
Areas between the 100-year floodplain and the 500-year
floodplain. Also includes areas that are protected by
levees from 100-year floods and shallow flooding areas
with average depths of less than one foot.
Special Flood
Hazard Area
Zones A or
A99
Areas within the 100-year floodplain. Detailed analyses
are not performed, so base flood elevations are not
80 “Section II. Definitions – Flood”. FEMA (n.d.). Archived on May 31, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://emilms.fema.gov/IS1104/groups/62.html
90
shown. Zone A99 are areas protected by federal flood
control systems.
Zone AE Areas within the 100-year floodplain where base flood
elevations are available. Zone AE replaces the previous
Zone A1-A30 designation.
Zone AH Areas within the 100-year floodplain where the average
depth ranges between 1-to-3 feet.
Zone AO Rivers and streams that are within a 100-year floodplain
in which shallow flooding from 1-to-3 feet is possible.
Zones V, VE,
or V1-30
Areas within a 100-year floodplain along coastlines due to
storm surge and waves.
Undetermined
Risk
Zone D Possible but undetermined flood risk and/or unstudied
areas.
NWS maintains watches and warnings for floods, as described in Table 4-19. Note that any watch
or warning requires immediate action to be taken due to the fast-developing and destructive
nature of floods.81 Each color corresponds to NWS’s flood map products.
Table 4-19: NWS Flood Notifications
Notification Description
Flood Advisory
Issued when flooding is not expected to lead to a warning. However, standing
waters may cause significant inconvenience and may still threaten life and/or
property.
Flood Watch
Issued when conditions are favorable for flooding or a weather event that can
lead to flooding. Watches are issued when floods are possible but not
occurring.
Flash Flood Watch
Issued when conditions are favorable for flash flooding, such as a forecasted
weather event that brings significant rain to overwhelm the drainage capacities
of the surrounding landscape.
Flood Warning Issued when a flood or weather event that can lead to flooding is imminent or
occurring.
Flash Flood Warning
Issued when a flash flood is imminent or occurring. If you are in a flood-prone
area, immediately move to higher ground. Warnings are often issued within six
hours of the causative event and when there is a rapid rise in water levels in
urban areas, small drainages, or arroyos.
A fundamental concern specific to wastewater utilities and floods is “infiltration and inflow” (I/I).
Both terms refer to how water can enter sewer pipes, increase wear and tear, and cause sewer
backups. “Infiltration” refers to water entering sewer pipes through cracks and leaks in joints.
“Inflow” is specifically water that enters sewer systems through direct connections such as drains,
manhole covers, and catch basins. Flooding can strongly increase I/I, though infiltration is the
greater concern given the pressure from water entry can degrade already damaged pipes.82
81 “Flood Warnings Vs. Watch”. NWS, NOAA (n.d.). Archived on July 29, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250729083048/https://www.weather.gov/safety/flood-watch-warning
82 “Infiltration and Inflow: What Is It and Why Should We Care?” Bay Area Clean Water Agencies (n.d.). Archived April
23, 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://bacwa.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/BACWA-Infiltration-and-
Inflow-Factsheet.pdf
91
Regulatory Context: The County of San Bernardino’s 2007 Development Code contains several
chapters to encourage effective land use. These include Chapter 82.14 (Flood Plain Safety
Overlay), Chapter 85.07 (Flood Hazard Development Review), and Chapter 86.04 (Floodplain
Management Administrator). The Cities within the service area contains various zoning
ordinances that support floodplain protection.
The County of San Bernardino is a participant within the NFIP. The County currently has over
1,000 flood protection policies in place. Some areas – including most of the upper Santa Ana
River Watershed – have been evaluated by FEMA through detailed Flood Insurance Studies that
describe base flood elevations. Through its participation, the County has the ability to regulate
development within SFHAs. New buildings and existing developments undergoing improvement
must be elevated to protect against damage by 100-year floods, and new developments “must
not aggravate existing flood problems or increase damage to other properties”.83
Developmental Trends: As stated in the 2024 City of San Bernardino LHMP, flooding “will
continue to affect land use and development patterns […] as flood-related impacts have to be
accounted for, mitigated, and minimized.”84 However, developments by the District are unlikely to
change how floods and floodwaters are anticipated. Water and wastewater underground
infrastructure exists underground within and without SFHAs. The District does not currently have
plans to expand into SFHAs, and neither do the Cities of San Bernardino and Highland.
Impact of Climate Change: Although climate change is frequently associated with hotter and
drier weather, there also exists greater potential for heavier precipitation days that could increase
localized flooding. According to the Climate Change and Health Profile Report – San Bernardino
County prepared in 2017 by CDPH, extant climate models “predict an increase in the frequency
and intensity of extreme weather events such as hurricanes, floods, and droughts”.85 Since the
flooding potential of the Santa Ana River is based on precipitation and runoff, any increase in the
number and/or intensity of extreme precipitation events will increase the risk of destructive floods.
Overall, the southwestern areas of the County of San Bernardino are expected to have a reduction
in precipitation of 2-to-4 inches by 2050 and 3.5-to-6 inches by 2100.86 Nonetheless, extreme
precipitation events may become more frequent and intense as warmer temperature increase the
amount of water vapor in the atmosphere. Despite an average reduction in precipitation, the
events that do occur are expected to be larger and potentially more destructive. The Vulnerability
Assessment cites Swain et al. (2018) in stating that “extremely wet seasons” with a historical 4
83 County of San Bernardino MJHMP (2022)
84 City of San Bernardino LHMP (2024)
85 “Climate Change and Health Profile Report – San Bernardino County”. CDPH, UC Davis (February 2017). Archived
February 22, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/OHE/CDPH%20Document%20Library/CHPRs/CHP
R071SanBernardino_County2-23-17.pdf
86 Ibid.
92
percent chance of occurring in previous years “are projected to occur twice as frequently by mid-
century in Southeastern California”.87
Probability of Future Events and Magnitude: Appendix H identifies the flood hazard zones
according to 100-year and 500-year floodplains overlaid with the District’s service area.
Statements of probability for future events accompanies each FIRM. Given the definitions of each
floodplain, it may be assumed that any part of the service area within the 100-year floodplain has
at least a 1 percent annual chance of occurring, whereas the 500-year floodplain has a 0.2 percent
chance of occurring.
4.3.7 Hazardous Materials Incident
Description: “Hazardous materials” (HAZMAT) refers to any material that is harmful to human
health and the environment. These include but are not limited to biologics, acids, carcinogens,
corrosive materials, flammable and explosive materials, toxic chemicals, and radioactive
materials. Many such materials have important industrial, manufacturing, and medical uses, or
they are byproducts of those industries.
HAZMAT incidents involve the accidental or intentional release of HAZMAT into an area.
Reasons include transport or manufacturing incidents, sanitary sewer spills, chemical storage
leaks, contamination from Superfund sites, and explosions. Of these, the most likely incident to
occur within the District’s service area is a sanitary sewer spill, which occurs when a pipe, facility,
pump, or other sewer infrastructure breaks and releases human waste underground or
aboveground. Sanitary sewer spills are most likely to occur simultaneously with another hazard
(e.g., earthquake) or due to built-up fats, oils, and grease (FOG) within pipes.
Hazardous chemicals will be accompanied by a Safety Data Sheet (SDS). These are detailed
documents prepared by the manufacturer, importer, or storer of the material. SDS describe the
properties of the chemical, storage guidelines, its toxicity and health impacts, recommended
personal protective equipment (PPE), disposal and transport, and procedures for cleaning spills.
Employers are required to provide HAZMAT workers with access to SDS, be they fixed to the
storage area or easily accessible upon request.
History: While the District has not experienced any major sewer system issue that resulted in
State/County action, such incidents have occurred within southern California. For example, in
mid-January 2025, beaches in Laguna Beach and Aliso Viejo were closed by the Orange County
Healthcare Agency following a major sewer main break near Laguna Niguel Regional Park that
spilled over 465,000 gallons.88 An eight-million-gallon spill similarly shut down Long Beach’s
beach access after a 48-inch sewer main failed in the City of Carson on December 30, 2021.89
87 WRCOG SBC Vulnerability Assessment (2022)
88 Farzan, Y. “Sewage spill forces beach closures in Orange County”. LAist (January 15, 2025). Archived July 23,
2025. https://web.archive.org/web/20250723150812/https://laist.com/news/climate -environment/sewage-spill-forces-
beach-closures-in-orange-county
89 Elassar, A. & Sutton, J. “More than 8 million gallons of sewage shuts beaches in California’s Long Beach”. CNN
(January 2, 2022). Archived April 18, 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://www.cnn.com/2022/01/02/us/long -
beach-sewage-spill-california/index.html
93
According to Cal OES’s HAZMAT Spill Release Reporting Archive,90 four HAZMAT incidents
with uncontained releases occurred between 2010 and 2024 for which the District was the
responsible/reporting party. These are summarized in Table 4-20 below.
Table 4-20: Uncontained HAZMAT Incidents (2010-2024)
Date Substance Quantity
(gallons) Location Description
2/25/2011 Raw
Sewage 1,800-2,000 City of Highland
FOG blockage on a private lateral line released raw
sewage out of a nearby manhole. All on-site
sewage was cleaned by the District, but 1,800-
2,000 gallons were released into a storm drain
running into Bledsoe Creek.
10/31/2011 Sewage 1,350 City of Highland
FOG blockage from an unknown source led to
sewage leakage from a manhole covered by
asphalt. Sewage leaked into a catch basin and
storm drain
6/13/2024 Sewage 1,800,000 City of San
Bernardino
A major power loss at a wastewater treatment plant
between 4:30PM and 11PM led to a discharge of
1.8 million gallons of sewage out of a manhole and
contained within a nearby catch basin. There were
no known impacts form the released sewage.
10/22/2024 Recycled
Water 1,200 City of San
Bernardino
Recycled water “reached a level and impacted the
storm channel”. There were no known impacts from
the released water.
Location: HAZMAT incidents may occur anywhere these materials are transported, stored, or
used. The service area does not have significant industrial or manufacturing areas. There are
no battery storage sites within 25 miles of the service area. A natural gas transmission pipeline
traverses the City of San Bernardino from east to west along Mill Street, Tippecanoe Avenue,
and East San Bernardino Avenue. Were a HAZMAT incident to occur that does not involve
sewer lines, it would likely be a minor spill occurring during chemical transportation.
The District stores chemicals used for treatment of water and wastewater in large vats at various
facilities. The contents and locations are not for public knowledge. A breach at any one of these
vats could result in chemical spillage. Likewise, a spill at the SNRC could result spillage of
recycled or untreated wastewater. Structural damage to the membrane bioreactors could also
result in spillage of untreated wastewater and sewage – however, this is highly unlikely except
in the case of severe structural damage.
“Superfund” is the colloquial name for polluted sites designated under National Priority List of
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (more
information under the “Regulatory Context” section of this hazard). The service area contains
90 Accessible here (as of August 22, 2025): https://www.caloes.ca.gov/office-of-the-director/operations/response-
operations/fire-rescue/hazardous-materials/spill-release-reporting/#
94
one Superfund site (Norton Air Force Base)91 and is adjacent to another (Newmark Groundwater
Contamination Site).92 Both are located within the City of San Bernardino. Figure 4-14 on the
next page shows the locations of both sites in relation to the District.
Figure 4-14: Map of Superfund Sites Near the Service Area
Norton Air Force Base is located in eastern City of San Bernardino in the southwest of the
District’s service area. It was operable between 1942 and 1994, when it was closed pursuant to
the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure Action. The site is 2,165 acres. For most of its service
time, Norton Air Force Base was used as an overhaul center for jet engines and aircraft repair.
The primary environmental contamination site is the Area II Landfill.
91 “Superfund Site: Norton Air Force Base (LNDFLL #2) San Bernardino, CA”. EPA (n.d.). Archived August 22, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250822200646/https://cumulis.epa.gov/supercpad/cursites/csitinfo.cfm?id=0902760
92 “Superfund Site: Newmark Ground Water Contamination San Bernardino, CA”. EPA (n.d.). Archived August 22,
2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250822200922/https://cumulis.epa.gov/supercpad/cursites/csitinfo.cfm?id=0902439
95
Insufficient HAZMAT management at Norton Air Force Base resulted in contaminated
groundwater and soil with polychlorinated biphenyls, dioxins, heavy metals, and acids. Clean-
up activities were the responsibility of the US Air Force. Actions include groundwater monitoring,
groundwater extraction/treatment, and institutional controls to restrict residential use. According
to EPA, construction of remedies finished in 2006, and removal of lead-contaminated soils
finished in 2019. Groundwater and landfill gas monitoring will continue for the foreseeable future.
Groundwater migration/infiltration is listed as “under control”. Many of the extant aviation
buildings were converted to the San Bernardino International Airport.
The Newmark Groundwater Contamination Site is a dispersed site of groundwater
contamination that impacts over 25 percent of the City of San Bernardino’s municipal water
supply. The source of the contamination is a US Army landfill and depot operated from 1942 to
1947 at which solvents, trucks, and munitions were disposed. Notable contaminants include
trichloroethylene and tetrachloroethylene, both of which are cleaning solvents. The
contamination covers approximately eight square miles.
The Site is defined by two contaminant plumes: the Newmark Plume and the Muscoy Plume.
Both plumes are “several hundred feet” deep underground. Three water treatment plants are
constructed to scrub and return the contaminated groundwater via adsorption using activated
carbon. Construction on the Newmark Plume plants finished in 1998; Muscoy Plume, 2005. EPA
conducts a review of the Site’s progress every five years “until the aquifer is restored to its
beneficial uses”.
Sanitary sewer spills may occur anywhere sewer infrastructure exists. This includes laterals,
despite those being the responsibility of the homeowner. Pipes with greater risk for spillage are
those with a Condition Grading System of 4 or 5. These represent imminent need of repair or
potential holes. Higher grades (1-3) are not anticipated to be at risk unless in the event of seismic
shaking or other major event.
Extent: The primary concern of HAZMAT incidents is the long-term health impact of exposure
to seepage or the material itself. HAZMAT incidents occurring alongside significant structural
damage (e.g., an earthquake causing a major sewer main to break) can complicate repair and
emergency response. Health impacts will vary by material, exposure pathway, and exposure
length. Information on specific substances may be found within the Agency for Toxic Substances
and Disease Registry’s Toxic Substances Portal93 or within the material’s SDS.
Sanitary sewer systems that spill untreated or partially treated sewage must be reported, per a
2006 General Order issued by California’s State Water Resources Control Board. Table 4-21
describes the four categories of sanitary sewer spills and their indicator color on maps.94
93 Accessible here (as of August 22, 2025): https://wwwn.cdc.gov/tsp/substances/SubstanceAZ.aspx
94 “Discharge Types”. State Water Resources Control Board (n.d.). Archived June 16, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250616225034/https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/water_issues/programs/sso/sso_map/
files/sso_legend.html
96
Table 4-21: Categories of Sanitary Sewer Spills
Category Description
Category 1
A spill of any volume of sewage from or caused by a sanitary sewer system regulated
under the General Order that results in:
• A discharge to surface water, including a surface water body that contains no
flow or volume of air; or
• A discharge to a drainage conveyance system that discharges to surface
waters when the sewage is not fully captured and returned to the sanitary
sewer system or disposed of properly.
Any spill volume not recovered from a drainage conveyance system is considered a
discharge to surface water, unless the drainage conveyance system discharges to a
dedicated stormwater infiltration basin or facility.
Category 2
A spill of 1,000 gallons or more that is from or caused by a sanitary sewer system
regulated under the General Order. These spills do not discharge to surface water.
This category also includes spills of 1,000 gallons or more that spill out of a lateral but
are caused by a failure or blockage in the main lines of the sanitary sewer system.
Category 3
A spill of between 50 and 1,000 gallons that is from or caused by a sanitary sewer system
regulated under the General Order. These spills do not discharge to surface water.
This category also includes spills of between 50 and 1,000 gallons that spill out of a
lateral but are caused by a failure or blockage in the main lines of the sanitary sewer
system.
Spills of less than 50 gallons that were reported according to the 2006 General Order are
Category 3 spills. These types of spills are reported as Category 4 spills from 2022
onward.
Category 4
A spill of less than 50 gallons that is from or caused by a sanitary sewer system regulated
under the General Order. These spills do not discharge to surface water.
This category also includes spills of less than 50 gallons that spill out of a lateral but are
caused by a failure or blockage in the main lines of the sanitary sewer system.
This is a new spill category (Order 2022-0103-DWQ).
Regulatory Context: Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA), the EPA is authorized to maintain a list of heavily polluted locations for
targeted clean-up and long-term response. These sites may be placed on the National Priorities
List for investigation and environmental remediation, colloquially called “Superfund sites”.
Following appropriate and documented clean-up, these sites may be removed from the list.
If a spill occurs, the potentially responsible party (PRP) ensures funding and/or clean-up with
oversight from relevant local, State, and Federal agencies. If a sewer system spill, wastewater
main breakage, or other chemical spill were to happen at the fault of District infrastructure, then
the District would be the PRP. This includes FOG obstructions.
97
Chemical manufacturers, distributors, and importers are required to provide SDS for each
hazardous chemical under the 1993 Occupational Health and Safety Act. A list of mandatory
information within SDS may be found in Appendix D to OSHA Standards 1910.1200 – Safety
Data Sheets (Mandatory).95
Storm drains are a common way for pollution to enter waterways and groundwater. The National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System’s Municipal Separate Storm Sewer System requires
permits for cities to build storm drains, catch basins, channels, and other methods of conveying
runoff into local watersheds. The Cities of Highland and San Bernardino are required to conduct
stormwater compliance inspections of local businesses to ensure they are complying with the
permit and each city’s stormwater ordinance.
Developmental Trends: According to the General Plans of the Cities of Highland and San
Bernardino, there are no plans for developing heavy industry and/or manufacturing within the
service area. The San Bernardino International Airport is planning to expand its air cargo
services, though construction plans are not yet set.96
The greatest change to the service area in context of HAZMAT risk is the SNRC, which became
online at the start of 2024. This facility massively increases the concentration of influent, digester
chemicals, and recycled wastewater located at a single position. However, the newness of the
facility and lack of old or damaged pipes and other infrastructure make it an unlikely location for
a HAZMAT incident.
Impact of Climate Change: There is no association between climate change and the risk of
HAZMAT incidents. HAZMAT releases are entirely a technological hazard – in other words, a
failure of infrastructure or maintenance as opposed to an act of nature.
Probability of Future Events and Magnitude: The exact probability of a HAZMAT incident is
unknown. Multiple factors described within this LHMP contribute to such incidents including the
structural integrity of pipes and facilities, changes in land use, and impacts to the water table.
Barring transport incidents, with no hazard mitigation performed on District-owned wastewater
pipes or solid waste infrastructure, it is anticipated that annual recurrence would be between
one and ten percent.
4.3.8 Heat Wave
Description: NOAA defines “heat waves” (or “extreme heat events”) as any period of abnormally
hot temperature that lasts longer than two days.97 Heat waves are typically caused by high-
95 Standard Number 1910.1200, Appendix D – Safety Data Sheets (Mandatory). Retrieved from:
https://www.osha.gov/laws-regs/regulations/standardnumber/1910/1910.1200AppD
96 A Deeper Look at San Bernardino International Airport”. County of San Bernardino, Economic Development Team
(August 3, 2020). Archived on October 6, 2022. https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://selectsbcounty.com/blog/a-
deeper-look-at-san-bernardino-international-airport
97 “During a Heat Wave”. NWS (n.d.). Archived on July 28, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250728204417/https://www.weather.gov/safety/heat -during
98
pressure systems from the south moving north and forcing warm air to the ground. The lack of air
movement stops precipitation from forming and allows the air to continually absorb warmth from
solar radiation and the Earth’s surface.
EPA defines a heat wave as when the “daily minimum apparent temperature […] in a particular
city exceeds the 85th percentile of historical July and August temperatures (1981-2010) for that
city”.98 For the service area, this amounts to daily minima above approximately 70°F and maxima
above 102-103°F during July and August. Figure 4-15 below shows a chart of the average high
and low temperatures in the City of Highland (exported July 15, 2025).
Figure 4-15: Temperature History of the City of Highland
According to NWS, extreme heat occurs when the temperature reaches high levels or when the
combination of heat and humidity causes the air to become oppressive. NWS will issue advisories
or warnings when the heat index is expected to significantly impact public safety. The common
guidelines for the issuance of excessive heat warnings are when the maximum daytime index is
expected to reach 105°F and the nighttime low temperature does not fall below 75°F.
History: A general history of southern California heat waves and other “extreme heat” events from
1990-2023 is maintained by the NWS station in San Diego.99 Selected events germane to the
service area and surrounding Counties of San Bernardino and Riverside are listed in Table 4-22
below. Descriptions are taken directly from NWS.
98 “Climate Change Indicators: Heat Wave”. EPA (June 2024). Archived on July 30, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250730003335/https://www.epa.gov/climate-indicators/climate-change-indicators-heat-
waves
99 “A History of Significant Weather Events in Southern California”. NWS (March 2025). Archived on July 26, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://www.weather.gov/media/sgx/documents/weatherhistory.pdf
99
Table 4-22: Selected History of Southern California Heat Waves
Date Event Description
August 16-17, 1992 Tropical air brought hot and muggy weather with high heat index values to the
region for a week. On this day it was 99°F in LA with a heat index of 110°F.
Temperatures in the valleys and Inland Empire ranged from 100-110°F.
July 27-29, 1995 Heat wave: 123°F at Palm Springs on July 28-29. 120°F at Coachella, 113°F
San Jacinto, 112°F Riverside, 111°F Banning, Moreno Valley, and Sun City.
110°F at Yucaipa on July 17.
October 10, 1996 Strong high pressure engulfed the Southwest. Temperatures soared
accordingly in the deserts, allowing Victorville to reach 100°F, the latest date
in the season for a triple-digit reading on record.
August 2-7, 1997 Heat wave: 121°F at Thermal, 113°F Brea, 110°F Riverside and Ontario,
101°F Julian. Low of 93°F at Palm Springs on August 5. Five deaths.
May 21, 2000 A strong ridge of high pressure built over the region in the wake of a storm
system over the Intermountain West. Temperatures in the Inland Empire and
Coachella Valley subsequently soared, with Riverside reaching 105°F and
Palm Springs topping out at 113°F.
May 7-9, 2001 Heat wave. 109°F at Palm Springs, Thermal, and Borrego Springs, 103°F at
Hemet, 102°F San Bernardino.
March 21, 2004 This day fell in the middle of a three-day heat wave in the deserts, brought on
by a strong area of high pressure over the Western US. Thermal recorded its
highest temperature in March with a reading of 103°F, while Mecca reached
107°F.
July 10-20, 2005 Strong high pressure brought a lengthy heat wave to the region. 121°F in
Thermal, 120°F in Palm Springs and Borrego Springs, 116°F in Hesperia. Big
Bear Lake tied their all-time record at 94°F on July 18. 98°F at Idyllwild. Low
temperature at Indio was 90°F on July 13. One death in the Anza Borrego
Desert. Near record power consumption.
July 22, 2006 A major heat wave with humidity, in some ways unprecedented, hit Southern
California. 121°F in Palm Springs, 120°F at Indio and Thermal, 114°F at
Ontario and the Wild Animal Park, 113°F at El Cajon. It was 112°F at
Escondido and 109°F in La Mesa (both highest all time). Record minimum
temperatures were recorded in most places. Desert locations reported the all-
time warmest month on record. Sea temperatures hit 80°F. 16 were killed from
the heat, and many more were treated. Some power outages occurred.
July 3-6, 2007 A major heat wave struck the mountains and deserts. A strong persistent
marine layer precluded the heat wave from impacting the coasts and valleys.
119°F in Ocotillo Wells, 116°F in Palm Springs and Indio, 115°F in Anza
Borrego, 107°F in Julian, 103°F at Lake Cuyamaca, 100°F at Idyllwild, 97°F at
Palomar Mountain, 94°F at Big Bear Lake (ties all time high) and Mt. Laguna.
Some heat illnesses, poorly documented.
September 1-3, 2007 A heat wave with a monsoon flavor. Temperatures exceeded 95°F in the
coasts and the mountains, 105°F in the valleys, 110°F in the Inland Empire
and high deserts, and 115°F in the lower deserts. At least six deaths from heat-
related illnesses.
100
Table 4-22: Selected History of Southern California Heat Waves
Date Event Description
June 16-23, 2008 A prolonged heat wave that lingered for nearly a week peaked on June 21 in
the valleys, mountains and deserts. Highs reached 117°F in Palm Springs and
114°F in Indio. West of the mountains Ramona recorded a high of 107°F while
San Diego reached 92°F.
November 3-4, 2010 Strong high pressure and offshore flow led to all-time November record high
temperatures. At San Diego it reached 100°F on November 4, the highest
temperature on record in November, and the only time it has reached the
century mark in November. This was also the first time a 100°F reading was
reached in more than 21 years. In Riverside, the temperature of 99°F on
November 3 tied and the 101°F reading on November 4 broke all time
November records. On November 3, it was 101°F in Santa Ana, equaling the
highest November temperature on record. And it was 96°F in Laguna Beach,
the second highest November temperature on record.
June 28-30, 2013 A heat wave on the order of a 20-year event enveloped the west and Southern
California. Death Valley hit highest U.S. June temperature ever recorded:
129°F on June 30. Other desert cities like Palm Springs, Thermal, and Borrego
Springs tied or set new June records and came within one degree of the all-
time highest temperature on record on June 29.
June 20, 2016 An intense heat wave peaked on this day with a total of 13 daily high
temperature records set. Borrego Springs tied an all-time record high of 122°F.
Palm Springs reached 122°F, an all-time record for June and the second
highest temperature on record. Indio and Thermal both reached 121°F, the
second highest temperatures on record for June. West of the mountains
Riverside was 114°F, while Ramona (109°F) and El Cajon (107°F) both set
records for June.
June 15-18, 2021 Strong high pressure brought a dry heat to inland areas. Temperatures
reached 123°F in Palm Springs on June 17, tying the highest reading on
record. It was also 123°F at Ocotillo Wells on June 17 and June 18. 104°F in
Idyllwild and 112°F in Apple Valley on June 16. 107°F in San Jacinto and 97°F
in Yorba Linda on June 15.
July 21, 2023 A long heat wave enveloped the region for most of the month. Palm Springs
hit 120°F on this day. 18 days this July recorded a high of 115°F or higher.
Several low temperatures remained in the 90s Fahrenheit. July 2023 was the
hottest month on record for Palm Springs, with an average temperature of
98.5°F.
A recent event not listed within the San Diego station’s list occurred on June 5-9, 2024. The
County of San Bernardino Health Officer issued a heat advisory due to forecasts of temperatures
“soaring into the 90s in the valley and into the triple digits in the deserts”.100 NWS forecasted
temperatures as high as 120°F in Needles.
100 “Hot weather returns to San Bernardino County”. Conty of San Bernardino, County Administrative Office (June 6,
2024). Archived on June 19, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250620043953/https://main.sbcounty.gov/2024/06/06/hot-weather-returns-to-san-
bernardino-county/
101
Heat waves often accompany periods of drought and strong dust – known as “compound events”.
According to a December 2022 joint article from researchers at the University of Kansas, NOAA
Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory, and Peking University, California experienced 16
“compound events” from 2007 to 2018 with maximum temperature anomalies between 3.19 and
14.02°F.101
Location: By definition, heat waves are regional events. This LHMP assumes that any heat wave
impacting one part of the service area will impact the rest.
Urban areas such as the Cities of Highland and San Bernardino are naturally hotter than
periurban, rural, and wilderness areas that immediately surround them. This effect is called the
“urban heat island”. The World Meteorological Organization states that urban areas may be
warmer by up to 5-10°C (9-18°F), and this difference will be exacerbated during heat waves.102
Extent: High air temperatures can harm the body’s ability to maintain a consistent temperature
suitable for life. Uncommon yet severe health impacts include heath stroke and dehydration.
Technician, maintenance, construction, and other staff whose work is outside or within non-air-
conditioned spaces may have to operate on altered time schedules to avoid the heat.
Infrastructure can also be impacted due to heat waves. As with droughts, greater evaporation due
to the heat can reduce waterflow and increase maintenance costs. Above-ground pipes can
buckle and crack. Increased energy demand due to greater HVAC use can increase strain on
power stations, thereby increasing the likelihood of a power failure or PSPS event.
The “heat index” is defined as the relative intensity of heat depending on a combination of ambient
temperature, sunlight, wind, and humidity. It may be interpreted as what the heat feels like when
outside as opposed to only the nominal temperature. NWS will issue advisories, watches, and
warnings when the heat index endangers public health and safety. Table 4-23 describes heat-
related public notifications according to NWS descriptions.
Table 4-23: NWS Heat Notifications
Notification Description
Excessive Heat Outlook
The potential for excessive heat exists over the next 3-to-7 days. No
temperature thresholds need to be met to issue an outlook other than the
potential for a heat event may develop based on weather patterns and climate.
Outlooks are intended for local agencies and utilities to begin preparing for a
potential event.
Excessive Heat Advisory
The heat index is at or above 100°F for at least two hours. Heat Advisories are
issued when people may be impacted by heat if precautions are not taken.
Heat Advisories may trigger regulations concerning evictions, turning off
power, and outdoor work requirements.
101 Pu et al. “Compound Heat Wave, Drought, and Dust Events in California”. American Meteorological Society
(December 15, 2022). doi: 10.1175/JCLI-D-21-0889.s1.
102 “Heatwave”. World Meteorological Organization (n.d.). Archived on July 26, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250726032407/https://wmo.int/topics/heatwave
102
Table 4-23: NWS Heat Notifications
Notification Description
Excessive Heat Watch Issued when a Heat Warning is anticipated within 1-to-2 days in advance of
the criterion being met.
Excessive Heat Warning
The heat index is at or above 105°F for at least two hours. Heat Warnings are
issued when people may be seriously impacted by heat if precautions are not
taken, with injuries such as heat stroke expected for persons who spend a
significant amount of time working or living outside.
Heat Warnings are used by hospitals and public agencies to take certain
actions to prepare and respond to an increase in emergency calls, as well as
perform wellness checks on elderly and homebound persons. Local
jurisdictions may establish public cooling centers. As with Heat Advisories, a
declared Heat Warning may trigger regulations concerning evictions, turning
off power, and outdoor work requirements.
To supplement the official advisories, NWS developed the HeatRisk index to forecast the risk of
heat-related impacts over a 24-hour period.103 HeatRisk considers the duration of the heat through
day and night, if the heat index poses an elevated risk of heat-related impacts, and how unusual
the heat is for the time of year. For example, an 85°F day might not be unusual in the City of
Highland, but it would be highly unusual and factored into HeatRisk if it occurred in Anchorage,
Alaska. Table 4-24 describes each HeatRisk level.
Table 4-24: NWS HeatRisk Index
Notification Description
Green (0) Little to no risk is expected from the heat.
Yellow (1)
Minor: This level of heat primarily affects individuals who are highly sensitive
to heat already, especially when outdoors without effective cooling and/or
adequate hydration.
Orange (2)
Moderate: This level of heat affects most individuals sensitive to heat,
especially those without effective cooling or adequate hydration. Impacts are
possible to some health systems and persons in heat-sensitive industries.
Red (3)
Major: This level of heat affects anyone without effective cooling and/or
adequate hydration. Impacts likely in some health systems, heat-sensitive
industries, and infrastructure.
Magenta (4)
Extreme: This level of rare and/or long-duration extreme heat with little-to-no
overnight relief affects anyone without effective cooling and/or adequate
hydration. Impacts likely in most health systems, heat-sensitive industries, and
infrastructure.
Regulatory Context: Regulations concerning heat waves primarily center around occupational
health guidelines pursuant to the requirement that employers ensure their workplaces are “free
103 “NWS HeatRisk”. NWS, NOAA (n.d.). Archived July 30, 2025.
web.archive.org/web/2/https://www.wpc.ncep.noaa.gov/heatrisk/
103
from recognized hazards that are causing or likely to cause death or serious harm to
employees”.104
The State of California’s Heat Illness Prevention Standard further requires employers to provide
training, water, shade, and comprehensive planning resources if the workplace’s temperature
exceeds 80°F.105 In July 2024, the Standard was amended with the Heat Illness Prevention in
Indoor Places of Employment Standard that requires similar actions to be taken if the workplace
temperature exceeds 82°F.106 The standards do not apply to “incidental or brief exposure” of 15
minutes or less between 82°F and 95°F.
In April 2022, the State of California released the Extreme Heat Action Plan.107 This Plan identifies
the State’s goals and actions to reduce the impact of future heat waves and warmer temperatures.
The four action tracks include: A) build public awareness and notification; B) strengthen
community services and response; C) increase resilience of our build environment; and D) utilize
nature-based solutions.
Developmental Trends: Increased urbanization and development within the Cities of Highland
and San Bernardino may intensity the urban heat island effect and thereby exacerbate the impacts
of heat waves. Both Cities include within their General Plans’ Housing Elements provisions for
increased energy efficiency of residential homes and other buildings to reduce the impact of heat.
There is no additional development among District-owned buildings and infrastructure that would
influence the impact of heat waves.
Impact of Climate Change: Climate change will lead to warmer average temperatures and more
extreme weather events throughout most of the western United States. According to NOAA, “heat
waves are occurring more often than they used to […] from an average of two heat events per
year during the 1960s to more than six per year during the 2020s.”108
In 2020, the County of San Bernardino developed a Resilience Strategy to identify “possible
actions the County and other agencies […] could implement to address and ameliorate key
104 Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Section 5(a)(1). Retrieved from: https://www.osha.gov/laws-
regs/oshact/Section5-duties
105 California Code of Regulations Title 8 – Industrial Relations, General Safety Orders, Group 2 Safe Practices and
Personal Protection. Section 3395: Heat Illness Prevention in Outdoor Places of Employment. Retrieved from:
https://www.dir.ca.gov/title8/3395.html
106 California Code of Regulations Title 8 – Industrial Relations, General Safety Orders, Group 2 Safe Practices and
Personal Protection. Section 3396: Heat Illness Prevention in Outdoor Places of Employment. Retrieved from:
https://www.dir.ca.gov/oshsb/documents/Indoor-Heat-updated-txtbrdconsider.pdf
107 “Protecting Californians from Extreme Heat: A State Action Plan to Build Community Resilience”. California Air
Natural Resources Agency (April 2022). Archived July 26, 2025. https://resources.ca.gov/-/media/CNRA-
Website/Files/Initiatives/Climate-Resilience/2022-Final-Extreme-Heat-Action-Plan.pdf
108 Lindsey, R. & Collins, N. “Heat wave in Southern California and the Southwest in early September 2024”. NOAA
(September 13, 2024). Archived on June 18, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250618233320/https://www.climate.gov/news-features/event-tracker/heat-wave-
southern-california-and-southwest-early-september-2024
104
vulnerabilities”.109 Reducing heat impacts to vulnerable communities was listed as a topmost
priority. Within this discussion, the County developed a map (Figure 4-16 below) that overlaid
low, moderate, and high Social Vulnerability Index values with the projected additional maximum
heat days by 2050. The service area was entirely within “moderate” and “high” values with 35-40
additional maximum heat days.
Figure 4-16: Heat Exposure in Southwestern County of San Bernardino
Probability of Future Events and Magnitude: As stated previously, heat waves are expected to
rise in frequency and duration over the next 25 years. Regardless of the cause, “annual average
temperature has been rising since the beginning of the 20th century, and temperatures are
expected to continue to rise through the end of this century”. The Southwest US is expected to
warm faster than other regions of the country.110
Cal-Adapt, California’s database of climate data and visualization tools, provides five different
ways to define the extreme heat hazard: (1) the number of extreme heat days by year ; (2) the
number of warm nights by year; (3) the number of heat waves by year; (4) the timing of extreme
heat days by year (cf., which months do extreme heat hazards occur); and (5) the maximum
109 “San Bernardino County Resilience Strategy”. WRCOG (2019). Archived on July 4, 2024.
https://web.archive.org/web/20240704221017/https://wrcog.us/DocumentCenter/View/7660/San-Bernardino-County-
Resilience-Strategy2019_FINAL
110 “Extreme Heat & Public Health Report”. SCAG (September 2020). Archived on July 14, 2020.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250714122158/https://scag.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2024 -
05/extremeheatpublichealthreportfinal_09302020.pdf
105
duration of the heat wave by year. These metrics project both the intensity and the temporal nature
of extreme heat.111
Using Cal-Adapt’s tool for Extreme Heat Days & Warm Nights, the Upper Santa Ana River
Watershed is expected to have an average of 26 days per year with temperatures above 95.2°F
under a “Medium Emissions” scenario between 2036 and 2064. The 30-year range is 4 to 60 days
per year. The modeled historical baseline period of 1961-1990 averaged 5 days per year with a
range of 0-16 days above the same temperature.112
Heat waves are likely to be an annual occurrence in and around the service area. It is likely that
multiple events may occur in years with multiple high-pressure systems as in 2017 and 2022.
4.3.9 Landslide
Description: Landslides are defined by USGS as “the movement of a mass of rock, debris, or
earth down a slope”.113 Landslides may occur suddenly and unexpectedly, or they may occur
following storms, wildfires, and/or earthquakes. They are the result of friction between layers of
soil and rock failing, which causes uncontrollable sliding of the topmost layers. Natural causes of
landslides include intense rainfall, prolonged rainfall, earthquakes, freeze-thaw cycles, and
flooding. Human causes include improper excavation, unstable earth fills, improper loading of a
slope, deforestation, and water leakage from water or sewer lines.114
Landslides are a fairly common occurrence within the San Bernardino Mountains, though events
large enough to cause an emergency declaration are rare. They are most likely to occur during
and immediately after storms when soil water saturation is at the highest level or due to seismic
shaking during earthquakes.
Table 4-25 describes the most common types of landslides. For the purposes of the LHMP,
“landslide” collectively refers to these unless otherwise specified. USGS’s Landslide Handbook
contains additional information on landslide types and causes.115
111 Cal-Adapt “delivers critical climate data and cutting-edge tools” concerning climate change’s potential impacts and
adaptability measures. The website is accessible as of August 24, 2025: https://cal-adapt.org/tools/extreme-heat
112 Ibid. See Cal-Adapt’s Tool Array.
113 “What is a landslide and what causes one?”. USGS (n.d.). Archived on July 22, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://www.usgs.gov/faqs/what-a-landslide-and-what-causes-one
114 “Appendix A: Basic Information about Landslides”. The Landslide Handbook – A Guide to Understanding
Landslides. USGS (n.d.). Archived on April 19, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250419081749/https://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/1325/pdf/Sections/AppendixA.pdf
115 Ibid.
106
Table 4-25: Common Types of Landslides
Type Description
Earthflow A soil flow landslide in which the soil materials are fine-grained and cohesive
with little material strength. As the soil slides, it shears off and creates a lumpy
slope with an outward bulge at the end. Earthflows usually occur on
moderately steep slopes after prolonged rainfall. They can be fast- or slow-
moving. Extremely slow-moving earthflows are called “creep”.
Debris Flow Fast-moving landslides that often occur with little warning. They may
propagate after heavy rains, especially on slopes where the soils are not
cohesive or denuded after wildfires. Debris flows can carry boulders, trees,
vehicles, and small buildings. They can be especially destructive and extend
for several miles if they travel into gullies and seasonal river channels. Debris
flows are also known as mudslides.
Debris Avalanche Debris avalanches are fast-moving landslides that occur when an unstable
slope collapses and falls away from the slope. They occur in steep terrain and
can be very large. Not to be confused with snow avalanches.
Earthquake-Induced
Landslide
Landslides that occur due to seismic shaking. These types of landslides can
cause very large landslides as soils that would otherwise remain cohesive are
sufficiently disturbed at greater moment magnitudes.
Rockfall A mass of rock detaches from a steep slope by sliding or toppling off the slope
and into the air. They can be caused by heavy rains, earthquakes, and freeze-
thaw cycles.
History: Landslides are a common occurrence within mountainous areas. However, they are
likely to be unreported if they do not impact a populated area or road. Large, destructive landslides
often occur after wildfires. A series of debris flows and debris avalanches occurred in January
2018 throughout southern California, mostly along slopes denuded in Santa Barbara County
during the 2017 wildfire season.116
The California Department of Conservation’s Reported California Landslides Database lists major
landslides that caused casualties, property damage, and/or road closures. According to this
database, no destructive landslides have occurred at the District’s northern boundaries. However,
some have occurred nearby – especially on State Road 18 and State Road 330 that travel north
into the San Bernardino Mountains. According to the Database, eight landslides occurred on State
Road 18 and six on State Road 330 in 2023. All landslides occurred during the winter months
(January through March). 117
116“The Economic Impacts of the Montecito Mudslides: A Preliminary Assessment”. Robert D. Niehaus, Inc. (March
2018). Archived on May 26, 2018. https://web.archive.org/web/20180526185909/http://www.rdniehaus.com/rdn/wp -
content/uploads/2018/03/RDN_Montecito_Mudslides_Impacts -1.pdf
117 The Reported California Landslides Database is accessible as of August 24, 2025. Available information include
landslide photographs, State reports, maps, and location data. See: https://www.conservation.ca.gov/cgs/landslides
107
Location: Landslides can occur at any place where steep slopes and soils exist together. These
qualities are present along the slopes of the San Bernardino Mountains in the northernmost
service area. Appendix I shows a projection from the Landside Susceptibility Map maintained by
USGS overlaid with the District’s boundaries.118 Dark red portions demonstrate the highest value
of landslide susceptibility during favorable conditions (e.g., saturated soils).
Extent: Human activities that destabilize slopes can increase vulnerability, such as removing
trees or building structures near steep ground. Any District buildings, roads, pipelines, and other
infrastructure that are adjacent to or on top of eroded landscapes can be at risk. Any infrastructure
adjacent to fault lines (such as the San Andreas Fault) may be at increased risk to landslides
following even minor earthquakes.
One of the few systematized reporting metrics is the National Atmospheric and Space
Administration’s Cooperative Open Online Landslide Repository (COOLR), which allows citizen
scientists to submit reports on landslides. COOLR uses the following landslide size
classifications:119
• Small: Less than 10 cubic meters of debris. These minimally impact infrastructure and
roads though may still hold enough mass to kill a human.
• Medium: Between 10 and 1,000 cubic meters of debris. These can block roads for days,
damage houses and facilities, and easily kill humans.
• Large: Between 1,000 and 100,000 cubic meters of debris. Often cover wide areas with
substantial impact to roads and infrastructure, likely displacing people and causing tens
to hundreds of casualties.
• Very Large: Between 100,000 and 1,000,000 cubic meters of debris. These landslides
cover extremely large areas that can cover entire towns and neighborhoods.
• Catastrophic: Over 1,000,000 cubic meters of debris. Multiple towns, neighborhoods,
and boroughs may be impacted or completely covered. Fatalities might be over 1,000.
Landslide risk may change based on natural and human factors. Erosion can steepen a slope
and increase the risk of debris avalanches or earthflows. Severe storms may cause water to
percolate between layers, increase their weight, and reduce friction forces. The shaking caused
by earthquakes can loosen soils that would otherwise be firm. Vegetation plays an important role
in reducing landslide risk by absorbing water and providing structural integrity to soils through root
systems. Removing plans can increase landslide risk even if the slope remains the same. Finally,
wildfires can drastically increase the probability of highly destructive landslides and debris flows.
Regulatory Context: As discussed within the Earthquake & Seismic Events hazard analysis, the
State of California’s Seismic Hazards Mapping Act (SHMA) directs the Department of
Conservation to identify and map areas that are prone to seismic hazards, including earthquake-
118 The February 3, 2025, edition of the Landslide Inventory and Susceptibility Map was used in constructing this
LHMP. See: https://www.usgs.gov/tools/us-landslide-inventory-and-susceptibility-map
119 “The Landslide Reporter’s Guide; Primer and Landslide Identification”. NASA (n.d.). Archived on February 23,
2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250223161959/https://gpm.nasa.gov/landslides/guides/COOLRGuide_Primer.pdf
108
induced landslides. EZRIs with landslide risk “generally indicate steep hillslopes composed of
weak materials that may fail when shaken by an earthquake”.120 The Natural Hazards Disclosure
Act requires sellers of real property to disclose if the property is within a state-mapped hazard
area. Seismic Hazard Zone Maps are available through the Department of Conservation and the
California Earthquake Hazards Zone Application.121
Developmental Trends: There are no known developmental trends or changes in land use that
would either increase the risk of destructive landslides or place significant infrastructure near
steep slopes. The Cities of Highland and San Bernardino are not expanding further into the
mountainous slopes, and no major construction is currently planned by the District in any
landslide-prone areas.
Impact due to Climate Change: Debris flows and mudslides may become more common as
more extreme weather events cause greater soil saturation.122 El Niño weather events could also
increase the amount of water dumped during each event despite the area becoming dryer on
average. There is no association between climate change and earthquakes, so the risk of
landslides associated with seismic shaking is unlikely to change.
Probability of Future Events and Magnitude: It is difficult to predict where landslides will occur,
and landslide risk is often defined following destructive events. Slopes that previously experienced
landslides will not necessarily be safer, especially if lingering weaknesses in the soil or bedrock
remain. Any slopes burned by wildfires should be assumed to have significantly increased risk of
debris flows. Appendix I shows areas within the service area at greatest risk for landslides. Based
on previous history, a landslide that impacts actual infrastructure (as opposed to being in an
unpopulated/undeveloped gully) is estimated at under 1 percent but greater than 0.1 percent
annual chance of occurrence.
4.3.10 Power Failure/PSPS
Description: A power failure is the partial or total loss of the electricity supply to an area or region.
In addition to natural hazards such as earthquakes and high winds, power failures may occur due
to a defect in a power station, damage to a power line or other part of the distribution system, a
short circuit, or the overloading of electricity mains.
There are three categories of power failures relevant to this LHMP:
• Blackout: Occurs if power is completely lost within a section of the grid. They may
occur due to transmission failures, extremely high demand, and cascading failures at
substations. Blackouts may last for hours to days in severe cases.
• Brownout: Occurs if some power supply is retained, but the voltage level is below the
minimum level specified for the system. Brownouts typically occur due to periods of
120 “California Seismic Hazard Zones”. California Department of Conservation (n.d.). Archived on August 24, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250824161714/https://www.conservation.ca.gov/cgs/shma
121 Accessible as of August 24, 2025: https://www.conservation.ca.gov/cgs/geohazards/eq-zapp
122 WRCOG SBC Vulnerability Assessment (2022)
109
high demand and do not necessarily result in blackouts. Typically, power grids quickly
recover from brownouts upon reduction of demand.
• Short Circuit: Indicates a loss of power over a short amount of time, usually measured
in seconds as opposed to the longer duration of blackouts and brownouts.
An intentional power outage called a Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) may be induced by
power companies due to high power demand that exceeds supply or to de-energize power lines
in wildfire-prone areas. PSPS are planned reductions of service and will be accompanied by press
releases or statements from the power company one to three days in advance. PSPS often occur
in conjunction with “red flag days” when wildfire risk is much higher than normal due to low
humidity, strong winds, and heavy fuel loads.
Major power failures most often occur because of transmission issues and heavy demand, as
might happen during heat waves when HVAC use is very high. Strong winds and severe storms
can knock down power lines, which is especially dangerous within rural and m ountainous areas.
Earthquakes can disrupt power lines and substations, knocking out power for days or weeks as
in the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake in northern California.
History: According to the US Department of Energy’s Form OE-417 (“Electric Emergency
Incident and Disturbance Report”), 138 outages impacting at least 50,000 customers occurred in
the State of California from 2000 to 2023.123 Two-thirds of the causes were “weather-related” by
way of storms, strong winds, and heat waves. Most failures were restored within minutes. Larger
power failures that significantly impacted southern California are detailed in Table 4-26.
Table 4-26: History of Major Power Failures in Southern California
Date Description
December 1982 High winds and storms knocked out transmission towers throughout the
western United States, leading to over two million businesses and homes
losing power throughout Nevada, southern California, and the San
Francisco Bay Area.
July 2 – August 10,
1996
The Western North America blackouts impacted power grids throughout
Canada, northern Mexico, and the western United States over a six-week
span. Most of the blackouts lasted minutes to hours, with the cause
identified as grounding and relay issues over long-range power
transportation. The August 10 blackout occurred during a heat wave that
placed additional strain on the power grid due to reliance on air
conditioning.
123 “Power Outages in California”. PowerOutage.report (n.d.). Archived on June 16, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250616195409/https://poweroutage.report/ca
110
Table 4-26: History of Major Power Failures in Southern California
Date Description
May 2000 – March
2001
A series of escalating planned and unplanned blackouts and brownouts
occurred throughout California. Reasons included deregulation of the
State’s electric utilities, higher wholesale energy costs, no new investment
in new power plants, price manipulation by energy sellers, and an
unsustainable reliance on energy imports from other states.
Droughts within the Pacific Northwest reduced the amount of hydroelectric
power available for import and increased prices. Heat waves throughout
the western United States likewise increased demand. Electricity supply
further decreased following transmission failures and a natural gas
pipeline rupture. Some utilities companies (such as PG&E) filed for
bankruptcy.
September 8, 2011 The largest power failure in California history resulted in over six million
customers losing power in southern California due to an overload brought
by a mix of lack of contingency for power dispatch issues, unusually warm
weather, misclassification of emergency protocols, and human error
among transmission operators. Within 11 minutes, 23 failures occurred on
five separate power grids. This “Great Blackout of 2011” lasted for
approximately 12 hours.
August 2020 California ISO and electricity providers instituted the first statewide rolling
blackouts since 2001 following a major heat wave that placed significant
strain on the statewide power grid. 492,000 customers lost power on
August 14 for between 15 and 150 minutes. 321,000 customers lost power
on August 15 for between 8 and 90 minutes.
Location: The power grid within the service area is operated by Southern California Edison
(SCE), a subsidiary of Edison International. SCE maintains the general power system and
electrical transmission facilities for over 15 million customers within southern Californi a. A power
outage that impacts the service area due to SCE service is likely to affect other nearby
communities. Brownouts and blackouts can occur anywhere within the power grid.
Figure 4-17 shows nearby power stations and transmission lines within southwest County of San
Bernardino per the United States’ Energy Information Administration (EIA). The map is a
screenshot of the EIA’s US Energy Atlas.124 The service area does not directly provide power to
124 EIA’s Energy Infrastructure and Resource Maps resource is accessible as of August 24, 2025:
https://atlas.eia.gov/pages/energy-maps
111
any power stations, nor is it near any substations that could secondarily impact District-owned
facilities or infrastructure if an explosion occurred.125
Figure 4-17: Energy Infrastructure Near Southwest County of San Bernardino
As shown above, the service area exclusively contains electrical transmission lines under 100
kilovolts. The only power plant within the service area is the San Manuel Central Plant Cogens
natural gas power plant. It is operated by the Yuhaaviatam of San Manuel Nation and produced
approximately 26.5 gigawatts-per-hour in 2023.126
Localized power failures could impact a single facility. These types of failures are more likely
during other disasters such as floods or earthquakes that damage power lines.
Extent: Small brownouts are relatively common and do not often result in an emergency
response. Larger blackouts can lead to grid-wide cessation of service, which can cause backups
within sewer and water treatment facilities. Power loss can also impact staff through a lack of air
125 Note: The District’s FY 24-25 Budget states that excess energy produced by the SNRC could be sold back to
SCE. However, this has not yet occurred at a reportable level as of July 15, 2025.
126 “San Manuel Central Plant Cogens – Plant Summary Information”. GridInfo (n.d.). Archived on August 24, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250824162625/https://www.gridinfo.com/plant/san-manuel-central-plant-cogens/66472
112
conditioning and an inability to wash and maintain vehicles. The District may more easily prepare
for PSPS given they are often announced 72 hours in advance; however, the risk to infrastructure
that rely on continuous energy still exists.
There are four different metrics used to define power reliability. Of these, the System Average
Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) is the most commonly used index. The following definitions
come from the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC):127
• System Average Interruption Duration Index: Measures the average total minutes
of outage that a customer on the system experienced in the reporting year.
• System Average Interruption Frequency Index: Measures the average number of
sustained outages (i.e., outages that lasted greater than five minutes) that a customer
on the system experienced in the reporting year.
• Customer Average Interruption Duration Index: Measures the average duration of
a single sustained outage that a customer experienced in the reporting year.
• Momentary Average Interruption Duration Index: Measures the average number of
momentary outages (i.e., outages that lasted less than five minutes) that a customer
experienced in the reporting year.
Under California law, each of these metrics is reported with and without Major Event Days (MEDs).
MEDs are defined as days when the SAIDI of an event exceeds a statistically-defined threshold
based on the previous five years of daily SAIDI data. According to CPUC, MEDs are “low
frequency, high consequence events” that exclude “all but the worst 0.63 percent of outage
events”.128 PSPS are considered MEDs only when they exceed the threshold.
Regulatory Context: EIA’s Energy Disruption Maps show current and potential threats to energy
infrastructure.129 EIA also provides information on large-scale energy infrastructure, energy source
production, and energy resources. The California State Geoportal provides Power Outage
Incidents maps that are updated every 15 minutes.130 These materials and maps can assist the
District in planning for potential emergencies, especially if wildfires or urban fires could potentially
impact transmission lines. Finally, SCE provides information on current outages, scheduled
outages, and potential PSPS on its website.131
Development Trends: Over the last decade, power companies such as SCE have become more
risk-averse, especially following the destructive 2018 and 2020 wildfire seasons. In 2018 SCE
initiated three separate PSPS; it was its first year doing so. In 2024, SCE initiated 20 PSPS from
127 “Electric System Reliability Annual Reports”. CPUC (n.d.). Archived on July 4, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250704171738/https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/industries -and-topics/electrical-
energy/infrastructure/electric-reliability/electric-system-reliability-annual-reports
128 Ibid.
129 EIA provides information on disruptions due to hurricanes and tropical storms, wildfires, and flooding events.
Accessible as of August 24, 2025: https://atlas.eia.gov/pages/energy-disruptions
130 Cal OES’s Statewide Power Outages public map contains data pulled from utilities’ power outage maps.
Accessible as of August 24, 2025: https://data.ca.gov/dataset/statewide-power-outages-public-view
131 Accessible as of August 24, 2025: https://www.sce.com/outage-center/check-outage-status
113
June through December, with most occurring October through December.132 While an important
component of wildfire mitigation, the relatively high frequency of PSPS events demonstrates a
trend toward more frequent power loss events.
To mitigate wildfire risk, SCE is implementing “targeted undergrounding” of high-risk power lines
throughout southern California. Given that blown power lines are a common ignition source,
targeted undergrounding will reduce power utilities’ vulnerability and risk of power loss due to
strong winds. Targeted undergrounding takes place under CPUC’s Rule 20, which sets the
policies and procedures for converting overhead power lines to underground. Further information
may be found within CPUC’s Rule 20 Frequently Asked Questions page.133
Impact of Climate Change: There is no direct link between climate change and power failure.
However, indirect effects due to the changing probability of other natural hazards may increase
the number and severity of power outages. The August 2020 rolling blackouts resulted from high
energy usage during record-setting heat throughout the State. The hazard analysis for the Heat
Wave hazard described an increase in the frequency and duration of extreme heat events and
hot days over the next several decades; these events will further strain the power grid.
Probability of Future Events and Magnitude: Power failures are inherently difficult to predict.
They are predicated on a complex system of economic factors, natural hazards, climate, and
population needs. Power failures are likely to occur in tandem with heat waves, earthquakes, and
wildfires – the last of which is the greatest risk to power given their association with PSPS and
long-term damage to energy infrastructure.134,135,136
According to SCE’s 2024 Annual Electric Reliability Report, the SAIDI value for 2024 was 158.30
(100.25 when MEDs excluded). That means the average customer on the SCE power grid
experienced 158.30 minutes of power loss throughout 2024. This value is slightly higher than
2022 (131.13) and 2023 (115.90) but lower than 2019 (177.97), 2020 (201.32), and 2021
(179.79).137 This data shows that some form of annual power loss is virtually guaranteed for the
132 Each year’s reports are released in April of the following year. For a list of post-event reports, pre-season reports,
and post-season reports, please see (accessible as of August 24, 2025): https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/consumer -
support/psps/utility-company-psps-reports-post-event-and-post-season
133 “CPUC Rule 20 Undergrounding Programs – FAQ”. CPUC (n.d.). Archived on June 9, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/industries -and-topics/electrical-energy/infrastructure/electric-
reliability/undergrounding-program-description/rule-20/cpuc-rule-20-undergrounding-programs----faqs
134 Skibell, A. “Wildfires are jacking up California’s power bills”. Politico (January 15, 2025). Archived on April 19,
2025. https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://www.politico.com/newsletters/power -switch/2025/01/15/wildfires-are-
jacking-up-californias-power-bills-00198429
135 Penn, I., Levitt, Z., & González Gómez, M. “New Data Shows Major Electrical Disruption Ahead of Eaton Fire”.
New York Times (January 29, 2025). Archived on July 22, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250722223915/https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/01/29/business/energy -
environment/eaton-fire-electrical-faults-southern-california-edison.html
136 “Moody’s says LA fire may pose risk to Southern California Edison”. Reuters (January 16, 2025). Archived on
January 17, 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/20250117104211/https://www.reuters.com/world/us/moodys-says-la-
fire-may-pose-risk-southern-california-edison-2025-01-16/
137 “Annual Electric Reliability Report – Calendar Year: 2024”. SCE (July 15, 2025). Prepared for: CPUC. Archived on
August 24, 2025.
114
District in the absence of backup power sources that do not rely on SCE’s grid. The CPRI places
power failure and PSPS in the highest probability category at greater than 10 percent chance of
annual occurrence.
4.2.11 Severe Storms
Description: Severe storm events are common throughout southern California, though not
always to the extent of a disaster declaration. These events include thunderstorms, high winds,
and the El Niño-La Niña oscillation cycle. Severe storms are strongly related to other hazards
described within this LHMP including floods, wildfires, power loss/PSPS events, and landslides.
The climate within the service area is a mix of semi-arid and hot-dry mediterranean in which
winters are generally cool and damp. The dominating factor in the area’s weather is the semi-
permanent high-pressure area of the northern Pacific Ocean, which moves northward in summer
and reduces precipitation during summer and early fall. This leads to the San Bernardino Valley
(and most of southern California at-large) having zero recorded precipitation from June through
August – and often very little well into fall.
Beginning in August and September, much of southern California is subject to Santa Ana winds.
These are strong and extremely dry down-slope winds that originate inland and bring hot, dry
weather. Santa Ana winds are often responsible for fanning the area’s most destructive wildfires,
but they are very rarely strong enough to harm buildings or infrastructure.
Much of southern California’s wet season is driven by “atmospheric rivers”. Atmospheric rivers
are defined as narrow bands of highly concentrated moisture within the atmosphere that transport
water out of tropical areas.138 Upon making landfall, the water vapor cools and releases extremely
large amounts of precipitation, typically over a few days. While an important part of California’s
water cycle, large atmospheric rivers can cause widespread flooding and debris flows.
The El Niño and La Niña events strongly influence global weather patterns. These events refer to
the periodic warming and cooling of the eastern Pacific Ocean, especially near the California and
Mexico coastlines. El Niño generally leads to wetter winters, whereas La Niña is associated with
warmer and drier winters. El Niño periods often cause greater and more powerful thunderstorms
and atmospheric river events given the significant warming of the eastern Pacific Ocean.139
History: The area’s history of significant storms and wind events is described within the 2022
County of San Bernardino MJHMP and NWS’s “A History of Significant Weather Events in
Southern California”.140 A list of all events would be outside the scope of this LHMP. Table 4-27
https://web.archive.org/web/20250824163900/https://www.sce.com/sites/default/files/AboutUs/Reliability/Annual%20
Reliability%20Report%202024%20FINAL.pdf
138 “What are atmospheric rivers?”. NOAA (February 21, 2025). Archived on July 27, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250727062801/https://www.noaa.gov/stories/what-are-atmospheric-rivers
139 “Extreme Weather – El Niño”. California Coastal Commission (n.d.). Archived on June 27, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://www.coastal.ca.gov/climate/extreme -weather/el-nino/
140 A History of Significant Weather Events in Southern California”. NWS (March 2025). Archived on July 26, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://www.weather.gov/media/sgx/documents/weatherhistory.pdf
115
below lists major storm and wind events within the region over the last 100 years. Text comes
directly from NWS.
Table 4-27: Selected History of Severe Storms in the County of San Bernardino
Date Description
September 1932 A late-season tropical storm brought four days of rain to most of southern
California, coinciding with the El Niño year of 1932-1933. At least 15
people died due to floods and debris flows.
March 1938 22 inches of rain fell within the San Bernardino Mountains, flooding the
Santa Ana River and causing mudslides within western Orange County.
Over 210 people died.
January 25-27, 1956 Heavy storms washed over the Counties of Los Angeles, Orange, and San
Bernardino. Almost eight inches of rain are recorded in Los Angeles.
Mudslides occurred throughout mountainous areas
September 9-12, 1976 Tropical Storm Kathleen passed over southern California with significant
rainfall during the El Niño year of 1976-1977.
February 13-21, 1980 A series of six storms hit southern California, dumping 9-10 inches
throughout the area.
February 18-19, 1984 Mudslides occurred within the mountainous areas of the Counties of
Orange, Los Angeles, and San Bernardino after a period of severe storms.
December 6-8, 1997 Widespread flooding, mudslides, and coastal erosion occurred in southern
California after a line of thunderstorms brought the heaviest rain in over
70 years.
March 15, 2003 A slow-moving cold front brought 3-7 inches of rain into southern
California. NWS states that over 1,000 traffic accidents and six deaths
were attributed to this particular storm due to flooded roadways.
July 18-19, 2015 Residual showers from a dissipating Hurricane Dolores brought a series
of thunderstorms throughout southern California.
January 5 and February
12, 2019
Two winter atmospheric river events brought heavy precipitation
throughout southern California. High winds, flooding, debris flows, and
power outages occurred. Governor Gavin Newsom declared a state of
emergency on February 21, 2019.
February 25, 2021 An extreme Santa Ana wind event resulted in gusts of 80-90 miles per
hour within the foothills of the San Bernardino Mountains north of the city.
January 9-10 and 14-16;
and February 23-26, 2023
Widespread flooding throughout southern California followed a series of
atmospheric river events.
August 19, 2023 Hurricane Hillary made landfall in southern California as a Category 4
hurricane, resulting in widespread flooding and evacuations throughout
the area.
January 7-8, 2025 An extreme Santa Ana Wind event lasted for 48 hours throughout the
County of San Bernardino. Gusts reached over 80 miles per hour in some
area, with most areas in the Inland Empire experiencing sustained winds
of 50-60 miles per hour.
Location: Storms, high winds, and the El Niño-La Niña oscillation cycle are regional by definition.
There is no particular location in the service area or among District infrastructure where storm
events are more or less likely.
116
NWS, NOAA, and other government agencies maintain several tools that facilitate forecasting
storms and high winds. The most common of these is the NWS’s system of local forecasting
offices (LFOs). NWS summarizes information from LFOs and distributes it through weather
forecasts in a simple graphic format, including comprehensive day and night forecasts for up to
three days in the future. Additional information is provided on temperature, humidity, windspeeds,
precipitation, and heat index. Figure 4-18 shows a screenshot of the local forecast for the City of
Highland.
Figure 4-18: Local Forecast for the City of Highland (Exported 7/29/2025)
Extent: Storms are strongly associated with many other hazards. The extent and vulnerabilities
outlined for floods, landslides, and wildfires will apply to severe storms. Additionally, there are
several different categories of severe storms based on expected damage and windspeed. Table
4-28 describes the Storm Prediction Center’s classification for thunderstorm risk.141
Table 4-28: Storm Prediction Center Risk Categories
Risk Category Description
Marginal (MRGL) Isolated severe thunderstorms are possible. Storms are limited in duration
and/or coverage and/or intensity.
Slight (SLGT) Short-lived and/or not widespread; isolated intense storms are possible.
Enhanced (ENH) Numerous severe storms are possible. Storms are more persistent and/or
widespread, but few are intense.
141 “SPC Products – Understanding Severe Thunderstorm Risk Categories”. Storm Prediction Center, NOAA (n.d.).
Archived on July 29, 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://www.spc.noaa.gov/misc/about.html
117
Table 4-28: Storm Prediction Center Risk Categories
Risk Category Description
Moderate (MDT) Widespread severe storms are likely. Storms may be long-lived,
widespread, and intense.
High (HIGH) Widespread severe storms are expected. Storms may be long-lived and
particularly intense.
In 2019, the Scripps Institution of Oceanography at UC San Diego published a five-level scale
developed by F. Martin Ralph at the Center for Western Water and Weather Extremes that
evaluates the relative strength of atmospheric river events. The scale ranges from AR 1-5. The
intention of the scale is to assist planners in assessing if an event is “beneficial” or “hazardous”
based on the intensity of rainfall and length of the event. Shorter events with greater rainfall may
be ranked similarly to longer events with less average rainfall. Rainfall is defined according to
“maximum vertically integrated water vapor transport” (Max. IVT), which approximates the total
amount of water vapor precipitated.
An example of an AR 1 event is the February 2, 2017, atmospheric river that produced “modest
rainfall” throughout the central and southern California coastline.142 The series of atmospheric
river events throughout January and March 2023 during the record-setting Sierra Nevada snow
year included ten AR 2 events and seven AR 3 events.143 This series ended the 2020-2022
California drought.
Table 4-29 depicts the scale.144
Table 4-29: Atmospheric River Event Categories
Category Strength & Impact Max. IVT
(kg/m2s) Duration
1 Weak – Primarily beneficial 500-750 <24 hours
250-500 24-48 hours
2
Moderate – Mostly beneficial, also
hazardous
750-1000 <24 hours
500-750 24-48 hours
250-500 >48 hours
3 Strong – Balance of beneficial and
hazardous
1000-1250 <24 hours
750-1000 24-48 hours
142 A History of Significant Weather Events in Southern California”. NWS (March 2025). Archived on July 26, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://www.weather.gov/media/sgx/documents/weatherhistory.pdf
143 “The Atmospheric Rivers of Water Year 2023: End of Water Year Summary”. Scripps Institution of Oceanography
at UC San Diego, Center for Western Weather and Water Extremes (October 20, 2023). Archived on May 18, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://cw3e.ucsd.edu/the-atmospheric-rivers-of-water-year-2023-end-of-water-year-
summary/
144 Monroe, R. “New Scale to Characterize Strength and Impacts of Atmospheric River Storms”. Scripps Institution of
Oceanography at UC San Diego, Center for Western Weather and Water Extremes (February 5, 2019). Archived on
June 12, 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/20250612195921/https://scripps.ucsd.edu/news/new-scale-characterize-
strength-and-impacts-atmospheric-river-storms
118
Table 4-29: Atmospheric River Event Categories
Category Strength & Impact Max. IVT
(kg/m2s) Duration
500-750 >48 hours
4
Extreme – Mostly hazardous, also
beneficial
≥1250 <24 hours
1000-1250 24-48 hours
750-1000 >48 hours
5 Exceptional – Primarily hazardous ≥1250 24-48 hours
≥1000 >48 hours
El Niño and La Niña events do not have associated scales, but there are consistent atmospheric
and oceanic impacts that can be measured. Both events are “oscillations” in that they occur due
to variations in sea surface temperatures, wind strength, and precipitation patterns. They occur
irregularly but semi-cyclically. Both events can result in significant swings in heat/cold and
precipitation throughout the North American continent. They are typically measured by
oceanographic and atmospheric surveys performed by NOAA that monitor sea surface
temperatures and precipitation averages.
El Niño events are associated with warmer sea surface temperatures, when central and western
Pacific Ocean waters near the tropics exceed 80 degrees Fahrenheit. According to NWS,145 El
Niño causes a pattern of hotter-than-average temperatures within Californian coastal areas from
December through March. Precipitation also generally increases, with wetter conditions expected
from January through March.
La Niña events incur the opposite oscillation; the same tropical waters are often within the low
60s degrees Fahrenheit. Northern and coastal California are generally cooler, especially February
through April. Coastal California is slightly dryer from November through January, whereas
southern California is extremely dry. For either oscillation, the impacts to the District are measured
via the drought and storm scales discussed in this LHMP.
As described in the hazard analysis for floods, severe rainfall is a serious concern for areas like
the District. Rainfall-derived inflow and intrusion (RDII) into sewer systems is “the main cause of
sanitary sewer overflows” and can “create serious operating problems for sewage treatment
plants”.146 The severe storms and atmospheric river events described within this hazard analysis
can cause heavy precipitation that leads to RDII and exacerbates wear and tear.
145 “El Niño: Risk of Weather Extremes”. NOAA (n.d.). June 23, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://www.weather.gov/mhx/risknino
146 Kesik, T. “Best practices guide: Management of inflow and infiltration in new urban developments”. Institute for
Catastrophic Loss Reduction (February 2015). Archived on February 17, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250217020058/https://academic.daniel s.utoronto.ca/pbs/wp-
content/uploads/sites/13/2023/04/II-Best-Practices-Guidelines.pdf
119
Regulatory Context: There are no regulations that pertain to thunderstorms, Santa Ana winds,
or the El Niño-La Niña oscillation cycle. The regulatory context for related hazards (floods,
wildfires, landslides) may be found in their respective hazard analyses.
Developmental Trends: Building and infrastructure development within the San Bernardino
Valley does not influence severe storm risk. Likewise, any population growth is not expected to
change the service area’s vulnerability to storms and wind. As with the “Regulatory Context”
subsection, developmental trends concerning related hazards may be found in their respective
analyses.
Impact of Climate Change: According to the San Bernardino County Vulnerability Assessment,
“recent studies project that future atmospheric rivers could be approximately 25 percent longer
and wider, while carrying larger amounts of water vapor compared to historical conditions”.147 This
finding corresponds with the general trend toward dryer climate on average but a greater
preponderance of extreme events when such events occur.
The City of San Bernardino’s 2024 LHMP states “atmospheric rivers that deliver storms to
southern California may intensify […] storms are expected to increase by 10 to 20 percent”.148
The 4th Climate Change Assessment qualifies this sentiment in that “climate change is projected
to increase the strength of the most intense atmospheric rivers affecting California” even if “climate
model projections do not present a strong consensus towards the whole of California ‘getting
wetter’ or ‘getting drier’”.149
The data on Santa Ana winds are more mixed. Santa Ana winds may follow the trend of other
weather-related phenomena in having a greater number of extreme events. Other studies show
a potential decrease in the duration of Santa Ana winds coupled with increased temperatures in
December and January. The State of California’s 4th Climate Change Assessment reflects this
lack of consensus as “some results suggest decreased activity […] however, there is no indication
of decreased activity in the longest record of Santa Ana winds available”.150
Probability of Future Events and Magnitude: The State of California has the most variable
seasonal and annual precipitation in the contiguous United States. This causes multi-year wet
and dry periods (cf. droughts and record-setting water years) that can feature periods of variable
storm frequency, intensity, and duration. Per the 4th Climate Change Assessment, “most of the
heaviest precipitation events occur in winter” and the “wettest days explain the dominant portion
of year-to-year variability”.151 Annual extreme precipitation events are all but guaranteed.
Thunderstorms are common throughout southwestern County of San Bernardino and occur many
times each year. The County of San Bernardino’s disaster history demonstrates that storms
147 WRCOG SBC Vulnerability Assessment (2022)
148 City of San Bernardino LHMP (2024)
149 California 4th Climate Change Assessment (2018)
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid.
120
severe enough to cause localized flooding are rarer but occur on average once every 5-10 years.
Atmospheric river events occur multiple times throughout the rainy season. At least one AR 2 -3
event hits southern California each year, though AR 4-5 events occur approximately once every
ten years.152
Santa Ana winds are a seasonal occurrence. The winds can be expected to blow throughout the
fall and early winter each year. Extremely strong winds that incur gusts over 60-70 miles per hour
occur on average once per year, according to historical data and the City of San Bernardino’s
2024 LHMP.
According to NOAA, El Niño and La Niña events are irregular and occur on average ever y three
to five years. However, this interval can be as large as two to seven years.153
4.3.12 Wildfire
Description: Wildfires (or “wildland fires”) are any fires involving outdoor vegetation, typically
used in reference to large, uncontrolled, and/or unintended fires. Fires are a natural part of wild
spaces and are often beneficial to the landscape. Many species of trees (such as pine) require
fires to propagate their seeds. However, increased human habitation and landscape changes over
the last two hundred years of rapid development have made even natural fires much more
hazardous as uncontrolled fires can lead to conflagrations in periurban spaces.
Wildfires are typically described in context of the “Wildland Urban Interface” (WUI), which the US
Fire Administration defines as “the area or zone where structures and other human development
meet or intermingle with undeveloped wildland or vegetative fuels.”154 Scattered residential
development within wilderness areas increases the number of potential manmade ignition
sources due to the greater perimeter along the WUI in contrast to the deprecated view of the WUI
being a single urban center abutting a forest or grassland.
Wildfires are influenced by fuel, weather, and topography:
• Fuel: The rate of fire spread is strongly based on the type of vegetation present and
whether it is living or dead. The dry fallen wood of late summer can cause extremely hot
and fast-moving fires. Trees that have been defoliated due to insects or previous fires
may be more susceptible to ignition. The San Bernardino National Forest is primarily
mixed-conifer, oak woodlands, and chaparral, all of which are associated with wildfires.
• Weather: High temperatures, low humidity, and fast winds create conditions that make
“Red Flag” days, when wildfires are at the greatest potential to both start and spread
152 Monroe, R. “New Scale to Characterize Strength and Impacts of Atmospheric River Storms”. Scripps Institution of
Oceanography at UC San Diego, Center for Western Weather and Water Extremes (February 5, 2019). Archived on
June 12, 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/20250612195921/https://scripps.ucsd.edu/news/new-scale-characterize-
strength-and-impacts-atmospheric-river-storms
153 “El Niño and La Niña”. NOAA (n.d.). Archived on July 29, 2025.
web.archive.org/web/2/https://www.noaa.gov/education/resource-collections/weather-atmosphere/el-nino
154 “What is the WUI?”. US Fire Administration (n.d.). Archived on July 3, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://www.usfa.fema.gov/wui/what-is-the-
wui/#:~:text=The%20WUI%20is%20the%20zone,undeveloped%20wildland%20or%20vegetative%20fuels
121
quickly. Long periods of drought or little precipitation can also increase the speed of
spread, whereas coastal fog increases humidity and reduces spread. Lightning storms
are also an important ignition source for wildfires. As described within the Severe Storms
hazard analysis, the hot and dry Santa Ana winds can rapidly spread sparks.
• Topography: The mountainous landscape north of the District’s service area and
infrastructure can change the rate at which fire can spread. Valleys can funnel heat and
wind from wildfires, increasing spread and destructive force. The tops of fires burn hotter,
allowing easier spread up ridgelines. Mountainous terrain can also impede firefighters’
ability to enter the area.
The potential for both life and property losses within the WUI is exponentially higher than non-
populated wildlands. Most wildfires that directly threaten communities are caused by human
activity.155 The most common types of ignitions include:
• Lightning strikes: Lightning is the main cause of natural wildfires.156 When lightning
strikes the ground, it can ignite dry fuels such as brush and deadfall. “Dry lightning
storms” have caused some of California’s largest wildfires, such as the August Complex
fire in 2020. These storms occur when lightning strikes the ground but all or most
precipitation evaporates before hitting the ground.
• Utility-caused wildfires: Utility-caused wildfires typically occur when power lines short
or arc near vegetation, thereby sparking fires similar to lightning strikes. Overhead power
lines have caused wildfires throughout the southwestern United States, as with the 2018
Camp Fire that began due to a faulty hook on a transmission line owned by PG&E. Older
transmission lines that are downed due to storms can cause high-energy and high-
temperature arcing.
• Arson: Arson is defined as the intentional ignition of fire. The destructive 2024 Line Fire
and 2003 Old Fire were both caused by arson.
History: According to the 2023 California State Hazard Mitigation Plan, “California has long been
recognized as one of the most fire-prone natural landscapes in the world”.157 While wildfires have
always been a part of the State’s natural history, recent large conflagrations throughout the State
have devastated human and natural landscapes.
Table 4-30 shows a partial list of wildfires that burned within ten miles of the service area over the
last 25 years with an emphasis on declared disasters. Smaller wildfires that do not threaten human
life or infrastructure are unlikely to be declared as disasters and are not reported within this table.
155 Iglesias, V. “Wildfires Started by Daily Human Activities Are Often More Destructive”. Scientific American (January
15, 2025). Archived on June 27, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/wildfires-started-by-human-activities-are-
often-more-destructive/
156 Pérez-Invernón, F., Gordillo-Vázquez, F., Huntrieser, H., & Jöckel, P. “Variation of lightning-ignited wildfire
patterns under climate change”. Nature Communications 14, 739 (2023). doi: 10.1038/s41467-023-36500-5
157 California SHMP (2023)
122
This information comes from Cal Fire’s incidents database unless otherwise noted.158 A full list of
all fires that impacted the County of San Bernardino is outside the scope of this LHMP.
Table 4-30: Selected Wildfire History in the County of San Bernardino (2000-2025)
Date Fire Name
(FEMA #) Description
September 8
– November
26, 2024
Bridge Fire
(FM-4437-CA)
The Bridge Fire began at 2:15PM on September 8, 2024, along the boundaries
of the Angeles and San Bernardino National Forest. Though the cause is
unknown, it is suspected to be caused by lightning. Excessive heat and winds
resulted in a Red Flag Warning on the day of the fire. It burned simultaneously
with the destructive Line Fire ten miles east. Mandatory evacuations took place
in Mt. Baldy Village, Wrightwood, and Jackson Lake.
$10 million in damages were reported alongside eight injuries, 81 destroyed
structures (including 20 homes in Mt. Baldy Village), and 17 damaged
structures. There were no deaths.
September 5
– December
23, 2024
Line Fire
(FM-5535-CA)
The Line Fire started north of the City of Highland on the boundary of the San
Bernardino National Forest at Baseline and Alpin Streets. The fire began after
several days of extremely high temperatures throughout southern California,
hitting over 107°F in southwest County of San Bernardino and 112°F in Los
Angeles County. The fire rapidly burned north into the Santa Ana drainage
within the mountains due to upslope winds. 9,200 homes throughout the Cities
of Highland, East Highland, and Running Springs were evacuated. The cause
of the fire was arson.
Firefighting costs topped $14.5 million to keep the fire away from populated
areas. There were six injuries and zero deaths. One structure was destroyed
and four were damaged for $1 million in damages. 43,978 acres were burned.
September 5
– November
16, 2020
El Dorado Fire
(FM-5350-CA)
The El Dorado Fire burned 22,744 acres along the borders of Riverside County
and southwest County of San Bernardino after a pyrotechnic device during a
gender reveal party ignited brush. The fire threatened areas near Oak Glen,
Mentone, and Yucaipa south of Big Bear Lake. One firefighter died and 13
were injured. 20 buildings were destroyed, and Highway 38 was briefly closed
in September.
October 31
– November
14, 2019
Hillside Fire
(FM-5301-CA)
The Hillside Fire only burned 200 acres but occurred within periurban areas
north of the Cities of San Bernardino and Highland. Six homes were destroyed
and 18 homes were damaged.
July 6 –
October 22,
2018
Valley Fire
(N/A)
The Valley Fire began as a brush fire near Forest Falls in the San Bernardino
National Forest on a steep mountainside. The fire resulted in the evacuation
of Forest Falls and road closures along Highway 38. There were five injuries
and zero deaths with unknown damages.
158 Incident database is accessible here (as of August 24, 2025): https://www.fire.ca.gov/Incidents
123
Table 4-30: Selected Wildfire History in the County of San Bernardino (2000-2025)
Date Fire Name
(FEMA #) Description
August 16-
23, 2016
Blue Cut Fire
(FM-5147-CA)
The Blue Cut Fire was one of the most destructive wildfires in California history
at the time. It began within the San Gabriel Mountains along Interstate 15 on
the Blue Cut hiking trail during Red Flag conditions. Temperatures were over
100°F with wind gusts up to 30 miles per hour. The fire rapidly spread north
and burned most of its footprint within the first two days. A mandatory
evacuation order was issued for 35,000 homes near Oak Hills, Lytle Creek,
Summit Valley, and other communities. I-15 was closed in both directions for
two days. The cause of the fire is unknown but may have been an electrical
shortage along SCE-owned transmission lines.
The fire burned 105 homes and 213 outbuildings over its 37,000-acre footprint.
Two civilian injuries occurred and zero deaths. Damages were over $50
million.
October 22
– November
6, 2007
Slide Fire
(N/A)
The Slide Fire began during Red Flag conditions near Green Valley Lake and
Crestline. The fire burned 12,759 acres, destroyed 272 homes and 3
outbuildings, and damaged 43 additional structures. Nine firefighters were
injured. Over $65 million in damages were reported.
October 22
– November
6, 2007
Grass Valley Fire
(N/A)
The Grass Valley Fire started during Red Flag conditions on October 22nd
near the community of Lake Arrowhead. The fast-moving fire burned 1,247
acres, destroyed 199 homes, and damaged 25 additional structures as
firebrands ignited multiple homes at once.159 One civilian was injured, and
there were no deaths. Total damages topped $50 million.
July 22 –
July 24,
2006
Ramp Fire
(N/A)
The Ramp Fire began in the late morning at the junction of I-15 and Highway
18 within the San Bernardino Mountains. Gusty winds from afternoon
thunderstorms quickly fanned the fire toward populated areas, burning 450
acres and destroying 8 structures. There was one civilian death and 17
injuries. Over $11.7 million in damages were reported.
October 25
– November
2, 2003
Old Fire
(FM-2503-CA)
The Old Fire and Grand Prix Fire were two of the 15 wildfires through southern
California’s “Fire Siege of 2003”. The Old Fire is one of the most destructive
fires in the State’s history. It blew through southwest County of San
Bernardino, threatening the Cities of San Bernardino and Highland as well as
the mountain communities of Lake Arrowhead and Running Springs. Over $1.3
billion in damages (2003 dollars) were reported as the fire burned 975
structures and killed five people. The cause of the fire was arson.
October 21
– November
2, 2003
Grand Prix Fire
(FM-2501-CA)
The Grand Prix Fire occurred southwest of the Old Fire and eventually merged
with it. An additional $100 million of damages was attributed to the Grand Prix
Fire.
159 “Home Destruction Examination: Grass Valley Fire”. USDA (June 2008). Archived on July 9, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250709084655/https://www.fs.usda.gov/rm/pubs_other/rmrs_2008_cohen_j001.pdf
124
Location: The 2023 California SHMP specifically mentions the San Bernardino Mountains and
foothills as areas of significant wildfire risk. The dense brush and steep terrain increase the risk
of destructive and fast-moving wildfires, especially during drought years.
Figure 4-19 below shows a map of the Fire Hazard Severity Zones (FHSZs) within the service
area. FHSZs are determined by models of how fire behaves on various terrain and by the
probability of flames and embers threatening buildings. Within wilderness areas near the WUI,
the FHSZ model assesses ignition probability, weather, fuel, and terrain. Higher scores reflect
great potential of destruction, hotter embers, and higher likelihood of burning.
Figure 4-19: Fire Hazard Severity Zones near the District
Extent: Between 1993 and 2022, the County of San Bernardino had the third-highest number of
declared disasters (33) due to wildfires out of all California counties. Events such as the 2024
Line Fire show that District’s service area infrastructure is at high risk of potential impact if a fire
were to occur within the northern foothills.160
160 California SHMP (2023)
125
The US Forest Service uses the National Fire Danger Rating System (NFDRS) to assess potential
fire danger. This five-level scale rates the relative danger of daily fire potential. Table 4-31
describes the scale, using the descriptions from the US Forest Service website.
Table 4-31: National Fire Danger Rating System
Level Description
Low Fuels do not easily ignite from small embers, but lightning may start fires in duff or dry
and rotten wood. Fires in open grasslands may burn easily a few hours after rain, but
most wood fires will spread slowly by creeping or smoldering. Control of fires is
generally easy.
Moderate Fires can start from most accidental causes, but the number of fire starts is usually
pretty low. If a fire does start in an open, dry grassland, it will burn and spread quickly
on windy days. Most wood fires will spread slowly to moderately. Average fire intensity
will be moderate except in heavy concentrations of fuel, which may burn hot. Fires are
still not likely to become serious and are often easy to control.
High Fires can start easily from most causes and small fuels (such as grasses and needles)
will ignite readily. Unattended campfires and brush fires are likely to escape. Fires will
spread easily, with some areas of high intensity burning on slopes or concentrated
fuels. Fires can become serious and difficult to control unless they are put out while
they are still small.
Very High Fires will start easily from most causes. The fires will spread rapidly and have a quick
increase in intensity, right after ignition. Small fires can quickly become large fires and
exhibit extreme fire intensity, such as long-distance spotting and fire whirls. These fires
can be difficult to control and will often become much larger and longer-lasting fires.
Extreme Fires of all types start quickly and burn intensely. All fires are potentially serious and
can spread very quickly with intense burning. Small fires become big fires much faster
than at the "very high" level. Spot fires are probable, in which embers are blown long
distances to ignite fires nominally outside of the fire perimeter. Long-distance spotting
is likely. These fires are very difficult to fight and may become very dangerous and often
last for several days.
As stated previously, NWS may issue various fire weather statements161,162 to alert the public
about the onset of conditions that may cause rapidly spreading wildfires that are easy to ignite.
These conditions chiefly concern very low humidity and high windspeeds. The definitions of each
are listed in Table 4-32 below:
161 “What Is a Red Flag Warning?”. NOAA (n.d.). Archived on June 30, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://www.weather.gov/media/lmk/pdf/what_is_a_red_flag_warning.pdf
162 “Watches and Warnings for California”. National Interagency Fire Center, Geographic Area Coordination Centers
(n.d.). Archived March 29, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://gacc.nifc.gov/oscc/predictive/weather/myfiles/Watches_and_Warnings_for_Calif
ornia.htm
126
Table 4-32: NWS Heat Notifications
Notification Description
Fire Danger Statement Not issued by all weather forecast offices. Fire Danger Statements are issued
when there is a low but present fire danger that is outside normal conditions.
Fire Weather Watch
Fire Weather Watches are issued any time the area has been dry for a
substantial amount of time (or for a shorter period during spring green-up or
after fall color); the NFDRS is “high”, “very high”, or “extreme”; and critical
weather conditions are expected within the next 48 hours. These conditions
include sustained winds averaging 15 mph or greater, relative humidity 25
percent or less, and temperature 75°F or greater. Fire Weather Watches are
issued when there is high potential for a Red Flag Warning.
Red Flag Warning
Red Flag Warnings are issued any time there is an ongoing wildfire or when
critical weather conditions will occur within the next 24 hours. These conditions
include sustained winds averaging 15 mph or greater, relative humidity 25
percent or less, and temperature 75°F or greater. Additionally, NWS monitors
fuel loads that can dry out quickly within ten hours. Red Flag Warnings are
issued to inform the public, firefighters, and land management staff that
conditions are present for easy ignition and rapid spread of wildfires.
Debris flows can occur after highly destructive wildfires. Wildfires that burn hot enough (such as
the 2024 Line Fire and 2003 Old Fire) can completely strip vegetation, burning away root systems
and topsoil. If this occurs on steep slopes, then future precipitation can cause massive debris
flows that endanger any structures and people in their path. Debris flows are often fast -moving
and may contain slurries of rock, soil, trees, and boulders.
In addition to casualties and destroyed structures, the destructive potential of wildfires is
described through identifying values-at-risk (VARs) either within or near the burned area. For
example, the Watershed Emergency Response Team report on the 2024 Line Fire identified 66
VARs within and downslope of the fire, with 22 VARs encompassing multiple individual sites due
to similar hazard and risk. VARs can include buildings, roads, pipes, infrastructure, and
landscapes.163
Fire damage to the landscape is most commonly characterized by soil burn severity. When fires
burn, they can char the ground surface and strip away organic matter, leaving a water-repellent
layer. Soil burn severity is often used to identify how wildfire changes the soil properties itself,
thereby changing the potential for vegetation regrowth or destructive debris flows. Each severity
indicator is described in Table 4-33 below:164
163 “Watershed Emergency Response Team (WERT): 2024 Line Fire”. Cal Fire, California Department of
Conservation, & CGS (November 6, 2024). CA-BDF-012520. Archived on June 28, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://www.conservation.ca.gov/cgs/documents/publications/wert/11062024_Line_Fire
_WERT_Final_ADA.pdf
164 Parsons, A., Robichaud, P., Lewis, S., Napper, C., & Clark, J. “Field Guide for Mapping Post-Fire Soil Burn
Severity”. USDA (October 2010). Archived on July 26, 2025.
web.archive.org/web/2/https://www.fs.usda.gov/rm/pubs/rmrs_gtr243.pdf
127
Table 4-33: Soil Burn Severity Indicators
Indicator Description
Unburned/Very Low Areas that are clearly unburned or do not have significant heat impacts from the
fire. The surface may appear normal or close to normal with substantial remaining
vegetation and greenery.
Low Surface organic layers are not completely consumed and are still recognizable.
Structural aggregate stability is not changed from its unburned condition, and
roots are generally unchanged because the heat pulse below the soil surface was
not great enough to consume or char any underlying material. The ground surface
may appear brown or black, and the canopy and understory will likely appear
green.
Moderate Up to 80 percent of the pre-fire ground cover may be consumed. Fine roots may
be scorched but are rarely completely consumed. The color of the ash on the
surface is generally blackened with possible gray patches. Scorched needles or
leaves remaining in the canopy might fall to the ground.
High All or nearly all of the pre-fire ground cover and surface organic matter is
consumed, and charring may be visible on larger roots. The site is often black
due to extensive charring. Bare soil or ash is exposed and susceptible to erosion.
The aggregate structure may be less stable. White or gray ash indicates
considerable ground cover and fuels were consumed. Very large tree roots (over
3 inches in diameter) may be entirely burned and extending from a charred stump
hole. Soil is often grey, orange, or reddish where large fuels were concentrated
and consumed.
Soil burn severity assessments are often used by the State of California’s Watershed Emergency
Response Teams and in the Burned Area Emergency Response (BAER) program in assessing
damage to burned areas and identifying potential remediation actions. BAER reports and
summaries are publicly available through CGS, Cal Fire, the California Department of
Conservation, and local county websites.
According to the BAER report for the 2024 Line Fire, soil was severely burned (21 percent “high”,
50 percent “moderate”) with significant risk of erosion in subsequent rainstorms that “can cause
tremendous damage to homes and other structures in the years after a fire”.165 This represents
an extremely hot and destructive fire. For context, the highly destructive Blue Cut Fire had 5
percent “high” and 43 percent “moderate” soil burn severity.166
165 “Line Fire Burned Area Summary: Burned Area Report”. USDA, USFS (November 2024). Archived on April 2,
2025. https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://burnareainfo.sbcounty.gov/wp -content/uploads/sites/49/2024/11/Line-
Post-Fire-BAER-Assessment-Report-Summary_PUBLIC.pdf
166 “Blue Cut Fire – San Bernardino National Forest, Front Country Ranger District”. USDA (September 6, 2016). FS-
2500-8 (7/00). Archived on August 24, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250824170947/https://www.wrightwoodfsc.com/fires/BlueCut/BlueCutBAERReport.pdf
128
Another post-fire impact is contaminated drinking water. This may occur following flash floods,
destruction of pipes and conveyance systems, greater sediment and runoff in reservoirs, and/or
decreased downstream water supply. Depressurization combined with greater demand for water
during a fire can create partial vacuums that suck in volatile organic compounds such as
benzene.167 Degradation of plastic pipes can leach high amounts of carcinogenic vinyl chloride.
Raw water sampling may detect organic carbon, iron, and manganese.168
Regulatory Context: In the State of California, building materials must comply with the California
Building Code’s Title 24, Part 2, Chapter 7A (colloquially known as “Chapter 7A”). Chapter 7A lists
mandatory requirements for materials and construction methods on building exteriors to reduce
the risk of ignition. Among its mandates are fire-resistant siding, Class A fire-rated roofing,
tempered glass, and ventilation. Additionally, Chapter 7A lists requirements for managing
flammable vegetation and building defensible spaces for firefighters. It applies to all structures
built after 2008 within any FHSZ (moderate, high, very high).169
In 2007, the County of San Bernardino established the Fire Safety Overlay within the County’s
Development Code (Chapter 82.13). The Fire Safety Overlay includes areas “designated by the
applicable Fire Authority as wildfire risk areas” with “moderate to heavy fuel loading contributing
to high fire hazard conditions”.170 The Fire Safety Overlay consolidated several outdated fire laws
and aligned the County’s wildfire planning priorities more closely with the State’s. It broadly
overlaps with “very high” FHSVs and extends further into flat, less-forested areas in which brush
fires are the chief concern, though the Fire Safety Overlay predates FHSZs. Development within
these locations requires augmentations to emergency access, driveways/roadways, fencing,
vegetation management, and vehicular access to water sources.171
Similar to ASCE and earthquakes, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) maintains
peer-reviewed standards for building construction and operations, fire extinguishers, foam
systems, sprinkler systems, and more. NFPA’s standards are considered the gold standard for
reducing fire risk to life and safety. Although these standards are not legally binding, they are
strongly recommended and will be the standards to which the District conforms in its wildfire
mitigation actions. More information on the NFPA standards may be found through their
website.172
167 Liu, J. “When wildfires compromise drinking water, utilities lean on this professor’s advice”. APM Reports,
published by CPR News (August 26, 2025). Archived August 26, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250826195810/https://www.cpr.org/2025/08/26/wildfire-impact-drinking-water/
168 “Addressing Contamination of Drinking Water Distribution Systems from Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs)
After Wildfires” EPA, Office of Water (October 2021). Archived July 14, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2021-09/addressing-contamination-of-
drinking-water-distribution-systems-from-volatile-organic-compounds-after-wildfires_508.pdf
169 California Building Code Title 24, Part 2, Chapter 7A “Materials and Construction Methods for Exterior Wildfire
Exposure”. Retrieved from: https://codes.iccsafe.org/content/CABC2025P1/chapter-7a-materials-and-construction-
methods-for-exterior-wildfire-exposure
170 County of San Bernardino Building Code Chapter 82.13 “Fire Safety (FS) Overlay”. Retrieved from:
https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/sanbernardino/latest/sanberncty_ca/0 -0-0-168320
171 “Fire Safety Overlay Zone: San Bernardino County”. California Climate Investments (n.d.). Archived August 16,
2025. web.archive.org/web/2/https://lci.ca.gov/docs/20220817 -San_Bernadino_County_Case_Study.pdf
172 More information on NFPA standards may be found through their website (accessible as of September 9, 2025):
https://www.nfpa.org/for-professionals/codes-and-standards/list-of-codes-and-standards
129
Given its propensity toward destructive wildfires, the State of California requires property owners
to establish defensible space. A “defensible space” is defined as a landscape buffer around a
building that is free of flammable vegetation and debris to both reduce the risk of ignition and aid
firefighters’ access. At least 100 feet of defensible space around buildings or structures is required
on any property that exists within a Very High FHSZ.173
Developmental Trends: Wildfires are an ever-present aspect of California’s environment, but
their nature and frequency have changed over the past 20 years. Greater development throughout
the State’s heavily forested and mountainous areas has increased the destructiveness of wildfires
as measured by property damage and human casualties.174
The 2023 California SHMP identifies an increase in destructive wildfires, with 18 of the largest
wildfires in the State’s history occurring between 2018 and 2023 The SHMP identifies the following
factors in explaining the recent increase:175
• Increased fuel loading due to fire exclusion and suppression policies as opposed to
controlled burns
• Increases in human-caused ignitions that cause destructive conflagrations in periurban
areas
• Climate change’s influences on drought and extreme heat events
• Insect infestations and non-native species impacting extant plant life
• Increases in tree mortality, thereby creating more deadfall and fuels
• Longer fire seasons in which vegetation are more receptive to ignition and combustion
According to the Housing Elements within the General Plans of the Cities of San Bernardino and
Highland, all new construction and refurbishment will take place occurring to the updated 2019
California Fire Code.176 The Conservation & Open Space Element of the City of Highland’s
General Plan makes explicit the “use of fire-resistant vegetation and ample spacing between trees
and shrubs […] to reduce the spread of fires”. Additionally, the City will “enforce hillside
development standards that call for […] fire-retardant building materials”. Vegetation will be
reduced within high fire hazard zones.177
Power companies throughout the State of California are increasing their efforts to harden
infrastructure and reduce the risk of utilities-caused wildfires. SCE’s 2026-2028 Wildfire Mitigation
Plan systematically describes the steps that SCE will take to reduce the risk of ignition and spread,
173 More information on defensible space requirements may be found through Cal Fire (accessible as of September 9,
2025): https://readyforwildfire.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Defensible-Space-and-the-Law-Factsheet-Revisions-
Jan-2024.pdf
174 “Frequently Asked Questions About Wildfires in California”. Legislative Analyst’s Office (February 13, 2025).
Archived on June 14, 2025. web.archive.org/web/2/https://lao.ca.gov/Publications/Report/4952
175 California SHMP (2023)
176 City of San Bernardino General Plan (2005); City of Highland General Plan (2006)
177 City of Highland General Plan (2006)
130
including risk scenarios, vegetation management, grid monitoring, emergency preparedness,
community outreach, and PSPS.178
Impact of Climate Change: Per California’s 4th Climate Change Assessment, the current
trajectory of greenhouse gas emissions will result in a 50 percent increase in large wildfires over
25,000 acres over the next 75 years. Increasing temperatures throughout the State may increase
wildfire risk in forest ecosystems that are vulnerable to more intense drought. Changing water
cycle patterns in the desert might reduce the risk of lightning-caused fires as storms become less
frequent, but a greater preponderance of more intense storms could lead to a greater number of
lightning strikes were such events to occur. Finally, changing climates could shift insect habitats
throughout southern California’s forest, increasing tree mortality.179
According to the UC Davis Division of Agriculture and Natural Resources, invasive plant species
within the southern California deserts may contribute to increasing wildfire risk. For example, non-
native annual grasses that dry out during the summers (e.g. red brome) can increase fuel loads
within arid and semi-arid areas that would previously be protected from fires. The giant reed
(which mostly grows near riparian areas) can create dense masses of fuels that violently burn
during wildfires and also take little time to regrow. Finally, woody plants such as acacia and
eucalyptus may also burn rapidly and regrow quickly.180
Probability of Future Events and Magnitude: According to Cal Fire, 77,518 wildfire events
occurred between January 2013 and July 2022. This averages approximately 8,000 wildfires per
year – not all of which reach a large size or burn near populated areas. Numerous large fire
complexes in the County demonstrate their destructive potential and ability to impact the District
for years to come. Given recent history and trends, the probability of a wildfire occurring within
ten miles of the service area in the next ten years is very high. The CPRI assumes an annual
chance of over 10 percent, placing wildfires within the highest probability category.
Historically, wildfire management throughout the United States has focused on fire suppression
in which the primary goal is to avoid ignition and spread altogether. Fire suppression allowed fuel
build-up that would normally be cleared away during natural fire cycles.181 Fire management
practices on the State and Federal level are now moving away from total fire suppression for a
combination of timber regulation, forest restoration, and controlled burns;182 nonetheless, the
District must be prepared for the potential of large fires in the future.
178 “2026-2028 Wildfire mitigation Plan”. SCE (May 16, 2025). Archived on June 13, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250613130855/https://www.sce.com/sites/default/files/AEM/Wildfire%20Mitigation%20
Plan/2026-2028/SCE%202026%20Base-WMP%20R0.pdf
179 California SHMP (2023)
180 Bell, C., Ditomaso, J., & Brooks, M. “Invasive Plants and Wildfires in Southern California”. University of California,
Division of Agriculture and Natural Resources (August 2009). Archived on July 25, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250725155614/https://anrcatalog.ucanr.edu/pdf/8397.pdf
181 California SHMP (2023)
182 “Restoring and Maintaining Forest Ecosystem Health and Wildfire Resilience”. California Natural Resources
Agency (n.d.). Archived on July 6, 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://resources.ca.gov/Initiatives/Forest-
Stewardship
131
SECTION 5: RISK & VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
The District’s critical assets include wastewater infrastructure, drinking water infrastructure,
administrative buildings, processing facilities, and piping. The Planning Team conducted a risk
assessment that concerned critical assets, impacted populations, land use, and cultural/natural
resources.
A risk assessment involves evaluating vulnerable assets, describing potential impacts, and
estimating losses for each hazard. The risk assessment defines and quantifies the assets at risk
from hazards with potential losses, as well as potential impact to staff and the served populations.
All information is based on the most available and recent data.
FEMA REGULATION CHECKLIST: RISK ASSESSMENT
44 CFR § 201.6(c)(1): The plan shall include documentation of the planning process used
to develop the plan, including how it was prepared, who was involved in the process, and
how the public was involved.
Element:
B2. Does the plan include a summary of the jurisdiction’s vulnerability and the impacts on the
community from the identified hazards? Does this summary also address NFIP-insured
structures that have been repetitively damaged by floods? (Requirement 44 CFR §
201.6(c)(2)(ii))
B2-a. Does the plan provide an overall summary of each jurisdiction’s vulnerability to the
identified hazards?
B2-b. For each participating jurisdiction, does the plan describe the potential impacts of each
of the identified hazards on each participating jurisdiction?
B2-c. Does the plan address NFIP-insured structures within each jurisdiction that have been
repetitively damaged by floods?
Source: FEMA, Local Mitigation Planning Handbook Review Tool, June 2025
5.1 Identification of Critical Facilities and Assets
Critical facilities and assets include headquarters buildings, distribution infrastructure, pump
stations, reservoirs, wells, and storage facilities. Most of these assets are located within the City
of Highland at the north-central side of the service area. The SNRC is located in the southwestern
end. Other assets (such as drinking water pipes and sewer lines) lie underground.
The following information conforms to the District’s water system RRA, the WSMP, the SSMP,
and a GIS model. The risk assessment does not identify the vulnerabilities of specific assets, nor
does it identify the financial vulnerabilities of the entire East Trunk pipeline.
132
The Planning Team acknowledges the possibility that some infrastructure might not be captured
within the various data sources used in developing this LHMP, such as sewer siphons and certain
pumping stations. Therefore, the described valuations and number of at-risk assets should be
considered the absolute minimum.
This LHMP does not attempt to quantify the financial value of employees’ lives or risk thereof. For
hazards that have substantial risk to life but little impact on property (e.g., heat waves), this LHMP
will reflect no risk to buildings or infrastructure but will emphasize the risk to human health.
5.1.1 Critical Assets and Devices at Risk
Table 5-1 shows the number and value of critical assets according to the District’s insurance
schedules and RRA as of June 2025. This includes the SNRC facility. The RRA also reported
discrete wells and pressure release valves (PRVs) not associated with a plant, which are likewise
treated as separate assets in this LHMP.
Table 5-1: District-Owned Critical Assets
Asset Category Number Total Value
Buildings 3 $237,865,211
Electrical Facilities 1 $75,000
Plants 14 $26,737,500
Wells 3 $1,600,000
PRVs 6 $150,000
Total Asset Value $266,427,711
Tables 5-2 and 5-3 below list the length and cost of each diameter of pipelines within the District’s
water and wastewater systems. This information comes from District-maintained shapefiles for
both water lines and sewer lines, which the Planning Team assumed is the most up-to-date source
on District infrastructure.
Note that these tables differ from the 2019 WMSP and SSMP for two distinct reasons: 1) these
shapefiles contain updated line data from land use developments and expansions over the six
years since the WMSP and SSMP’s GIS models were developed; and 2) these shapefiles include
water and sewer system laterals, which were excluded from both the WMSP and SSMP. The
preponderance of 1-inch diameter pipe within the water system model is almost entirely due to
inclusion of the laterals. Within the sewer system model, pipes of 27-inch diameters and greater
are related to the East Trunk Sewer while the overwhelming majority of 4-inch pipe are laterals.
The modeled water system pipes totaled 311.8 miles. Internal estimates place the water pipe
distance at approximately 300 miles. Water system pipes with diameter values of “0”, “1.25”, “2.5”,
“27”, “39”, “48”, and “78” inches were excluded from this analysis. These values totaled
approximately 8.4 miles of pipe, of which 5.1 miles were in the “0” value bucket.
In comparison, the modeled wastewater system pipes totaled 263.2 miles while excluding
diameter values of “0” and “14” (0.53 total miles). Internal estimates place the wastewater pipe
133
distance at approximately 220 miles. This discrepancy may be explained by the GIS model
including laterals and some wastewater pipes that are outside the service area (as with the
northwestern pipe system) due to being a part of the expanded sphere of influence or a part of
the East Trunk Sewer, the latter of which is part of the 2019 SSMP.
The unit cost of water system pipes greater than or equal to 2-inch diameter comes from the
District’s water system RRA. ¾- and 1-inch pipes were assumed to be $60/ft based on
extrapolations from the unit cost of other pipes. Though of negligible total length, 5-inch pipe was
interpolated at $130/ft.
In the absence of an equivalent RRA metric for wastewater systems, the Planning Team assumed
that the unit cost per pipe would be roughly equivalent to that of drinking water pipes. The cost of
pipe diameters without drinking water pipe analogues (15-inch, 27-inch, 33-inch, 39-inch, 48-inch)
were interpolated from the other pipe valuations and rounded to the nearest $5 interval.
Table 5-2: Breakdown of District Pipelines Model (Water Systems)
Diameter Modeled
Miles
Modeled
Percent Unit Cost ($/ft) Total Cost
¾” 7.2 2.3% $60/ft* $2,284,652
1” 95.4 30.6% $60/ft* $30,222,652
2” 2.7 0.9% $75/ft $1,091,332
3” 1.3 0.4% $90/ft $622,654
4” 9.3 3.0% $113/ft $5,511,426
5” 0.01 0.0% $130/ft* $9,782
6” 60.0 19.2% $150/ft $47,488,172
8” 64.8 20.8% $180/ft $61,623,854
10” 4.4 1.4% $200/ft $4,634,242
12” 35.3 11.3% $215/ft $40,144,110
14” 1.4 0.4% $240/ft $1,694,652
16” 13.2 4.2% $300/ft $20,841,232
18” 0.3 0.1% $375/ft $632,041
20” 5.0 1.6% $450/ft $11,816,065
21” 0.87 0.3% $505/ft $2,341,899
24” 2.8 0.9% $560/ft $8,350,948
30” 2.8 0.9% $615/ft $9,071,040
36” 5.1 1.6% $725/ft $19,437,182
Total Asset Value $267,817,313
*Interpolated values
Table 5-3: Breakdown of District Pipelines Model (Sewer Systems)
Diameter Modeled
Miles
Modeled
Percent Unit Cost ($/ft) Total Cost
3” 0.12 0.05% $90/ft $56,567
4” 95.7 36.4% $113/ft $57,097,258
6” 20.8 7.9% $150/ft $16,460,000
134
Table 5-3: Breakdown of District Pipelines Model (Sewer Systems)
Diameter Modeled
Miles
Modeled
Percent Unit Cost ($/ft) Total Cost
8” 117.0 44.5% $180/ft $111,210,769
10” 6.0 2.3% $200/ft $6,274,200
12” 8.0 3.0% $215/ft $9,089,991
15” 6.3 2.4% $280/ft* $9,309,024
16” 0.06 0.03% $300/ft $123,559
18” 2.0 0.8% $375/ft $3,920,136
21” 1.9 0.7% $505/ft $5,208,876
24” 2.2 0.8% $560/ft $6,564,503
27” 0.37 0.1% $590/ft* $1,112,673
30” 0.25 0.1% $615/ft $777,035
33” 0.25 0.1% $670/ft* $875,591
36” 0.50 0.2% $725/ft $1,840,520
39” 0.25 0.1% $780/ft* $983,413
48” 1.6 0.6% $945/ft* $7,954,346
Total Asset Value $238,858,462
*Interpolated values
The District maintains a large swathe of water infrastructure to maintain service outside of plants.
These are broadly termed “water devices” and were not given financial valuations given the high
number of devices in addition to diverse installation dates, materials, models, sizes, and functions.
Table 5-4 below enumerates these devices according to GIS data received from the District’s GIS
consultants.
Table 5-4: Breakdown of District Water Devices
Asset Category Description Total Number
Flow Control Valves
Regulate the flow or pressure of drinking water within
the system. Do not regulate flow between pressure
zones.
7
System Valves
Pipeline valve where the closure member is rotated to
control or stop flow within pipes. Common for basic
maintenance of pressure throughout the system.
4841
Pressure Valves Prevent backflow within the water system. 17
Service Valves Stop the flow of water into specific facilities,
appliances, and pipelines at lower pressure gradients. 3358
Hydrants
Above-ground appliances in which nozzles and hoses
can be attached directly to water mains to allow a
pressurized stream.
3099
Flushings & Blow Offs Allow water mains to discharge water from the water
system. 357
Service Meters Monitor water use. Primarily used for accurate billing
within the District’s customer base. 23,760
Storage Units Areas in which the District stores supplies for water
infrastructure operations and maintenance. 32
135
Table 5-4: Breakdown of District Water Devices
Asset Category Description Total Number
Minor Wells Wells not associated with specific plants that are used
to draft groundwater from the basin. 30
Sampling Devices
Assess the quality and contamination of drinking water
to ensure compliance with EPA and State of California
regulations.
39
Weirs Barriers built across bodies of water to control water
flow while allowing flow over the crest. 20
Pumps Used to maintain consistent pressure within the
drinking water system. 13
Total Assets 35,584
As with the water system, the District maintains a large number of additional infrastructure to
maintain wastewater service. These are broadly termed “sewer devices” and were not given
financial valuations given the high number of devices in addition to diverse installation dates,
materials, models, sizes, and functions. Table 5-5 below enumerates these devices.
Table 5-5: Breakdown of District Sewer Devices
Asset Category Description Total Number
Pumps
The District owns a single wastewater pump. This
device is not used for maintaining pressure within the
wastewater system, which is entirely gravity-fed.
1
Service Connections Act as the physical connections of the wastewater
system to customers’ service lines. 20,501
Cleanouts Pipe or capped pipe that provides District access to
sewer lines to remove blockages, especially FOG. 338
Manholes Street-level opening to the wastewater system that
allow access by maintenance and operations staff. 5192
Total Assets 26,032
An additional cost is that of providing imported potable water that might occur in cases of serious
water system plant malfunctions or losses of power due to hazards. According to the 2019 WSMP,
the modeled average daily demand for 2025 within the water system is 93.4 acre-feet per day
(25.34 million gallons per day). At a blended cost of $125.80 per acre-foot, the District would pay
a maximum of approximately $11,750 per day for imported water. No similar measurement of
wastewater exports or hook-ups exist, but the cost would be similarly non-negligible.
5.1.2 GIS Methodology
The Planning Team used GIS technology to assess the impact of each hazard on the District’s
critical infrastructure. The main program used in the analysis was QGIS3 (3.40.5 “Bratislava”), an
open-source software initially launched in 2002 with the most recent stable release in July 2025.
QGIS supports integration with the Python programming language and R software. Shapefiles
136
are loaded as layers into “projects” that act as the workspace for data cleaning and analysis. Each
layer can be made visible or invisible to aid in data projection and map development.183
Each analysis followed these basic steps:
1. Develop a new QGIS project specific to the District’s 2026 LHMP.
2. Load each relevant shapefile into the QGIS project.
3. Review the metadata for District and hazard-specific shapefiles to make note of what
attributes are appropriate for analysis.
4. Clean each shapefile so it conforms to the District’s service area boundaries and can be
properly interpreted by analysis software.
5. Fine-tune the modeling used in developing the pipe infrastructure shapefiles within the
District’s water and sewer systems so that information on pipe sections and diameters
conforms to the RRA.
6. Determine overlaps between hazards and District infrastructure (e.g., total feet of pipelines
overlaid with fire severity hazard zones).
7. Export maps with overlays of each hazard and impacted infrastructure.
Table 5-6 on the next page shows the shapefiles, information sources, and uses. Copies of each
shapefile are available upon request.
Table 5-6: GIS Data Sources
Shapefile Source Description
California County
Boundaries
US Census
Bureau
Shows the terrestrial boundaries for each county within the State of
California. Used to establish a baseline map.
Address Features &
Structures OpenStreetMap
Shows the buildings, utilities, and other infrastructure throughout
the State of California. Does not include lines or polygons for
military bases and critical infrastructure. Used to establish a
baseline map.
Roads and Highways OpenStreetMap Shows primary, secondary, and city/county-owned roads and
highways as line data. Used to establish a baseline map.
Elevation Contour Lines USGS
Shows the elevation contour lines in 20-foot and 40-foot intervals
throughout southern California. Data is preliminary and was derived
July 12, 2012. Used to establish a baseline map.
Rivers, Streams, and
Lakes OpenStreetMap
Shows rivers and streams as line data. Lakes and large rivers are
depicted as polygons. Used to establish a baseline map and to
provide context to the FIRM analysis.
Service Area Boundaries EVWD Shows the boundaries of the District’s service area. Used to
establish a baseline map.
District-Owned Facilities
and Buildings EVWD
Shows point data for the facilities and buildings owned and
operated by the District. Does not include any water or wastewater
infrastructure (e.g., pipelines). Used to assess what
facilities/buildings would be impacted by various hazards.
183 The QGIS website is accessible here (as of September 11, 2025): https://qgis.org/
137
Table 5-6: GIS Data Sources
Shapefile Source Description
District-Owned Water
Lines EVWD
Shows the line data for water (not wastewater) lines within the
service area, including connections. Used to assess the proportion
of water lines that would be impacted by various hazards.
District-Owned
Wastewater Lines EVWD
Shows the line data for sewer pipelines, mains, and laterals within
the service area. Note that laterals are considered the responsibility
of property owners. The types of pipelines are not separated out
within this analysis. Used to assess the proportion of wastewater
lines that would be impacted by various hazards.
District-Owned Center
Lines EVWD
Shows the line data for sewer center lines within the service area.
Used to assess the proportion of center lines that would be
impacted by various hazards.
District-Owned Sewer
Devices EVWD
Shows point data for sewer devices such as manholes and
cleanouts within the service area. Used to assess the proportion of
sewer devices that would be impacted by various hazards.
District-Owned Water
Devices EVWD
Shows point data for water devices such as pressure valves and
service meters within the service area. Used to assess the
proportion of water devices that would be impacted by various
hazards.
South San Andreas Fault
– M7.9 Scenario USGS
Describes a hypothetical scenario for an M7.9 earthquake along the
South San Andreas Fault approximately within ten miles of the
service area’s boundaries. Intensity estimates are provided by the
MMI Scale in contour lines radiating from the scenario’s epicenter.
Elsinore Fault – M7.1
Scenario USGS
Describes a hypothetical scenario for an M7.1 earthquake along the
Elsinore Fault within Los Angeles County. Intensity estimates are
provided by the MMI Scale in contour lines radiation from the
scenario’s epicenter.
San Jacinto Fault – M7.0
Scenario USGS
Describes a hypothetical scenario for an M7.0 earthquake along the
San Jacinto Fault within Riverside County. Intensity estimates are
provided by the MMI Scale in contour lines radiation from the
scenario’s epicenter.
Peralta Hills Fault – M6.6
Scenario USGS
Describes a hypothetical scenario for an M6.6 earthquake along the
Peralta Hills Fault within Los Angeles County. Intensity estimates
are provided by the MMI Scale in contour lines radiation from the
scenario’s epicenter.
Landslide Susceptibility USGS Shows the polygons of “landslide susceptibility” based on slope-
relief threshold and documented landslide occurrence.
California Soil
Liquefaction Zones CGS
Shows the boundaries of soil liquefaction zones mapped by USGS
and maintained by the California Geological Survey. This dataset
was used to confirm that the service area is not within a soil
liquefaction zone, and therefore it is not part of any exhibit.
Superfund Site
Boundaries EPA
Shows the polygons of each superfund site’s footprint within the
State of California. Used to demonstrate the proximity of the
District’s service area to the two discussed Superfund sites in the
HAZMAT Release hazard analysis.
Wildfire Hazard Severity
Zones Cal Fire
Shows the polygons of the Wildfire Hazard Severity Zones within
the County of San Bernardino. Used to demonstrate the proximity
of various District buildings and infrastructure to each zone.
138
Table 5-6: GIS Data Sources
Shapefile Source Description
Flood Hazard Areas FEMA
Shows the line and polygon data of the flood hazard areas
according to collated FIRM data. Used to assess what proportion of
District buildings and infrastructure are within the 100-year and 500-
year floodplains.
5.2 Land Use Trends and Development
FEMA REGULATION CHECKLIST: PLAN UPDATE
44 CFR § 201.6(d)(3): A local jurisdiction must review and revise its plan to reflect
changes in development, progress in local mitigation efforts, and changes in priorities,
and resubmit it for approval within 5 years in order to continue to be eligible for mitigation
project grant funding.
Element:
E1. Was the plan revised to reflect changes in development? (Requirement 44 CFR §
201.6(d)(3))
E1-a. Does the plan describe the changes in development that have occurred in hazard-
prone areas that have increased or decreased each community’s vulnerability since the
previous plan was approved?
E2. Was the plan revised to reflect changes in priorities and progress in local mitigation
efforts? (Requirement 44 CFR § 201.6(d)(3))
E2-a. Does the plan describe how it was revised due to changes in community priorities?
Source: FEMA, Local Mitigation Planning Handbook Review Tool, June 2025
Per the 2020 LHMP, the service area consists of much scenic open space, light commercial, and
light residential zoning, which are conducive to short- and long-term growth. Demand for utilities
will increase alongside projected growth; the District therefore needs actionable and appropriate
hazard mitigation activities.
Table 5-7 below compares the population size of the service area and local jurisdictions through
three distinct periods. Estimated population growth within the service area and the Cities of
Highland and San Bernardino outpaces that of the County of San Bernardino and the broader
State of California. All information comes from the US Census Bureau.
139
Table 5-7: Population Estimates within District-Served Populations
Area Population
(2010)
Population
(2017)
Population
(2023)
Percent Change
(2017-2023)
District Service Population 97,000 103,000 108,000 4.85 percent
City of Highland 53,000 55,000 56,700 3.09 percent
City of San Bernardino 210,484 216,818 223,728 3.19 percent
County of San Bernardino 2,035,000 2,171,000 2,181,000 0.46 percent
State of California 37,254,000 39,557,000 39,198,000 -0.91 percent
The City of Highland’s Community Design Element of the General Plan outlines the following
priorities for infrastructure and city planning/design:184
• Revitalize and enhance the quality of the Base Line, 3rd Street, 5th Street, 9th Street
Pedestrian Promenade, Victoria Avenue, and Palm Avenue by developing “unifying
streetscape elements” and consolidating vacant parcels.
• Place above-ground utility and power lines underground, where possible.
• Plant fire-resistant plants native to the San Bernardino Valley along streetscapes,
especially in areas near the foothills to the north.
• Develop a plan for the Town Center to revitalize downtown areas and encourage new
growth. Encourage compactness; design plazas and “pedestrian amenities”; and promote
a mix of retail, office, and civic use space.
• Zone and encourage mixed-use development within the Town Center and within vacant
lots.
• Design local commercial centers with appropriate landscaping, unified design themes, and
usable pedestrian features (e.g., shaded sitting areas, fountains, arcades, and secondary
entrances).
• Encourage single-family residential development, such as a planned mid-block residential
development along the Base Line. Designate lots throughout the City as medium density
residential land use.
• Encourage industrial and business park development via coordinated site planning,
signage, and cohesive architectural design.
• Preserve the City’s historic buildings, especially within the Town Center. Enhance
community outreach programs and update design guidelines for rehabilitation and new
construction within historic areas.
• Locate and design plazas to encourage third spaces within the City.
• Prioritize and encourage “green planning” within the area, with a focus on drought-tolerant
landscaping, drip irrigation, and channeling water to permeable surfaces.
184 City of Highland General Plan (2006)
140
The City of Highland’s 6th Cycle (2021-2029) Housing Element identifies 33 programs related to
the City’s housing needs for the eight-year planning period. Land use and development programs
relevant to this LHMP are described below:185
• Program 11: Continue capital improvements on infrastructure throughout the City,
especially the Town Center, Base Line Corridor, and Victoria Avenue Corridor Policy
Areas. Prioritize projects in lower and moderate resource areas. Complete the widening
of the Interstate 210 interchange. Complete development of the Local Roadway Safety
Plan.
• Program 14: Coordinate with the East Valley Water District to ensure proposed housing
developments (especially lower-income households) are prioritized for providing water
and sewer services.
• Program 30: Identify and prioritize local surplus lands for housing development for lower-
income households. Support the development of 89 senior rental units, with a focus on
extremely low-income, very low-income, and low-income households. The development
will occur on a two-parcel site owned by the Highland Housing Authority.
During the previous LHMP cycle, four major developments were mentioned as having potential
for large-scale land use changes. Updates are discussed below:
• Harmony Specific Plan: The Harmony Specific Plan was proposed as a high-density
mixed-use development on 1,650 acres within the City of Highland. This project was
challenged in-court and the land purchased for $31.8 million by the San Bernardino Valley
Municipal Water district. There are currently no plans to start a similar project.186
• Greenspot Village and Marketplace: The Greenspot Village and Marketplace is a
planned mixed-use development project with a mixture of residential, commercial, and
office uses. Greenspot would cover 104 acres within the City of Highland, including 21
acres previously owned by the San Bernardino County Flood Control District. Greenspot
is located at Greenspot Road between Palm Avenue and Boulder Avenue. This project
includes the Residence at Greenspot (200 residential multi-family units) the San Carlo
developments (200 two-story townhomes and 272 residential multi-family units), and the
Greenspot Villages (550 residential units).187
• Mediterra: The Mediterra Planned Development is a partially constructed project within
the City of Highland. It will contain 316 housing units in a mix of low- and medium-density
parcels. Mediterra will be developed by D.R. Horton south of the San Bernardino National
Forest boundary.188
185 Ibid.
186 Hernandez, H. “Water district purchases Harmony property for $31.8 million”. Redlands Community News
(October 14, 2021). Archived on November 29, 2021.
web.archive.org/web/2/https://www.redlandscommunitynews.com/news/government/water -district-purchases-
harmony-property-for-31-8-million/article_ea587ad8-2d12-11ec-9c89-3fb4d843d12a.html
187 Project information available via the Greenspot Village & Marketplace Specific Plan on CEQA (as of August 24,
2025): https://ceqanet.lci.ca.gov/2008031058/5
188 “Mediterra at East Highlands”. City of Highland (January 12, 2021). Archived on August 24, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250824172315/https://www.cityofhighland.org/DocumentCenter/View/2682/Mediterra -
Planned-Development-Document-PDF
141
• Yaamava’ Resort & Casino: The Yuhaaviatam of San Manuel Nation began developing
a major expansion to the Yaamava’ Resort & Casino in 2018 and completed construction
2021.189
Other salient projects are listed below. Information on other projects may be found via the City of
Highland’s 2025 Community Activity Map:190
• Halcyon Apartments: 220 apartments to be developed by Helios Holdings.
• Anacapa Residence: 79 single-family detached residential units to be developed by
Anacapa Developments.
• Smart & Final: 27,500 square foot mixed-use retail building with a 2.9-acre vacant mixed-
use lot. The project would include 34 housing units. The project is to be developed by KZ
DevCo.
• Woodbridge Planned Development and Glenrose Planned Development: These are
two housing developments located adjacent to each other. The former is to be developed
by Center Stone; the latter, Richmond American Homes. Both would total 251 single-
family residential units “with recreational facilities”.
• East Highlands Ranch: This designation includes two housing developments located
adjacent to each other, both listed under “East Highlands Ranch PA”. The first (PA 39)
includes 13 single-family residential units developed by Mastercraft Homes Group. The
second (PA 40/42) includes 137 detached single-family units developed by Sunland
Communities.
5.3 Natural and Cultural Resources Inventory
5.3.1 Natural Resources
There are no natural resources on District-owned lands or facilities. However, the service area
significantly overlaps with forest, riparian, and mountainous habitats.
As described within 3.2 Geography, the District sources much of its water from the Bunker Hill
Basin via District-owned wells. The Bunker Hill Basin stores approximately 5 million acre-feet of
water, of which 1.2 million acre-feet are accessible by the District for pumping. The basin’s
recharge is approximately 16,000 acre-feet per year via rain, runoff, imported water, and recycled
water from the SNRC. It is a vital resource for over 600,000 residents of southern California,
namely the Cities of Highland, Redlands, Loma Linda, San Bernardino Colton, Rialto,
Bloomington, Fontana, Grand Terrace, and Riverside, in addition to portions of unincorporated
County of San Bernardino. Stewardship of the Bunker Hill Basin is shared by the Cities of
189 “Casino Expansion”. Yuhaaviatam of San Manuel Nation (n.d.). Archived on July 17, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://sanmanuel-nsn.gov/community/casino-expansion
190 “Community Development Activity Map”. City of Highland (2025). Archived on August 24, 2025.
web.archive.org/web/2/https://www.highlandca.gov/DocumentCenter/View/4248/Community-Development-Map-2025-
PDF
142
Redland, San Bernardino, Loma Linda, and Riverside; East Valley Water District; and West Valley
Water District.191
The District’s northern service area extends into the foothills of the San Bernardino Mountains,
much of which is managed by the US Forest Service via the San Bernardino National Forest. The
National Forest totals over 800,000 acres, of which over 680,000 acres are federally managed.
Flora is primarily a mix of coniferous forest within the foothills proper; species include ponderosa
pine, sugar pine, lodgepole pine, and pinyon. Sagebrush and chaparral are present within the
lowest elevations. The service area does not encounter any designated wilderness areas, and
there is no known old growth forest.192
The service area is entirely within the watershed of the Santa Ana River, and its southern
boundaries align with the river itself. The Santa Ana River is the largest river within Southern
California and drains the largest watershed within the region. It flows out of the San Bernardino
Mountains through the Counties of San Bernardino, Riverside, and Orange into the Pacific Ocean.
The service area encompasses several of the river’s tributaries, including Plunge Creek, Elder
Creek, Bledsoe Creek, Cook Creek, City Creek, Sand Creek, and Warm Creek. Downstream of
the Seven Oaks Dam, the ecology of the Santa Ana River becomes an alluvial scrub zone with a
mixture of desert and coniferous flora.193
According to the Habitat Conservation Program of the Upper Santa Ana River Sustainable
Resources Alliance, there are 23 endangered or threatened species native to the watershed.194
Factors for endangerment include flood control projects changing historical flooding cycles,
increased urbanization encroaching on habitats, and riverine pollution. Three of species are
particularly relevant to the District (given their proximity to the District’s mountain-chapparal
transitional terrain and the Seven Oaks Dam) are the Santa Ana River woolly-star, Santa Ana
sucker, and the San Bernardino kangaroo rat. The Wooly Star Preservation Area was established
in 1998 by USACE and covers 764 acres downstream of the Seven Oaks Dam to mitigate the
effects of the dam.195
5.3.2 Cultural Resources
The Planning Team has identified no cultural resources within its owned properties and
infrastructure. However, it does serve a variety of properties within the City of Highland, City of
San Bernardino, and the Yuhaaviatam of San Manuel Nation that would be considered cultural
191 “Bunker Hill Basin Facts”. San Bernardino Valley Water Conservation District (n.d.). Archived on August 24, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20250824172531/https://www.sbvwcd.org/our-district/publications/fs-
bunkerhill/?layout=file
192 Further information about the San Bernardino National Forest is accessible through USFS (as of August 24,
2025): https://www.fs.usda.gov/r05/sanbernardino
193 Buck-Diaz, J. & Evens, J. “Alluvial Scrub Vegetation of Southern California, A Focus on the Santa Ana River
Watershed in Orange, Riverside, and San Bernardino Counties, California”. California Native Plant Society,
Riverside-Corona Resource Conservation District (September 2011). Archived on December 7, 2022. nps.org/wp -
content/uploads/2018/03/alluvial_scrub-diaz_evans2011.pdf
194 Information on each species is available through the Alliance’s website (as of August 24, 2025):
https://www.uppersarhcp.com/
195 “Santa Ana River woolly-star”. US Fish & Wildlife Service (n.d.). Archived on May 11, 2025.
web.archive.org/web/2/https://www.fws.gov/media/santa-ana-river-woolly-star
143
resources within those jurisdictions. These include libraries, museums, religious institutions, and
sports arenas. The Highland Historic District is completely within the service area and is on the
National Register of Historic Places.
The lands that make up the service area were inhabited by Native Americans of the Serrano,
Cahuillia, and Gabrieleno groups. No known archaeological sites from these cultures are present
on District-owned lands. The General Plans of the Cities of Highland and San Bernardino
acknowledge “several […] archaeologically sensitive areas with a high probability for discovery of
archaeological resources if disturbed by development”. However, these sites are not enumerated
and are “widely spread” throughout the area.196
Further information about cultural resources within the service area may be found within the City
of San Bernardino’s 2005 General Plan, the City of San Bernardino’s 2021-2029 Housing
Element, the City of San Bernardino’s 2024 LHMP, and the City of Highland’s 2006 General Plan.
5.4 Vulnerability Assessment and Potential Loss
Each hazard of significant concern included within this LHMP was assessed for potential impact
to facilities, infrastructure, pipelines, and staff. Where possible, the critical facilities and assets
inventory was used to quantify assets at risk. The Planning Team used a combination of GIS
technology, discussions with local stakeholders, and subject matter expertise to assign the
following losses.
5.4.1 Climate Change
By its nature, climate change is a systemic hazard that will impact most if not all of the District’s
service area, infrastructure, buildings, and staff. While climate change does not have direct
impacts, it will be indirectly felt through changes to the intensity and frequency of droughts, floods,
heat waves, and severe storms. Likewise, all District staff are expected to be similarly impacted
– especially for hazards that pose the strongest threats to human life and well-being such as
droughts, severe storms, and wildfires per the District’s disaster history. Given the long-term
effects of climate change, potential losses may be interpreted as an increase in the baseline level
of hazard present within the District.
5.4.2 Cyberattack
Cyberattacks on utilities often target control systems, such as SCADA. Cyberattacks will likely
disrupt or damage technological infrastructure as opposed to the buildings themselves. The true
monetary cost to the District (and population served) can be based on the extent of systems
impacted, the proportion of lost services, and the total time the District is impacted by the
cyberattack.
District staff are unlikely to be directly impacted since cyberattacks do not directly threaten life
and health. Even in the case of significant or extended service loss, other temporary wastewater
196 City of Highland General Plan (2006)
144
and solid waste collection services would be available in an emergency, such as mutual aid
agreements with other Orange County sanitary districts.
A ransomware attack will likely incur additional costs if the District is unable to regain control of
SCADA and/or administrative systems without paying the ransom. The ransom itself for utilities is
often between $1 million and $2 million, as discussed in the hazard analysis.
This LHMP assumes that all critical assets are at risk to cyberattacks given they either incorporate
telecommunications infrastructure that could be taken down (e.g. the headquarters building) or
are tied to the District’s SCADA systems for water and wastewater. All pipes and water/sewer
devices are indirectly threatened due to backups or pressure increases that could occur if the
SCADA system is compromised.
5.4.3 Dam Inundation
According to the Seven Oaks Dam’s inundation map, the southern service area is at greatest risk
of damage. Staff may be threatened if they are within this area during a dam break. Administrative
staff at the headquarters building and SNRC would not be affected. Water and wastewater
services might be impacted if the water pressure exceeds capacity. Table 5-8 shows the water
system assets at risk. Appendix F shows the dam inundation map overlaid with the District’s
service area, including the headquarters building.
Table 5-8: Water System Critical Assets at Risk due to Dam Inundation
Asset Category Number At
Risk
Number Not
At Risk Total Value at Risk
Buildings 3 0 $237,861,211
Electrical Facilities 1 0 $75,000
Plants 3 11 $1,650,000
Wells 3 0 $1,600,000
PRVs 1 5 $25,000
Total 11 16 $241,211,211
Table 5-9 summarizes water and wastewater pipelines that intersect with the inundation map.
Note that the dam inundation map intersects with all of the District’s East Trunk Sewer line.
Table 5-9: District Pipelines at Risk due to Dam Inundation
System
Category Diameter Miles at
Risk
Miles Not
at Risk
Unit Cost
($/ft)
Total Pipe Value at
Risk
Water
¾” 2.1 5.1 $60/ft $642,676
1” 27.6 67.8 $60/ft $8,742,345
2” 0.9 1.8 $75/ft $346,565
3” 0.2 1.1 $90/ft $92,907
4” 3.6 5.7 $113/ft $2,136,748
145
Table 5-9: District Pipelines at Risk due to Dam Inundation
System
Category Diameter Miles at
Risk
Miles Not
at Risk
Unit Cost
($/ft)
Total Pipe Value at
Risk
5” 0.0197 0.01 $130/ft $8,767
6” 18.0 42.0 $150/ft $14,211,800
8” 19.5 45.3 $180/ft $18,547,110
10” 3.2 1.2 $200/ft $3,385,603
12” 9.4 25.9 $215/ft $10,740,409
14” 0.3 1.1 $240/ft $299,315
16” 3.9 9.3 $300/ft $6,225,308
18” 0.06 0.24 $375/ft $108,350
20” 2.1 2.9 $450/ft $4,853,461
21” 0 0.87 $505/ft $0
24” 2.4 0.4 $560/ft $6,920,649
30” 1.8 1.0 $615/ft $5,803,829
36” 1.7 3.4 $725/ft $6,371,194
Wastewater
3” 0.0 0.12 $90/ft $0
4” 28.3 67.4 $113/ft $16,916,919
6” 5.7 15.1 $150/ft $4,472,597
8” 26.2 90.8 $180/ft $24,939,652
10” 2.7 3.3 $200/ft $2,807,881
12” 4.1 3.9 $215/ft $4,631,153
15” 2.5 3.8 $280/ft $3,711,756
16” 0 0.06 $300/ft $0
18” 1.6 0.4 $375/ft $3,171,235
21” 1.9 0.0 $505/ft $5,208,876
24” 2.2 0.0 $560/ft $6,564,502
27” 0.37 0.0 $590/ft $1,112,672
30” 0.25 0.0 $615/ft $777,034
33” 0.25 0.0 $670/ft $875,591
36” 0.25 0.0 $725/ft $1,840,520
39” 0.5 0.0 $780/ft $983,413
48” 1.6 0.0 $945/ft $7,954,346
Total $175,405,183
Table 5-10 shows the water and sewer system devices that intersect with the inundation map.
Table 5-10: Water and Sewer Devices at Risk due to Dam Inundation
System
Category Asset Category Number At
Risk
Number Not
At Risk
Water
Flow Control Valves 4 3
System Valves 1418 3423
Pressure Valves 4 13
Service Valves 1045 2313
197 Value listed as 0.0 due to rounding to one significant digit. The number of modeled feet at risk is approximately 60
feet.
146
Table 5-10: Water and Sewer Devices at Risk due to Dam Inundation
System
Category Asset Category Number At
Risk
Number Not
At Risk
Hydrants 950 2149
Flushings & Blow Offs 117 240
Service Meters 7074 16,686
Storage Units 8 24
Minor Wells 22 8
Sampling Devices 8 31
Weirs 1 19
Pumps 0 13
Wastewater
Pumps 1 0
Service Connections 6004 14,497
Cleanouts 99 239
Manholes 1301 3891
5.4.4 Drought
Droughts are primarily defined by indirect impacts. Staff health and well-being would be indirectly
impacted due to secondary impacts such as higher temperatures, as with the extreme heat
hazard.
Droughts are unlikely to directly threaten buildings and infrastructure in the same way as
destructive physical hazards such as earthquakes, though they are expected to stress pumps and
increase maintenance costs. Quantified values on maintenance costs exclusively due to drought
management are unavailable within the literature or District records; the Planning Team assumes
that all pipes are nominally at risk.
Drought impacts on water utility infrastructure itself include reduced water pressure, reduced
water quality (thereby requiring additional treatment), and reduced ability to access
supplementary water sources. Therefore, this LHMP assumes that any water system facility or
device directly involved in the storage, conveyance, and/or treatment of drinking water will be at
risk to marginal costs based on drought-related maintenance. Table 5-11 summarizes the water
system critical assets potentially at risk.
Table 5-11: Water System Critical Assets at Risk due to Drought
Asset Category Number At
Risk
Number Not
At Risk Total Value at Risk
Buildings 0 3 $0
Electrical Facilities 0 1 $0
Plants 14 0 $26,737,500
Wells 3 0 $1,600,000
PRVs 6 5 $150,000
Total 23 9 $28,487,500
147
Droughts may also impact the District’s operations through decreasing available water for
transporting sewage. Decreased water flow can increase concentration of waste within the system
and amplify the impacts of FOG obstructions. Shifting and compacted soils can create space
around pipes that increases the risk of small shifts and cracks. With consideration of the
discussion on water systems, Table 5-12 below shows the water and sewer system devices
potentially at risk. Again, only devices directly involved in the storage, conveyance, and/or
treatment of drinking water are considered at risk.
Table 5-12: Water and Sewer Devices at Risk due to Drought
System
Category Asset Category Number At
Risk
Number Not
At Risk
Water
Flow Control Valves 7 0
System Valves 4841 0
Pressure Valves 17 0
Service Valves 3358 0
Hydrants 3099 0
Flushings & Blow Offs 0 357
Service Meters 0 23,760
Storage Units 0 32
Minor Wells 30 0
Sampling Devices 0 39
Weirs 0 20
Pumps 13 0
Wastewater
Pumps 1 0
Service Connections 20,501 0
Cleanouts 338 0
Manholes 0 5192
5.4.5 Earthquakes and Seismic Events
Much District infrastructure is along seismically active fault zones within southern California. For
example, the South San Andreas Fault runs directly through the northern service area. If a major
earthquake (M7.0 or higher) were to impact the area, then the District may expect significant
losses due to the destruction of facilities and pipelines – leading to major disruption of service
provision and likely secondary impacts and hazards.
Many District buildings and much of its infrastructure lie within anticipated dangerous fault zones.
The lives of all staff may be threatened by an M7.0 earthquake. District customers and residents
within the service area would almost certainly experience massive disruptions to water and
wastewater services due to pipelines breaking, building collapse, and fires.
Given the destructive potential of earthquakes and the District’s location along the Southern San
Andreas fault, all buildings and infrastructure owned by the District are considered at risk.
Appendix G contains maps that overlay four earthquake scenarios at four different southern
California fault zones. These maps are intended to be diagrammatical expositions on earthquake
risk rather than discrete planning tools.
148
Table 5-13 shows the critical assets within Alquist-Priolo Fault Zones.
Table 5-13: Critical Assets within Alquist-Priolo Fault Zones
Asset Category Number At
Risk
Number Not
At Risk Total Value at Risk
Buildings 0 3 $0
Electrical Facilities 0 1 $0
Plants 8 6 $18,662,500
Wells 0 3 $0
PRVs 10 6 $0
Total 8 19 $18,662,500
Table 5-14 shows the waster and sewer system infrastructure that intersect with Alquist -Priolo
Fault Zones.
Table 5-14: District Pipelines within Alquist-Priolo Fault Zones
System
Category Diameter Miles at
Risk
Miles Not
at Risk
Unit Cost
($/ft)
Total Pipe Value at
Risk
Water
¾” 0.06 7.14 $60/ft
1” 12.4 83.0 $60/ft
2” 0.3 2.4 $75/ft
3” 0.4 0.9 $90/ft
4” 0.3 9.0 $113/ft
5” 0 0.01 $130/ft
6” 6.0 54.0 $150/ft
8” 10.8 54.0 $180/ft
10” 0.6 3.8 $200/ft
12” 7.4 27.9 $215/ft
14” 0.2 1.2 $240/ft
16” 3.0 10.2 $300/ft
18” 0.19 0.11 $375/ft
20” 0.9 4.1 $450/ft
21” 0 0.87 $505/ft
24” 0.2 2.6 $560/ft
30” 0.5 2.3 $615/ft
36” 2.8 2.3 $725/ft
Wastewater
3” 0 0.12 $90/ft $0
4” 11.0 84.7 $113/ft $10,556,100
6” 0.9 19.9 $150/ft $1,199,141
8” 22.1 94.9 $180/ft $33,800,710
10” 0.1 5.9 $200/ft $134,191
12” 0.1 7.9 $215/ft $193,403
15” 0 6.3 $280/ft $0
16” 0 0.06 $300/ft $0
18” 0 2.0 $375/ft $0
149
Table 5-14: District Pipelines within Alquist-Priolo Fault Zones
System
Category Diameter Miles at
Risk
Miles Not
at Risk
Unit Cost
($/ft)
Total Pipe Value at
Risk
21” 0 1.9 $505/ft $0
24” 0 2.2 $560/ft $0
27” 0 0.37 $590/ft $0
30” 0 0.25 $615/ft $0
33” 0 0.25 $670/ft $0
36” 0 0.50 $725/ft $0
39” 0 0.25 $780/ft $0
48” 0 1.60 $945/ft $0
Total
Table 5-15 shows the water and wastewater devices that lie within Alquist-Priolo Fault Zones.
Table 5-15: Water and Sewer Devices within Alquist-Priolo Fault Zones
System
Category Asset Category Number At
Risk
Number Not
At Risk
Water
Flow Control Valves 0 7
System Valves 707 4134
Pressure Valves 0 17
Service Valves 481 2877
Hydrants 432 2667
Flushings & Blow Offs 67 290
Service Meters 2773 20,987
Storage Units 14 18
Minor Wells 3 27
Sampling Devices 9 30
Weirs 7 0
Pumps 13 0
Wastewater
Pumps 0 1
Service Connections 2347 18,154
Cleanouts 41 297
Manholes 860 4332
5.4.6 Flooding
Riverine flooding would most likely impact infrastructure within the immediate 100-year floodplain
(1 percent chance of annual occurrence). However, a 500-year flood could be catastrophic. Staff
who are working within these buildings or are driving in vehicles as floodwaters rise are most likely
to be threatened, especially during flash floods near channels in the northern foothills. According
to the District’s RRA (Not For Public Release), several plants would have access cut-off if floods
inundated service roads. Appendix H shows the District’s service area overlaid with FEMA’s flood
zones per the area’s FIRM map.
Table 5-16 shows the critical assets at risk within the 100-year floodplain. Table 5-17 shows the
critical assets at risk within the 500-year floodplain.
150
Table 5-16: Critical Assets within the 100-year Floodplain
Asset Category Number At
Risk
Number Not
At Risk Total Value at Risk
Buildings 0 3 $0
Electrical Facilities 0 1 $0
Plants 1 13 $550,000
Wells 0 3 $0
PRVs 1 5 $25,000
Total 2 25 $575,000
Table 5-17: Critical Assets within the 500-year Floodplain
Asset Category Number At
Risk
Number Not
At Risk Total Value at Risk
Buildings 1 2 $25,000,000
Electrical Facilities 0 1 $0
Plants 4 10 $4,537,500
Wells 0 3 $0
PRVs 2 4 $50,000
Total 7 20 $29,587,500
Table 5-18 shows the water and sewer system infrastructure that intersect with the 100-year
floodplain. Table 5-19 shows the water and sewer system infrastructure that intersect with the
500-year floodplain.
Table 5-18: District Pipelines within the 100-year Floodplain
System
Category Diameter Miles at
Risk
Miles Not
at Risk
Unit Cost
($/ft)
Total Pipe Value at
Risk
Water
¾” 0.2 7.0 $60/ft $55,418
1” 8.7 86.7 $60/ft $2,753,619
2” 0.5 2.2 $75/ft $188,734
3” 1.9 1.1 $90/ft $100,483
4” 0.8 8.5 $113/ft $469,572
5” 0 0.01 $130/ft $0
6” 6.2 53.8 $150/ft $4,911,177
8” 7.5 57.3 $180/ft $7,151,653
10” 0.7 3.7 $200/ft $710,829
12” 6.0 29.3 $215/ft $6,801,999
14” 0.2 1.2 $240/ft $288,274
16” 3.3 9.9 $300/ft $5,238,360
18” 0.06 0.24 $375/ft $108,350
20” 2.4 2.6 $450/ft $5,707,890
21” 0.81 0.06 $505/ft $2,095,649
24” 0.8 2.0 $560/ft $2,323,888
30” 1.3 1.5 $615/ft $4,143,984
36” 1.1 4.0 $725/ft $4,018,119
151
Table 5-18: District Pipelines within the 100-year Floodplain
System
Category Diameter Miles at
Risk
Miles Not
at Risk
Unit Cost
($/ft)
Total Pipe Value at
Risk
Wastewater
3” 0 0.12 $90/ft $0
4” 8.3 87.4 $113/ft $4,954,280
6” 1.8 19.0 $150/ft $1,436,724
8” 16.6 100.4 $180/ft $15,756,613
10” 1.0 5.0 $200/ft $1,031,802
12” 1.2 6.8 $215/ft $1,313,615
15” 1.9 4.4 $280/ft $2,874,606
16” 0.06 0.0 $300/ft $70,615
18” 0.9 1.1 $375/ft $1,764,841
21” 0.4 1.5 $505/ft $1,110,085
24” 0.9 1.3 $560/ft $2,483,536
27” 0.06 0.31 $590/ft $122,940
30” 0.06 0.19 $615/ft $139,658
33” 0 0.25 $670/ft $0
36” 0.25 0.25 $725/ft $850,974
39” 0 0.25 $780/ft $0
48” 1.4 0.2 $945/ft $6,860,097
Total $87,838,384
Table 5-19: District Pipelines within the 500-year Floodplain
System
Category Diameter Miles at
Risk
Miles Not
at Risk
Unit Cost
($/ft)
Total Pipe Value at
Risk
Water
¾” 0.3 6.9 $60/ft $107,792
1” 20.8 74.6 $60/ft $6,589,216
2” 0.7 2.0 $75/ft $265,651
3” 0.3 1.0 $90/ft $129,397
4” 2.6 6.7 $113/ft $1,553,245
5” 0.0 0.01 $130/ft $0
6” 12.8 47.2 $150/ft $10,137,433
8” 15.7 49.1 $180/ft $14,920,192
10” 1.0 3.4 $200/ft $1,068,423
12” 9.3 26.0 $215/ft $10,530,355
14” 0.8 0.6 $240/ft $962,357
16” 3.5 9.7 $300/ft $5,537,993
18” 0.1 0.2 $375/ft $108,350
20” 2.6 2.4 $450/ft $6,059,468
21” 0.81 0.06 $505/ft $2,095,649
24” 1.1 1.7 $560/ft $3,182,204
30” 1.3 1.5 $615/ft $4,143,984
36” 1.1 4.0 $725/ft $4,046,945
Wastewater
3” 0.00 0.12 $90/ft $0
4” 19.3 76.4 $113/ft $11,481,601
6” 8.2 12.6 $150/ft $6,482,869
8” 32.0 85.0 $180/ft $30,436,092
152
Table 5-19: District Pipelines within the 500-year Floodplain
System
Category Diameter Miles at
Risk
Miles Not
at Risk
Unit Cost
($/ft)
Total Pipe Value at
Risk
10” 2.0 4.0 $200/ft $2,085,237
12” 1.9 6.1 $215/ft $2,110,499
15” 3.0 3.3 $280/ft $4,443,854
16” 0.06 0.0 $300/ft $70,615
18” 1.2 0.8 $375/ft $2,506,442
21” 0.5 1.4 $505/ft $1,388,753
24” 1.4 0.8 $560/ft $4,065,628
27” 0.06 0.31 $590/ft $122,940
30” 0.06 0.19 $615/ft $139,658
33” 0.0 0.25 $670/ft $0
36” 0.25 0.25 $725/ft $840,974
39” 0. 0.25 $780/ft $0
48” 1.4 0.2 $945/ft $6,860,097
Total $144,473,913
Table 5-20 shows the water and sewer system devices that intersect with the 100-year floodplain.
Table 5-21 shows the water and sewer system devices that intersect with the 500-year floodplain.
Table 5-20: Water and Sewer Devices within the 100-year Floodplain
System
Category Asset Category Number At
Risk
Number Not
At Risk
Water
Flow Control Valves 0 7
System Valves 111 4730
Pressure Valves 1 16
Service Valves 89 3269
Hydrants 76 3023
Flushings & Blow Offs 28 329
Service Meters 174 23,586
Storage Units 0 32
Minor Wells 5 25
Sampling Devices 1 38
Weirs 0 20
Pumps 0 13
Wastewater
Pumps 0 1
Service Connections 110 20,391
Cleanouts 4 334
Manholes 78 5114
Table 5-21: Water and Sewer Devices within the 500-year Floodplain
System
Category Asset Category Number At
Risk
Number Not
At Risk
Water Flow Control Valves 5 2
System Valves 1029 3812
153
Table 5-21: Water and Sewer Devices within the 500-year Floodplain
System
Category Asset Category Number At
Risk
Number Not
At Risk
Pressure Valves 2 15
Service Valves 750 2608
Hydrants 709 2390
Flushings & Blow Offs 82 275
Service Meters 4820 18,940
Storage Units 8 24
Minor Wells 13 17
Sampling Devices 5 34
Weirs 0 20
Pumps 0 13
Wastewater
Pumps 1 0
Service Connections 4248 16,253
Cleanouts 120 218
Manholes 1217 3975
5.4.7 Hazardous Materials Release
HAZMAT incidents could either impact storage and fueling facilities or incur costs due to sewer
main breaks. HAZMAT incidents are primarily a threat to staff who are either responding to the
incident onsite or those in the immediate vicinity of the release. Explosive releases that
substantially injure staff are a negligible risk.
Per Figure 4-14, the District’s service area does not intersect with the Newmark Groundwater
Contamination Site, but it does intersect with the northernmost part of Norton Air Force Base. This
intersection is relatively minimal. No critical assets are located at or near the Superfund sites. The
few assets that do overlap with the EPA-designated site boundaries are on the site’s borders, with
the exceptions of some lateral lines and some sections of center line.
All water/wastewater assets and pipeline lengths within or along the Norton Air Force Base site
boundaries are summarized in Table 5-22. For parsimony, only the assets and pipelines crossing
the official site boundary are listed. No critical assets were identified.
Table 5-22: Water/Wastewater Assets and Pipelines in Superfund Site
System Category Asset Category Number/Length
Within Site
Water
System Valves 2
Service Valves 6
Hydrants 3
Service Meters 17
Flushings and Blow Offs 2
¾” pipe 26.3 feet
1” pipe 268.9 feet
2” pipe 236.9 feet
154
Table 5-22: Water/Wastewater Assets and Pipelines in Superfund Site
System Category Asset Category Number/Length
Within Site
3” pipe 54.7 feet
4” pipe 86.6 feet
6” pipe 1360.4 feet
8” pipe 844.5 feet
24” pipe 106.7 feet
Wastewater
Service Connections 2
Manholes 1
4” pipe 126.2 feet
8” pipe 5742.2 feet
Table 5-23 below identifies critical assets at risk due to HAZMAT incidents precluding Superfund
contamination. Theoretically, any pipeline owned and operated by the District is at risk of
breakage, so all are considered nominally at risk (cf. sanitary sewer spills). The SNRC
Administration Building is considered at risk due to storage of HAZMAT onsite.
Table 5-23: Water System Critical Assets at Risk due to HAZMAT Release
Asset Category Number At
Risk
Number Not
At Risk Total Value at Risk
Buildings 2 1 $212,865,211
Electrical Facilities 0 1 $0
Plants 14 0 $26,737,500
Wells 0 3 $0
PRVs 0 6 $0
Total 16 11 $26,737,500
Table 5-24 below identifies water and sewer system devices at risk due to HAZMAT incidents.
Note that this risk assessment conservatively estimates the assets at risk and only considers
those assets involved in the direct storage, conveyance, and/or treatment of HAZMAT, including
biological waste. Significant pipeline failures or HAZMAT releases that occur near any discrete
asset would naturally threaten that asset, but that risk is not quantifiable with current data.
Table 5-24: Water and Sewer Devices at Risk due to HAZMAT Release
System
Category Asset Category Number At
Risk
Number Not
At Risk
Water
Flow Control Valves 0 7
System Valves 0 4841
Pressure Valves 0 17
Service Valves 0 3358
Hydrants 0 3099
Flushings & Blow Offs 0 357
Service Meters 0 23,760
Storage Units 32 0
155
Table 5-24: Water and Sewer Devices at Risk due to HAZMAT Release
System
Category Asset Category Number At
Risk
Number Not
At Risk
Minor Wells 0 30
Sampling Devices 0 39
Weirs 0 20
Pumps 0 13
Wastewater
Pumps 1 0
Service Connections 20,501 0
Cleanouts 338 0
Manholes 0 5192
5.4.8 Heat Wave
Heat waves are regional hazards by definition. Impacts are likely to be similar to droughts in that
heat waves will primarily be defined by impacts on staff and unlikely to harm buildings. All District
staff are at risk of heat wave health impacts, especially those who work outside, work in
maintenance, and/or transport solid waste in vehicles.
Given that heat waves can increase evaporation and may be accompanied by low humidity, there
may be some short-term stress to pumps and increased maintenance costs. This is especially
relevant to HVAC systems within administrative buildings and facilities or vehicles potentially
exceeding operating temperatures. Since heat waves are transitory events that last several days
at most and without the long-term climactic impacts to soil and water quality that droughts have,
this LHMP assumes that financial risks to water/sewer critical assets, devices, and pipelines are
negligible.
5.4.9 Landslide
The District’s risk to landslides was calculated using data from the USGS Landslide Susceptibility
Index. This index examines slope-relief, soil/bedrock stability, gullies/runouts, and previous
occurrences of landslides to determine a relative landslide risk. The index ranges from a relative
risk of 0 to 81. Assets and infrastructure were identified as “at risk” if the index was 64 or greater,
which the developers indicated as the highest bucket of landslide risk.198
Appendix I shows the raster data from the index overlaid with the District’s boundaries. The
northeastern edge of the District has the greatest risk given its proximity to the San Bernardino
Mountains and foothills. No critical assets were identified as at risk to landslides
Table 5-25 below shows the pipeline infrastructure at risk.
198 Mirus, B., Belair, G., Wood, N., Jones, J., & Martinez, S. “Parsimonious High -Resolution Landslide Susceptibility
Modeling at Continental Scales”. AGU Advances, 5 (2024). doi: 10.1029/2024AV001214
156
Table 5-25: District Pipelines at Risk to Landslides
System
Category Diameter Miles at
Risk
Miles Not
at Risk
Unit Cost
($/ft)
Total Pipe Value at
Risk
Water
¾” 0 7.2 $60/ft $0
1” 0.1 95.3 $60/ft $47,300
2” 0* 2.7 $75/ft $0
3” 0 1.3 $90/ft $0
4” 0* 9.3 $113/ft $0
5” 0 0.01 $130/ft $0
6” 0* 60.0 $150/ft $0
8” 0.2 64.6 $180/ft $183,962
10” 0 4.4 $200/ft $0
12” 0.1 35.2 $215/ft $86,362
14” 0* 1.4 $240/ft $0
16” 0.2 13.0 $300/ft $317,584
18” 0 0.3 $375/ft $0
20” 0 5.0 $450/ft $0
21” 0 0.87 $505/ft $0
24” 0* 2.8 $560/ft $0
30” 0* 2.8 $615/ft $0
36” 0.4 4.7 $725/ft $1,339,256
Wastewater
3” 0 0.12 $90/ft $0
4” 0.01 95.6 $113/ft $30,570
6” 0 20.8 $150/ft $0
8” 0.3 116.7 $180/ft $213,925
10” 0 6.0 $200/ft $0
12” 0 8.0 $215/ft $0
15” 0 6.3 $280/ft $0
16” 0 0.06 $300/ft $0
18” 0 2.0 $375/ft $0
21” 0 1.9 $505/ft $0
24” 0 2.2 $560/ft $0
27” 0 0.37 $590/ft $0
30” 0 0.25 $615/ft $0
33” 0 0.25 $670/ft $0
36” 0 0.50 $725/ft $0
39” 0 0.25 $780/ft $0
48” 0 1.6 $945/ft $0
Total $2,218,959
*Total pipe length at risk was under 0.05 miles and not reported.
Table 5-26 below shows the water and sewer devices at risk.
Table 5-26: Water and Sewer Devices at Risk to Landslides
System
Category Asset Category Number At
Risk
Number Not
At Risk
Water Flow Control Valves 0 7
157
Table 5-26: Water and Sewer Devices at Risk to Landslides
System
Category Asset Category Number At
Risk
Number Not
At Risk
System Valves 19 4822
Pressure Valves 0 17
Service Valves 5 3353
Hydrants 6 3093
Flushings & Blow Offs 0 357
Service Meters 28 23,732
Storage Units 2 30
Minor Wells 0 30
Sampling Devices 0 39
Weirs 2 18
Pumps 0 13
Wastewater
Pumps 0 1
Service Connections 10 20,491
Cleanouts 0 338
Manholes 8 5184
5.4.10 Power Loss
Power failures and PSPS primarily concern pump stations, administrative buildings, and water
treatment plants. As with cyberattacks, power failures/PSPS may impact infrastructure but will not
directly impact staff except in the case of massive, multi-day power losses – which are extremely
rare even in fire-prone southern California. Long-lasting power failures are more likely to occur as
a secondary impact due to a major disaster such as an earthquake.
Table 5-27 shows the critical assets at risk. These assets were determined by assessing locations
that require power to operate and do not have backup power available onsite.
Table 5-27: Water System Critical Assets at Risk due to Power Loss
Asset Category Number At
Risk
Number Not
At Risk Total Value at Risk
Buildings 1 2 $25,000,000
Electrical Facilities 0 1 $0
Plants 6 8 $8,162,500
Wells 0 3 $0
PRVs 0 6 $0
Total 7 20 $33,162,500
Theoretically, all pipelines are at risk to power loss in the case of backups caused by a plant,
conveyance system, or treatment center going offline. In practice, the pipes most likely to be
impacted would be those directly connected to these facilities/systems and therefore experiencing
the greatest amount of pressure. As this would be a very short pipe length, the LHMP does not
model the value of pipelines at risk. Additionally, the District’s wastewater system is entirely
158
gravity-fed and does not rely on pumps. The Planning Team acknowledges that this assumption
might underestimate the true risk.
Table 5-28 below shows the water and sewer devices at risk to power loss. This table assumes
only those devices that rely on power and a constant connection to the SCADA system to operate
will be at risk to systemic power failures.
Table 5-28: Water and Sewer Devices at Risk to Power Loss
System
Category Asset Category Number At
Risk
Number Not
At Risk
Water
Flow Control Valves 0 7
System Valves 0 4841
Pressure Valves 17 0
Service Valves 0 3358
Hydrants 0 3099
Flushings & Blow Offs 0 357
Service Meters 0 23,760
Storage Units 0 32
Minor Wells 0 30
Sampling Devices 0 39
Weirs 0 20
Pumps 13 0
Wastewater
Pumps 1 0
Service Connections 0 20,501
Cleanouts 0 338
Manholes 0 5192
5.4.11 Severe Storms
By definition, severe storms will have regional impact. Large thunderstorms are most likely to
impact the power grid by blowing down power lines as opposed to directly harming District
facilities or underground infrastructure. Pipelines are unlikely to be directly impacted by severe
storms though indirect impacts may still occur, such as after flash floods. Please see the risk
assessments for the Flood and Power Loss hazards for more information.
None of the District’s facilities were identified as being more or less likely to be impacted by severe
storms than others; all should be considered at equal levels of risk. Staff and customers are
assumed to be at risk if they are caught traveling during the storm or if staff are performing outside
maintenance.
5.4.12 Wildfires
The District’s service area is almost entirely at elevated risk to wildfires. Infrastructure within the
northern section is at particular risk given proximity to the heavily forested foothills and gullies
with historical fire danger. Maintenance staff at pump stations, water treatment stations, and
administrative buildings may likewise be threatened by fast-moving fires. Figure 4-20 within the
hazard analysis exhibits the District’s intersection with Fire Hazard Severity Zones (FHSZs).
159
Table 5-29 shows critical assets at risk within FHSZs. Note that the District’s boundaries
exclusively cross “Very High” FHSZs, representing the highest level of wildfire risk.
Table 5-29: Water System Critical Assets within “Very High” FHSZs
Asset Category Number At
Risk
Number Not
At Risk Total Value at Risk
Buildings 0 3 $0
Electrical Facilities 0 1 $0
Plants 11 3 $22,150,000
Wells 0 3 $0
PRVs 0 6 $0
Total 11 16 $22,150,000
Table 5-30 shows District pipelines within FHSZs.
Table 5-30: District Pipelines within “Very High” FHSZs
System
Category Diameter Miles at
Risk
Miles Not
at Risk
Unit Cost
($/ft)
Total Pipe Value at
Risk
Water
¾” 0.1 7.1 $60/ft $19,006
1” 18.2 77.2 $60/ft $5,762,497
2” 0.4 2.3 $75/ft $161,031
3” 0.4 0.9 $90/ft $172,754
4” 0.4 8.9 $113/ft $268,309
5” 0.0 0.01 $130/ft $0
6” 6.7 53.3 $150/ft $5,308,284
8” 14.3 50.5 $180/ft $13,566,823
10” 0.4 4.0 $200/ft $420,166
12” 9.0 26.4 $215/ft $10,166,778
14” 0.1 1.3 $240/ft $147,282
16” 4.9 8.4 $300/ft $7,629,997
18” 0.2 0.1 $375/ft $314,773
20” 1.4 3.6 $450/ft $3,218,227
21” 0 0.87 $505/ft $0
24” 0.8 2.1 $560/ft $2,198,818
30” 0.4 2.4 $615/ft $1,488,054
36” 3.4 1.7 $725/ft $12,760,112
Wastewater
3” 0 0.12 $90/ft $0
4” 16.1 79.6 $113/ft $9,603,756
6” 0.8 20.0 $150/ft $616,930
8” 25.4 91.6 $180/ft $24,105,484
10” 0.1 5.9 $200/ft $87,343
12” 1.2 1.2 $215/ft $1,400,867
15” 0.0199 6.3 $280/ft $40,628
16” 0 0.06 $300/ft $0
199 Value listed as 0.0 due to rounding to one significant digit. The number of modeled feet at risk is 233.5.
160
Table 5-30: District Pipelines within “Very High” FHSZs
System
Category Diameter Miles at
Risk
Miles Not
at Risk
Unit Cost
($/ft)
Total Pipe Value at
Risk
18” 0 2 $375/ft $0
21” 0 1.9 $505/ft $0
24” 0 2.2 $560/ft $0
27” 0 0.37 $590/ft $0
30” 0 0.25 $615/ft $0
33” 0 0.25 $670/ft $0
36” 0 0.5 $725/ft $0
39” 0 0.25 $780/ft $0
48” 0 1.6 $945/ft $0
Total $99,457,919
Table 5-31 below shows the water and sewer devices within FHSZs.
Table 5-31: Water and Sewer Devices within “Very High” FHSZs
System
Category Asset Category Number At
Risk
Number Not
At Risk
Water
Flow Control Valves 0 7
System Valves 926 3915
Pressure Valves 0 17
Service Valves 653 2705
Hydrants 610 2489
Flushings & Blow Offs 95 262
Service Meters 4071 19,689
Storage Units 19 13
Minor Wells 4 26
Sampling Devices 18 21
Weirs 16 4
Pumps 13 0
Wastewater
Pumps 0 1
Service Connections 3520 16,981
Cleanouts 22 316
Manholes 1063 4129
161
SECTION 6: MITIGATION STRATEGY
Federal regulations require local mitigation plans to identify goals for reducing long-term
vulnerabilities to the identified hazards in the planning area, called “hazard mitigation actions”
(Section 201.6(c)(3)(i)).
A hazard mitigation plan’s primary focus is the mitigation strategy. It represents the efforts selected
by the District to reduce or prevent potential losses. The mitigation strategy consists of the
following steps:
• Identify and profile hazards and risk within the District.
• Identify projects and activities that can prevent or mitigate damage and injury to District
staff, buildings, and infrastructure.
• Develop a mitigation strategy to implement the mitigation actions.
FEMA REGULATION CHECKLIST: MITIGATION STRATEGY
44 CFR § 201.6(c)(3): The plan must include mitigation strategies that provide “the
jurisdiction's blueprint for reducing the potential losses identified in the risk assessment, based
on existing authorities, policies, programs and resources, and its ability to expand on and
improve these existing tools.”
44 CFR § 201.6(c)(3)(i): The plan must include “a description of mitigation goals to reduce or
avoid long-term vulnerabilities to the identified hazards.”
44 CFR § 201.6(c)(3)(ii): The plan must include “a section that identifies and analyzes a
comprehensive range of specific mitigation actions and projects being considered to reduce
the effects of each hazard, with particular emphasis on new and existing buildings and
infrastructure.”
Element:
C3. Does the plan include goals to reduce/avoid long-term vulnerabilities to the identified
hazards? (Requirement 44 CFR § 201.6(c)(3)(i))
C3-a: Does the plan include goals to reduce the risk from the hazards identified in the plan?
C4. Does the plan identify and analyze a comprehensive range of specific mitigation actions
and projects for each jurisdiction being considered to reduce the effects of hazards, with
emphasis on new and existing buildings and infrastructure? (Requirement 44 CFR §
201.6(c)(3)(ii))
C4-a: Does the plan include an analysis of a comprehensive range of actions/projects that
each jurisdiction considered to reduce the impacts of hazards identified in the risk
assessment?
C4-b: Does the plan include one or more action(s) per jurisdiction for each of the hazards as
identified within the plan’s risk assessment?
Source: FEMA, Local Mitigation Planning Handbook Review Tool, June 2025
162
• Develop and implement the mitigation action plan to prioritize, implement, and
administer the mitigation actions.
The Planning Team developed mitigation goals and actions based on the capability assessment,
hazard analysis, and risk assessment. The Planning Team also developed a process to
prioritize, implement, and administer the mitigation actions to reduce risk to existing facilities
and new development.
6.1 Hazard Mitigation Statement
The 2026 LHMP represents the District’s commitment to create a safer, more resilient community
by taking actions to reduce risk and by committing resources to lessen the effects of hazards on
the people and property of the District.
6.2 Hazard Mitigation Goals and Objectives
Mitigation goals are guidelines that represent what the community wants to accomplish through
the mitigation plan. These are broad statements that represent a long-term, community-wide
vision. The Planning Team reviewed the example goals and objectives from the previous LHMP
and determined which goals best met the District’s objectives. Table 6-1 lists the goals for the
2026 LHMP.
Table 6-1: Hazard Mitigation Goals (2026)
Goal 1: Protect life and property, and reduce potential injuries from natural, technological, and
human-caused hazards including those identified in the hazard analysis.
Goal 2: Improve public understanding, support of, and need for hazard mitigation measures.
Goal 3: Promote disaster resilience for the District’s natural, existing, and future built
environment.
Goal 4: Strengthen partnerships and collaboration to implement hazard mitigation activities.
Goal 5: Enhance the District’s ability to effectively and immediately respond to disasters.
6.3 Mitigation Actions/Projects and Implementation Strategy
The requirements for prioritization of mitigation actions, as provided in the federal regulations
implementing the Stafford Act as amended by DMA 2000, are described below.
FEMA REGULATION CHECKLIST: MITIGATION STRATEGY
44 CFR § 201.6(c)(3)(iii): The mitigation strategy section shall include “an action plan
describing how the actions identified in section (c)(3)(ii) will be prioritized, implemented, and
administered by the local jurisdiction. Prioritization shall include a special emphasis on the
extent to which benefits are maximized according to a cost benefit review of the proposed
projects and their associated costs.”
Element:
163
C5. Does the plan contain an action plan that describes how the actions identified will be
prioritized (including a cost-benefit review), implemented, and administered by each
jurisdiction? (Requirement 44 CFR § 201.6(c)(3)(iv)); (Requirement §201.6(c)(3)(iii))
C5-a. Does the plan describe the criteria used for prioritizing actions?
C5-b. Does the plan provide the position, office, department, or agency responsible for
implementing/administrating the identified mitigation actions, as well as potential funding
sources and expected time frame?
Source: FEMA, Local Mitigation Planning Handbook Review Tool, June 2025
Based on these criteria, the District prioritized potential mitigation projects and included them in
the action plan discussed below in Table 6-4. The mitigation action plan developed by the
Planning Team includes the action items that the District intends to implement during the next five
years, assuming funding availability.
6.3.1 Previous Mitigation Actions/Projects Assessment
FEMA REGULATION CHECKLIST: PLAN UPDATE
44 CFR § 201.6(d)(3): A local jurisdiction must review and revise its plan to reflect changes in
development, progress in local mitigation efforts, and changes in priorities, and resubmit it for
approval within 5 years in order to continue to be eligible for mitigation project grant funding.
Element:
E2. Was the plan revised to reflect changes in priorities and progress in local mitigation
efforts? (Requirement 44 CFR § 201.6(d)(3))
E2-b. Does the plan include a status update for all mitigation actions identified in the previous
mitigation plan?
Source: FEMA, Local Mitigation Planning Handbook Review Tool, June 2025
The 2020 LHMP contained 35 mitigations actions. Many of the mitigation actions were completed
or carried out to some degree or are considered ongoing. None were either not addressed during
the time period or were not feasible to accomplish. Some of the mitigation actions were generic
or duplicative and others were better categorized as emergency preparedness or recovery
activities. Many of these actions were consolidated for this update. Table 6-2 provides the status
of mitigation actions from the 2020 LHMP.
Table 6-2: Mitigation Actions 2020 Status
# Hazard Activity Status
1 All
Continually understand and measure impacts, including
consequence and vulnerability, on critical assets from
all hazards.
Ongoing. Included in Plan Maintenance
process.
164
Table 6-2: Mitigation Actions 2020 Status
# Hazard Activity Status
2 All
Periodically provide state and local agencies with
updated information about hazards, vulnerabilities, and
mitigation measures.
Ongoing. Included in Plan Maintenance
process.
3 All
Comply with all applicable local codes and standards
while ensuring the protection of life, property, and
continuity of service.
Ongoing. Revise and consolidate with
other generic activities to produce
specific, measurable, attainable, realistic
and time bound (SMART) activities.
4 All
Ensure that all District investment in high-risk areas is
protected by mitigation measures that improve safety
and protect infrastructure.
Ongoing. Revise and consolidate with
other generic activities to produce
specific, measurable, attainable, realistic
and time bound (SMART) activities.
5 All
Identify and mitigate all imminent threats to life safety. Ongoing. Revise and consolidate with
other generic activities to produce
specific, measurable, attainable, realistic
and time bound (SMART) activities.
6 All
Establish partnerships with all levels of government and
the business community to improve and implement
methods to protect level of service.
Ongoing. Revise and consolidate with
other generic activities to produce
specific, measurable, attainable, realistic
and time bound (SMART) activities.
7 All
Educate District employees and customers of the risks,
mitigation actions, and contingency plans established to
enhance safety.
Ongoing. This is a preparedness activity
8 Drought
Identify and secure new water sources to increase
diversity, redundancy, and reliability in the water supply.
Ongoing. Revise and consolidate with
other water security activities to produce
specific, measurable, attainable, realistic
and time bound (SMART) activities.
9 Drought
Improve operational efficiency and transfers by
maintaining water production and distribution to ensure
reliable service to customers.
Ongoing. Revise and consolidate with
other water security activities to produce
specific, measurable, attainable, realistic
and time bound (SMART) activities.
10 Drought
Reduce water demand by prioritizing water use for
health and safety purposes.
Ongoing. Revise and consolidate with
other water security activities to produce
specific, measurable, attainable, realistic
and time bound (SMART) activities.
11 Drought
Focus on water conservation measures that reduce
nonessential water use.
Ongoing. Revise and consolidate with
other water security activities to produce
specific, measurable, attainable, realistic
and time bound (SMART) activities.
165
Table 6-2: Mitigation Actions 2020 Status
# Hazard Activity Status
12 Drought
Adhere to State drought level regulation updates. Ongoing. Revise and consolidate with
other water security activities to produce
specific, measurable, attainable, realistic
and time bound (SMART) activities.
13 Earth-
quakes
Pursue funding for retrofit programs to bring non-
compliant structures up to code. These codes help
water utilities design and construct reservoirs, pump
stations, groundwater wells, and pipelines that resist the
forces of nature and ensure safety.
Ongoing. Identify specific facilities.
Address steps required to achieve
concrete results such as structural
assessments, design, permitting,
environmental compliance and
construction.
14 Earth-
quakes
Design new District facilities to withstand an 8.0
earthquake. This area of Southern California is a high
earthquake risk and exists on the fault zone.
Ongoing. Identify specific new facilities in
the CIP. Address steps required to
achieve concrete results such as
structural assessments, design,
permitting, environmental compliance
and construction.
15 Wildfire
Increase the capacity of the District to respond to
wildfires, including preparedness activities such as
interagency planning.
Ongoing. Revise and consolidate with
other preparedness activities to produce
specific, measurable, attainable, realistic
and time bound (SMART) activities.
16 Wildfire
Require identification of critical facilities in need of
improvement, and alternatives for mitigation.
Ongoing. Revise and consolidate with
other activities to produce specific,
measurable, attainable, realistic and time
bound (SMART) activities.
17 Wildfire
Implement improvements and upgrades to existing and
new facilities in wildfire hazard areas.
Ongoing. Revise and consolidate with
other activities to produce specific,
measurable, attainable, realistic and time
bound (SMART) activities.
18 Flooding
Require identification of critical facilities at risk and
alternatives for mitigation.
Ongoing. Revise and consolidate with
other activities to produce specific,
measurable, attainable, realistic and time
bound (SMART) activities.
19 Flooding
Implement floodproofing measures and upgrade critical
facilities in flood hazard areas.
Ongoing. Revise and consolidate with
other activities to produce specific,
measurable, attainable, realistic and time
bound (SMART) activities.
20 Flooding
Continually increase the District’s understanding of
flood hazards as it relates to critical facilities.
Ongoing. Revise and consolidate with
other activities to produce specific,
measurable, attainable, realistic and time
bound (SMART) activities.
166
Table 6-2: Mitigation Actions 2020 Status
# Hazard Activity Status
21
Land
Subsi-
dence
Support the San Bernardino Valley Municipal Water
District efforts for responsible basin management.
Ongoing. Revise and consolidate with
other water security activities to produce
specific, measurable, attainable, realistic
and time bound (SMART) activities.
22 Physical
Adversary
Maintain headquarter evacuation preparedness with
staff.
Ongoing. Revise and consolidate with
other preparedness activities to produce
specific, measurable, attainable, realistic
and time bound (SMART) activities.
23 Physical
Adversary
When applicable, implement physical protective
features into the design of the building to heighten
security measures.
Ongoing. Revise and consolidate with
other security activities to produce
specific, measurable, attainable, realistic
and time bound (SMART) activities.
24 Cyber-
attack
Expand staff education and training for cyber security,
including manual operations in case of system failure.
Ongoing. Revise and consolidate with
other security activities to produce
specific, measurable, attainable, realistic
and time bound (SMART) activities.
25 Cyber-
attack
Increase resources to prevent compromises to
cybersecurity.
Ongoing. Ongoing. Revise and
consolidate with other security activities
to produce specific, measurable,
attainable, realistic and time bound
(SMART) activities.
26 Cyber-
attack
Develop a contingency strategy or recovery plan if the
system is compromised.
Ongoing. Revise and consolidate with
other preparedness activities to produce
specific, measurable, attainable, realistic
and time bound (SMART) activities.
27 Power
Loss
Maintain an accurate inventory of the District’s critical
spares.
Ongoing.
28 Power
Loss
Identify vendors or establish Memoranda of
Understanding (MOUs) to access critical supplies in
case of an event.
Ongoing.
29 Power
Loss
Ensure accessibility to supply critical spares in the event
of a disaster.
Ongoing.
30 Power
Loss
Continually collaborate with other utility companies to
expand knowledge base of alternative energy sources.
Ongoing. Revise and consolidate with
other activities to produce specific,
measurable, attainable, realistic and time
bound (SMART) activities.
31 Power
Loss
Identify alternative sources of power. Ongoing. Revise and consolidate with
other activities to produce specific,
measurable, attainable, realistic and time
bound (SMART) activities.
167
Table 6-2: Mitigation Actions 2020 Status
# Hazard Activity Status
32 Power
Loss
Identify facilities in need of retrofit or improvement to
allow for alternative energy sources.
Ongoing. Revise and consolidate with
other activities to produce specific,
measurable, attainable, realistic and time
bound (SMART) activities.
33 Power
Loss
Maximize State Water Project resource while
maintaining reliable alternate and redundant water
sources by developing a strategy and set benchmarks
to annually bank State Water Project credits.
Ongoing. Revise and consolidate with
other water security activities to produce
specific, measurable, attainable, realistic
and time bound (SMART) activities.
34 Proximity
Hazards
Actively monitor ground wells. Ongoing. Revise and consolidate with
other water security activities to produce
specific, measurable, attainable, realistic
and time bound (SMART) activities.
35 Proximity
Hazards
Leverage regional working groups, such as ERNIE, to
discuss and collaborate on proximity hazards that may
impact water quality.
Ongoing. Revise and consolidate with
other activities to produce specific,
measurable, attainable, realistic and time
bound (SMART) activities.
The Planning Team collaboratively identified and prioritized mitigation strategies for the identified
hazards. The prioritization efforts looked at the risks and threats from each hazard, financial costs
and benefits, technical feasibility, and community values. Hazards were prioritized for specific
mitigation actions based on the CPRI, Planning Team members’ input, and expediency for
successful District operations.
The Planning Team evaluated potential mitigation actions using the STAPLE/E Method, which
assesses the Social, Technical, Administrative, Political, Legal, Economic, and Environmental
feasibility of potential projects. Some of the questions that inform STAPLE/E are described in
Table 6-3 below. The full STAPLE/E analysis of each mitigation action may be found within
Appendix D.
Table 6-3: STAPLE/E Method
Issues Criteria
Social
• Is the action socially acceptable to community members?
• Would the action mistreat some individuals?
• Is there a reasonable chance of the action causing a social
disruption?
168
Table 6-3: STAPLE/E Method
Issues Criteria
Technical
• Is the action likely to reduce the risk of the hazard occurring, or
will it reduce the hazard's effects?
• Will the action create new hazards or make existing hazards
worse?
• Is the action the most useful approach for the District to take,
given the District and community members' goals?
Administrative
• Does the District have the administrative capabilities to
implement the action?
• Are there existing District staff who can lead and coordinate the
measure's implementation, or can the District reasonably hire
new staff for this role?
• Does the District have enough staff, funding, technical support,
and other resources to implement the action?
• Are there administrative barriers to implementing the action?
Political
• Is the action politically acceptable to District officials and other
relevant jurisdictions and political entities?
• Do community members support the action?
Legal
• Does the District have the legal authority to implement and
enforce the action?
• Are there potential legal barriers or consequences that could
hinder or prevent the implementation of the action?
• Is there a reasonable chance that the implementation of the
action would expose the District to legal liabilities?
• Could the action reasonably face other legal challenges?
Economic
• What are the monetary costs of the action, and do the costs
exceed the monetary benefits?
• What are the start-up and maintenance costs of the action,
including administrative costs?
• Has the funding for action implementation been secured, or is a
potential funding source available?
• How will funding the action affect the District’s financial
capabilities?
• Could the implementation of the action reasonably burden the
District’s economy or tax base?
• Could there reasonably be other budgetary and revenue impacts
to the District?
169
Table 6-3: STAPLE/E Method
Issues Criteria
Environmental
• What are the potential environmental impacts of the action?
• Will the action require environmental regulatory approvals?
• Will the action comply with all applicable federal, state, regional,
and local environmental regulations?
• Will the action reasonably affect any endangered, threatened, or
otherwise sensitive species of concern?
To meet the cost estimation requirements of the hazard mitigation planning process, the Planning
Team identified relative cost estimates based on their understanding of the mitigation action intent
and their experience in developing identical or similar programs/implementing projects. Three cost
categories based on the District’s typical cost criteria were used for budgeting purposes:
• Low cost ($): $100,000 or less
• Medium cost ($$): $100,001 to $999,999
• High cost ($$$): Greater than $1,000,000
The Planning Team also identified general timeframes for each project assuming successful
funding. These timelines were defined as a certain number of years or one of the following
categories:
• Ongoing (Annually): Actions within this timeframe are the types of actions that District
staff would conduct on an annual basis.
• Ongoing (As Needed): Actions within this timeframe include activities that District staff
would conduct in response to a request by internal (e.g., District departments) or external
(e.g., City of Highland) parties.
• Future Planning Process: Actions identified within this timeframe are considered low-
priority actions that the District would like to continue to track but does not feel they would
be able to implement in the current planning implementation timeframe.
6.3.2 2026 LHMP Mitigation Actions
Mitigation actions are more specific than goals or objectives. They include a mechanism, such as
an assigned time period, to measure success and ensure the actions are accomplished.
The District is the sole responsible party for implementing all hazard mitigation actions, projects,
and activities. The Human Resources & Risk Management department is responsible for keeping
and maintaining the list of hazard mitigation actions and coordinating with the responsible
departments to ensure completion. Each mitigation action’s responsible department is included
in 6.3.3 Supplementary Material for Mitigation Actions.
Based on the criteria and evaluation processes used during LHMP development, the Planning
Team prepared a prioritized list of 20 mitigation actions to improve the District’s resilience to
170
hazard events. These mitigation actions include a broad range of approaches to hazard mitigation
such as retrofitting, public education, increased staff training and awareness, development of
redundant facilities, and others.
Some mitigation actions were considered but not chosen for inclusion in this LHMP. Many of these
were projects identified within the 2019 WSMP and SSMP and were since obviated due to
changes in priorities or project completion. These actions are summarized below:
• Conduct seismic assessments on District buildings and infrastructure that are rated
"Fair" or "Poor" within the District's RRA and/or are known not to be at current
earthquake seismic code: Excluded given no building with human occupancy exceeded
“fair” or “poor”. The only structures with these designations were wells that are already in
the process of being refurbished.
• Perform critical asset hardening on the water storage and treatment system by
upgrading concrete tanks to steel tanks: Excluded due to a lack of high priority and the
concrete tanks noted as being in “excellent” condition within the RRA. Additionally, the
District’s Engineering department noted that concrete was the preferred material for
certain storage locations due to ease of maintenance, among other factors.
• Conduct a feasibility study on upgrading water system plans that serve the
Yaamava’ Resort & Casino at San Manuel: Excluded given that the next iteration of the
WSMP addresses deficiencies within this system, if needed. Additionally, the tribal
government has their own water reservoirs for fire protection.
• Develop plans and/or source a contractor to construct a temporary water supply
system within the Canal 3 Zone: This action was inspired by the 2019 WSMP’s concern
that Plant 140 cannot be rehabilitated due to a lack of temporary supply and Plant 137
was reported as not having enough volume to take up the slack. However, the Engineering
department stated that the Plant 140 rehabilitation plans are actually complete and
construction started in November 2025.
• Conduct a feasibility study and building survey on building out District emergency
water supply systems to increase baseline resilience to hazards, especially if
reservoirs or wells are compromised: Excluded given this feasibility study will already
be included within the next WSMP update.
• Replace sewer system pipes via installing pipe sleeves and sliplining pipes for
pipes rated a 4 or 5 for structural quality to reduce I/I: Excluded given the District does
not have any pipes rated a 4 or 5 as of the most recent dataset.
• Augment the District's Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) to include
contingencies in the event of a cyberattack involving loss of control of plants,
power, or SCADA: Excluded given this information is already present within the most
recent COOP.
• Integrate the District into the San Bernardino County Flood Control District’s EOP
for the Seven Oaks Dam: Excluded due to the District already being within the EOP’s
emergency contact tree.
171
• Develop a Floodplain Management Plan to increase resiliency and ensure
construction conforms to FEMA 100-year planning guidelines: Excluded due to not
being applicable given the District already conforms to these guidelines with any new
construction or refurbishment.
• Design and construct an additional production well at Plant 129 per the mitigation
actions outlined within the District's Drought Contingency Plan (DCP): This
mitigation action was inspired by the 2019 WSMP. It was excluded given the project is
already underway.
• Develop a priority list for seismically retrofitting inlet/outlet lines owned by the
District: The Engineering department recommended excluding this mitigation action given
it was considered duplicative of Mitigation Action #12.
• Conduct a feasibility study for the installation of concrete or steel open-type check
dams within gullies that have elevated landslide or debris flow risk: Excluded due to
being outside the scope of the District’s operations.
• Conduct drainage assessments at District-owned properties within the 100-year
and 500-year floodplains, then conduct any identified erosion control methods:
Excluded due to being outside the scope of the District’s operations.
• Maintain, repair, and improve culverts, waterbars, and other water conveyance
systems to reduce the impacts of floods and heavy rains: Excluded due to being
outside the scope of the District’s operations.
• Conduct an assessment on the capacities of existing foundation drainage systems
within District wastewater facilities: Excluded as foundation drainage has not been a
problem during any historical floods or severe storms.
• Conduct an inventory of HAZMAT stored throughout the District’s facilities
including type, quantity, and location. Attach the appropriate SDS to every
applicable storage and/or conveyance system: Recommended exclusion by the
Operation & Maintenance department given all chemicals are inventoried and permitted
through the San Bernardino County Fire Protection District. All HAZMAT inventories with
volumes of 200 gallons and above have the appropriate SDS.
• Refurbish and maintain HVAC systems within offices, garages, and workshops to
reduce the impact of heat waves on staff: Excluded because the Operation &
Maintenance department did not identify any facilities that lack proper HVAC, nor are any
HVAC units deficient in maintenance.
• Engage with Cal Fire and other local agencies to identify trees, telephone poles,
power lines, and/or other objects that could threaten the District’s buildings and
infrastructure during severe storms: Excluded as this was already performed following
the 2024 Line Fire.
Table 6-4 lists the mitigation actions. Supplementary material (e.g., implementing department,
technical specifications) is included in the following subsection. Note that the potential funding
sources confirm to the financial capabilities and resources identified in Table 4-3.
172
The mitigation action plan assigns the primary responsibility for each action item to an
implementing department. The implementing department is the controlling department that will
assign funding and oversee activity implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. The prioritization
of projects in the LHMP provides a basis for implementing the mitigation strategies, but all new
mitigation actions and projects will be formally prioritized and selected by the respective
implementing department.
173
Table 6-4: Mitigation Actions
# Action Description Mitigation
Goal(s)
Related
Hazard(s)
Estimated
Cost
Potential
Funding
Priority
Level
Timeframe
1
Integrate the LHMP’s mitigation actions into
forthcoming updates to the capital improvements
section of the Fiscal Year Budgets for each
budget period throughout the next five-year
cycle.
1,3,5 All Hazards $ General Fund High Ongoing
(Annually)
2
Add the most frequently used water system
PRVs to the District’s SCADA system to facilitate
monitoring pressure changes and to increase
response efficacy during sudden pressure
changes.
1,3,5 All Hazards $
General Fund
Bonds
HMGP
High 1 year
3
Install pressure loggers at key points within the
water system to facilitate surveillance of
pressure differentials within the District’s sewers.
Connect the pressure loggers to the SCADA
systems.
3,5 All Hazards $$
General Fund
Bonds
HMGP
BOR
Medium 1-2 years
4
Maintain inventories of critical spares. Establish
Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with local
vendors to access critical supplies during major
emergencies.
3,4,5 All Hazards $
General Fund
Bonds
SCAG
High Ongoing
(Annually)
5
Develop a public messaging campaign about
water conservation to address drought and water
management concerns. 2 All Hazards $
General Fund
Bonds
SCAG
Medium Ongoing
(As Needed)
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Table 6-4: Mitigation Actions
# Action Description Mitigation
Goal(s)
Related
Hazard(s)
Estimated
Cost
Potential
Funding
Priority
Level
Timeframe
6
Update SCADA systems with the latest security
patches to reduce vulnerabilities to cyberattacks.
Engage with the SCADA vendor and other
software developers on an annual basis to
ensure compliance with security standards and
knowledge of current threats.
1,3 Cyberattack $$
General Fund
SCAG
Riverside UASI
Medium Ongoing
(Annually)
7
Conduct routine training for staff on
cybersecurity and phishing to reduce the risk of
social engineering leading to successful
cyberattacks.
1,3 Cyberattack $
General Fund
SCAG
Riverside UASI
Low Ongoing
(Annually)
8
Institute multi-factor authentication among all
staff, thereby reducing the risk of a cyberattack
or other incident in the case of a cracked or
stolen password.
1,3 Cyberattack $
General Fund
SCAG
Riverside UASI
High Ongoing
(As Needed)
9
Implement network segmentation throughout the
District to reduce network vulnerabilities 1,3 Cyberattack $
General Fund
SCAG
Riverside UASI
Medium Ongoing
(As Needed)
10
Conduct pipe replacement and seismic
mitigation within the water main infrastructure
along Dwight Way and Sterling Avenue in the
City of Highland. 3
Dam Inundation
Earthquake
Flood
Landslide
Severe Storms
Wildfire
$$$
General Fund
Bonds
HMGP
BOR
CWSRF
DWSRF
WIFIA
Medium 3-4 years
175
Table 6-4: Mitigation Actions
# Action Description Mitigation
Goal(s)
Related
Hazard(s)
Estimated
Cost
Potential
Funding
Priority
Level
Timeframe
11
Identify pipelines that cross known faults. Where
appropriate, install flexible piping and fortified
connections at Alquist-Priolo Fault Zones.
3 Earthquake $
General Fund
Bonds
HMGP
BOR
CWSRF
DWSRF
WIFIA
Low 5 years
12
Retrofit water system tanks with seismic valves
to reduce risk to earthquakes as a part of the
Seismic Retrofit of Seven Reservoir project.
3 Earthquake $$
General Fund
Bonds
HMGP
BOR
CWSRF
DWSRF
WIFIA
Medium 1 year
13
Retrofit the tank at Plant 140 to increase
resilience to earthquakes and seismic hazards.
3 Earthquake $$$
General Fund
Bonds
HMGP
BOR
DWSRF
High 1-2 years
14
Add a fifth membrane bioreactor at the SNRC to
improve operational flexibility and facilitate
handling fluctuating flows. 1,3 HAZMAT Release $$$
General Fund
Bonds
HMGP
BOR
CWSRF
Medium 1-3 years
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Table 6-4: Mitigation Actions
# Action Description Mitigation
Goal(s)
Related
Hazard(s)
Estimated
Cost
Potential
Funding
Priority
Level
Timeframe
15
Identify and clear any hazard trees remaining
following the 2024 Line Fire on or near District
properties.
1,3 Landslide
Wildfire $$$
General Fund
Bonds
SCAG
DWR
EWP
EQIP
CCI
SFAP
Medium 1-2 years
16
Conduct a feasibility study on pre-treating raw
water entering Plant 134 from the Santa Ana
River. 1,3 Landslide
Wildfire $$
General Fund
Bonds
HMGP
BOR
DWSRF
Low 1 year
17
Identify the power needs for water treatment and
sewer system plants/pumps without back-up
generators. Install back-up generators that fulfill
these power needs to increase resilience to
PSPS/power failures.
3,5 Power Failure $$$
General Fund
Bonds
HMGP
SCAG
Riverside UASI
DWR
Medium 3 years
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Table 6-4: Mitigation Actions
# Action Description Mitigation
Goal(s)
Related
Hazard(s)
Estimated
Cost
Potential
Funding
Priority
Level
Timeframe
18
Establish and reinforce defensible spaces
around District facilities, water tanks, and other
major infrastructure – especially those within or
near FHSZs. 1,3,5 Wildfire $$
General Fund
Bonds
HMGP
SCAG
CCI
SFAP
Medium Ongoing
(Annually)
19
Replace any flammable roofing and/or tiling at
District buildings and infrastructure with fire-
resistant materials in compliance with the
National Fire Protection Association Standards
(NFPA 2020).
1,3,5 Wildfire $$$
General Fund
Bonds
HMGP
SCAG
Medium 3-5 years
20
Monitor dry vegetation, deadfall, and
accumulated debris on District property and
within the service area (as appropriate). Conduct
vegetation abatement and engage with local
stakeholders to ensure proper forest
management and fuel reduction actions are
taken.
1,3,5 Wildfire $$
General Fund
Bonds
HMGP
SCAG
CFIP
CCI
SFAP
High Ongoing
(As Needed)
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6.3.3 Supplementary Information for Mitigation Actions
This section contains additional technical information to accompany some mitigation actions.
Mitigation Action #1: This mitigation action will encourage a culture of preparedness throughout
all levels of the District’s planning. Additionally, it will increase the likelihood that the mitigation
actions are included within capital improvement planning, thereby aligning efforts between various
planning mechanisms rather than sequestering projects.
Responsible Agency: Finance
Mitigation Action #2: This mitigation action aligns with capital improvement projects identified
within the 2019 WSMP. The WSMP specifically mentioned the importance of adding these PRVs
to the SCADA system to improve the reliability of the WSMP’s hydraulic model. Additionally,
hazard responses such as firefighting can strongly increase demand on the water system.
Earthquakes could also result in broken water mains that cause low pressure. Both of these
problems can be ameliorated by PRV integration.
Further information may be found within the 2019 WSMP. As of this LHMP’s approval date, there
are four such stations that are SCADA-controlled: Stations 33, 40, 108, and 127. Updates to the
distribution system will be reflected in the next iteration of the WSMP.
Responsible Agency: Operation & Maintenance
Mitigation Action #3: Pressure loggers record and monitor pressure at various points within the
water distribution system. These tools can be used to better anticipate pressure changes and
make more efficient use of PRVs, especially during significant pressure fluctuations as described
in Mitigation Action #2. The locations of these key points are not currently identified by the District
but may potentially include the borders of each pressure zone, areas near or within FHSVs (given
the likelihood of a firefighting response needing high water pressure), areas near Alquist-Priolo
Fault Zones, and areas of known heavy use (e.g., Patton State Hospital).
Responsible Agency: Operation & Maintenance
Mitigation Action #4: Critical spares are defined as any specialized equipment needed to
operate water and wastewater services that are especially vulnerable to hazards and have uses
that cannot be replicated by similar devices. For example, surface water treatment equipment at
Plant 134, earthquake valves at reservoirs, and generators. While supply chains are currently not
anticipated to be a problem for the District’s equipment, establishing and maintaining MOUs will
increase resilience in case of a large-scale disaster that hampers the ability for rapid equipment
replacement or repair (such as a major earthquake).
The critical spares inventory maintained by the District is not for public release.
Responsible Agency: Human Resources & Risk Management
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Mitigation Action #5: The District currently performs outreach at several yearly community
events and at quarterly meetings with the CAC. There are also resources concerning water
conservation (especially regarding drought and climate change) on the District’s website.
However, this hazard mitigation action would support the District in developing more continuous
public messaging. Examples include water shortage/prolonged service outage, water quality
issues, sanitary overflows, and/or wastewater spills.
Responsible Agency: Public Affairs
Mitigation Action #6: The District’s Information Technology department defines SCADA as “the
telemetry and control of water/sewer flow”.200 The SCADA system is separate from the business
network, and data does not pass between the two networks. The District sources a private vendor
(ATSI) for SCADA services. The system is only accessible by granted internal accounts on a local
network. SCADA systems can be vulnerable to malware attacks, ransomware, DDoS, and remote
access insecurities.
The District’s SCADA system has Virtual Private Network (VPN) capabilities, in which external
users are allowed access to the system through a firewall and non-public website. This access
point does not grant direct access to the internal SCADA network. By the end of 2025, the District
will remove radio communication from all sites connected to the SCADA system in favor of next
generation firewalls and redundant cell service gateways. The District will also incorporate and
maintain multi-factor authentication (MFA) among staff with access, which is described in
Mitigation Action #8.
Responsible Agency: Information Technology
Mitigation Action #7: Currently, the Information Technology department sends routine phishing
campaign emails once per month with the goal of sending 1200 simulations to staff each fiscal
year. If a staff member fails a phishing campaign, then a training course and review of
cybersecurity threats is sent directly to them. Currently, no process is in place to ensure that the
staff member actually reviews the course material.
Responsible Agency: Information Technology
Mitigation Action #8: MFA is a software tool that increases cybersecurity. MFA operates by
requiring users to input a passcode sent to their phone upon logging into their account. This
passcode can be texted directly to the user’s phone or displayed on an authenticator app that
might require its own log-in. MFA reduces the risk that a stolen password will give access to a
staff member’s account. The District’s MFA provider will be Cisco Duo via Microsoft Security.
200 Sourced from conversations held in early October 2025 with the Information Technology department.
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If the MFA passcode is unavailable or not input by the user within a specific amount of time (often
a few minutes or less), then access is not granted. The District will not require a contractor or
consultant to have MFA when accessing the District’s network, however their user account will be
restricted to a specific domain that does not grant all privileges and will be disabled after project
completion.
Responsible Agency: Information Technology
Mitigation Action #9: Network segmentation is defined as classifying and categorizing
information technology assets, data, and personnel into specific groups called Virtual Local Area
Networks (VLANs) and then reducing access between those groups. Access to one VLAN does
not guarantee access to any other resources hosted through another network. Network
segmentation is the best practice to prevent network leaks.
Responsible Agency: Information Technology
Mitigation Action #10: Though all pipes are considered at high risk to seismic shaking, the
Dwight Way and Sterling Avenue pipes were identified within the FY 25-26 Budget as being
particularly “vulnerable”. According to the FY 25-26 Budget, the project will cost approximately
$17 million and replace 34,700 linear feet of pipes within a 0.4 square mile project area over a
two-year project timeline.
The design of this project is complete and was funded via a previous cycle. Further information
about seismic retrofits of pipes and mains may be found through the ALA’s Seismic Design and
Retrofit of Piping Systems white paper.
Responsible Agency: Engineering
Mitigation Action #11: As described within the hazard analysis, the District is located on top of
the San Andreas Fault Zone. Many District assets and infrastructure are within Alquist-Priolo Fault
Zones. Table 5-14 within the risk assessment shows the total mileage and approximate value of
the water and sewer lines that intersect with the zones. The overwhelming majority of these pipes
serve single-family residential homes or are connected to water plants.
The pipes will be designed according to the specifications listed in the ALA’s Seismic Design and
Retrofit of Piping Systems. General recommendations include steel pipes with welded joints, high-
density polyethylene pipes with fused joints, ductile iron with seismic joints, and/or molecularly-
oriented polyvinyl chloride pipes with restrained joints.
Responsible Agency: Engineering
Mitigation Action #12: “Seismic valves” are valves that automatically shut off water into areas
that experience a significant drop in pressure (as in a breakage) during an earthquake. They can
be triggered upon sensing the rapid lateral movement associated with seismic shaking or upon
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detecting the drop in pressure. Most commercial seismic valves will operate upon detection of an
M5.0-5.4 earthquake. According to the 2019 WSMP, Plant 134 has a seismic valve in operation.
The Seismic Retrofit of Seven Reservoir project includes retrofitting the reservoirs at Plants 33,
39, and 129. The initial engineering phase was completed in early 2025 through HMGP funding
and is awaiting award for the next phase.
Responsible Agency: Engineering
Mitigation Action #13: Plant 140’s tank is the highest-priority tank for rehabilitation. It has a
capacity of two million gallons and is one of the District’s largest tanks. The District has estimated
a cost of $1,500,000 for recoating and rehabilitating the tank.
Responsible Agency: Operations & Maintenance
Mitigation Action #14: Membrane bioreactors are used in wastewater treatment to separate
water from waste. They combine aspects of conventional biological treatments (e.g., activated
sludge process) with membrane filtration to separate liquids and solids. Membrane bioreactors
tend to produce higher-quality effluent, less sludge, and longer solid retention times.
The SNRC currently has four membrane bioreactors online. A fifth membrane bioreactor would
increase plant flow capacity and reduce the risk of sewer system backups.
Responsible Agency: Engineering, Operations & Maintenance
Mitigation Action #15: FEMA defines “hazard trees” as “any tree that presents an immediate
threat to lives, public health and safety, or improved property” under these criteria:201
• The tree’s diameter is 6 inches or greater, measured 4.5 feet above ground level;
• The tree is a distance less than 1.5 times the tree height from a structure, such as improved
infrastructure, a neighboring home; or if the tree presents a hazard to debris removal; and
• The tree is dead or will die within 5 years based on an evaluation by an International Society
of Arboriculture certified arborist with Tree Risk Assessment Qualification
Hazard trees can pose long-lasting threats to staff and infrastructure. The trees can fall on
maintenance staff, reduce soil cohesion (thereby causing landslides), increase the destructive
potential of debris flows, and provide fuel/ignition for other wildfires. Figure 6-1 on the next page
shows the perimeter of the Line Fire and its intersection with District boundaries, showing the
close proximity of the fire to much of the District’s facilities.
Responsible Agencies: Engineering, Operation & Maintenance
201 “Southern Wildfires Debris Recovery 2025 – Hazard Trees Defined”. USACE (2025). Archived October 14, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/20251014152653/https://www.spl.usace.army.mil/Portals/17/Hazard%20Trees_Combine
d.pdf
182
Figure 6-1: Line Fire (2024) Perimeter and District Boundaries
183
Mitigation Action #16: Plant 134 is located near City Creek on the District’s north end. It is the
main surface water treatment plant and part of the Upper Zone. Per the FY 25-26 Budget, the
District will prioritize this project in its goal to optimize District water and energy resources. The
proposed budget is $100,000 and will focus on “effective strategies and technologies to remove
excess sediment, organic material, and other constituents commonly found in river water”. If
feasible, pre-treated water can reduce maintenance costs within Plant 134.
Pre-treating water is especially important in context of wildfires given the strongly diminished
water quality in streams and reservoirs within burned areas. Per the WERT summary of findings
for the 2024 Line Fire, fire-induced damage to soil “is a primary influence on increased runoff and
sediment generation”. Additionally, 70 percent of the Line Fire’s footprint was at moderate or high
soil burn severity.202
Given a significant portion of the Santa Ana River watershed is within both the burned area and
the District, pre-treating water could facilitate Plant 134’s future resiliency. The RRA reflects that
changes to the quality of source water could require a “significant increase in treatment time” that
could impair the plant’s ability to meet peak demand.
Responsible Agency: Engineering
Mitigation Action #17: Details on the water facilities without backup power come from the RRA.
Accordingly, the SNRC administrative building and six plants do not have backup power. Power
loss contingencies are currently described within the Continuity of Operations Plan. The District
uses diesel fuel.
While particularly important for power failures occurring due to supply issues from the power grid
(e.g., high demand during heat waves), backup power is also necessary in case of severe power
infrastructure damage following earthquakes or wildfires.
Responsible Agencies: Engineering, Operation & Maintenance
Mitigation Action #18: As described within the hazard analysis, the State of California requires
property owners to establish a defensible space around buildings and infrastructure. These are
landscape buffers in which flammable vegetation and debris are removed to reduce the risk of
wildfire ignition or spread, especially within areas defined by a Very High FHSZ. Defensible
spaces are also vital around areas near steep slopes and valleys as strong winds can funnel
sparks onto flammable structures. A defensible space must have 100 feet between the structure
and potential fuel loads, removal of dead/dry vegetation within 30 feet of the structure, and
removal of all combustible material within five feet of the structure.
202 “Watershed Emergency Response Team (WERT): 2024 Line Fire”. Cal Fire, California Department of
Conservation, & CGS (November 6, 2024). CA-BDF-012520. Archived on June 28, 2025.
https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://www.conservation.ca.gov/cgs/documents/publications/wert/11062024_Line_Fire
_WERT_Final_ADA.pdf
184
Considering the impacts of the 2024 Line Fire, it is even more important for the District to reinforce
defensible spaces around facilities, water tanks, and exposed infrastructure. While the law only
applies to inhabited structures, establishing defensible space around non-inhabited structures is
vital to the District’s resiliency given the loss of water plants (as an example) could seriously impair
the District’s ability to serve customers.
Responsible Agencies: Engineering, Operation & Maintenance
Mitigation Action #19: As described within the hazard analysis, NFPA standards are not legally
binding but are strongly recommended for mitigating urban fires and wildfires. This mitigation
action would include the identification of any flammable roofing and/or tiling.
Potentially applicable standards include:
• NFPA 1 – Fire Code
• NFPA 13 – Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems
• NFPA 80A – Recommended Practice for Protection of Buildings from Exterior Fire
Exposures
• NFPA 1140 – Standard for Wildland fire Protection
• NFPA 5000 – Building Construction and Safety Code
Responsible Agencies: Engineering, Operation & Maintenance
Mitigation Action #20: Notable dry vegetation, deadfall, and accumulated debris will be identified
as a part of this mitigation project. Ideally, this will occur at the same time as Mitigation Action #13
to reduce cost. As with that mitigation action, this is vital for reducing future wildfire risk within
Very High FHSZs.
Responsible Agency: Operation & Maintenance
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SECTION 7: PLAN MAINTENANCE
FEMA REGULATION CHECKLIST: PLAN MAINTENANCE
44 CFR § 201.6(c)(4): The mitigation strategy section shall include “a plan maintenance
process” that includes:
44 CFR § 201.6(c)(4)(i): “A section describing the method and schedule of monitoring,
evaluating, and updating the mitigation plan within a five-year cycle.”
44 CFR § 201.6(c)(4)(ii): “A process by which local governments incorporate the requirements
of the mitigation plan into other planning mechanisms such as comprehensive or capital
improvement plans, when appropriate.”
44 CFR § 201.6(c)(4)(iii): “Discussion on how the community will continue public participation
in the plan maintenance process.”
Element:
D1. Is there discussion of how each community will continue public participation in the plan
maintenance process? (Requirement 44 CFR § 201.6(c)(4)(iii))
D1-a. Does the plan describe how communities will continue to seek future public participation
after the plan has been approved?
D2. Is there a description of the method and schedule for keeping the plan current (monitoring,
evaluating and updating the mitigation plan within a five-year cycle)? (Requirement 44 CFR §
201.6(c)(4)(i))
D2-a. Does the plan describe the process that will be followed to track the progress/status of
the mitigation actions identified within the Mitigation Strategy, along with when this process will
occur and who will be responsible for the process?
D2-b. Does the plan describe the process that will be followed to evaluate the plan for
effectiveness? This process must identify the criteria that will be used to evaluate the
information in the plan, along with when this process will occur and who will be responsible.
D2-c. Does the plan describe the process that will be followed to update the plan, along with
when this process will occur and who will be responsible for the process?
Source: FEMA, Local Mitigation Planning Handbook Review Tool, June 2025
Implementation and maintenance of the plan is critical to the overall success of hazard mitigation
planning. This section details the process that the District will use to monitor, update, and evaluate
the plan within the five-year hazard mitigation cycle to ensure the LHMP remains an active and
relevant document. The format of the plan aligns with the regulation checklist and is divided into
sections of information. Data can easily be located and incorporated into future updates, keeping
the plan relevant.
The information collected within this document is based on the most recent and available
information, input, and resources. The District’s Strategic Plan, SSMP, WSMP, UWMP, and
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various other policy documents are integral for proper implementation of this LHMP. Many of the
ongoing recommendations identified in the mitigation activities are recommended by extant
District plans, such as the Capital Improvement Plan.
Each department was given the opportunity to provide input during development. This philosophy
will continue for future plan revisions through evaluations, maintenance, and updates of data,
processes, and programs. The Planning Team will convene annually to review the LHMP and its
implementation. It will include representatives from residents, citizen groups, partner agencies,
and stakeholders within the planning area.
If members can no longer serve on the Planning Team, the Director of Administrative Services
will assign another staff person to be on the Planning Team so that every District department is
represented.
7.1 Monitoring and Evaluation
The hazard mitigation plan includes a range of action items intended to reduce losses from hazard
events. Together, the action items provide a framework for activities that the District can choose
to implement over the next five years. The effectiveness of the plan depends on the incorporation
of the action items into existing plans, policies, and programs. Although the Human Resources &
Risk Management department has the primary responsibility for the LHMP, all departments will
facilitate continual review, coordination, and promotion, plan implementation, and evaluation.
The Director of Administrative Services within the Human Resources & Risk Management
department and District department supervisors will be jointly responsible for the plan’s
implementation and maintenance through existing District programs. Department supervisors will
be responsible for implementing mitigation strategies and actions specific to their department
operations. The Director of Administrative Services will assume the lead responsibility for
facilitating plan maintenance and coordinating the Planning Team.
Each April, the Planning Team will begin the process of reviewing the LHMP and the mitigation
actions to develop an annual progress report. This process can also assist the budget review
process by providing information on mitigation projects and activities that have been completed
or implemented. The annual progress report process will serve to align annual reviews of the
hazard mitigation plan and to incorporate information. As updates to the LHMP are completed,
the public will be made aware of the changes to the LHMP and make recommendations or
comments. This report will include:
• A summary of any hazard events that occurred during the prior year and their impact on
the planning area.
• A review of successful mitigation initiatives identified in the 2025 plan.
• A brief discussion about the targeted strategies that were not completed.
• A re-evaluation of the action plan to determine if the timeline for identified projects needs
to be amended, and the reason for the amendment (e.g., funding issues).
• Any recommendations for new projects.
187
• Any changes in or any potential for new funding options (e.g., grant opportunities).
• Any impacts of other planning programs or initiatives that involve hazard mitigation.
The progress report will be provided to the District’s budget team for review. The hazard mitigation
plan progress report will also be posted on the District website on the page dedicated to the
hazard mitigation plan and presented in the form of a report to the District Board. The Planning
Team will strive to complete the progress report process by March of each year.
7.2 Plan Update
Section 201.6(d)(3) of 44 Code of Federal Regulations requires that local hazard mitigation plans
be reviewed, revised as appropriate, and resubmitted for approval in order to remain eligible for
benefits awarded under the Disaster Mitigation Act. The District intends to update its LHMP on a
five-year cycle.
Based on needs identified by the Planning Team, the update will, at a minimum, include the
following elements:
• The hazard risk assessment will be reviewed and updated using the most recent
information and technologies.
• The action plan will be reviewed and revised to account for any initiatives completed,
dropped, or changed and to account for changes in the risk assessment.
• Any new District policies identified under other planning mechanisms, as appropriate.
• An LHMP update that will be sent to appropriate agencies and organizations for
comment.
• Opportunities for the public to comment on the updated version prior to adoption.
• Documentation of District Board approval.
At a minimum of 12 months before the expiration date of this LHMP, the Planning Team will
implement a plan revision schedule. The plan will be revised using the latest FEMA hazard
mitigation guidance documents, such as the Mitigation Planning Tool and Regulation Checklist,
to ensure compliance with current hazard mitigation planning regulations. The LHMP may be
updated earlier than the five-year cycle if the District experiences a State/federal-declared
disaster or if a hazard event results in loss of life.
The overall success of the LHMP is through implementation of the plan’s hazard mitigation
strategy and activities to reduce the effects of hazards, protect people and property, and improve
the District’s efforts to respond to and recover from disasters. Members of the public and the
District will ultimately benefit from the implementation of the LHMP and must be given the
opportunity to provide input to the continuous cycle of LHMP planning.
7.3 Continued Public Involvement
The District will strive to keep the public aware of hazard mitigation projects and involved in the
LHMP update process. Information will be released through press releases, website
188
announcements, public hearings (as required), Board meetings, social media, and the District’s
e-news blast to subscribers.
Projects that mitigate hazards will continue to be included in the District’s annual budget planning
process. The public is made aware of the planning through District Board meetings and press
releases during this time. The budget planning process will serve as an annual opportunity to
conduct outreach to the public on updates to the hazard mitigation planning process.
A survey may be conducted to gather input on community opinion about the progress being made
on LHMP activities. The District will regularly provide press releases and information about hazard
mitigation projects to the public. At a minimum, the public will be engaged to learn about current
LHMP activities and given the opportunity to provide comments and information on an annual
basis to update and maintain the LHMP. The District’s Public Affairs Department will be tasked
with public outreach and responsible for ensuring the public is involved in the annual public plan
update and outreach.
Table 7-1 summarizes proposed activities for public involvement and dissemination of information
that shall be pursued whenever possible and appropriate.
Table 7-1: Past and Proposed Continued Public Involvement Activities or Opportunities
Identified by the District
Department Public Involvement Activity or Opportunity
PAST PROPOSED
All N/A
Place more emphasis on the risks associated with natural and
manmade hazards at public awareness campaigns conducted by
various District departments. Consider developing and distributing
public education materials for natural hazards.
Administration N/A Conduct annual surveys to be completed online and at the annual
Open House Event
Human
Resources &
Risk
Management
N/A Lorem ipsum
Lorem Ipsum N/A Lorem ipsum
189
SECTION 8: PLAN APPROVAL AND ADOPTION
TBD.
190
APPENDIX A: LOCAL MITIGATION PLAN REVIEW TOOL
TBD.
191
APPENDIX B: PLANNING TEAM MEETING DOCUMENTATION
Appendix B contains documentation of the planning process for the LHMP Planning Team,
including meetings, presentations, emails, etc. Table B-1 summarizes the documentation therein.
Table B-1: Planning Meeting Documentation
Meeting Date Meeting Title Materials
12/18/2024 Project Kickoff Meeting &
Planning Team Meeting #1
- Invitation
- Sign-in sheet (virtual)
- Presentation (cover only)
- Meeting minutes
10/8/2025 Planning Team Meeting #2
- Invitation to stakeholders
- Sign-in sheet
- Presentation (cover only)
- Meeting minutes
TBD Planning Team Meeting #3
- Invitation to stakeholders
- Sign-in sheet
- Presentation (cover only)
- Meeting minutes
192
Meeting #1 – Internal LHMP Project Kickoff Meeting
Invitation:
193
Sign-in Sheet:
EVWD Planning Meeting #1: Participants
Name Position Agency
Patrick Milroy Operations Manager EVWD
Manny Moreno Water Reclamation Manager EVWD
Ray Roybal Water Reclamation Supervisor EVWD
Jon Peel Water Maintenance Supervisor EVWD
Dale Barlow Facilities Supervisor EVWD
Jason Wolf Senior Engineer EVWD
Nathan Carlson Senior Engineer EVWD
William Ringland Public Affairs/Conservation Manager EVWD
Roxana Morales Public Affairs Supervisor EVWD
Ryan Ritualo IT Manager EVWD
Kerrie Bryan Director of Administrative Services EVWD
Eileen Tafolla-Bateman Human Resources Coordinator EVWD
Lee Rosenberg Consultant NPA
194
Presentation:
195
Notes:
December 22, 2024
To: Kerrie Bryan
From: Lee Rosenberg
Planning Team Meeting #1
East Valley Water District (East Valley) hosted an in-person Planning Team Meeting with
East Valley staff and Navigating Preparedness Associates (NPA) on December 18, 2024,
at 1:30 PM.
Attendees
Summary of Discussion
Kerrie Bryan kicked off the meeting. Lee Rosenberg introduced the project and gave an
overview of why the Planning Team is here. Meeting attendees introduced themselves.
Attendees are listed above.
NPA provided a presentation that addressed the LHMP update process, project
management implementation, project schedule and project data needs. The group
reviewed the following items:
• LHMP Planning Team Organization
• Scope of Work
• New Challenges in the LHMP Development Process and NPA’s solutions
• Project Management Plan
• Next Steps
Attendee Organization/Division
Patrick Milroy Operations Manager
Manny Moreno Water Reclamation Manager
Ray Roybal Water Reclamation Supervisor
Jon Peel Water Maintenance Supervisor
Dale Barlow Facilities Supervisor
Jason Wolf Senior Engineer
Nathan Carlson Senior Engineer
William Ringland Public Affairs/Conservation Manager
Roxana Morales Public Affairs Supervisor
Ryan Ritualo IT Manager
Kerrie Bryan Director of Administrative Services
Eileen Tafolla-Bateman Human Resources Coordinator
Lee Rosenberg Navigating Preparedness Associates
196
The group discussed data needs for updating the LHMP. Key information required is listed
below:
• History of emergencies since the last LHMP update
• Status of completion of mitigation action items in previous LHMP
• Comprehensive listing of East Valley owned infrastructure with value estimates
• Contact points for community outreach focusing on underserved communities
• GIS layers to support hazard mapping process
The group discussed the importance of the public outreach process. NPA will provide a
draft public outreach plan for review. Key public outreach activities include:
• Public survey on the East Valley website with advertising on social media accounts.
The survey will be translated into Spanish and one other language
• Up to two public meetings. The meetings need to be scheduled in conjunction with
ongoing activities to increase participation.
• Opportunities at other public events to set up a booth that provides information on
the LHMP update process and requests input
• Board meetings including a meeting to formally adopt the LHMP
The group discussed creating new mitigation actions that focus on improving
infrastructure resilience. This is particularly relevant because East Valley has a new
wastewater treatment plant.
Action Items
Action Item Responsible
Party Due Date Status
NPA to provide a list of requested
GIS layers from the District. NPA Friday, January 20 Open
Verify facilities in current Risk and
Resilience Assessment NPA/East Valley Friday, December 17 Open
Deliver draft public outreach plan NPA Friday, January 17 Open
Deliver public outreach survey and
other advertising material
NPA
East Valley
provide language
requirements)
Friday, January 31 Open
Provide list of East Valley owned
facilities with values
East Valley Risk
Management Friday, January 31 Open
Provide status of previous LHMP
activities East Valley Friday, January 31 Open
Points of Contact
197
For concerns or questions regarding these notes, please contact:
Lee Rosenberg, (925) 381-0583 or lee.rosenberg@navigatingpreparedness.com
Meeting 2 – LHMP Planning Team Meeting #2
Invitation:
198
Sign-in sheet:
EVWD Planning Meeting #2: Participants
Name Position Agency
Patrick Milroy Operations Manager EVWD
Manny Moreno Water Reclamation Manager EVWD
Jason Wolf Senior Engineer EVWD
Nathan Carlson Senior Engineer EVWD
William Ringland Public Affairs/Conservation Manager EVWD
Roxana Morales Public Affairs Supervisor EVWD
Ryan Ritualo IT Manager EVWD
Kerrie Bryan Director of Administrative Services EVWD
Lee Rosenberg Consultant NPA
Dylan Kilby Consultant NPA
Presentation:
199
Notes:
October 8, 2025
Planning Meeting #2 – Notes
ATTENDEES/INVITEES
1. EVWD Representatives
o Kerrie Bryan
o Ryan Ritualo
o Patrick Milroy
o Manny Moreno
o William Ringland
o Roxana Morales
o Jason Wolf
o Nathan Carlson
2. NPA Representatives
o Lee Rosenberg
o Dylan Kilby
MEETING NOTES
Note: These notes are supplementary to the PowerPoint slides.
1. Hazard Mitigation Process Review
o “Hazard mitigation”: process by which threats/hazards to facilities,
infrastructure, and staff are identified and evaluated. Financial risk is applied
to the hazards, and then mitigation actions are identified by the jurisdiction
that will reduce risk.
2. Updates on Plan Completion
o The majority of the plan is complete. Remaining tasks include drafting the
hazard mitigation actions, the public engagement documentation, and any
necessary technical details or supplementary information.
o Next Planning Team meeting (roughly December) will discuss the Cal
OES/FEMA submission and review process.
3. Hazards Review
o Identified hazards include climate change, cyberattack, dam
failure/inundation, drought, earthquakes/seismic events, flooding, HAZMAT
200
incidents, heat waves, landslides, power loss/PSPS, severe storms, and
wildfires.
o Hazards within the 2020 LHMP but were removed for this cycle include land
subsidence, loss of critical spares, and physical adversary.
▪ Land Subsidence: removed due to lack of evidence in geologic
surveys that land subsidence threatens water/wastewater
infrastructure.
▪ Loss of Critical Spares: removed due to not being appropriate for
LHMPs and the types of grants that LHMPs facilitate.
▪ Physical Adversary: removed due to unlikelihood of terrorism or
tampering in addition to not being appropriate for the types of grants
that LHMPs facilitate.
• Note that “cyberattack” remained within the LHMP.
o Top four most salient hazards are (in order) earthquakes/seismic events,
wildfire, power loss/PSPS, and drought.
4. Risk Assessment Process Review
o The risk assessment assigns financial valuations to critical assets and
infrastructure (e.g., pipelines) and then assesses risk from each hazard.
▪ Pipeline risk based on replacement costs per foot by each pipe
diameter from the Risk & Resilience Assessment completed earlier
this year.
▪ Water and sewer devices (e.g., manholes) also included but financial
valuations not assigned due to different ages, sizes, types, etc.
o When appropriate, GIS technology was used to assess where and how
hazards intersected with District facilities and infrastructure.
▪ E.g., overlying dam inundation maps with District assets.
▪ In our experience, FEMA and Cal OES have appreciated maps for
clarity.
o Systemic hazards such as power failures and droughts were assessed
qualitatively through narratives that describe impact.
5. Public Outreach Process – Survey
o The public engagement survey has been drafted and reviewed.
o The open dates will be October 13th through 31st.
o The results of the survey will be summarized and included within the LHMP
as an appendix.
▪ We do not expect many surprises in the responses.
o EVWD has social media graphics, a QR code, and a link to the open survey.
201
o NPA has sole access to the survey data. All responses will be anonymous.
EVWD will only have access to the summary data, not individual responses.
6. Public Outreach Process – LHMP Draft
o The public review draft is an important component of the public engagement
process.
▪ Members of the public (including EVWD staff) will be able to review
the full plan and email NPA comments for consideration/inclusion.
▪ There is no requirement for number of responses or comments. A
good faith effort for public outreach is the requirement, not that
comments were received. We cannot force people to respond.
o FEMA/Cal OES want to see who received the draft, what the comments were,
and how comments were incorporated into the LHMP.
▪ NPA will develop comments to accompany the public review draft.
▪ NPA will send EVWD a spreadsheet of organizations, points-of-
contact, emails, etc. to send the LHMP directly. It is important that
notable stakeholders (e.g., large businesses, academic institutions,
other users of the Bunker Hill Groundwater Basin) have had a chance
to receive and review the plan.
o NPA recommends publishing a download link on the EVWD website through
which members of the public can download the draft.
▪ EVWD to send NPA screenshots of posts.
o EVWD will receive an internal review draft two weeks prior to publishing the
public review draft.
7. Mitigation Strategies/Actions Process
o “Mitigation strategies” are any projects, actions, etc. that reduce risk to
hazards.
o NPA recommends including as many ideas as possible. FEMA/Cal OES want
to see what projects were considered but not included.
o Will include potential funding opportunities and applicable grants to each
hazard.
o Each hazard identified in the LHMP must be represented within the
mitigation actions.
8. Mitigation Strategies/Actions Review
o The Hazard Mitigation Tool spreadsheet was sent out on September 23rd and
comments were received this week. Dylan Kilby is in the process of
compiling notes and suggested actions.
o The identified actions will be placed within the LHMP.
202
o Dylan will be in contact with EVWD through Kerrie Bryan for follow-up on any
supplementary or technical information that might be needed.
9. October-December LHMP Schedule
o October 13-31: Public engagement survey will be available for responses
from the general public via the SurveyMonkey platform.
o October 15: The next draft of the hazard mitigation actions will be sent to the
Planning Team for input.
o November 1: The internal review draft of the LHMP will be sent out to the
Planning Team.
o Mid-November: The public review draft will be open for comments.
o November 18th: The community advisory committee will hold their quarterly
meeting at which the LHMP will be presented for EVWD.
o December 10: EVWD Board meeting at which the LHMP will be presented.
10. Action Items – NPA
o Action Item: Submit to EVWD the updated mitigation actions by October 15th,
along with supplementary materials.
o Action Item: Submit to EVWD the public survey results and internal review
draft by November 1st.
o Action Item: Collate any comments from the internal review draft and update
the LHMP by November 14th and send to EVWD.
o Action Item: Support EVWD with any needs during the internal and public
review draft process (ongoing).
o Action Item: Compile public outreach documentation (ongoing)
o Action Item: Prepare to present the completed LHMP with public review
comments to the EVWD Board on December 10th.
11. Action Items – EVWD
o Action Item: Review the updated mitigation actions by October 27th
(conditional on receiving the document from NPA on October 15th).
o Action Item: Review the internal review draft by November 12th (conditional
on receiving the document from NPA on November 1st).
o Action Item: Send NPA screenshots, social media comments, and any other
outreach documentation (ongoing)
o Action Item: Respond to NPA requests for information (ongoing).
203
Meeting 3 – LHMP Planning Team Meeting #3
Invitation:
TBD
Sign-in Sheet:
TBD
Presentation:
TBD
Notes:
TBD
204
APPENDIX C: PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT DOCUMENTATION
Appendix C contains documentation of the planning process including meetings, presentations
held for the stakeholders and public, and other stakeholder/public outreach efforts. Table C-1
summarizes the various activities undertaken.
Table C-1: Stakeholder & Public Engagement Activities
Activity Date Meeting Audience/ Activity Documentation
10/13/2025 –
10/31/2025
Survey posted on EVWD
website with links provided
in social media accounts.
Documentation 1: Survey
Documentation 2: Posting on District
Facebook Account
Documentation 3: Posting on District
Instagram Account
Documentation 4: Emails Sent to
Selected Stakeholders
10/13/2025 –
10/31/2025
Public hazard mitigation
survey conducted.
Documentation 5: Survey
Results
12/1/2025 NPA representative
attended a Finance/HR
Committee meeting and
provided information on the
LHMP.
Documentation 6: Copy of
Finance/HR Committee PowerPoint
Presentation
XX/XX/XXXX Draft LHMP provided for
public review.
TBD
XX/XX/XXXX Draft LHMP sent to various
public stakeholders for
review and comment.
TBD
205
Documentation 1: Survey
206
207
208
209
210
211
Documentation 2: Posting on District Facebook Account
Documentation 3: Posting on District Instagram Account
212
Documentation 4: Emails Sent to Selected Stakeholders
213
Documentation 5: Survey Results
Given the low number of responses (12), the survey results are not statistically significant.
Nonetheless, responses are summarized below.
Q1: What community do you live in?
All but 1 respondent reported they lived within the City of Highland.
Q2: What property type are you responding on behalf of?
All but 1 respondent reported they were responding on behalf of a single-family residential
property.
Q3: How concerned are you about your water and wastewater services being impacted by
a natural or manmade disaster?
7 respondents stated that they were “strongly concerned” and 4 respondents stated they were
“somewhat concerned”. No respondents stated they were “not concerned”. 1 skipped the
question.
Q4: Have you ever experienced or been impacted by a natural or manmade disaster while
living in San Bernardino County?
7 respondents stated “yes”, and 3 stated “no”. 2 skipped the question.
Q5: From the following list, please select the types of disasters you have experienced while
living or working in San Bernardino County.
The number of reports of each disaster are as follows:
• Cyberattack: 1
• Dam Failure/Inundation: 0
• Drought: 7
• Earthquake (and similar events): 7
• Flooding: 6
• HAZMAT Incident: 1
• Heat Wave: 6
• Landslide: 3
• Power Loss/PSPS: 8
• Severe Storms and/or Winds: 6
• Wildfire: 8
• None: 0
Q6: Have you ever experienced a disruption to your water or wastewater services due to a
disaster?
2 respondents stated “yes”, and 9 stated “no”. 1 skipped the question.
214
Q7: Please select the TOP THREE disasters you think post the GREATEST THREAT to your
community.
The topmost three disasters were earthquake (9), cyberattack 96), and power loss/PSPS (5).
Q8: Please select your TOP THREE concerns regarding threats to EVWD’s water and
wastewater services.
The topmost three issues all received 7 answers: power losses at plants and conveyance
systems, service disruption due to earthquakes, and aging pipes and infrastructure.
Q9: Have you ever received information from San Bernardino County or EVWD on how to
make your household or organization safer from disasters?
2 respondents stated they received information from only EVWD, 5 stated both the County and
EVWD, and 4 said they did not receive information from either organization.
Q10: Please select the TOP THREE organizations you would MOST TRUST to provide you
with information about disasters in your area concerning water and wastewater.
Respondents overwhelmingly selected EVWD and the San Bernardino County Office of
Emergency Services, with 11 each.
Q11: Do you believe that EVWD is adequately preparing to deal with natural and manmade
disasters concerning water and wastewater?
6 respondents stated “yes”, 5 “I don’t know”, and no respondents stated “no”.
Q12: Please explain your answer to the question above.
Respondents reflected that the District is being proactive in projects and community engagement,
especially in informing the public about potential threats.
“EVWD is taking the lead on preparing the community in case of natural or
manmade disaster by asking these questions and taking action.”
Q13: In your opinion, what are some steps that EVWD can take to reduce disasters?
Respondents stated that they want the District to update their emergency response plans, prepare
as strongly as possible for earthquakes, conduct exercises, and continue with plants to update
and repair infrastructure.
“Conduct simulations and exercises that would allow us to measure the likelihood
and consequences of specific disasters. Harden our physical security and all
facilities. Continual cybersecurity enhancements. Improve community outreach
and education relative to disasters.”
Q14: Please use the text box below to provide any additional information you would like
us to know. Thank you!
Respondents asked that the District share the results of the survey with the community and to
further engage organizations such as the CAC in preparing for disasters and communicating with
215
the public.
“I would also like to add, to use CAC members as neighborhood watch partners in
the event of a natural disaster. Equip them with CERT training and tools so that
they can also help other community members in the event a natural disaster
happens. In addition, have some way of communication via 2-way radios with CAC
members during their service terms. (Optional to each member.)”
Documentation 6: Copy of Finance/HR Committee PowerPoint Presentation
216
APPENDIX D: MITIGATION ACTION PRIORITIZATION
(STAPLE/E)
TBD.
217
APPENDIX E: ACRONYMS
ALA American Lifelines Alliance
APEFZ Alquist-Priolo Earthquake Fault Zone
APG California Adaptation Planning Guide
APT Advanced Persistent Threat
ASCE American Society of Civil Engineers
AWIA America Water Infrastructure Act
BAER Burned Area Emergency Response
CAC Community Advisory Commission
Cal Fire California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection
Cal OES California Governor's Office of Emergency Services
CCI California Climate Investments
CDAA California Disaster Assistance Act
CERCLA Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
CFIP California Forest Improvement Grant Program
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CGS California Geological Survey
CIFP Capital Improvement and Financial Plan
CISN California Integrated Seismic Network
CPRI Calculated Priority Risk Index
CPUC California Public Utilities Commission
COOLR Cooperative Open Online Landslide Repository
CWC California Water Code
CWSRF Clean Water State Revolving Fund
DCP Drought Contingency Plan
DDoS Direct Denial of Service
DMA 2000 Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000
DRA Drought Risk Assessment
DSAC Dam Safety Action Classification
DSoD Division of Safety of Dams
DWR Department of Water Resources
DWSRF Drinking Water State Revolving Fund
EFZ Elsinore Fault Zone
EIA Energy Information Administration
218
EID Emerging Infectious Disease
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
EQIP Environmental Quality Incentives Program
ERP Emergency Response Plan
EVWD East Valley Water District
EWP Emergency Watershed Protection Program
EZRI Earthquake Zones of Required Investigation
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FHSZ Fire Hazard Severity Zone
FIRM Flood Insurance Rate Map
FMA Flood Mitigation Assistance Grant Program
FOG Fats, Oils, and Grease
FY Fiscal Year
GIS Geographic Information Systems
HAZMAT Hazardous Materials
HMGP Hazard Mitigation Grant Program
HVAC Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning
I/I Infiltration and Inflow
LFO Local Forecasting Office
LHMP Local Hazard Mitigation Plan
MED(s) Major Event Day(s)
MFA Multi-Factor Authentication
MMI Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale
MMS Moment Magnitude Scale
MJHMP Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan
NFDRS National Fire Danger Rating System
NFIP National Flood Insurance Program
NFPA National Fire Protection Association
NID National Inventory of Dams
NIDIS National Integrated Drought Information System
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NPA Navigating Preparedness Associates
NRCS Natural Resources Conservation Service
NRI National Risk Index
219
NWS National Weather Service
PDSI Palmer Drought Severity Index
PPE Personal Protective Equipment
PRP Potentially Responsible Party
PRV Pressure Release Valve
PSPS Public Safety Power Shut-off
RDII Rainfall-derived inflow and intrusion
RFC Repetitive Flood Claims Program
Riverside UASI Riverside Urban Area Security Initiative
RL Repetitive Loss
RRA Risk and Resilience Assessment
SAFZ San Andreas Fault Zone
SAIDI System Average Interruption Duration Index
SB Senate Bill
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
SCAG Southern California Association of Governments
SCE Southern California Edison
SCEDC Southern California Earthquake Data Center
SDS Safety Data Sheet
SDWA Safe Drinking Water Act
SFAP State Fire Assistance Program
SFHA Special Flood Hazard Area
SHMA Seismic Hazards Mapping Act
SHMP State Hazard Mitigation Plan
SJFZ San Jacinto Fault Zone
SMART Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant, and Timebound
SNRC Sterling Natural Resource Center
SRL Severe Repetitive Loss
SSMP Sewer System Master Plan
THIRA Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment
UCERF3 Third Uniform California Earthquake Rupture Forecast
USACE US Army Corps of Engineers
USGS US Geological Survey
UWMP Urban Water Management Plan
220
VARs Values-at-risk
VLAN Virtual Local Area Network
VPN Virtual Private Network
WERT Watershed Emergency Response Team
WIFIA Water Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act
WPP Watershed Protection Program
WRCOG Western Riverside Council of Governments
WRFP Water Recycling Funding Program
WSMP Water System Master Plan
WUI Wildland Urban Interface
221
APPENDIX F: DAM INUNDATION EXHIBIT
Figure F-1 below overlays the dam inundation map for the Seven Oaks Dam with District boundaries.
Figure F-1: Seven Oaks Dam Inundation Map with District Boundaries
222
APPENDIX G: EARTHQUAKE & SEISMIC HAZARD EXHIBIT
Figures G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4 overlay damage contours of four earthquake scenarios (i.e., planning tools and not real events)
along various faults in southern California.
Figure G-1: Contour Map for M6.6 Earthquake Along the Peralta Hills Fault
223
Figure G-2: Contour Map for M7.0 Earthquake Along the San Jacinto Fault
224
Figure G-3: Contour Map for M7.1 Earthquake Along the Elsinore Fault
225
Figure G-4: Contour Map for M7.9 Earthquake Along the South San Andreas Fault
226
Figure G-5: Alquist-Priolo Fault Zones within the District
227
APPENDIX H: FLOOD HAZARD EXHIBIT
Figure H-1 below shows the FIRM data for the service area overlaid with service area boundaries, rivers, streams, and lakes.
Figure H-1: FEMA FIRM Overlaid with District Boundaries (2008, 2016 FIRMs)
228
APPENDIX I: LANDSLIDE SUSCEPTIBILITY EXHIBIT
Figure I-1 below shows the USGS raster data for landslide susceptibility overlaid by the District’s boundaries.
Figure I-1: USGS Landslide Susceptibility Map Overlaid with District Boundaries
Agenda Item
#3b
January 14, 20261
Meeting Date: January 14, 2026
Agenda Item #3b
Discussion Item
2
5
6
0
Regular Board Meeting
TO: Governing Board Members
FROM: General Manager/CEO
SUBJECT: Consider Approval of Ordering Imported Water from the San Bernardino Valley
Municipal Water District for Calendar Year 2026
RECOMMENDATION
That the Board of Directors authorize the General Manager/CEO to order 4800-acre feet of
imported water in the amount of $603,840 from San Bernardino Valley Municipal Water District
for calendar year 2026.
BACKGROUND / ANALYSIS
The District has a diverse water supply portfolio that includes both surface water and
groundwater. Treatment Plant 134 can treat surface water from both the Santa Ana River
(SAR) and State Water Project (SWP). SAR is the primary source because it is a less expensive
local water source. However, the SAR is less reliable and the District can source water supply
from the SWP.
Water flows and quality from SAR were impaired for most of 2025. The water quality has been
impaired due to a pipe break above Seven Oaks Dam. Treatment Plant 134 only treated 16% of
its’ supply from SAR in 2025. The District is anticipating a similar impairment of SAR supplies in
2026.
SWP supplies are provided from the region’s State Water Contractor, San Bernardino Valley
Municipal Water District (SBVMWD). Most of the cost of imported water is collected through
property taxes. However, some of the cost of imported water is also collected through water
retailers based on a volumetric rate. On November 18, 2002, SBVMWD adopted Resolution No.
888 which describes the rules, regulations, and rates for the sale and delivery of SWP water.
The following chart illustrates the cost tiers for SWP.
Agenda Item
#3b
January 14, 20262
Meeting Date: January 14, 2026
Agenda Item #3b
Discussion Item
2
5
6
0
Criteria Payment Method Discount/
Surcharge Water Rates
Option 1 – Payment for 1/12th of the
water ordered due at the end of
each month for the base price.
0% Discount of
base water rate $148/AF
Ti
e
r
1
Pl
a
n
A
h
e
a
d
Water ordered prior to
December 31st for
delivery in the following
calendar year.Option 2 – Payment in full by
January 31st for discounted rate.
15% Discount of
base water rate $125.80/AF
Option 1 – Payment for 1/5th of the
water is due at the end of each Tier
II month for the base price.
0% Discount of
base water rate $148/AF
Ti
e
r
I
I
Se
a
s
o
n
a
l
St
o
r
a
g
e
Water ordered for
groundwater recharge
prior to December 31st for
delivery during January
through May of the
following year.
Option 2 – Payment in full by
January 31st for discounted rate.
20% Discount of
base water rate $118.40/AF
Ti
e
r
I
I
I
Sp
o
t
Ma
r
k
e
t
Pu
r
c
h
a
s
e
s
Water ordered at any
time during the calendar
year for delivery in the
same calendar year.
Payment method pursuant to Section
4.07 of the Rules and Regulations.
25% Surcharge
of base water
rate
$185/AF
Ou
t
s
i
d
e
Wa
t
e
r
Ra
t
e
s
Water purchased from
SBVMWD for use outside
of the boundary of
SBVMWD.
Payment method pursuant to section
4.07 of the Rules and Regulations.
Rate based on DWR Bulletin 132
Appendix B.
--$378.89/AF
The District is planning water supply and operations for 2026 and estimates 4800-acre feet of
SWP. The SWP water would be ordered at the Tier 1 Option 2 rate of $125.80 per acre foot to
capitalize on the 15% discount. If SAR becomes available in 2026, the ordered SWP supply for
2026 will be utilized at a later date.
Agenda Item
#3b
January 14, 20263
Meeting Date: January 14, 2026
Agenda Item #3b
Discussion Item
2
5
6
0
DISTRICT PILLARS AND STRATEGIES
IV - Planning, Maintenance, and Preservation of District Resources
b. Dedicate Efforts Toward System Maintenance and Modernization
c. Utilize a Comprehensive Asset Management Approach
REVIEW BY OTHERS
This agenda item has been reviewed by the Executive Management Team.
FISCAL IMPACT
The proposed expenditure for 4800-acre feet of prepaid water is $603,840.00 that will be split
between fiscal year 2025/26 and year 2026/27.
Recommended by:
________________
Michael Moore
General Manager/CEO
Respectfully submitted:
________________
Patrick Milroy
Operations Manager
ATTACHMENTS
SWP Order Form
Agenda Item
#3c
January 14, 20261
Meeting Date: January 14, 2026
Agenda Item #3c
Discussion Item
1
7
1
8
Regular Board Meeting
TO: Governing Board Members
FROM: General Manager/CEO
SUBJECT: Consider Approval of Amendment No. 2 to the Professional Services Agreement with
Trussell Technologies for Regulatory Reporting Support for the Sterling Natural Resource Center
RECOMMENDATION
That the Board of Directors authorize the General Manager/CEO to execute Amendment No. 2
to the Professional Services Agreement with Trussell Technologies in the amount of $199,984
and extend the agreement through June 30, 2026.
BACKGROUND / ANALYSIS
The Sterling Natural Resource Center (SNRC) is required to submit monthly, quarterly, and
annual regulatory reports to the Division of Drinking Water and the Regional Water Quality
Control Board under its permit. Trussell Technologies has been providing support on meeting
regulatory requirements since February 2024 and their contract ended on June 30, 2025. The
proposed Amendment No. 2 will provide uninterrupted support through the end of the fiscal
year. District staff will issue a request for proposal in Spring to contract future regulatory
support services starting next fiscal year.
The proposed amendment will allow the completion of required monitoring reports, coordination
of data, and support for compliance documentation with the SNRC permits. The District is in the
process of transitioning laboratory testing services to a new contractor. Trussell has already
begun this transition and is assisting staff in training the new laboratory contractor and
reviewing the new laboratory’s requirements, sampling expectations, and method alignment.
Their continued involvement is essential to coordinate analytical methods, bottle kits, chain-of-
custody procedures, QA/QC requirements, and turnaround times. Maintaining continuity during
this transition ensures that sampling events proceed without interruption and that all reporting
remains accurate and defensible.
Trussell is also supporting several key technical tasks to ensure compliance with the SNRC
permits for new total organic carbon requirements effective July 2026. Their previous history
with SNRC will benefit the District in complying with the requirements.
DISTRICT PILLARS AND STRATEGIES
IV - Planning, Maintenance, and Preservation of District Resources
a. Develop Projects and Programs to Ensure Safe, Reliable, and Resilient Service
Agenda Item
#3c
January 14, 20262
Meeting Date: January 14, 2026
Agenda Item #3c
Discussion Item
1
7
1
8
REVIEW BY OTHERS
This agenda item has been reviewed by the Executive Management Team.
FISCAL IMPACT
Trussel’s contract will be increased by $199,984 to a new total amount of $698,864. The
amendment costs are included in the current fiscal year budget.
Recommended by:
________________
Michael Moore
General Manager/CEO
Respectfully submitted:
________________
Manny Moreno
Water Reclamation Manager
ATTACHMENTS
Amendment No. 2
AMENDMENT NO. 2 TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN
EAST VALLEY WATER DISTRICT
AND
TRUSSELL TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
East Valley Water District (“District”) and Trussell Technologies, Inc. (“Trussell”) entered into an
Agreement dated February 28, 2024, to provide regulatory reporting support for the Sterling Natural
Resource Center (SNRC). The purpose of this Amendment No. 2 is to increase the not-to-exceed
agreement amount and extend the term of services through June 30, 2026, to support additional
required work consistent with the attached scope of work dated January 1, 2026.
The original agreement amount was $99,880. Amendment No. 1 increased the agreement by
$399,000. Amendment No. 2 will increase the agreement by $199,984. The revised total agreement
shall not exceed $698,864.
All other conditions of the original agreement shall remain the same as set forth in the Agreement
between the District and Trussell.
EAST VALLEY WATER DISTRICT TRUSSELL TECHNOLOGIES, INC
By: __________________________ By: _______________________
Michael Moore,
GM/CEO
R. Shane Trussell, Ph.D, P.E., BCEE
CEO and President
Date: ________________________ Date: ________________________
2
EXHIBIT A
4350 Executive Drive, Suite 300, San Diego, CA 92121 (858) 458-1030
January 1, 2026
Manny Moreno
Water Reclamation Manager
East Valley Water District
31111 Greenspot Road
Highland, CA 92346
mmoreno@eastvalley.org
Subject: Proposal for Sterling Natural Resource Center Regulatory Reporting Support
Additional Tasks and Extension Through June 2026
Dear Mr. Moreno,
We appreciate the opportunity to submit this proposal to complete additional tasks and the
extension of support through June 2026 for the Sterling Natural Resource Center (SNRC).
Trussell will continue to develop the routine regulatory reports (monthly, quarterly, and annually)
as required by the SNRC Waste Discharge Requirements and Master Recycling Permit (Order
No. R8-2023-0009). Trussell has supported EVWD in the request for proposal and selection of a
new external laboratory for all compliance and process analytical water quality monitoring, which
we expect to result in a 25% reduction in costs for the external lab analyses. We will continue to
support the transition to the new lab as part of this proposal. Trussell will also continue supporting
EVWD in maintaining compliance with the State Water Board’s Recycled Water Policy potions of
the Permit in updating the required Quality Assurance Project Plan per recent comments from the
State to add AhR bioassays to the quarterly monitoring. Other continuing tasks include
investigation into the total organic carbon concentrations in the recharged water, which will have
a Permit requirement effective as of July 2026, and continuation of the evaluation for the solids
handling process performance.
As part of the past and current efforts, we are working to lessen the regulatory burden of the
SNRC project by optimizing the development of the regulatory reports, streamlining the
coordination with the external lab, and negotiating with the regulators for reduced monitoring
and requirements where possible. We look forward to continuing this work with you.
Sincerely,
Eileen Idica, Ph.D., P.E.
Principal Engineer
Trussell Technologies, Inc.
Cell: (858) 232-8175
eileen@trusselltech.com
Cc: Jeff Noelte, Ph.D., P.E., BCEE, Director of Engineering and Operation, EVWD
Nikki Botello, Senior Administrative Assistant, EVWD
Shane Trussell, Ph.D., P.E., BCEE, President & CEO, Trussell Technologies
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East Valley Water District
Sterling Natural Resource Center
Regulatory Reporting Support
Proposal for Additional Tasks and Extension Through June 2026
East Valley Water District’s (EVWD’s) Sterling Natural Resource Center (SNRC) project started
discharging treated recycled water into the Weaver Basins for potable reuse as a groundwater
replenishment project via surface application. Under the project’s Waste Discharge
Requirements and Master Recycling Permit (Order No. R8-2023-0009), the project is required
to produce routine reports on monthly, quarterly, semi-annual, and annual frequencies. The
original scope of work covers the routine reports that are due between February 10, 2024, and
February 15, 2025. The original scope was amended through June 2025. In order to ensure
compliance with the permit and potable reuse regulations, an extension of support through June
2026 is being requested. These tasks are detailed below.
SCOPE OF WORK
Task 1 – Regulatory Reporting Support Through June 2026
Task 1.1 – Monthly DDW LRV Reports
Monthly reports are due to the Division of Drinking Water (DDW) to document daily pathogen
log reduction values (LRVs) for compliance with the permit and regulation requirements. These
reports are due on the 10th month following the reporting month (first day to last day of calendar
month). Trussell will develop a draft of each monthly report (reporting periods from November
2025 to June 2026; 8 reports total) and incorporate comments from one comment-review cycle
with EVWD. It is assumed that EVWD will provide operating data on membrane filtrate turbidity
and UV operating parameters via SCADA output daily reports or other database system. In
addition to preparing monthly LRV reports, Trussell will provide a monthly calculation for the
total influent and effluent flow volumes using the same SCADA daily reports. It is also assumed
that EVWD will provide information and context for any events requiring notations to be made
on the reports, such as additional operating data and copies of relevant operator logbook
entries.
Task 1.2 – Quarterly Monitoring Reports
Quarterly self-monitoring reports are reports that compile all required monitoring on continuous,
daily, weekly, monthly, and quarterly frequencies for all required monitoring locations, including
influent, effluent, lysimeter, monitoring wells, and diluent water. Most of the data contained in
each quarterly report comes from laboratory analytical data, with the remainder being operating
data. Trussell will develop a draft of each quarterly report (Quarter 4 of 2025 and Quarters 1 and
2 of 2026; 3 reports total), including a compliance summary that clearly identifies any violations
of the permit and associated corrective actions and required documentation. Trussell will
incorporate comments from one comment-review cycle with EVWD for each quarterly report. As
part of this task, Trussell will coordinate with other contracted lab(s) performing EVWD’s
compliance monitoring analyses to ensure that upload to DDW’s electronic database for water
quality monitoring (CLIP) is occurring as required by DDW; any deviations are to be noted in the
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quarterly reports. It is assumed that Trussell will be able to coordinate directly with contracted
lab for copies of lab results reports as PDF and MSExcel formats as they are generated, and for
other questions pertaining to information required in the quarterly reports. It is assumed that lab
data will not be compiled into a laboratory information management system (LIMS) and as such
will need to be organized by Trussell manually. It is also assumed that EVWD will provide
information and context for any off-spec events to be reported on these quarterly reports, such
as additional operating data and copies of relevant operator log entries.
Currently, no monitoring is conducted on a semi-annual frequency (i.e., once every six months).
Pending approval by the Santa Ana Regional Water Quality Control Board (Regional Board)1,
quarterly monitoring for health-based and performance constituents of emerging concern
(CECs) and surrogates for CECs may be reduced to a semi-annual frequency. Per discussion
with the Regional Board (email confirmation sent on August 14, 2024), semi-annual reporting
may be included in quarterly self-monitoring reports in lieu of separate semi-annual reports.
Trussell will include semi-annual monitoring in quarterly self-monitoring reports when applicable.
Task 1.3 – Annual Self-Monitoring Reports, Annual Summary Reports, Annual Volumetric
Reports
Annual self-monitoring reports are reports that compile information from the quarterly reports,
including semi-annual monitoring, and monitoring required annually. The first SNRC annual self-
monitoring report was submitted on June 30, 2025. The second SNRC annual self-monitoring
report covers the monitoring period from January 2025 through December 2025 and is due to
on June 30, 2026.
Annual Summary Reporting is a separate reporting requirement required per the California
Code of Regulations (CCR) Title 22, Division 4, Article 5.1 (Indirect Potable Reuse:
Groundwater Replenishment – Surface Application), Section 60320.128 (Reporting), and
documented for SNRC in Order No. R8-2023-0009 Attachment D (Water Recycling
Requirements), Section VII, Part H. This annual report is to be provided to public water systems
and drinking water well owners having downgradient sources potentially affected by the project
and within 10 years groundwater travel time from the project. This report must be prepared by
an engineer licensed in California and experienced in the fields of wastewater treatment and
public water supply. The first Annual Summary Report was submitted on June 30, 2025. The
second annual summary report covers the monitoring period January 2025 through December
2025 and is due to on June 30, 2026. Trussell will provide the required experienced California
Professional Engineer certification of this report, if requested by EVWD. Trussell assumes that
the following information required for the Annual Summary Report will be provided by others
with facilitation by EVWD:
• information pertaining to the vertical and horizontal migration of the recharge water
plume;
• summary of measures taken to comply with the wastewater source control requirements
of the regulations (22 CCR Section 60320.106); and
• increases in recycled water contribution during the previous calendar year and recycled
water contribution increases anticipated for the next calendar year.
Annual volumetric reports are required per the permit each year to denote the monthly volume
of influent, production, and various uses per the categories specified in the permit. As part of
1 Trussell support to request reduced monitoring is included in Task 2.1
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this task, Trussell will develop the 2025 annual volumetric reports for submittal to the Regional
Board through GeoTracker.
Task 1.4 – Coordination with External Lab for Compliance Monitoring Requirements,
Sampling Schedule, Bottle Kits, and Associated Quality Assurance and Quality Control
EVWD has contracted a commercial lab to conduct water quality laboratory analyses required
by the permit at various monitoring locations and frequencies. In order to ensure that the lab
analyses are done in compliance with the requirements of the permit and regulations, Trussell
will conduct the following subtasks:
• Verify that laboratory analytical methods performed are consistent with those stated in
the Operation Optimization Plan (OOP), and in compliance with the requirements of the
permit and regulations (e.g., ELAP certification and drinking water methods for
contaminants with primary and secondary MCLs, ELAP certification for regulation
monitoring requirements)
o If method adjustment is needed, Trussell will discuss and coordinate these items
with the external lab and ensure that changes are incorporated in subsequent
monitoring.
• Ensure that the external lab provides the correct samples bottles in time for the required
monitoring period, particularly for quarterly, semi-annual, and annual monitoring events,
in which several hundreds of samples bottles are required for each multi-day sampling
event. This subtask is key to ensure that no missed monitoring occurs during the
required monitoring period, as missed monitoring must be reported to the Regional
Board and may be considered a violation. This task includes Trussell requesting bottle
kits that are consistent with the permit required monitoring, setting up timing for delivery
to SNRC by the external lab, verifying bottle kit paperwork prior to bottle shipment, and
in-person checking of the bottle kits on site at SNRC prior to the sampling event.
o If bottle kit paperwork, including bottle list and Chain of Custody forms, is
incorrect, Trussell will direct the external lab on the corrections that are needed
and verify the paperwork is correct prior to shipment. If missing or incorrect
bottles are identified during the in-person checking of the bottle kits at SNRC,
Trussell will initiate correction with the external lab in time for the sampling event.
o If monitoring requirements change, such as reduction of frequency for certain
contaminants, or increase in frequency due to exceedance of a regulatory limit,
Trussell will ensure that the bottle kits and associated paperwork take into
account these changes.
• Verify that laboratory analytical results meet the requirements for compliance reporting
both in terms of turnaround time and for quality of results.
o If results are delayed past the lab’s contracted turnaround time, Trussell will
notify the lab, as delays may result in EVWD being unable to conduct any
required resampling, which may result in missed monitoring.
o If results were flagged by the lab to have quality assurance and quality control
(QAQC) issues, then Trussell will facilitate the discussion on if the result is still
acceptable for compliance reporting or should be resampled within the reporting
period.
o If resampling is required, Trussell will perform the subtasks described above for
the additional monitoring.
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Task 1.5 – Laboratory Transition Support
Trussell will provide support to help SNRC transition from the current contract laboratory to a
new provider while maintaining full regulatory compliance for sampling and reporting per permit.
Our focus is on continuity of established methods and minimal disruption to the ongoing
monitoring schedules. Trussell assistance will include:
• Coordinate the established analyte and method list with the new laboratory,
• Participation in four one-hour meetings with the new laboratory to ensure its readiness
for the initial sampling event and to set up clear communication procedures for promptly
addressing any exceedances or sample-related concerns.
Task 2 – DDW and RWQCB Technical Support
Task 2.1 – DDW and RWQCB Technical Support As-needed
Trussell will support EVWD with technical support items as needed with DDW and RWQCB as
relates to compliance that is separate from the items described in Task 1. Potential tasks
include the following:
• Continued discussion with DDW on follow-up items from the DDW inspection and OOP
• Clarification or modification of requirements in the permit with DDW and RWQCB
o Request for modification or reduction of monitoring if certain conditions are met,
such as:
§ Reduced monitoring for asbestos if it is not detected for four consecutive
quarters, per 22 CCR Section 60320.112(f)
§ Reduced monitoring for health-based and performance CECs and
surrogates for CECs to move from the initial assessment monitoring
phase to the baseline monitoring phase per the permit and Recycled
Water Policy.
o As part of an earlier separate contract, Trussell developed the SNRC Indicator
Study Report in late 2023 that laid out which soil aquifer treatment indicators
(which are CECs) would have the greatest likelihood of demonstrating 90%
removal per the regulations (22 CCR Section 60320.118(g) and (h)). Eight
indicators are being monitored for currently and the regulations require a
minimum of three. Trussell will evaluate, each quarter upon receipt of new
results, if a case can be made to the regulators to reduce the number of
indicators, as well as potentially modify the indicators to be sampled if 90%
removal is not demonstrated by enough indicators.
• Documentation and communication related to potential non-compliance items, such as
exceedances of permit limits, maximum contaminant levels, and notification levels;
missed monitoring; missed notification; off-specification water with respect to pathogen
LRV requirements. Five non-compliance items are included in the budget.
o As part of the FY2025 work, Trussell began investigating the potential
compliance for SNRC with the total organic carbon (TOC) requirement of the
permit for the recharged water. The TOC limit will begin to be in effect as of July
2026, whereby the recharged water TOC must meet a limit based on the diluent
water provided. Based on the current calculations, SNRC has the potential to
exceed this limit. Additional investigations are needed on the sampling location
and sampling strategies to understand if sample interference is occurring and
any potential resolutions. Trussell will work with EVWD to conduct these
investigations.
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Task 2.2 – Regulator Meetings
Trussell will attend up to two regulator meetings with DDW and/or RWQCB if requested by
EVWD. Four meetings are included in the budget with two hours of a senior experienced
Trussell engineer to prepare for and participate in each meeting.
Task 2.3 – Quality Assurance Project Plan Annual Updates
The Recycled Water Policy (version effective April 8, 2019) requires that all projects that
produce recycled water for potable reuse applications develop a Quality Assurance Project Plan
(QAPP) for monitoring CECs. As part of a separate contract, Trussell developed the QAPP for
SNRC in late 2023. The Recycled Water Policy requires that the QAPP be updated at least
annually and any time significant changes are made that would affect data quality. Trussell is
currently in the process of updating the QAPP and received comments from the State Board in
[Month], 2025. However, due to the laboratory transition, the QAPP update is pending
completion of the final switch and requires coordination with the new laboratory. This task
includes one annual update for the QAPP, as those are the current anticipated frequencies
necessary for SNRC’s QAPP updates.
General Assumptions for Task 2
• Task 2 does not include development or update of documents related to Cross
Connection Control, drinking water well control zones, groundwater tracer study,
wastewater source control or local limits requirements, recycled water contribution
management plan, Title 22 Engineering Report, or climate change action plan. Trussell
will review and provide comments on these topics or documents if requested by EVWD
as part of Task 2.1.
Task 3 – Project Management
This task involves budget tracking, schedule management, and monthly invoicing through June
2026.
Task 4 – Operator Training
To ensure that the SNRC operations team maintains consistent regulatory compliance and data
integrity throughout all sampling and reporting activities, Trussell will provide a focused operator
training program. The training will emphasize proper field sampling, chain-of-custody (COC)
procedures, equipment handling, and data documentation, with alignment to the OOP and
permit requirements.
Task 4.1 – Develop Training Material
Trussell will develop detailed training materials to serve both as instructional content and future
reference guides for SNRC operators. These materials will include: sampling and COC
guidance, QAQC activities review, equipment and bottle kit handling, brief regulatory context
and best sampling practices.
All materials will be formatted for reuse by EVWD as part of future operator onboarding or
refresher training programs. Trussell will provide both electronic (PDF/PowerPoint) and printed
materials as requested.
Task 4.2 – On-Site Workshop
Trussell will provide an interactive workshop at SNRC for operators and other relevant EVWD
personnel.
Trussell will document and summarize workshop outcomes, including any operator feedback
and follow-up training needs.
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Task 5 – Solids Handling Evaluation
In April 2025, Trussell initiated a solids handling process performance evaluation and paused
the task to focus on regulatory compliance. As part of this amendment, Trussell will continue the
solids handling process performance evaluation based on data to be provided by EVWD via the
SCADA daily reports and the operator rounds sheets. Trussell will compile the results into a
technical memorandum and conduct one comment-review cycle with EVWD.
Schedule
This amended scope of work covers work through June 2026, with the exact schedule of tasks
dependent upon regulatory reporting deadlines and requirements and EVWD request for as-
needed and one-time items.
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Budget
The proposed engineering consultant fee for the scope of work described herein is $199,984.00 and will be billed on a time-and-
materials basis. The details of the proposed budget are shown in the following table.